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Competing and Conflicting 
Power Dynamics in Waqfs in 
Kenya, 1900-2010 
Suleiman A. Chembea 
Summary 
Waqfs (religious endowments) are a socio-cultural heritage established in the seventh century to 
provide means to express taqwa (piety) for the purpose of qurba (divine closeness) and for the 
safeguarding of socio-economic security of the progeny and the community. As an Islamic 
charitable endeavor, it was expected that waqfs would be administered according to the Sharica 
by Muslim institutions of the mutawalli (custodian) with the kadhis (Muslim judges) and culama 
(clerics) not only interpreting the requisite normative precepts under which it subsists, but also 
settling matters arising there from. This not being the absolute case, the scenario puts the 
institution of waqf in Kenya under constant negotiations between the Muslims and the secular 
state on the one side, and among diverse socio-ethnic groups of Muslims on the other. 
This study was, therefore, undertaken to achieve four significant objectives: To explore the 
historical development of the institution of waqf from the British colonial period (1900) to 
independent times (2010); examine secular state policies and civil courts’ rulings that influenced 
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waqfs; interrogate Muslims’ response vis-à-vis the secular state and civil courts’ constructs in the 
practices of waqfs; and establish how Muslims use waqfs in their contribution to socio-cultural 
development of the society. To realize the set objectives, this study adopted a multi-disciplinary 
approach. Bourdieu’s theory of practice (1977), particularly the concepts of field, capital 
(symbolic, cultural, social, and political), and symbolic violence, aptly explained the negotiations 
among various state and non-state actors and agents in the control of resources including waqfs 
in the community. 
While James C. Scott’s (1976) concept of symbolic (ideological) resistance was useful in 
understanding Muslims’ response to state control of waqfs, together with Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice, they could not adequately explain the internal socio-ethnic and cultural dynamics that 
informed the behaviors to consecrate, control, manage, and uses of waqfs by Muslims themselves 
during and after colonization and outside the purview of the secular state. This accounts for the 
development and adoption of the concept of umiji-wamiji (locale identity and belonging) based on 
the historical fluid spatial relations between Muslim groups and regions in the country. Whereas 
primary data was collected in over ten months of extensive fieldwork along the predominant 
Muslim regions of Mombasa, Malindi/Kilifi, Lamu, and Kwale through informal talks with different 
waqf actors, analysis of requisite waqf records, and visits to waqf sites; secondary data was 
obtained through review of cutting edge investigations on waqfs across Muslim societies. 
Normative precepts as well as qualitative and quantitative methods were used as the bases for 
analysis of the data, findings of which were presented using a fusion of historical, anthropological, 
and descriptive approaches. The study established that secular state legislations and civil judicial 
rulings ushered in control of waqfs subjecting Muslims into socio-economic and cultural 
subordination since the British colonial times. Consequently, cowed by the loss of the socio-
cultural heritage and its privileges, Muslims unwittingly ‘exited’ from state controlled waqfs to 
uncontrolled charitable institutions including sadaqa (alms giving), community based 
organizations, and other non-labeled waqfs as provided by the Sharica as part of Islamic charity. 
This exit did not only change the relations’ matrix between the ruler and the ruled into retaining 
ownership and control of resources for socio-cultural and economic power, but also helped 
Muslims to fulfill the spiritual obligation of giving back to the community through a wider concept 
of charity. This seemingly united response against state control of waqfs is, nonetheless, not to 
deny the prevalent internal dynamics in the Muslim community manifested in the use of waqfs to 
safeguard and promote temporal group and locale interests. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Institution des islamischen Stiftungswesens (waqf) reicht bis in das 7. Jahrhundert zurück und 
steht für ein reiches sozio-kulturelles Erbe. Die vornehmlichen Aufgaben des islamischen 
Stiftungswesens waren finanzielle Mittel zu generieren, die als Ausdruck von Frömmigkeit 
(taqwa) Nähe zu Gott (qurba) bezwecken sollten. Zudem diente es dazu sowohl die 
Nachkommenschaft als auch die Gemeinschaft gesellschaftlich und wirtschaftlich abzusichern. Als 
ein islamisch-wohltätiges Unternehmen unterliegt das islamische Stiftungswesen einer durch das 
islamische Recht (Scharia) legitimierten Verwaltung, die dem Verwalter (mutawalli), der durch 
Kadis und islamische Gelehrte (culama) angeleitet wird, unterstellt ist. Seine Aufgabe ist nicht nur 
auf die Interpretation normativer Vorschriften, durch die die Existenz der Stiftung sichergestellt 
werden, beschränkt, sondern auch auf potentielle Konflikte, die daraus entstehen können, zu 
regeln. 
Ferner bedingt diese islamische Institution im Kontext von Kenia auch einen ständigen 
Aushandlungsprozess gegenüber dem säkularen Staat einerseits und gegenüber den 
unterschiedlichen sozialen und ethnischen Gruppen der Muslime Kenias andererseits. Diese 
Studie hat folgende Hauptforschungsziele: Die Darstellung der historischen Entwicklung der 
Institution des waqf vom britischen Kolonialismus (1900) bis in die Gegenwart (2010). Die 
Analyse der Einflüsse eines säkularen Staatswesens und zivilrechtlicher Regularien auf das 
islamische Stiftungswesen sowie die muslimischen Reaktionen auf diese Rahmenbedingungen. 
Schließlich untersucht die Studie die Nutzbarmachung islamischer Stiftungen für die 
gesellschaftliche und kulturelle Entwicklung der Gemeinschaft durch die Muslime. 
Zur Umsetzung dieser Forschungsziele, bedient sich diese Studie eines multidisziplinären 
Ansatzes. Bourdieus Theorie der Praxis (1977) erhellt die Aushandlungsprozesse zwischen den 
unterschiedlichen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Vertretern und Akteuren in Bezug auf die 
Kontrolle über die Ressourcen – einschließlich des islamischen Stiftungswesens – der 
muslimischen Gemeinschaft. Insbesondere Bourdieus Konzepte zum sozialen Feld, Kapital 
(symbolisch, kulturell, sozial und politisch) und symbolischer Gewalt bieten vielversprechende 
Erklärungsansätze. James C. Scotts (1976) Konzept des symbolischen (ideologischen) 
Widerstands war nützlich, um die Reaktionen der Muslime auf die staatliche Kontrolle des 
islamischen Stiftungswesens zu verstehen. Allerdings konnten weder Scotts Ansatz noch 
Bourdieus Theorie der Praxis die internen sozio-ethnischen und kulturellen Dynamiken 
vollumfänglich erklären. 
Diese Dynamiken umfassten Verhaltensweisen in Bezug auf die Schaffung, die Kontrolle, das 
Management und den Gebrauch von islamischen Stiftungen während und nach der Ära des 
Kolonialismus sowie außerhalb der Einflusssphäre des Staates. Auf Basis dieser Beobachtung und 
auf Grundlage der historisch bedingten Fluidität räumlicher Beziehungen zwischen muslimischen 
Gruppen und Regionen im Lande erfolgte die Entwicklung des Konzepts von umiji-wamiji (lokale 
Identität und Zugehörigkeit). Die primären Forschungsdaten sind das Ergebnis von über zehn 
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Monaten Feldforschung in den überwiegend von Muslimen bewohnten Gebieten von Mombasa, 
Malindi/Kilifi, Lamu und Kwale. Es wurden informelle Gespräche mit unterschiedlichen Akteuren 
des islamischen Stiftungswesens geführt, entsprechende waqf Unterlagen analysiert sowie 
islamische Stiftungen vor Ort besucht. Als sekundäre Daten diente die aktuellste wissenschaftliche 
Literatur zum islamischen Stiftungswesen in muslimischen Gesellschaften. Normative Konzepte 
als auch qualitative und quantitative Methoden waren die Grundlage für die Datenanalyse, deren 
Ergebnisse mit einer Verschmelzung historischer, anthropologischer und deskriptiver Ansätze 
präsentiert werden. Die Studie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Gesetzgebung des säkularen 
Staates sowie die daraus resultierenden zivilrechtlichen Regularien in eine Kontrolle über das 
islamische Stiftungswesen mündeten. Infolgedessen fanden sich die Muslime seit der britischen 
Kolonialherrschaft in einer untergeordneten sozioökonomischen und kulturellen Stellung wieder. 
Als Ergebnis des Kontrollverlustes über dieses sozio-kulturelle Erbe und dessen Privilegien, 
haben sich die Muslime von dem staatlich kontrollierten islamischen Stiftungswesen abgewandt 
und anderer nicht unter staatlicher Kontrolle stehender islamischer Wohltätigkeit bedient. Auf 
der Grundlage scharia-rechtlicher Möglichkeiten handelte es sich um freiwillige Gaben (sadaqa), 
wohltätige Organisationen unter der Kontrolle der Gemeinschaft sowie alternativer Formen 
islamischer Stiftungen. Somit haben sich die Muslime der staatlichen Kontrolle entzogen. Dadurch 
änderte sich nicht nur das Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen Herrschern und Beherrschten sondern 
hatte auch den Effekt, dass die Muslime weiterhin die Eigentumsrechte und die Kontrolle über 
sozio-kulturelles und wirtschaftliches Vermögen innehatten. Durch ein breiter angelegtes 
Konzept islamischer Wohltätigkeit waren die Muslime somit weiterhin in der Lage ihrer 
spirituellen Verpflichtung – die Sorge für die Gemeinschaft – nachzukommen. Diese offenbar 
konzertierte Antwort auf die staatliche Kontrolle über das islamische Stiftungswesen hat jedoch 
nicht dazu geführt, dass die innerhalb der muslimischen Gemeinschaft vorhandenen Dynamiken 
– das islamische Stiftungswesen für zeitlich und lokal begrenzte Gruppeninteressen zu benutzen 
– abhandengekommen sind.
  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of the Study 
This study examines the practices of waqf (religious endowment) among minority Muslims in a 
predominantly Christian society and within a secular state milieu. Waqf is an Islamic socio-
cultural heritage that lies at the intersection between the law of mirath (inheritance) and sadaqa 
(charity) for the purpose of attaining qurba (divine closeness) and sawab (divine rewards, merit) 
from God.1 It is an undertaking where a waqif (dedicator) consecrates some property in perpetuity 
to be held in trust by a mutawalli (also nazir, custodian) so that its manfaca (usufruct) could be 
channeled towards predetermined religious objectives (van Leeuwen 1999). 
Unlike other religious charitable institutions such as zakat (alms) and sadaqa, waqfs have no 
precise textual foundation in the Qur’an. Islamic traditions, however, trace the institution to some 
hadiths (sayings) attributed to Prophet Muhammad from the seventh century when he 
encouraged his companions to spend in charity for the benefit of the society (Barnes 1986; 
Hennigan 2004; Lev 2005; Kozlowski 2008). Throughout the eighth to thirteenth centuries, the 
institution evolved by adapting to varying theoretical and practical realities growing into an 
important economic and social institution in the Muslim community before attaining stability 
following establishment of the various madhhabs (schools of jurisprudence). As a matter of fact, 
during the fourteenth century, waqfs became significant element of the civil society in Islam 
providing the socio-economic mainstay of the endowers’ progeny as well as plethora of 
community welfare initiatives including education, housing, health care, and water among others, 
supplementing efforts of several governments of the time (Hodgson 1974; Hoexter 2002; 
Hennigan 2004; Dafterdar / Cizakca 2013). 
However, despite immense contribution to the society, development of the institution of waqf 
always depended on the state facing periodic turbulence in most parts of the Muslim world. Many 
factors, including institutional corruption, jurisprudential rigidity, poor management, and state 
(both Islamic and colonial) interference were attributed to the sorry state and near collapse of the 
institution in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Schoenblum 1999; Shatzmiller 2001; 
Kahf 2003). Nonetheless, concerted efforts begun in earnest across Muslim societies, particularly 
in the last decades of the twentieth century, like Iran (1984), Sudan (1987), Kuwait (1993), 
Malysia (2004), and Qatar (2007), to revive and modernize waqfs. These coincided with the 
upcoming of the concept of civil society where in Islam, the model Islamic civil society included 
                                                 
1Waqfs have several synonyms as used in different regions and among adherents of various madhhabs (schools of law) 
in Islam, including habs, hubs, hubus, [North Africa], vakif (pl. evkaf) [Asia], as well as mahbusa muharrama. See Barnes, 
J. (1986). An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire, Leiden: Brill; Benthall, J., / Bellion-Jourdan, J. 
(2003). The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World, London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.; Hennigan, P. (2004). 
The Birth of a Legal Institution: The Formation of the Waqf in Third-Century A. H. Hanafi Legal Discourse, Leiden: Brill; El 
Daly, M. (2010). “Challenges and Potentials of Channeling Local Philanthropy towards Development and Social Justice 
and the Role of Waqf (Islamic and Arab-Civic Endowments) in Building Community Foundations”, Berlin: Humbolt-
Universität zu Berlin. 
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efforts to free waqfs from state control and supervision. These developments resulted into 
(trans-)national charitable organizations; establishment of policies and institutions; as well as 
reviewing perceived rigid jurisprudential interpretations regarding waqfs by predominant 
Muslim states with a view to returning the institution to its pristine time (Shatzmiller 2001; 
Dafterdar / Cizakca 2013). Accordingly, this study is an attempt to understand the contours of the 
institution among Kenya’s Muslim community since the last decades of the twentieth century and 
more specifically, to interrogate Muslims’ negotiation of the secular state milieu in practicing 
waqfs. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Renowned investigations on waqfs, (Barnes 1986; Powers 1989; Hennigan 2004; Kozlowski 
2008), have extensively focused on the institution as lived in historically predominant Muslim 
communities like the Mamluk (1250-1517) periods, Ottoman Empire (1299-1922), and in the 
Asian sub-continent. Observations made in these studies portray waqfs as primarily practiced 
according to Islamic normative precepts under Muslim political, administrative, and juridical 
institutions. However, figures by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) derived from the 
Kenya Population and Housing Census (2009), place Muslims in Kenya at 11.2% (i.e. 4.3 million) 
of the thirty eight million people. This makes Muslims to be the largest minority religious group 
in the country. Above all, the institution of waqf is managed by a state agency, the Waqf 
Commissioners of Kenya (WCK) under the auspices of a secular law, the Waqf Commissioners Act 
(1951) rather than the Sharica.2 Clearly, conclusions drawn from the experiences of predominant 
Muslim communities would not adequately explain the same among minority groups in 
predominant Christian societies, especially where administration of waqfs is strictly by secular 
state policies and civil statutes like in Kenya. 
Accordingly, some perceptions by studies on waqfs drawn from the predominant Muslim 
communities that endowers were accorded economic security through tax exemption for return 
in public investments leading to large scale consecrations (Kuran 2001), do not apply to the 
present community under investigation. This is not to deny that some waqfs in Kenya provide 
social welfare services transcending religious boundaries. Nonetheless, for various reasons, they 
were either not registered as waqfs or were regarded as insufficient by the state and municipal 
authorities to warrant tax exemptions. This is mainly informed by the population of Muslims that 
dims significantly in the face of their Christian compatriots as well as the jurisdiction of the civil 
statute that controls waqfs which is limited to one region in the country, the coast province. 
Owing to the foregoing, the argument that some Muslims, particularly of ‘the politically dominant 
class’, appropriated waqfs as a means to shield their wealth against confiscation and taxation, or 
even legitimizing laundered public properties (Barnes 1986; Kuran 2001; Hennigan 2004; 
Kozlowski 2008) is also untenable in the Kenyan context. Confiscation of private property 
                                                 
2 The statute and the state agency governing waqfs are cited as Waqf Commissioners of Kenya. See the WCK Act (1951), 
Chapter 109, which is a revised version of the Waqf Commissioners Ordinance (1900). 
Introduction 7 
 
warranting invocation of waqfs to protect them was informed by the political culture of the 
Mamluk and Ottoman periods. During that age, political adversaries who lost in battles also had 
their wealth confiscated by the victors exposing them to economic, political, and social ruin. Apart 
from the non-existence of the ‘Mamluk/Ottoman-like’ political culture in Kenya, the demographic 
disadvantage of Muslims in the country could not sufficiently sustain the argument on the use of 
waqfs to protect wealth against confiscation. Moreover, although Muslim administrative 
institutions of the liwali (district governor) and mudir (director) established during the Bu Sacidi 
Sultanate (1698-1888) were incorporated as part of the British colonial government, occupiers of 
the positions were very few compared to ordinary believers.3 This emphasizes the fact that 
Muslims who composed of the political class were not only negligible but their waqfs were also 
outnumbered by those of the ordinary Muslims, rendering the assumption that the former 
appropriated waqfs “as a means of ensuring their families against loss of political influence and 
earning capacity” superfluous (Kuran 2001: 857). 
Based on this background, the scenario of waqfs in Kenya is a sharp departure from the popular 
Islamic understanding bringing into fore two significant considerations: First, the recognition of 
the institution in the constitution makes it an important socio-cultural heritage albeit with few, if 
any, studies on its various manifestations in a minority Muslim community. Second, the 
administration of waqfs is by a state agency and mainly through a secular statute rather than the 
Sharica under which the institution subsists. Then, how did waqfs develop over time from the 
British colonial period to postcolonial times? To what extent did secular state policies and 
Common law judicial rulings influence the development of waqfs in Kenya? How do Muslims 
negotiate the secular state and Common law judicial constructs vis-à-vis the waqf practices in the 
country? And how do Muslims in Kenya use waqfs in socio-cultural development? This study was, 
therefore, undertaken to answer the pertinent questions raised in the ambiguous relations 
between an Islamic institution and a secular state cum civil institutional milieu. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
Based on the foregoing, the study endeavors to: 
 Explore the development of the institution of waqf from the British colonial rule (1900) to 
postcolonial Kenya (2010) 
 Examine the secular state legislative policies and Common law judicial orders that 
influenced the development of waqfs during the two historical periods in the country 
                                                 
3Liwalis and mudirs were mainly Arabs who worked as administrators of the Sultanate, normally stationed in urban 
centers. There were only six Muslim administrative officers of the liwali in the Protectorate, i.e. Gazi (south coast), 
Mombasa (central); Takaungu, Mambrui, Malindi, and Lamu (north coast); and four mudirs in Vanga (south coast), 
Mtwapa, Witu, and Faza (north-coast). See Partridge, M. & Gillard, D. (Eds.) (1995). British Documents on Foreign Affairs: 
Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, vol. 17. London: University Publications of America. 
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 Interrogate how Muslims negotiate the secular state and Common law juridical milieu vis-
à-vis the practices of waqfs in the country 
 Establish the various types of waqfs prevalent in Kenya’s Muslim community 
 Describe how Kenyan Muslims use the various types of waqfs in the socio-cultural 
development of the society. 
1.4 Justification of the Study 
Despite the seeming significance of the institution of waqfs, both among the minority Muslims as 
a socio-cultural heritage and in the state as evident in the constitutional recognition of the same, 
there are very few studies on the subject along the East African coast, and fewer still in Kenya in 
particular, that explicitly discuss the institution. These include studies by Carmichael (1997), 
Sheriff (2001), Fair (2001), Bang (2001a), Oberauer (2008), Yahya (1995; 2008), and Hashim 
(2010a). On their part, Sheriff, Fair, Bang, and Oberauer mainly investigated the institution among 
predominant Muslims in Zanzibar during the colonial period. Bang’s article, “Intellectuals and 
Civil Servants: Early 20th Century Zanzibar cUlama and the Colonial State” bears testimony on 
studies in waqfs during the colonial period where the institution was subjected to an array of 
secular state policies that put it under supervision and control. (Bang 2001a). The problem, 
however, in virtually all of the studies carried out in Zanzibar is the tendency to perceive waqfs 
from the viewpoint of predominant Muslim societies and institutions. Hence these works could 
not be relied upon in presenting a contemporary picture of the institution among minority 
Muslims in Kenya on the face of secular state policies and civil institutions in the postcolonial 
times. 
On the other hand, Tim Carmichael’s article, “British Practice towards Islam in the East Africa 
Protectorate: Muslim Officials, Waqf Administration and Secular Education in Mombasa and 
Environs, 1895-1920”, sketches the ambiguous relations between Muslims and the colonial 
government in an array of socio-cultural matters with no serious attempt at addressing the issues 
raised by the present study (Carmichael 1997: 293-309). On their part, Hashim (2010a) and Yahya 
(1995; 2008) lament the challenges bedeviling the institution including mismanagement though 
they echo the sentiments on reviving waqfs as the panacea to the biting poverty afflicting the 
Muslim society in the region. Yet, as articles, they also suffer the academic limitation of in-depth 
analysis of the subject. Consequently, my investigation, in seeking to fill the knowledge gap, 
departs sharply from the preceding academic pieces as an ethnographic interrogation on how 
Muslims negotiated the institution of waqf in the midst of secular state political, economic, and 
socio-cultural policies from the British colonial era to postcolonial period. 
1.5 Scope and Limitations 
The study was conducted in four administrative regions (counties) of Mombasa, Malindi/Kilifi, 
Lamu, and Kwale, in the coast of Kenya. The choice of these research areas demonstrates a 
strategic and purposeful underpinning because the WCK Act is limited to the coast province, 
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particularly, the predominant Muslim areas of the former British East Africa Protectorate (Sw. 
mwambao). The Protectorate was a narrow coastal strip stretching ten miles inland from the sea 
shore from Kipini in the north to Vanga in the south (Hailey 1979: 105; Eliot 1996; Ndzovu 2014b). 
Although it would have made a lot of sense to include regions outside the former Protectorate for 
the purpose of diversity and comparison, but the limitation of the statute implies that Muslims 
outside the coast province could not establish waqfs in the legal definition of the Act. At best, theirs 
could only be regarded as non-labeled waqf initiatives. More so, owing to the concentration of 
Muslims in the former Protectorate, non-labeled waqfs outside this region have, for several 
reasons, been systematically overlooked by the state agency. In view of this, only areas defined by 
the Act as legally capable of endowing, and whose waqfs are captured in the state registry could 
be sampled. 
Moreover, the institution of waqf encountered some transformation between the fifteenth and 
seventeenth centuries to include cash in its various forms as corpus (waqf nuqud) as well as other 
adaptation facilities; and the upcoming of the Muslim civil society since the last decades of the 
twentieth century to free the institution from imperial supervision and control. These 
developments led to the establishment of private foundations and community based associations 
to provide socio-cultural welfare (Kuran 2001; Kahf 2003; Siraj / Hillary 2006; Dafterdar / 
Cizakca 2013). Nonetheless, the discussion in this study was based on waqfs in their ‘traditional’ 
sense as the new developments in Muslim civil society were largely yet to find footing in the 
community under investigation.4 Not oblivious of these limitations, hopefully, the findings of the 
study would be sufficient in drawing a general picture of the institution of waqf among minority 
Muslim groups in predominant Christian societies or secular state policies and civil institutions in 
contemporary times. 
Events in the post 9/11 largely shaped the global stage on (in-)security as evident in Kenya’s 
involvement in the ‘war against terror’ with al-Shabab militias in the neighboring Somalia. Since 
then, Kenya endured sporadic retaliatory attacks and the regions of interest were not spared 
either. As a matter of fact, the visit to Lamu was delayed several times owing to such incidents. 
While at Mombasa, I also came face to face with the scenario in two different occasions when the 
town was engulfed in riots following the extra-judicial extermination of two culama (Muslim 
clerics) – Abu Bakar Sharif Makaburi and Aboud Rogo Mohammed - alleged to have harbored links 
with the terrorist group. This made visit to some waqfs in the town, even in the guide of WCK 
secretariat staff, quiet challenging including the now famous masjids Mlango wa Papa, Bahero, and 
Musa in Mombasa that were claimed to be radicalization and recruiting centers for the militant 
group. 
                                                 
4 Among contemporary changes in waqfs evident in transnational charitable organizations include according the 
institution a juristic personality. This puts the management in a board of mutawallis that enjoys powers akin to those 
of a private enterprise. This does not, however, stop the board from harnessing resources in form of waqf shares and 
certificates for specified causes in the umma. See Kuran, T. (2001). The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: 
Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System. Law & Society Review, 35(4), 841-898. 
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Coupled with the question of (in-)security was the ambivalence of some respondents. Since I 
largely had to be referred to my respondents by the WCK, more often than not, some mistook me 
for a Commission mole. My initial over-reliance on referrals by WCK from which I snowballed was 
informed by the lack of identification mechanism for waqfs in the community. Only the state 
agency kept records of physical addresses of waqfs, their endowers, as well as current 
beneficiaries and mutawallis. Therefore, because of the sensitivity of the subject, especially where 
private wealth and properties were concerned, and my indispensable connection with the state 
agency, requests for interviews were granted after several postponements and change of venues 
when respondents were satisfied that I was not a threat to their interests. This was particularly 
so where beneficiaries were locked in legal battles against the state agency. This scenario aptly 
illustrates the competing and conflicting interests in the institution of waqf between various 
actors in the community. In this regard, my choice and sampling of respondents was basically 
purposeful and through snowball. Nonetheless, some informants like ordinary Muslims and the 
culama were randomly sampled and informally interviewed. 
Important also to mention is the bureaucracy and delays I had to endure with regard to accessing 
state offices and repositories like court registries (both kadhi and civil) and the acquisition of 
research permit from the National Commission of Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI) 
that required frequent rescheduling of my fieldwork plan. Finally when time came to visit those 
sites, I also had to put up with disorganized and overwhelmed staff in accessing vital documents 
and information. Not to be forgotten is the social and moral ethics in the Muslim community in 
relation to free mixing of the genders. Interviewing female respondents, for instance, demanded 
that they be accompanied by their mahram (close relatives), thereby requiring that I fit into their 
schedule. Coincidentally, these restrictions provided rarest opportunities for group talks that 
would have otherwise been difficult to organize in ordinary circumstances. 
Like any ethnographic undertaking, therefore, my study was no exception to the various 
challenges but, paradoxically, also immensely benefited from the merits associated with an 
‘insider’ researcher. By ‘insider researcher’ I mean “social research and interactions conducted 
between researchers and participants who share similar cultural, linguistic, ethnic, national, and 
religious heritage” (Ganga / Scott 2006, as quoted in Bryant 2010: 45). I regard myself as an 
‘insider researcher’ because I am a Kenyan Muslim from the region where this study was 
undertaken. Accordingly, this puts me in equal pedestal with my respondents in the socio-cultural, 
and at some instances, even ethnic milieu. Within this context, my study was enriched by the 
closeness with respondents that I easily engaged with owing to shared experiences and empathy 
that accorded me access to some sensitive information that an ‘outside researcher’ would be 
difficult to be privileged. 
My ‘insider researcher’ position notwithstanding, I also had to contend with the challenges of 
negotiating the asymmetrical power relation with my respondents. Researchers are perceived to 
wield power against participants on the view that they decide the subject of discussion, ask 
questions, and finally make analysis independent from the respondents (Kvale 1996, cited in Alan 
/ Arthur, undated: 3). To avoid demonstrating too much power against my respondents, I 
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identified myself as a learner rather than a researcher. In the eyes of informants, I was curious to 
learn and make sense of the situation placing them as my mentors, thereby working with rather 
than on them. As a matter of fact, I often allowed my respondents to decide on the venue, time, the 
sitting arrangement, and even who to include in the discussions. This explains the numerous 
cancellations and rescheduling of meetings. Effectively, this did not only accord room to my 
respondents to exercise their discretion but, eventually became a blessing in disguise. By inviting 
their relatives and friends, it in turn gave me the opportunity to conduct group talks. Among senior 
members in the community including the Chief Kadhi (both current and former) on their part, this 
also allowed them the convenience of being in their offices where they undoubtedly felt more at 
ease and in control than they would possibly have been elsewhere. Most times, I held informal 
talks with the Executive Secretary of the WCK in his office instead of the boardroom from where I 
was working. This ethnographic reflexivity underlines the view held by several authors including 
Munro et. al (2004), Thapar-Bjorkert / Henry (2004) that exercising power in a research 
undertaking is not an exclusive privilege of the researcher (both cited in Alan / Arthur, undated: 
3). 
‘Insider researchers’ on the other hand, as experienced during fieldwork, often face the challenge 
of potential biasness and confidentiality with sensitive information that, if mishandled, it could 
harm the respondents (Serrant-Green 2002, cited in Kerstetter 2012: 100). To gain and sustain 
trust that enabled me to access sensitive data from my respondents, I sought their audience 
through second and third parties whom they knew and trust beforehand. This partly explains my 
initial reliance on the WCK to access my informants. My initial access to the WCK was, for instance, 
through referral by a serving Commissioner. While with respondents, I was also constantly aware 
of my inadequacies to access them without such referrals and made it a point to appreciate them 
as a matter of security. This eased their potential suspicions against me that developed to good 
levels of trust and confidence that enabled me to obtain the much needed information. All in all, 
engaging in the project accorded me a rare opportunity to encounter the other side of the Muslim 
community and Kenya at large which I have always been oblivious of. 
1.6 Theoretical framework 
The present study is an ethnographic undertaking to understand the enacting of an Islamic 
practice by a minority group and the trends it generates in a predominantly non-Muslim but 
secular milieu. This involved a multi-disciplinary approach covering slightly over a century of 
negotiations by the Muslim community in the administration and development of the institution 
of waqf vis-à-vis secular policies and civil structures. Invoking Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
(1977), specifically the concepts of field, capital (social, economic, political and symbolic), and 
symbolic violence, was thus relevant as it appropriately fits the state-society negotiations 
between the Muslim community and the British colonial government and subsequent postcolonial 
regimes on one hand, and among socio-ethnic groups of Muslims on the other. According to 
Turner (2011), and Echtler and Ukah (2015), centrality and marginality of religion in Bourdieu’s 
works equally compete for space. This is in the sense that despite his limited works precisely 
dealing with religion, Bourdieu’s concepts in the theory of practice, drawn mainly from sociology 
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of religion, occupy an important position in the study and practices of religions as a whole (Turner 
2011: 102-123; Echtler / Ukah 2015: 1-32).5 For Bourdieu, the religious field is only “one of 
numerous distinct yet interrelated fields that together constitutes human society” (Rey 2007: 81; 
Echtler / Ukah 2015). This understanding was, therefore, significant in deconstructing essentialist 
perceptions in the theory of practice and to demonstrate its applicability to wider concerns 
affecting human societies beyond its parent geographical and conceptual framework.  
Accordingly, the constituent concepts in the theory of practice are “apt for studies of the 
relationship between religion, class and power; religion, race and ethnicity; and religion and 
colonial conquest” (Rey 2007: 82) that this study endeavored to investigate under the lenses of 
waqfs. This is not to be oblivious of the aversion by the theory of practice to obstruct in-depth 
understanding of the ‘fantasy life’ of the subordinate groups in the society by reducing “field 
relations to the power binary of the dominant and the dominated” (Friedland 1999: 305, as quoted 
in Rey 2007: 124; Martin 2000). Bourdieu portrays the subordinate groups in the society as 
“virtually and structurally un-free and thus unable to rise up, resist, and act to change the very 
social order that enables their oppression” (Rey 2007: 122; Martin 2000). This inadequacy was, 
however, complemented by two paradigms: James C. Scott’s (1976) symbolic (ideological) 
resistance (also hidden transcripts) and umiji-wamiji (locale identity and belonging) suggested by 
the researcher. In the manner of Martin, I argue that subordinate groups in the society also have 
the understanding and ability to decipher “contradictions in the established order and have the 
capacity to critique them, [hence] hidden transcripts demonstrate hidden grievances, alternative 
social organization, and other practices that are assumed to be repressed by the hegemony of the 
dominant” (2000: 72-73). 
Within this context, Scott’s concept of symbolic resistance proved efficacious in explaining 
Muslims’ response to the secular state legislative policies and Common law judicial rulings in the 
development of waqfs in the country. It was established that colonial and postcolonial regimes 
appropriated secular policies and civil institutions to control resources, particularly land that, 
created a community of ‘Muslim peasants’ who were effectively disillusioned and condemned to 
economic, political, and cultural domination. Thus, the establishment of the WCK in 1899 that 
herald state domination, supervision, and regulation of waqfs was only but a microcosm. In 
expressing dissent against state sponsored socio-cultural subordination, Muslims did not comply 
with the imposed compulsory registration of waqfs. Above all, they silently ‘exited’ from state 
controlled waqfs to express piety and qurba in non-labeled waqfs including sadaqa, private trusts, 
and community based associations. 
These alternative forms of attaining qurba were (still are) not only uncontrolled and 
uncoordinated, but also accorded Muslims the control over resources and privileges similar to 
                                                 
5 According to Rey (2007), Bourdieu published ten essays on religion that were mainly confined to Roman Catholicism 
(France) and Islam (Algeria). See Rey, T. (2007). Bourdieu on Religion: Imposing Faith and Legitimacy. London: Lightning 
Source UK Ltd, pp. 58-80; Turner, B. (2011). Religion and Modern Society: Citizenship, Secularization and the State. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 109. 
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those of waqfs while at the same time helped in fulfilling the religious obligations of giving back to 
the society. This subtly illustrates that resistance by subordinate groups in the society could as 
well be passive with a view to making “a total reversal of the established order where power, 
wealth, status, and material goods are in their hands” (Martin 2000: 73). Using Scott’s symbolic 
resistance was, therefore, crucial in understanding the ‘social world’ from the perspective of the 
subordinate Muslims’ strategies and improvisations to re-create autonomy and control over 
resources and the religious sphere. 
Significantly, the view that Muslims are not a monolithic but rather a supra-community is not far 
from the truth. Muslims in Kenya are characterized by competing and, at times, fluid conflicting 
ethnic, jurisprudential, regional, and political affiliations. To understand how this diverse 
community uses waqfs in socio-cultural development, my study coins the concept of umiji–wamiji 
in exploring the non-state-society engagement in the Bourdieu’s concept of capital among the 
various ethnic Muslim groups in the community. Apparently, religion (Islam) among Kenyan 
Muslims, though significant, but is not the main factor of identity and mobilization. The concept of 
umiji–wamiji thus, goes beyond the binary power struggles between the dominant and the 
subordinate groups over legitimacy in the society. 
Umiji-wamiji unravels the internal dynamics in the Muslim community that informed the 
constantly shifting borders of identity and belonging among diverse socio-ethnic Muslim groups 
in relation to access to resources and privileges in the region. This is true considering how waqfs 
were consecrated, their control negotiated, and eventually used in socio-cultural development as 
a microcosm. More importantly, since waqfs existed before and after colonization, the concept 
provides a significant framework in understanding the local trends and dynamics in the 
institution during these periods that could not be adequately explained by the two foreign 
concepts. Accordingly, fusing Bourdieu, Scott, and umiji-wamiji calls for an understanding of 
Muslims’ switch to uncontrolled and uncoordinated non-labeled waqfs not merely as a response 
to colonial and postcolonial state control of waqfs, but as “building social spaces relatively free 
from, and alternative to, life under domination” (Rey 2007: 116), the life outside secular state 
subordination, and the period thereafter. 
1.7 Methodology 
Knowledge on the history and traditions of the people is significant in understanding the 
circumstances that inform their contemporary trends. This explains the central place of historical 
approach in the study. The approach was used to identify the secular state legislative and Common 
law judicial constructs that influenced the development of the institution of waqf over time from 
the British colonial period (1900) when it was first placed under state supervision and control to 
the postcolonial era in 2010. More importantly, historical approach helped in understanding the 
trends in Muslims’ responses vis-à-vis the transition from practicing waqfs under the Sharica 
normative precepts to secular state control of the institution. The approach also made it possible 
to interrogate the extent at which various ethnic Muslim groups used waqfs in relation to the 
internal socio-cultural negotiations of the former governorates at the coast region. 
14 Competing and Conflicting Power Dynamics in Waqfs in Kenya, 1900-2010 
Bayreuth African Studies Online (6) 
Although the study draws from anthropological insights, it goes beyond mere recording and 
presentation of political and socio-cultural negotiations between Muslims and the state on the one 
side and among diverse Muslim groups in the community on the other. For instance, other than 
establishing and describing the secular statutes and Common law judicial rulings that influenced 
waqfs in the community, using normative Sharica precepts, the analysis further explored whether 
or not Muslims’ responses to such constructs could be situated within the broader concept of 
Islamic charity, qurba, and resource distribution in the society. Again, using normative precepts, 
it was possible to relate the compatibility or otherwise of established waqfs with the preponderant 
opinion about Sharica, especially where legal heirs were involved in the distribution of the 
usufruct. To this end, analysis of qualitative and quantitative data that formed the basis of this 
discussion was both contextual and normative according to the Sharica under which the 
institution of waqf subsists. 
The primary data, collected from over ten months of field research (November to December, 2014; 
July to December, 2015; October to mid-November, 2016) consisted of waqfiyyas (waqf deeds); 
informal talks and group discussions with Waqf Commissioners (both current and former); Waqf 
Commission agents in Malindi and Lamu; waqf secretariat at Mombasa; beneficiaries and culama. 
These talks were conducted in the local lingua franca, Kiswahili, and captured in voice recorders 
and field notes before being transcribed and translated in English by the researcher. Other 
documents that were reviewed during the study included court records (both kadhi and civil); 
archival records; lease contracts; records of appointment for the Commissioners and mutawallis; 
certificates of trusteeship; the WCK minutes; and compensation notices. Secondary data was 
collected through analysis of relevant existing works on the subject in public and private libraries 
and archives in Germany, Kenya, and Zanzibar. Some of the cutting edge information on the 
subject was also sourced through the internet. 
Registration of waqfs became mandatory upon establishment of the WCK failure of which was 
punished by law. The WCK secretariat, therefore, holds a repository of significant documents 
including waqf deeds dating from the time when compulsory registration was introduced by the 
British colonial government. By the period of research (2014-2017), however, the WCK was yet 
to establish a digital archival system. Therefore, all vital records reviewed during study were not 
ordered and organized to enable preservation and retrieval in the conventional sense of an 
archive, but were rather piled in bundles and old files in several rooms of the Commission 
building. I was, however, privileged to see some of these records before they were availed to me 
in piece meal for review and analysis in the boardroom from where I worked. The ‘piece meal 
revelation’ of the bundles of waqf deeds alone lasted for three weeks during which I made a 
random sample realizing a total of 104 from about 350 deeds. While precise details of the sampled 
waqf deeds were noted and short notes made, some were photocopied or photographed partly 
becoming the basis of this discussion. Moreover, owing to age and poor preservation of these 
important documents, some of which were hand written and are of various lengths ranging from 
one to about ten pages, several of them were worn out before they were laminated. Subsequently, 
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portions of some of the waqf charters were missing. Nonetheless, none of the sampled waqf deeds 
had serious defects that could radically interfere with the analysis.  
Waqf charters are the backbone of waqf practices in the Muslim world as they are the primary 
documents establishing a valid endowment. They identify the type of waqf, the waqif, and describe 
the type and nature of corpus. They mention the mutawalli(s) and how the position would be filled 
in future should it fall vacant. Waqf deeds also mention the primary beneficiaries and how 
usufruct should be distributed among them. Finally, the documents would essentially identify the 
residual beneficiaries, normally the indeterminate poor (masakin) and needy (fuqara) of the 
Muslim community or some other public worthy causes. Residual beneficiaries are invaluable 
means of encoding the special attachment a waqif had with certain socio-religious groups and 
localities in the community. 
The Sharica provides for istibdal (exchange), cana (lease), and rent (hikr) of both revenue-
generating and revenue-consuming waqfs for the acquisition of better alternatives with a view to 
attaining perpetuity of the consecrations. Lease agreements contain details of the lessee(s), the 
leaser, salf (advance payment for lease, premium) charged, period of lease, and the agreed rent. 
Clearly, analysis of lease contracts was significant in ascertaining the considerations including ijar 
al-mithal (prevailing market rates) in relation to sound investment of waqf properties that 
informed such transactions in the socio-cultural development of the institution. As WCK is a body 
corporate (with the powers to sue and be sued), court documents – court orders, judgments, 
summons, affidavits, and certificates of trusteeship of waqfs, were precise demonstration of the 
legal contestations involving ownership and control of waqf properties that also enriched this 
study. This information was collected and collated through visits to waqfs in the four 
administrative regions in the coast of Kenya and preserved through note taking, tape recording, 
and photography. 
1.8 Summary of Chapters 
In presenting the findings of the study, historical, descriptive, and analytical methods have been 
incorporated with the discussion adopting a spiral design. This makes every chapter to be the 
foundation upon which the proceeding discussion and analysis is built. Chapters one and two are 
the building blocks of the study. Chapter one sets the stage by identifying the main concerns, how 
they were investigated, and limitations of the study. Chapter two gives the interpretative insight 
into the normative precepts of waqf in Islam - the legal foundations; how and why waqfs are 
consecrated; and how they were established and managed in the formative periods. This aims at 
providing a broader understanding of the institution as practiced and mediated among Muslim 
communities in different historical epochs according to the Sharica with the view of setting the 
background for the normative analysis of waqfs among the Muslim community under 
investigation. 
Secular legislative policies, civil institutions and Common law judicial strategies established 
during the British colonial period that placed waqfs under state control are the focus of chapter 
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three. Importantly, the chapter explores relevant scenarios to illustrate how secular policies and 
civil constructs influenced the development of the institution. Using an array of legal ordinances 
and civil court judgments that applied the Sharica as understood by the British, the colonial 
government determined the relationship with the Muslim community vis-à-vis the establishment, 
management, and use of waqfs. 
Secular policies, civil institutions and Common law courts’ precedents established during the 
colonial period that put the institution of waqf into imperial supervision and control were 
inherited by subsequent postcolonial regimes. As illustrated in chapter four, this suggests that 
political elites in the independent state mainly echoed and perpetuated control of resources and 
political power. This put waqfs, and by extension, the Muslim community, into an extended period 
of state control and socio-cultural subordination. Unwittingly though, it also gave impetus to the 
flourishing of the internal socio-ethnic dynamics in the Muslim community as diverse groups and 
individuals sought to adapt and exploit the extended state control of resources to safeguard 
temporal group and private interests.  
Chapter five is an in-depth analysis of Muslims’ response to state regulation of waqfs since the 
colonial period. Muslims’ response is perceived in terms of spontaneous and continuous 
negotiation for control of resources against secular state policies and civil constructs as well as 
internal dynamics in the institution of waqfs. Accordingly, Muslims’ ‘exit’ from state controlled 
waqfs to non-labeled waqfs through non-compliance with official rules; establishment of 
community based organizations; preference to uncontrolled and uncoordinated charitable 
institutions of sadaqa, community organizations, and private trusts are the concerns of this 
section of the study. These draw our attention to efforts by the subordinate Muslim community to 
regain control over resources without attracting the wrath of the state while at the same time 
fulfill the religious obligations under a wider concept of charity as provided by the Sharica. 
Chapter six analyzes how the minority Muslim community negotiated the contours of waqf 
outside the secular state, civil institutions and Common law judicial constructs. This draws mainly 
from the diverse types of waqfs in the community, to demonstrate how waqfs are lived, mediated, 
and generate trends under the prism of umiji-wamiji. Shurut al-waqif (conditions of the endower) 
in waqfs, particularly, offered the avenue through which inter- and intra-socio-cultural and locale 
negotiations were mediated. Endowers designated specific socio-ethnic groups, institutions, and 
regions, as beneficiaries of their waqfs demonstrating close and special attachment between them 
in relation to the internal dynamics of identity and belonging in the Muslim community. The 
chapter closes with the analysis on how the concepts of cana, hikr and istibdal are exploited for 
the economic (dis-)advantage of entrepreneurs and the diverse groups of beneficiaries as 
influenced by locale dynamics. 
Chapter seven is a recapitulation of the entire discussion and makes general observations on the 
negotiations between various actors in the institution of waqf in the country. As arguments in 
preceding sections demonstrate, state (both colonial and postcolonial) involvement had 
significant ramifications on the institution. Secular policies, civil institutions and Common law 
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judicial constructs placed the control of resources, and waqfs in particular, in the hands of the 
state. This did not go down well within a section of Muslims who resorted to the uncontrolled and 
uncoordinated charitable institutions with a view to reversing control of resources and fulfill the 
religious obligations for the attainment of taqwa and qurba. Paradoxically, this in essence enabled 
the perpetuation of internal socio-ethnic and cultural negotiations for identity, belonging, and 
access to resources and privileges in the Muslim community appropriately captured under the 
concept of umiji-wamiji.
  
2 The Concept of Waqf in Islam 
This chapter provides the interpretative insight into the normative precepts of the institution of 
waqf in Islam. The discussion opens with a broad analysis of the several definitions of waqf as 
advanced by different scholars before zeroing on a working definition for this study. The 
discussion also meanders into the recurrent views in relation to the origin of the institution of 
waqf highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the prepositions as elaborated in various 
investigations. The chapter further discusses the contours of the practice of waqf upon its 
formalization during the formative years of Islam: what constitutes a legal waqf; how waqf was 
managed during its formative age; how efforts were made to categorize the different forms of 
waqfs in early studies with a view to highlighting the underlying substantive features of each 
category; and most importantly, how ruined and economically un-supportive revenue-bearing 
waqfs could be revived to secure the principle of perpetuity. Finally, the discussion closes with an 
analysis on how and why waqfs were appropriated during earlier periods in the history of the 
Muslim society before the institution came to be controlled and supervised by Muslim states and 
invading colonial powers. The proceedings in this chapter are not only significant in 
understanding the rudiments of the institution and how it developed through different epochs in 
Islamic history, but also to lay the basis for analysis of the practices of waqf among Muslims in 
Kenya in the subsequent chapters. 
2.1 What is Waqf? Problem of Defining the Concept 
The Islamic institution of waqf has aroused intense academic interests from diverse backgrounds 
that have invoked various approaches including law (Powers 1989; Engin / Alexandre 2005; 
Anderson 2008), history (Duff 1926; Hathaway 1994; Gil 1998), economics (Cizakca 1998, 2004; 
Haneef et. al 2014), and religion (Barnes 1986; Qureshi 1990; Banday 2013) among others. Given 
the different approaches adopted by these research works, it has become difficult to have a 
unanimous definition of waqf. Van Leeuwen (1999: 9-10) captures this difficulty and explains 
why: 
Defining the institution of waqf is both at the same time simple and extremely difficult. 
It is simple because the concept of waqf has been described in legal handbooks of 
various kinds, in a terminology which is especially molded to avoid ambiguity and 
misinterpretations […] The question what a waqf is, is difficult, however, since the 
phenomenon is not confined to the realm of legal theory and juridical handbooks. It 
is also part of a historical reality and it touches upon the material and spiritual 
conditions of societies beyond the sphere of legal systems. 
As part of historical reality, waqf is, according to van Leeuwen, naturally integrative and has two 
basic incongruent manifestations – theoretical and the other occurring in the material world. 
More often, what is textually and theoretically described as constituting waqf may not necessarily 
and exactly be what is happening in the material world. Nevertheless, events in the later 
environment may not be invalidated as they are significant manifestations of waqf that seek to 
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complement the texts in enabling the institution adapt to various situations (Hoexter 1995; van 
Leeuwen 1999). 
The scholar further postulates that for centuries, studies on waqf were based on either legal 
precept with a view to developing convenient administrative frameworks; or on theoretical 
assumptions that being divine, the Sharica from which the institution draws its mandate and 
operative structures are two sides of the same coin (1999: 10). Such studies, as van Leeuwen 
opines, are consequently limited to specific aspects of waqfs, thereby making it difficult to arrive 
at a conclusive end of what waqf is. 
Literally, waqf is derived from the Arabic root verb waqafa- implying to stop, prevent or restrain. 
Barnes (1986), Sheriff (2001), and Hennigan (2004) agree in their definition of waqf as a process 
where “-‘a revenue-bearing property’ is withdrawn from commercial transaction and is made 
inalienable for some beneficent end; taken out of the condition of private ownership, the property 
is said to belong to God, and its revenue is assigned for some religious or charitable purpose” 
(Barnes 1986: 5, emphasis added). In other words, revenue-producing properties (asl al-mal) are 
withdrawn from commercial transactions to become mortmain under the watch of a mutawalli 
that, allegedly, do not contribute to any economic growth though their manfaca is assigned to 
specified individuals, institutions, and other public welfare causes. This definition of waqf by 
Barnes does not depart sharply from that commonly adopted by the Shafici legal code, as explained 
by Imam al-Nawawi. To the Shafici madhhab (school of law) of Sunni Islam, waqf is “the alienation 
of ‘revenue-generating property’ with the principal remaining inalienable, while its revenues are 
disbursed for a pious purpose, in order to seek God’s favor” (al-Nawawi, AH 1385:314, as quoted 
in Sabra 2000: 70. See also El Daly 2010, emphasis added). 
The major challenge in perceiving waqfs in the context of revenue-bearing corpuses as 
emphasized in the above definitions is to place great prominence on material (economic) benefits. 
In turn, this perception, observes Shatzmiller (2000: 97-113), negates properties and institutions 
incapable of revenue-bearing that could as well, and have since immemorial times, been 
consecrated as waqfs based on the services they rendered to the community. Such revenue 
consuming corpuses may include, but not limited to hard copies of the Qur’an (mushaf), books of 
religious sciences, madrasas (Quranic schools), as well as masjids (mosques) among others also 
established by this study.6 The exclusive view on waqfs as revenue-bearing properties also fails to 
capture the spiritual facet, which - arguably, is the back bone of the institution in Islam (Hoexter 
1998a, 1998b; van Leeuwen 1999). 
                                                 
6 Qur’an 72:18 emphasizes the ownership of mosques (and other places of worship like musala – informal mosques) to 
Allah. The emphasis on the verse is twin fold – it stresses the absolute divine ownership of such places thus making 
them waqfs as well as the prohibition of invoking other beings in the mosque besides Allah. On non-revenue bearing 
waqfs, see Shatzmiller, M. (2000). The Berbers and the Islamic State: The Marinid Experience in Pre-Protectorate Morocco. 
Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers; Sanjuan, G. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth: Islamic Pious Endowments in al-
Andalus (9th -15th Centuries). Leiden: Brill.  
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In the Ottoman understanding, Barnes (1986: 5) posits, waqf means “to prevent the giving and 
taking possession of a thing so that the substance belongs to God, while its benefits pertain to 
mankind.” This perception to waqf is shared by others (Miran 2009; Peters 2000, as cited in El 
Daly 2010).7 Two aspects of this definition merit brief comments - ownership of the corpus being 
divine and intended objective as for the service of humanity. The definition, nevertheless, falls 
short in giving the precise purpose forming the foundation of the institution of waqf in Islam – birr 
(righteousness) or for the soul of the endower. It also leaves unanswered questions with regard 
to how the benefits are to be expended among the beneficiaries in the legality of waqfs according 
to the preponderant view about Sharica on the same. As pointed out earlier by van Leeuwen, some 
of the attempted definitions of waqf emphasize certain aspects of the institution ending up not 
being inclusive to all elements, at least as being perceived by the majority Muslim schools of 
theology. 
Nevertheless, their non-inclusivity notwithstanding, majority of the definitions seem to agree on 
significant pillars of waqf including inalienability (untouchability) and perpetuity. That the item, 
once declared as waqf would never be sold, purchased, inherited, or even given out as a gift. These 
and other principles are conflated in the definition of waqf by van Leeuwen (1999: 11-12): 
Essentially a waqf consisted of an object which was endowed to a specific pious 
purpose for eternity. The founder (waqif) gave up his property rights and determined 
the pious purpose and the regulations for the exploitation of the object, which became 
the property of God. The object was dissociated from the market circulation and any 
form of alienation (sale, pawning, donation) was strictly forbidden. Waqfs were often 
founded for the benefit of mosques, which themselves also had the status of waqf […] 
waqfs could thus either be possessions yielding revenues and profit, or objects 
consuming these revenues and serving as religious or social institutions.8 
Proceeding from van Leeuwen’s definition, we discern that: (a) waqf has to be endowed for a 
specific pious cause; (b) the endowment has to be permanent; (c) once endowed, the endower 
surrenders his right of ownership to God; (d) the endower reserves the right to determine the 
pious purpose and exploitation of the corpus; and (e) disposal of the corpus is strictly forbidden. 
Within this context, the study perceives waqf as a valuable income generating or service rendering 
                                                 
7 Similar positions are held by the Malik madhhab and some Hanafi scholars. See Layish, A. (1983). The Maliki Waqf 
According to Wills and Waqfiyyat.Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 46, 1-32; 
Cattan, H. (1984). The Law of Waqf. In M. Khadduri & H. Liebesny (Eds.), Law in the Middle East: Origin and Development 
of Islamic Law (pp. 203-222). Washington D. C.: The Middle East Institute; Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India: A Study of 
Legislative and Administrative Control. New Delhi: Gian Publishing House. 
8 The Ahmadiyya view of waqf goes beyond objects to include human beings. ‘Waqfi Nau’, established during the reign 
of the fourth khalif, Hadrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad (1982-2003), allows believers to consecrate their children (waqfin) to 
the service of the jamaca (community). These children are catered for under ‘waqfi jadid’ established during the reign 
of the second khalif, Mirza Basheer-ud-Din Mahmood Ahmad (1914-1965). The Ahmadiyya view, undoubtedly, draws 
from Qur’an 3:35-37 where Mariam, the mother of Jesus (Issa bin Mariam) was consecrated for the service of God. See 
Simon, V. (2008). Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jamacat: History, Belief, Practice. London: Hurst & Co., pp. 184-185. 
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(non-)item that an individual voluntarily cedes private ownership and consecrates it to God 
through a management system that holds it in trust during which period its value would be 
improved, sustained, and appropriated for specified pious objective(s). The position adopted by 
this study on the definition of waqf is anchored on Qur’an 3:92 where attaining righteousness and 
piety is contingent on giving out freely in charity what one loves in truth, not merely as a means 
of disposing the (non-)item for being invaluable. Emphasis is placed on spending (non-)properties 
that have utility and whose value could be improved for the benefit of both the giver and the 
recipient, while the rest of the conditions with regard towaqfs in Sunni Islam remain.9 
2.2 Practices of‘Waqf’ in other Traditions: A Borrowed Institution Discourse 
The question regarding origin of waqf has remained controversial pitting two schools of thought 
on this issue. On one side of the argument is a team which opinions that waqf is a borrowed 
concept or practice from other civilizations, while on the other end is one which holds that the 
institution is Islamic, all foreign elements notwithstanding.  
A cross section of scholars argues that Muslims borrowed the institution of waqf from other 
civilizations that came into contact with during different epochs in history. This school of thought 
gives credit to civilizations like the Roman, Greek, Mesopotamia, Jewish, Sassanid, and Budhism 
who are alleged to have practiced waqfs in different forms before they interacted with Muslims 
who adopted and ‘refined’ the practice as part of their socio-religious act. This position is captured 
in the observation by Cizakca (1998: 48): 
Charitable endowments have a history considerably older than Islam and it is also 
very likely that Islam may have been influenced by earlier civilizations. Ancient 
Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome as well as the pre-Islamic Arabs certainly knew of 
charitable endowments… While Roman origins have been rejected, primarily 
Byzantine, but also Mesopotamian, Sasanid, Jewish and Buddhist influences have 
been accepted as plausible. 
It is argued that the development of the institution of waqf in Islam is formulated along several 
foreign doctrinal and judicial concepts compounding the view that it is not originally Islamic. The 
Byzantine practice of piae causea is among the ideologies along which waqf was allegedly founded. 
                                                 
9 Shica Islam has a different perception of waqf as a contractual agreement between the endower and the beneficiary 
requiring an offer (ijab) from the endower and acceptance (qabul) by the beneficiary. In this case, the Shica view does 
not recognize testamentary waqfs since offer and acceptance has to trigger an immediate transfer of the property to 
waqf. In view of the principle of ijab and qabul, waqf, opines Makdisi (1981), could thus be rejected by the recipient. In 
the majority opinion, however, such refusal may not necessarily invalidate the waqf as usufruct could be channeled to 
the residual beneficiaries like the poor, the needy, or to other public causes for the general good. See Makdisi, G. (1981). 
The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; Zaid, A. 
(1986). The Islamic Law of Bequest. London: Scorpion Publishing Ltd; Kozlowski, G. (2008). Muslim Endowments and 
Society in British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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Under the piae causea, Barnes (1986: 13-14) argues that, charitable institutions were established 
in favor of an “anonymous and ever-changing collectivity” of the poor, the aged, orphans, widows, 
free-born girls, and for the ransoming of slaves. This view is also shared by others (Hennigan 
2004; Macuch 2004).10 Barnes (1986: 16) further explains that under the practice of piae causea, 
“the ownership of property dedicated to eleemosynary ends could be possessed by no one, but 
was given to God, and the fruits of its revenue were assigned to aid mankind.” According to the 
author, a specific legislation was established in the law code of Justinian (527-565 C. E.) that 
exempted such institutions against the Roman and Byzantine laws which prohibited designating 
charities to indeterminate beneficiaries as invalid legal entities. 
Later developments in the Roman law allegedly saw the category of anonymous invalid legal 
identities expanded to include institutions and towns giving rise to legatum sub modo (indirect 
legacy). Under this arrangement, a group of persons was accorded legal identity as trustees to 
whom the testamentary gift was given to administer on behalf of the institution and exercise 
judicial and legal personality over the charitable foundation (Barnes 1986; Macuch 2004). 
Nonetheless, the contending side that upholds waqf as an original Islamic institution faults the 
piae causae trajectory on the basis that Byzantine influences were confined to Egypt. They argue 
that the practice of piae causae did not last to the reigns of the Fatimid dynasty (909-1171 A.D.) 
who are alleged to have introduced waqf in the region (Hennigan 2004). 
Another religious practice associated with waqf is the Roman legal concept of res sacrae (sacred 
objects). Under the Roman doctrine of res sacrae, Barnes and Hennigan again explain that, there 
were two levels of jurisdiction - heaven and earth.11Divini juris (heavenly jurisdiction) was 
concerned with sacred objects and phenomena including religious symbols and institutions 
withdrawn from private ownership and dedicated to gods where they could not be sold, bought, 
or even alienated (Barnes 1986; Hennigan 2004; Bhala 2011). Different from the Islamic concept 
of waqf, however, in res sacrae, Morand, (1910) clarifies that, it was the material subject of offer 
that was withdrawn from private ownership to res nullius (no one but God). It neither included its 
benefits nor other usufruct bearing properties that could be devoted for their perpetual 
maintenance and spiritual use. Morand further posits that establishing res sacrae required direct 
permission and requisite statutes from the state (senatus consultum). Once an item became under 
divini juris, it was the state that managed it (Morand 1910, as cited in Hennigan 2004: 54). This is 
a sharp departure from the institution of waqf in Islam where it is the individual on his own 
                                                 
10The Babel Civilization is also said to have had similar practice where benefits of some properties were apportioned 
for the poor and widows. Among Egyptians, such properties were for the welfare of gods, temples, graves of kings, 
education and cultural services. See El Daly, M. (2010). Challenges and Potentials of Channeling Local Philanthropy, op. 
cit. 
11 The Roman, and similar other connections to waqf like the pre-Islamic Iranian law have also been contested by 
various studies. See Arjomand, S. (1998). Philanthropy, the Law, and the Public Policy in the Islamic World before the 
Modern Era. In W. Ilchmann, S. Katz, & L. Queen II, (Eds.), Philanthropy in the World’s Traditions (pp. 109-132). 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press; van Leeuwen, R. (1999). Waqfs and Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman 
Damascus. Leiden: Brill. 
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volition who establishes it, manages it, or appoints a mutawalli to oversee the growth of the 
institution and channel the usufruct to prescribed beneficiaries and causes. 
More so, foreigners and exiles were prohibited from establishing legacies under the Roman laws. 
To circumvent this prohibition, there arose the practice of fidei commissum in which properties 
were entrusted to trustees who transferred the usufruct to the intended beneficiaries, mostly 
relatives, for a specified period of time or until their extinction. Thus the corpus became 
inalienable. Fidei commissum, allegedly, resembles waqf ahli (also waqf dhurri, family or 
prosperity waqf) and was claimed to have been the origin of the institution of waqf in Islam. 
Notwithstanding the apparent similarities, this conclusion is, however, often dismissed as flawed 
owing to the several differences between waqf and fidei commissum. According to Schacht (1957), 
the later is said to have been strictly a post-mortem transaction unlike the former which could 
take either form – prompt or testamentary (Schacht 1957, as cited in Hennigan 2004: 55-56). 
Besides, fidei commissum did not envisage any pious cause as residual beneficiary other than to 
ensure that an individual’s progeny was well taken care of upon the death of the endower. A pious 
religious cause of public charity and qurba, whether designated or assumed, is a significant 
element of waqfs in Islam according to the majority opinion of Sunni theologians. 
On their part, Perikhanian (1983) and Macuch (2004) trace the origin of waqf to the institution of 
patruvan (also ruvanagan, to the soul) under the Sassanid Persian law of property. Under this 
arrangement, the scholars explain, a principal property, (non-)revenue bearing as well as 
(im-)moveable, was endowed ‘for the soul’ and considered inalienable. The property was then 
administered by a trustee(s) who channeled its benefits either to the progeny of the endower or 
some other pious public causes as predetermined by the dedicator in the endowment deed. The 
pious public benefits continuum ranged from the holding of services, distribution of alms, and 
provision of meals for festivals to works of social utility such as canals, bridges, or aqueducts and 
monuments (Perikhanian 1983, as cited in Yarshater 1983, vol. 3:2; Macuch 2004: 181-196). And 
“once declared ‘for the soul’, the property could not revert to the endower’s ownership since it 
was dedicated for pious goals”, adds Hennigan (2004: 59-61). The Sassanid ruvanagan practice is, 
therefore, held as a compelling foreign legal precursor of waqfs in Islam since it carried with it 
even the differences between proprietary and usufructory rights. 
As a means to wealth distribution in the society, waqf is also linked with the concept of charity as 
explained in different terms in other monotheistic beliefs like Judaism and Christianity. In 
Judaism, the concept of zedakah (charity) is considered as a significant mitzva (religious duty) and 
a pre-qualification for a pious life. Under the Jewish practice of hekdesh (dedicated or 
consecrated), a property could be withdrawn from private ownership to become perpetually 
inalienable and managed by an apotropos (trustee) appointed by the endower. The rabbi 
(religious leader) or court though, customarily retained the overall supervisory rights of the 
property whose benefits could be channeled to charitable purposes in the society. It is further 
believed that hekdesh properties were owned by God like those in waqf (Stillman 1998; Hennigan 
2004; Deguilhem 2008). Among the Byzantine Christians, the Church also got widely involved in 
the xenodochia (charitable institutions) that were concerned with among other services like 
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helping the aged, providing health care, taking care of orphans, and though to a limited extent, for 
the repair of religious institutions and for the benefit of the clergy (van Leeuwen 1994: 30-33; Lev 
2005). 
Therefore, the Byzantine piae causae, the Roman res sacrae, the Sassanid ruvanagan and the 
various forms of charity among monotheistic beliefs are among legal trajectories traced to various 
civilizations that allegedly influenced the institution of waqf in Islam. Yet, Muslim traditions, 
opines Kuran (2001: 848), hold that “the waqf is sufficiently different from each of its pre-Islamic 
forerunners to be considered a distinct Islamic institution.” In view of this position, we now turn 
to the argument that seeks to justify the institution as uniquely Islamic. 
2.3 Textual and Historical Evidence of Waqf in Islam: An Islamic Discursive View 
Talal Asad (2009: 20) espouses an Islamic discursive tradition as “a tradition of Muslim discourse 
that addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular 
Islamic practice in the present.”12 In essence, the concept seeks to explain Islam and its religious 
institutions as lived and negotiated across the umma (community of believers) not as fossil set of 
rules unrelated to the beliefs and practices of the faithful and incompatible with contemporary 
realities, but as a progressive discourse that relates to the past and the future through a present. 
In view of this, proponents of the institution of waqf as uniquely Islamic perceive it as a discursive 
tradition. Though not textually enshrined in the Qur’an, the institution is attributed to some 
hadiths of the Prophet during the seventh century, (i.e. past) which grew progressively through 
assumed rigid legal forms before reaching its peak in the thirteenth century (Hennigan 2004). 
During the last decades of the twentieth century, waqfs adopted internal regulation mechanisms 
against earlier operational and jurisprudential rigidity transforming to a modern institution 
capable of responding to challenges and demands in relation to charity and wealth distribution in 
the society (Kuran 2001), (i.e. present) and more significantly, as a religious practice meant for the 
attainment of qurba and sawab for the spiritual afterlife (i.e. future). 
Based on the foregoing, proponents of waqf as originally an Islamic tradition are further split into 
two ideologies – one purely theological and the other academic Islamic scholarship. While the 
latter group draws and appreciates existing similarities between waqfs and various waqf-like non-
Islamic practices as discussed above, Muslim theologians strictly draw inspiration from traditions 
of the Prophet; some companions’ acts of endowment; acts of individuals and those of other 
Muslim societies as their major points of reference to the genesis of waqf in Islam. Academic 
Islamic scholarship, as exemplified in Hennigan’s study (2004: 50), holds the view that trust 
                                                 
12 Discursive tradition was suggested as a concept to the anthropological studies of Islam owing to the alleged 
inseparability of ‘experience’ and ‘tradition’ in the faith vis-à-vis the Western conceptualization of religion and politics. 
For further discussion, see Asad, T. (1997). Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam. London: The John Hopkins University Press; Asad, T. (2003). Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Anjum, O. (2007). Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His 
Interlocutors. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 27(3), 656-671; Asad, T. (2009). The Idea 
of an Anthropology of Islam. Qui Parle, 17(2), 1-30. 
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practices existed among Muslim societies “before the waqf treatises came into existence.” The 
generic term waqf was allegedly adopted in the first and second-century A.H. Islamic legal 
discourse in place of a wide range of trust-like terminologies in the Near Eastern cultures 
including sadaqa, hubs, sadaqa mahbusa, and habis sadaqa. The Sharica is claimed to have adopted 
these terms and incorporated the practices as it did various other customs that were not 
antithetical in demonstration of the social heterogeneity of the society. Within this context, 
academic Islamic scholarship, as summarized in Hennigan (2004: 52), concedes that waqf 
incorporated some foreign practices in its body polity though such foreign elements do not 
necessarily make it to be an alien concept in Islam. 
To reconcile the foreign and indigenous trajectories on the origin of waqf, Hennigan, suggests the 
concept of ‘unconscious borrowing’ of foreign non-Islamic or pre-Islamic practices by Islam. He 
contends that foreign elements infiltrated the nascent Sharica when Muslim culama unconsciously 
adopted local cultures of the people they conquered in “attempts to bring order” to the legal 
discourse (2004: 52). The author summarizes the notion of ‘unconscious borrowing’ in the 
following way: 
As a result, […] there was likely no overarching Islamic law of trusts, but merely a 
collection of local practices – Roman, Byzantine, Persian, Jewish, and Arab – that all 
shared some similar features, and almost certainly used different terminologies. The 
task confronting jurists […] was how to bring some measure of uniformity to this 
diverse landscape of trust practices and terminologies. The legal institution these 
authors devised to bring order to this milieu of trust practices – the ‘waqf’- permitted 
Roman, Byzantine, Persian and /or Jewish practices to enter (perhaps unnoticed) in 
to Shari’a (Hennigan 2004: 68). 
By extension, the espoused view on ‘unconscious borrowing’ partly seeks to account for the 
existence of foreign elements in the Sharica not only with regard to waqfs, but also to various other 
socio-economic and cultural practices in justification of the perception of continuity and 
heterogeneity of the umma as having been established before and during Abrahamic (2510-2329 
B.H.) times. Most importantly perceived as an incorporative civilization, Islamic traditions 
recognize the principle of istihsan (also maslaha, common social good or welfare) where curf or 
cadat (local customs) that are not adverse to Islam could be adopted as secondary sources of 
Sharica (Stockreiter 2015: 29). As such, waqf in its different un-Islamic strands as a concept, could 
have probably and unconsciously permeated the Islamic tradition. Nonetheless, Hennigan (2004: 
107) observed that, whereas “the substantive law of waqf developed through rationalist 
discourse, the institution’s cultural (and hermeneutical) legitimacy rested upon the traditions of 
the Prophet and his companions.” 
Muslim theologians on their part draw evidence from historical events before and after the 
Prophet’s time to argue that waqf is originally an Islamic institution. Drawing reference from early 
Abrahamic Muslim society (Hunafa’) in Arabia, it is claimed that some rudimentary type of waqf 
was practiced from which the contemporary form developed (Barnes 1986). Moreover, both 
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historical and religious texts identify Abraham as a person of immense wealth that he 
appropriated for the service of God and for the welfare of humanity. The kacba (house of Allah), 
for instance, is commonly quoted as a living testimony of Abraham’s works of charity that he built 
with his son, Ismael, and dedicated it for the worship of one God (Barnes 1986; Lev 2005). The 
Qur’an (2:125) affirms this opinion: 
And [mention] when We made the House a place of return for the people and [a place 
of] security. And take, [O believers], from the standing place of Abraham a place of 
prayer. And We charged Abraham and Ishmael, [saying], "Purify My House for those 
who perform Tawaf and those who are staying [there] for worship and those who 
bow and prostrate [in prayer].13 
In the above verse, God talks of ‘my house’ implying the divine ownership of the property as waqf. 
Above all, looked at from the wider definition of waqf, the kacba is a permanent dedication by 
Abraham (i.e. perpetuity), hence could neither be sold (i.e. inalienable) nor its dedication revoked 
(i.e. irrevocable), and more importantly, it was dedicated for prayers (i.e. religious cause), (Qur’an 
24:36). Thus, the kacba allegedly carries with it all the necessary prerequisites of a valid waqf 
(Benthall, J., / Bellion-Jourdan, J 2003; Khan 2008). Through such acts of charity, Abraham is said 
to have accorded his followers a living example from which they established numerous charities. 
On the strength of this account with Abraham regarded as the father of Islam, waqf is claimed to 
have existed in Islam since immemorial times. 
Barnes also agrees with the above account of Abraham constructing and dedicating the kacba for 
charity to be credible as advanced by renowned scholars of waqf. In his opinion, however, “such 
acts as altar building and alms giving more correctly fall within the realm of individual instances 
of charity, or sadaka, and not vakif” (1986: 6). It is submitted in this study that Barnes’ perception 
of this charity not being waqf falls within the exclusive definition that emphasizes some elements 
in the expense of others. The author does not appreciate the holistic perception of waqf as a 
“religiously motivated behavior combined with or unrelated to altruism translated into practice 
to assume the different forms of assistance relevant to the needs of the society” (Lev 2005: 144). 
His repudiation of Abraham’s act of waqf should, therefore, be understood from his exclusive 
definition of waqf as strictly a revenue bearing property. Accordingly, he contends that any “simple 
open courtyard and sun-dried brick masjids” do not qualify to be waqf in the first place, hence 
should not be conceived as being “in need of landed endowments for their support” (1986: 7). 
The author further asserts that the account of Abraham’s act of sadaqa as being the foundation of 
waqf “is more properly in the realm of belief than historical fact” (Barnes, 1986: 6). It is an 
undisputed maxim that while all waqf is sadaqa, not all sadaqa is waqf. However, in the contested 
account above as corroborated by Qur’an 2:215, Qur’an 24:36, and Qur’an 72:18, Abraham’s 
charity is a living historical reality attracting millions of Muslims across the globe for the annual 
                                                 
13 See also Qur’an 72:18; footnote 3 above. 
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hajj (pilgrimage) rites. Therefore, it carries with it the “embodiment of a life of piety, the key to 
salvation, and an instrument of repentance and expatiation for sins” (Lev 2005: 144). These are 
spiritual foundations on which the institution of waqf is claimed to be built qualifying Abraham’s 
charity as waqf and not merely sadaqa. 
More closely drawn from the formative period of Islam to be the genesis of waqf is the concept of 
lands subject to fay’ (tribute) as advocated by Bercham (n. d., as cited in Barnes 1986).14 According 
to Bercham, spoils of war, both fay’ (also fai, property gained without fighting) and ghanima 
(booty) during the pre-Islamic times used to be distributed among the winning side in specific 
shares with the tribal chief entitled to khums (one-fifth) of the entire collection (Sahih al-Bukhari, 
4:327). Upon the establishment of Islam and subsequent conquest of the Bani an-Nadir, Bani 
Hawazin, Khaybar, and Fadak, the Prophet is claimed to have deviated from the pre-Islamic norm 
of distributing booty by dedicating the collection partly for his personal use and for the welfare of 
the umma (Quran 59:7-8; Sahih al-Bukhari 4:153). This trend was upheld by his companions after 
his demise as illustrated during the reigns of Abu Bakr (r. 632-634 C.E) and cUmar bin al-Khattab 
(r. 634-644 C.E) when fay’ was managed by the khalifa (caliph) for the course of God (Sahih al-
Bukhari 4:324-326). Therefore, “‘fay’ lands annexed to Islam through force of arms (canwatan) 
were in effect vakif by virtue of their not being divided, but having their revenue restrained for 
the good of the entire Muslim community”, concludes Bercham (as quoted in Barnes, 1986: 9).15 
It is debatable, however, whether or not fay’ constituted valid Islamic waqfs since fay’ were 
allegedly not anybody’s private property among the victorious Muslims. Rather, they were owned 
by non-Muslim subjects in the conquered territories and it was its kharaj (land tax) instead that 
was channeled to the Islamic state for distribution to beneficiaries (Barnes, 1986). According to 
the preponderant view, consecrated properties must be legally, whether singly or jointly, owned 
by the endower. Thus, the question of ownership of fay’ faults the legal trajectory in tracing the 
origin of waqf in Islam. Nevertheless, advocates of the theory assert that as community properties, 
legal ownership of fay’ rested with the central authority (i.e. first the Prophet then the caliphs) on 
behalf of all Muslims. They opine that since the Prophet’s (and caliphs) word was law unto itself, 
his not dividing the lands, which was one of two options of owning appended properties, became 
                                                 
14Fay’ is explained as booty acquired through surrender to Muslims by invaded territories as was the case of Bani an-
Nadir. These properties were centrally managed by the Prophet at the bayt al-mal (public treasury) who used them for 
his family upkeep as well as charity for the cause of God. See Qur’an 59:6; Sahih al-Bukhari 4:153, 325-326; Frenkel, Y. 
(1999). Political and Social Aspects of Islamic Endowments (“awqaf”): Saladin in Cairo (1169-73) and Jerusalem (1187-
93). Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 62(1), 1-20. 
15 Two options were open to claim ownership of conquered properties: divide them among Muslims or allow the local 
community to retain ownership but pay land tax (kharaj), hence becoming a form of waqf. The Prophet, upon conquest 
of Khaybar, allowed Jews to retain and plough their lands but pay half of the produce to the Muslims before they were 
expelled to Taima and Ariha during the reign of khalif cUmar bin al-Khattab (See Sahih al-Bukhari 3:522, 524, 527, 531; 
4:380). Waqf on kharaj was also upheld during the reign of caliph cUmar upon the conquest of the Sawad province in 
Iraq. There is evidence, though, suggesting that booty used to be divided amongst Muslim warriors even during the 
period of the Prophet. See Sahih al-Bukhari 4:359-360, 363-366, 375, 378-379; Gil, M. (1998). The Earliest Waqf 
Foundations. Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 57(2), 125-140; Sanjuan, A. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth, op. cit., 
p.400; Kozlowski, G. (2008). Muslim Endowments and Society in British India, op. cit., pp. 11-12. 
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a norm in the establishment of waqfs for the benefit of the general Muslim public (Sahih al-Bukhari 
4: 324-326; Hoexter 1995; Gil 1998). In essence, the argument that fay’ revenue benefited all 
Muslims subtly suggests that it was communally (i.e. jointly) owned putting into rest the question 
of legal ownership. 
On the extreme end of the Islamic scholarship continuum is a section of Muslim jurists who hold 
the view that “there is no evidence that such a complex system of appropriating usufruct as a life 
interest to varying and successive classes of beneficiaries existed prior to Islam” (Cattan 1984: 
205). As a matter of fact, this group of jurists is aptly informed of the fact that the Qur’an does not 
make direct reference to waqfs. For this reason, they endeavored to seek for evidence from the 
text where general references to wealth distribution are made before turning to precise traditions 
attributed to the Prophet as having established waqf in Islam so as to give the practice a textual 
legitimacy. In one of the various inferences where Qur’an is interpreted to have enshrined the 
concept of waqf as a form of charity, God says: 
Righteousness is not that you turn your faces toward the east or the west, but [true] 
righteousness is [in] one who believes in Allah, the Last Day, the angels, the Book, and 
the prophets and gives wealth, in spite of love for it, to relatives, orphans, the needy, 
the traveler, those who ask [for help], and for freeing slaves; [and who] establishes 
prayer and gives zakat… (Qur’an 2:177).16 
In Qur’an 2:215, again, beneficence to charity is foremost for parents and kindred before other 
deserving cases - the orphans, the needy, and travelers. The ‘parents and kindred’ category of 
beneficiaries is further protected in the wealth distribution scheme by Qur’an 4:11-12 in the 
Sharica guidelines of mirath. This brings into light the relationship between the concepts of charity 
and inheritance as manifested in waqf ahli. The subsequent section of Qur’an 2:215, - “orphans 
and the needy and the traveler”- is often interpreted to mean recipients of sadaqa that could either 
take the form of zakat or better still, waqfs (Barnes 1986; van Leeuwen 1999; Hennigan 2004). 
In light of this, the compound noun sadaqa mawqufa (immobilized alms) is often used in Islamic 
theology to mean waqfs, demonstrating the close knitting between the parent idea of charity and 
the several manifestations in which the institution could be practiced and mediated in the 
community (McChesney 1991; Singer 2003; Sanjuan 2007). Al-Kasani (d.587/1189) also opines 
that waqf is a form of sadaqa jariyya (perpetual charity) for the course of God (al-Kasani 1910, 4: 
221, cited in Hoexter 1995: 137). This view is enshrined in a Prophetic tradition: 
Abu Huraira (may Allah be pleased with him) reported Allah’s messenger (Pbuh) as 
saying: when a man dies, all his acts come to an end, but three; recurring charity 
                                                 
16 See also Qur’an 2:215; Qur’an 2:264; 270, 280; Qur’an 3:7, 86; Qur’an 3:180; Qur’an 58:12, 13; Qur’an 73:20; and 
Qur’an 111:92. 
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(sadaqa jariyya) or knowledge (by which people benefit), or a pious offspring, who 
prays for him (Sahih Muslim, 3:14). 
The above tradition mentions three forms of perpetual charity all of which could be coalesced in 
the institution of waqf as observed by Cizakca (1998: 49): 
Muslims needed an institution that would enable them to perform all three of these 
good deeds. This institution was the awqaf which can, indeed, assure ongoing, 
recurring charity for many years, even centuries, after the death of the founder. It can 
finance scholars whose lasting works would benefit mankind for a long period and 
the sawab that accrue to them would be shared by the waqf’s founder who had 
provided for their sustenance in the first place. Finally the management of the waqf 
can be entrusted to the offspring of the founder so that while, on the one hand, careful 
and loyal management is assured, on the other, the offspring would pray for the 
deceased for, thanks to his waqf, he or she is not destitute. 
In a similar tradition attributed to Muhammad, it is related that during the first year A.H., he 
wished to purchase a piece of land from the Bani an-Najjar to construct a mosque in Medina. The 
Bani an-Najjar, however, refused to take the money and gave out the piece of land freely instead 
in the course of God (Sahih al-Bukhari 4:32). In the opinion of some Muslim theologians, this 
dedicated piece of land was in essence awaqf in itself. The most recurrent tradition attributed to 
the Prophet as having established waqf in Islam, nonetheless, concerns a second year A.H. episode 
where cUmar bin al-Khattab (577-644 C. E.) is claimed to have sought the Prophet’s guidance with 
regard to his acquired date-palms at Khaybar (Thamgh). The tradition relates that the Prophet 
advised cUmar “to give it in charity (i.e. as an endowment) with its land and trees on the condition 
that the land and trees will neither be sold nor given as a present, nor bequeathed, but the fruits 
are to be spent in charity” (Sahih al-Bukhari 4:26).17 Among designated beneficiaries of the charity 
were the kinsmen with some portion also used in the cause of Allah, the emancipation of slaves, 
feeding the poor, guests, and travelers. This tradition is claimed to have summed up the necessary 
pillars of a valid waqf further augmenting the view that the institution is originally Islamic.  
To emphasize the foregoing argument, Muslim theologians cite several other instances when 
companions of the Prophet allegedly established waqfs immediately following the one endowed 
by cUmar bin al-Khattab.18 This is evidenced in one tradition attributed to the Prophet in which 
                                                 
17 In other versions of this tradition, the Prophet is alleged to have advised cUmar, “If you wish you can keep it as an 
endowment to be used for charitable purposes”; and “If you like you can give the land as endowment and give its fruits 
as charity.” See Sahihal- Bukhari 3:895; 4:33-34. 
18 Debate regarding the question of first (awacil) waqf during the period of the Prophet seems inconclusive with reports 
from the Helpers (Ansar) and Migrants (Muhajirun) apparent. Besides the waqf by cUmar bin al-Khattab, there was 
allegedly one by Abu Talha al Ansary who endowed the well of ‘Bircaa’ to his progeny and cousins (waqf ahli). Hennigan. 
(2004), McChesney, (1991) and Sanjuan (2007) point to sources which claim the first waqf (in form of sadaqa) as having 
been established by the Prophet himself out of seven walled gardens (hawacit) in Medina before the fall of Khaybar in 
7A.H /629 A.D., from some property willed to him by a Jewish convert, Mukhayriiq, who was killed in the battle of Uhud 
(3. A.H). On a similar note, Qureshi proposes that the house of Arqam in which the Prophet stayed after the declaration 
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Abu Talha allegedly gave the Prophet his favorite garden (Bairuha) in Madina. The tradition 
relates that the Prophet mostly enjoyed the garden because of its shade and cool waters and Abu 
Talha surrendered it to him following the revelation of Qur’an 3:92 when Allah warned Muslims 
of not being able to attain piety until they spent in charity what they loved most. The Prophet is, 
however, said to have given it back to Abu Talha and advised him to endow it for his relatives. 
Consequently, he endowed the garden for Ubaiy bin Kacb and Hassan bin Thabit as posterity waqf 
(Sahih al-Bukhari 4:30).19 
In conclusion, this is but a cross section of the several textual and historical evidences that Muslim 
theologians cite to demonstrate that waqf is originally an Islamic institution. As we have 
established before, however, both sides of the scholarship divide unanimously agree that the 
institution, as is understood in the contemporary times, grew rapidly from the seventh century 
until the thirteenth century when it found its footing in the legal field as an established religious 
practice in Islam. 
2.4 Essentials of Waqf: Significant Pillars and the Validity of an Endowment 
Conservative interpretations, arguably informed by Qur’an 2:125 and Qur’an 72:18 where God 
emphasizes divine ownership of masjids that are themselves waqfs, holds that consecrations are 
charities for the cause of God, hence milkiyat Allah (divine properties of God).20 In the words of 
Qureshi (1990: 31), “the creation of a waqf is essentially based on the legal fiction being that the 
property vests in God, in perpetuity, but income from the property is permitted to be utilized for 
certain specified purposes which under the Muslim law are recognized as pious or religious.” The 
causes could be outlined in the waqf deed, e.g. for mosque A, or institution B. Under this context, 
such waqf becomes ahbas mucayyana (purpose-specific waqf). On the other hand, waqfs could also 
                                                 
of Islam in Mecca could probably be the earliest waqf since Arqam endowed the same for his children (1990: 4). 
According to Sanjuan (2007), however, cUmar’s waqf came to be regarded as the first since it was recorded in all six 
Sunni collections of hadiths. Several other companions are said to have endowed waqfs including Ali bin Abu Talib 
(Yenbo, valley of Q’ara), Aisha, Asma, Um-e-Habib, and Zaid bin Thabit. See McChesney, R. (1991). Waqf in Central Asia: 
Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1889. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.7; Hoexter, 
M. (1998a). Endowments, Rulers and Community: Waqf Al-Haramyn in Ottoman Algiers. Leiden: Brill, p.7; Gil, M. (1998). 
The Earliest Waqf Foundations, op. cit. pp.125-140; Sheriff, A. (2001). The Records of the ‘Waqf Commission’ as a Source 
of Social and Religious History of Zanzibar. In S. B. Amoretti (Ed.), Islam in East Africa: New Sources (p. 27). Roma: Herder 
Editrice Libreria; Hennigan, P. (2004). The Birth of a Legal Institution, op. cit., pp. 169-175; Sanjuan, G. (2007). Till God 
Inherits the Earth, op. cit., p. 58; Khan, A. (2008). Commentary on the Law of Waqf in India (The Waqf Act, 1995). 
Hyderabad, Saraswathi Printers, p. 95; El Daly, M. (2010). Challenges and Potentials of Channeling Local Philanthropy, 
op. cit., p. 49. 
19 See also Sahih al-Bukhari 3:511; 4:15, 33-34.  
20 Muslim theologians, nonetheless, hold divided opinion regarding the question of ownership of waqfs. Three positions 
abound: (a) that ownership of waqfs belongs to the beneficiaries. This view is also shared by Shica Islam and posits that 
beneficiaries could alienate the corpus in whatever way they deem fit provided that it does not prejudice the rights of 
succeeding beneficiaries; (b) the dedicator assumes ceremonial ownership without the power to exercise other 
privileges associated with private ownership including sale or exchange of the corpus. This is the position held by Abu 
Hanifa; and (c) the waqf falls under divine ownership of God. This is the position shared by the majority of Sunni 
theologians. See Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India, op. cit., pp. 29-30, 97; Lienhardt, P. (1996). Family Waqf in Zanzibar. 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. University of London, 27(2), 95-106. 
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be generic, e.g. for the benefit or maintenance of the poor, needy, fi sabil Allah (in the cause of 
God), etc. 
Once a property is declared as waqf, its ownership permanently changes from private to divine 
and the consecration could not be revoked with a view to withdrawing the property from the 
divine ownership (Lev 2005; van Leeuwen 1999). As such, even in the circumstances when the 
endower turns out to be the mutawalli at the same time, his position remains that of a custodian 
of the corpus charged with the responsibility of developing and sustaining it to fulfill its 
designated causes (El Daly 2010). According to the hadith in relation to cUmar bin al-Khattab, the 
property was permanently dedicated to God and could not be sold, mortgaged, given out as gift, 
or inherited as this would have impeded the aims of the waqf. Neither could the corpus be attached 
to settle debts owed by the waqif nor become subject of private ownership due to the law of 
adverse possession. Thus, a consecrated property is believed to be “in perpetuity, till God inherits 
it, He who will inherit the heavens, the earth and its inhabitants, for He is the best heir” (Al-
Khassaf, undated, as quoted in Sanjuan 2007: 64. See also van Leeuwen 1999; Hennigan 2004). 
What the endower, however, allegedly gets in exchange for the loss of private ownership (milk) of 
the corpus to God is the perpetual sawab during the entire life span of the usufruct of the property, 
hence, the essence of sadaqa jariyya. This emphasizes the view that the further the value of the 
property is invested for the intended objectives the better as its multiplier effect is believed to 
greatly benefit the endower until the Day of Judgment (Hoexter 1998a; van Leeuwen 1999). 
Therefore, majority of Sunni Muslim theologians holds that waqfs could not be established for a 
limited period of time. In their opinion, tacabbid (also mucabbad, perpetuity) of waqfs implies that 
the aim for which an endowed property is made could not be altered. 
The principle of tacabbid of waqfs has, nonetheless, been the subject of debates across the 
scholarship divide. Opinion is sharply divided between perpetuity of asl al-mal and that of manfaca 
in relation to the strict adherence of the conditions of the endower vis-à-vis the pragmatic realities 
of prevailing socio-economic circumstances according to the doctrine of istihsan. The 
preponderant view espouses the position of non-extinction of waqf by virtue of expiry of the 
objective for which it was created. Rather, it advocates for adaptability of waqfs to changing 
circumstances with a view to perpetuating the underlying principle of charity by channeling the 
usufruct to other deserving causes in the community upon failure of the initial purpose (Cattan 
1984: 207; Lev 2005; Sanjuan 2007). Therefore, tacabbid in the majority opinion, requires that 
both realms (of corpus and benefits) be applied to make it possible to harmonize stipulations of 
the dedicator and prevailing public realities (haja or darura) as propounded in the doctrine of cy 
press (as near as possible) that provides: 
Where the dedication is to a religious or charitable institution, which in course of time, 
ceases to exist, the property so dedicated instead of reverting to the grantor or his 
heirs, would be applied […] to some other religious or pious institution, similar in 
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character to the one which has failed, or to any other object by which benefit may 
accrue to human (Qureshi 1990: 132).21 
The popular opinion draws from this narrative to postulate that waqfs could not become extinct. 
However, a revisit to the canon that established waqfs clearly reveals that except for inferences, 
no direct mention of irrevocability is alluded to in the tradition. Nonetheless, understood on the 
prism of sadaqa, waqfs cannot be revoked because, “one who takes back his gift (which he has 
already given) is like a dog that swallows its vomit”, warned the Prophet (Sahih al-Bukhari 3:762, 
790-792, 804). A parallel could also be drawn with religious teachings regarding nadhir (vows), - 
what is pledged and consecrated for the service of God must eternally remain as such as explained 
in Qur’an 3:35-37.22 Thus, looked at from the wider perspective of consecrated properties, waqfs 
could not be withdrawn from the causes for which they were pledged. At most, this is the opinion 
widely advocated by the majority of renowned Sunni Muslim jurists including ibn Hanbal (A.D. 
780-855), al-Shafici (c. 767-820) and the disciples of Abu Hanifa, imams Abu Yussuf and 
Muhammad. 
However, according to Abu Hanifa (A.D. 699-767), waqf would be deemed null and void when the 
cause for which it was created becomes obsolete. Hence, failure of the principal purpose, opines 
Abu Hanifa, necessitates return of the corpus to the endower or his heirs upon his demise (Qureshi 
1990). By implication, therefore, according to Abu Hanifa, a waqf could as well become extinct. 
The imam also advances a contrary opinion from the majority that allows the cancellation of an 
existing waqf upon change of economic circumstances by the endower (Qureshi 1990; Kozlowski 
2008; Banday 2013). Clearly, he does not accept the idea by the majority on the principle of cy 
press where usufruct of the waqf could be used on similar causes in the community. 
Imam Malik (c. 708-795), on the other hand, propagates the view of conditional temporality of 
waqfs. He opines that waqfs could be “limited as to time or as to a life or series of lives, and after 
the expiration of the time or the extinction of the life or lives specified for beneficence, it reverted 
in full ownership to the waqif or his heirs” (Cattan 1984: 207). Under Shica Islam, however, until 
the waqf property has already been transferred for administration to the appointed mutawalli, it 
could as well be revoked. This suggests that Shica Islam equally espouses some measure of 
temporality in waqfs (Qureshi 1990). 
                                                 
21 See Cattan, H. (1984). The Law of Waqf, op. cit., p. 207. 
22 In Qur’an 3:35, God says; “[Mention, O Muhammad], when the wife of cImran said, ‘My Lord, indeed I have pledged to 
You what is in my womb, consecrated [for Your service], so accept this from me. Indeed, You are the Hearing, the 
Knowing.” The context here was in reference to Mary (Mariam), the mother of Jesus (Isa, A.S), who was consecrated for 
the service of God. The pledge was not canceled or the consecrated withdrawn thereafter. Consecrations in the Jewish 
tradition could also not be withdrawn. It is commanded that; “Whoever states ‘I give such and such an object to 
charity …may not retract”. See Qur’an 2:270-271; Qur’an 19:26; ‘hekdesh,’ Encyclopedia Judaica. Retrieved from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0008_0_08693.html (Last access 6/3/2018). 
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2.4.1 (In-)alienability of Waqfs and Shurut al- Waqif (Conditions of the Endower) 
The principle of inalienability as advanced by the majority opinion of Sunni theologians implies 
that since waqfs belong to God, no human person should confiscate them with a view to changing 
their ownership into private establishments. The principle of inalienability, does not, however, in 
case of revenue-yielding properties, prohibit istibdal, cana or hikr of the corpus with a view to 
improving its input or acquiring a better one to fulfill the wishes of the endower once the original 
property is ruined or fails to yield sufficient income to sustain itself. Nonetheless, in either of the 
circumstances, the consent of the kadhi (or court) has to be obtained (Qureshi 1990; Banday 
2013). 
Similarly, waqfs have, since immemorial times, not been immune to the law of compulsory 
acquisition by the state. However, the majority opinion of Muslim scholars holds that if waqf is 
alienated under such schemes the proceeds must be re-invested in another property to replace 
the initial one that would be managed in accordance with the shurut al-waqif (Banday 2013). On 
consecrating waqf, therefore, the endower enumerates how the institution would be managed, 
disposed of, used, the designated beneficiaries with their respective portions, and other 
conditions attached to the beneficiaries. Among conditions often attached to beneficiaries include 
age, gender, and lineage. Others are social status, particularly among females, like being married, 
single, divorced, or widowed, in case of waqf ahli. Some waqfs also require the observance of 
certain rituals aimed at immortalizing the endower. These include recitation of the Qur’an or 
mawlid (commemoration for the birth of the Prophet) where waqifs are believed to benefit from 
ducas (supplications) made for them during such rites (Shoenblum 1999; Lev 2005; Ghazaleh 
2011).23 
Nevertheless, it is the conviction of the majority of scholars that shurut al-waqif could be changed 
(tacbid) if they are perceived to be harmful to the society, beneficiaries, or when not beneficial to 
the waqf itself without necessarily invalidating the endowment (Oberauer 2008; Powers 2011). 
This prevailing view is ostensibly meant to instill a balance between legal theory and socio-
economic practical realities of waqfs, an undertaking that is also sanctioned by Qur’an 2:180-182 
on wasiyya (testamentary bequests). In light of the text, it is strongly held that necessary changes 
could be made to the conditions of the waqf with a view to “make peace between parties”, and by 
extension, between specified wishes of the endower and practical needs on the ground. 
                                                 
23 The question of reciting Qur’an and devoting the (spiritual) rewards to somebody else remains contested. A section 
of scholars hold such rite as void and sufficient reason for the nullification of the waqf (or bequest). Ibn Hanbal is said 
to have held this practice as un-Islamic innovation (bidca) ruling that “bequests for the mere reading of the Qur’an and 
hiring the readers, as such, causes degeneration towards the merits of the Qur’an, such as, diverting people from pious 
reading and causing people to read the Qur’an rather for the sake of earning money.” Ibn Taimiyya is equally claimed 
to hold a similar view that “no reward is obtained from reading the Qur’an for the sake of money;” and one cannot, 
therefore, confer to another person what he could not earn. However, in a fatwa (advisory opinion) issued at the Grand 
Court in Makka in A.H. 1377 (c.1957) regarding the validity of a waqf with the provision of hiring reciters of the Qur’an 
for the immortality of the endower, the recitation requirement was annulled and usufruct channeled to other residual 
pious causes. See Zaid, A. (1986). The Islamic Law of Bequest. Op. cit., pp. 54-55. 
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Included among shurut al-waqif that are often disregarded involve investment of the corpus. 
Conditions prohibiting lease of the corpus beyond a given period of time could be overlooked as 
circumstances may warrant longer period for economic viability. If on the other hand an endower 
had appointed his progeny as mutawalli but turns out to be ineffective, the kadhi reserves the right 
to disregard this provision and replace him for the benefit of the waqf (Makdisi 1981; van 
Leeuwen 1999). Further reasons that may necessitate change in shurut al-waqif include loss of the 
original waqf deed; ambiguity of purpose as spelt out in the clauses of the waqf deed, where 
purpose(s) for which waqf was established become obsolete; or when the purpose(s) was not 
mentioned at all. In all cases where shurut al-waqif are changed or completely disregarded, the 
usufruct of the waqf could be used for other pious causes in accordance with the doctrine of cy 
pres as held by the majority opinion (Layish 1983; Sanjuan 2007; Banday 2013). 
2.5 Classical Administration of Waqfs: The Mutawallis, cUlama, and the Kadhi 
Essentially, waqf is an autonomous enterprise managed by a mutawalli appointed by the endower 
upon its establishment.24 In the words of El Daly (2010: 61), “[waqf] is an individual act seeking 
the consent of Allah or the consent of one’s conscience, and their management remained subject 
to the choice of the endower by either taking over the nizara or by appointing a nazir.”25 A 
mutawalli could be an individual(s) or a corporate body (Qureshi 1990).26 Moreover, unless 
provided for in the endowment deed, “the founder has no legal capacity to dismiss an 
administrator formerly appointed by himself due to the fact that the beneficiaries’ right to make 
use of the hubs is directly linked to the way it is managed” (Sanjuan 2007: 307).27 In case of 
eventualities, however, the kadhi could dismiss any mutawalli “guilty of wrongdoing either as a 
result of negligence or because he has squandered the revenues under his control” for the good of 
the waqf (Sanjuan 2007: 307; Hoexter 1995). 
It is expected that the mutawalli would be a mature person of sound mind and legally responsible, 
with the capacity to carry out the functions of the office with knowledge and experience. He must 
be cadl (just), i.e. have an honorable record to preserve the waqf “and not to depart from the 
                                                 
24 The title ‘mutawalli’ has several generic terms including nazir, qayyim, mushrif, wali, mubashir, muqaddam, and 
sahibal-ahbas which could either be used interchangeably or in reference to different capacities and duties to denote 
trusteeship. See Makdisi, G. (1981). The Rise of Colleges, op. cit., pp. 45-48; Sanjuan, A. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth, 
op. cit., pp. 268; 297; 327-336. 
25 The endower of a waqf, except under the Malik madhhab could as well become a mutawalli of his waqf and merely an 
administrator without legal ownership of the property. This makes mutawallis to be of two types: by inheritance rights 
(al-nazir bicl-asala) and by stipulation (al-nazir al-mashrut) i.e. not a legal heir of the endower. See Makdisi, G. (1981). 
The Rise of Colleges, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 
26 According to the majority opinion, it is illegal for one mutawalli of a jointly administered waqf to make unilateral 
decisions. In the long absence or tender age of one of them where affairs of the waqf would be affected, the kadhi could 
appoint a temporary replacement until the return or maturity of the initial mutawalli. See Zaid, A. (1986). The Islamic 
Law of Bequest, op. cit., pp. 126-128. 
27 Imam Abu Yusuf, though, holds a contrary opinion that whether the waqif has provided for or not, the kadhi retains 
the authority to remove the nazir when he is proved to be inefficient for the good of the waqf. See Qureshi, M. (1990). 
Waqfs in India, op. cit., p. 261. 
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intentions of the founder or from any rule fixed by him as to the objects of the benefactions” 
(Qureshi 1990: 240). Like a manager of a commercial enterprise in the case of revenue-bearing 
waqf, the mutawalli is further empowered “to do all those acts which are reasonable and necessary 
for the protection and administration of the waqf properties under his supervision” (Qureshi 
1990: 264). These include seeking to improve the income of the waqf through hire, lease, or charge 
with the approval by the kadhi;28 protect the property against encroachment; apply the income to 
the designated objectives of the waqf; and where necessary, employ other agents to help him in 
discharging the administrative responsibilities. For reasons of good management practices, 
mutawallis are also expected to keep proper records and be open for auditing though they could 
not be compelled to spend the usufruct of the waqf in ways not provided for by the endower 
(Barnes 1986; Hennigan 2004; Lev 2005; Kozlowski 2008). 
The Sharica does not bar women or non-Muslims from becoming mutawallis (Qureshi 1990). 
Customary practices have, nonetheless, in most times taken precedence in deciding how the 
position is filled particularly in favor of male descendants of the endower. This is especially true 
in patriarchal societies with the view to preserving the management of family wealth in the hands 
of men. In such cases, appointed mutawallis accrue economic and social privileges as they get 
double shares of the generated revenue both as beneficiaries and administrators.29 The position 
of mutawalli has also been dominated by males where the functions of the office demanded 
execution of certain spiritual rites associated with men. These may include leading prayers, 
delivering Friday khutba (sermon) or sounding the adhan (call for prayers) (Layish 1983; Barnes 
1986; Kozlowski 2008). Within this context, the position accords mutawallis socio-cultural and 
symbolic privileges associated with the power to decide on the distribution of the revenues and 
beneficiaries, especially where limited resources are concerned. 
The culama and the fuqaha’ (jurists) on the other hand hold a very significant position under the 
Sharica for the general well-being of waqfs in the community. Waqfs provided a steady source of 
income for a large segment of the community of culama and the fuqaha’ “who, apart from 
performing religious duties, had a monopoly on the interpretation of the Sharica and accumulated 
the most influential bureaucratic, judicial, and administrative state offices” (Sanjuan 2007: 419; 
Kuran 2001). Since mosques, Qur’an schools, and the zawiyas (Sufi orders) were among the major 
beneficiaries of waqfs, it goes without saying that “it is the fuqaha’ [and culama] who, by virtue of 
their knowledge in the cultural and legal realms, monopolized the religious and educational 
functions performed in those institutions” (Sanjuan 2007: 420). Such institutions became the 
                                                 
28 Despite the sanction of the kadhi (courts) being necessary in contracts of lease or rent for waqfs, it is opined that if 
found beneficial, such contracts would not be regarded as invalid even when not sanctioned. See Qureshi, M. (1990). 
Waqfs in India, op. cit., p. 269. 
29 The Sharica does not clearly define the remuneration of the mutawalli. He is, moderately though, allowed to draw his, 
and even that of his friends’ providence from the waqf. The position of a mutawalli was mostly honorary with occupants 
working on voluntary basis for unspecified tokens in case of revenue-generating waqfs. However, kadhis could fix the 
tokens up to 10 % where endowers failed to provide for them in the waqf deeds. See Sahih al-Bukhari, 3:507, 895; 
Barnes, J. (1986). An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire, op.cit.; Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in 
India, op. cit.; Kozlowski, G. (2008). Muslim Endowments and Society in British India, op. cit. 
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conduits through which the culama and the fuqaha’ greatly enjoyed the usufruct of waqfs while 
some even became dedicators themselves. 
The kadhi could as well be appointed by an endower as the first mutawalli apart from bearing 
witness to the endowing process or prepare the waqf deed for an illiterate endower. The kadhi 
could further assume mutawalliship if the post fell vacant without predetermined provisions on 
how it was to be filled, or when the beneficiaries of the waqf included the indeterminate legal 
entities, i.e. the poor, ill, or the general Muslim public. Once the kadhi assumes mutawalliship, he 
also retains the final decision on determining the deserving among beneficiaries and their relative 
portions, unless initially provided for in the waqf deed (Makdisi 1981; Hoexter 1995; Sanjuan 
2007). Thus, in deciding who and how much to give at any given point and time, waqfs accorded 
the kadhi a symbolic and material power and authority over a wider socio-religious constituency 
of Muslims. 
As a matter of fact, the Sharica does not empower a mutawalli to commit to commercial contracts 
that could ‘alienate’ waqfs like leases. It is the jurisdiction of the kadhi to sanction or undertake 
any such contracts necessary for the good of the waqfs.30 Besides, from a legal perspective as an 
authoritative source of Islamic jurisprudence, all disputes related to waqfs fell within the kadhi’s 
jurisdiction. He settled disputes between mutawallis and beneficiaries with regard to their 
inclusion or exclusion, and clarified legal clauses relating to the functionality of waqfs. These 
included, but not limited to, transfer of revenues between endowments and use of revenues on 
pious purposes vis-à-vis prevailing community needs, and recovering illegally alienated waqfs 
(Makdisi 1981; Sanjuan 2007). 
Such was the role that kadhis and, generally, the culama held in relation to waqfs in Islam that 
accorded them an expansive social, economic, and ‘symbolic capital’ in the community. Looked at 
from a different perspective, however, it ought to be appreciated that kadhis, as judicial officers, 
were always part of the government and their independence could not be taken for granted. To a 
larger extent, it was kadhis who were used by some rulers to usurp control and administration of 
waqfs. In Egypt, for example, state control of waqfs started as early as A.D. 737 during the reign of 
the tenth Umayyad khalifa - Hisham bin Abd al-Malik (691-743 A.D.) when the management was 
assigned to a state department, diwan al-awqaf, at the behest of kadhi Tawba b. Namir al-Hadrami 
(Rashid 1978; Sanjuan 2007). This was in addition to his judicial tasks of settling civil and criminal 
disputes with a view to ensuring that usufruct of waqfs were channeled towards the designated 
purposes. 
Similar trends were also noted in the Samanid Empire (A.D. 819-999) where a diwan al-awqaf was 
established (Rashid 1978). By the reign of Abu Tamim Ma’ad al-Mu’izz (953-975 C.E.), the Fatimid 
                                                 
30 The Sharica allows intra-waqf borrowing, i.e. tasrif (also sarf) among mixed or charitable waqfs. Waqf development 
loans in the contemporary times could also be secured through Islamic commercial banks as well as the two subsidiaries 
of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) - the World Waqf Fund (WWF) and the Awqaf Properties Investment Fund 
(APIF). See Makdisi, G. (1981). The Rise of Colleges, op. cit.; Sanjuan, G. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth, op. cit. 
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dynasty ordered the complete handing over of waqfs and their related records to the state 
treasury. The state hence forth edged out the mutawallis to directly manage waqfs with 
beneficiaries and the state sharing the usufruct.31 Neither was the situation different during the 
reign of the Ottoman Empire where the department of waqf was elevated to ministry of Imperial 
Religious Endowments during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839). Its main mandate was 
to register, control, and manage waqfs thereby, strengthening state grip over the institution 
(Barnes 1986; Lev 2005; El Daly 2010). 
There are three paradigms adopted in explaining the deviation from classical administration of 
waqfs by individual mutawallis and culama to state control: First, it is alleged that government 
takeover and control of waqfs was at times necessitated by the need to reign on inept and corrupt 
mutawallis and kadhis. The establishment of the ministry of Imperial Religious Endowments 
during the Ottoman Empire, for instance, was born out of such necessity as summarized by Barnes 
(1986: 102): 
…it was charged that the kadis would give judgments both for and against litigants in 
some cases. What is more, they would recommend for office both successors and 
predecessors of religious posts, issue statements that were contradictory to one 
another, and charge exorbitant fees as bribes to appoint unqualified persons to 
religious offices... 
With inept and inefficient kadhis, justice was not only a preserve of the highest bidders, but 
occupation of the positions of mutawalli by unqualified cronies also became the norm contrary to 
shurut al-waqif (van Leeuwen 1999). This gross misconduct amounted to auctioning waqfs to 
people who were ready to pay high prices, consequently, turning the institution to a private 
property enterprise. It was presumed laudable under such circumstances, therefore, for the state 
to institute strict control and supervision of the administration of waqfs by requiring that 
mutawallis submit periodic reports to the state office, carry out quarterly auditing of office records 
and personal accounts. Mutawallis were also threatened with further investigation into their 
conduct and possible auction of their private properties to recover stolen waqfs should claims of 
misappropriation be proved against them (Barnes 1986). 
Secondly, state involvement and supervision of waqfs was justified in instances where aims of the 
waqfs were closely related to some of the primary responsibilities of the state like provision of 
health care, education, housing, and other social-welfare services. Under such situations, 
therefore, state control of waqfs, particularly where the official line between din (religion) and 
dawla (state, politics) was unclear, was necessary ostensibly to defend the interests of the general 
public. This was evident in Persia, Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire (Hoexter 1995, 2002; Sheriff 
2001; Sanjuan 2007). Thus, where governments were involved in waqf affairs under this pretext 
                                                 
31On state control of waqfs during the Abbasid Caliphate (A. D. 750-1258) by the Buwayhids, see Kozlowski, G. (2008). 
Muslim Endowments and Society in British India, op. cit. 
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fit into the role as part of their obligations as legitimate political establishments ‘concerned’ with 
the welfare of the citizenry. 
Thirdly, state involvement in waqfs was perceived as a conscious political strategy aimed at 
stemming the rising popularity and independence of the culama and the general Muslim 
community. Among colonial governments as manifested in British Zanzibar, India, and Palestine; 
British East Africa Protectorate (1888-1963) as established by this study; French Algeria, Syria, 
and Lebanon; and the Italian colony of Libya (1911-1941), the underlying reason was, arguably, 
to consolidate political power by controlling the economic mainstay of the culama, zawiyas, and 
the diverse groups of beneficiaries (Deguilhem 2008; Medici 2011). Significantly, it also accorded 
Muslim political establishments an opportunity to use this religious institution to legitimize 
political authority and demonstrate its responsibility to the citizenry as it was the case in the 
Ottoman Empire from 1826. Powers (1989: 538) summarizes this position in the following way: 
In pre-modern times, the endowment system had been controlled by Muslim religious 
scholars (culama), who were the primary beneficiaries of public endowments and 
who, in their function as judges, oversaw the proper functioning of both public and 
family endowments. The endowment system had provided the culama with an 
extensive economic base that made them largely independent of Muslim rulers. 
During the 19th century, however, the religious scholars came in to conflict with 
Muslim and non-Muslim rulers who wanted to weaken the power of the culama and 
gain access either to revenues generated by religious endowments or to endowment 
property itself. 
Although basically a religious institution, the economic potential of waqfs could not, therefore, go 
unnoticed by other interested parties like the state. The material assets accruing from the various 
waqf transactions offered a significant ‘economic, social, and symbolic capitals’ as well as a 
spiritual symbol that the political authorities could not easily neglect for the enhancement of their 
public image and policy (Kozolowski 1996, 2008; Arjomand 1998; van Leeuwen 1999). 
2.6 A Brief History on the Classification of Waqfs in Islam 
It is debatable as to when and where formal attempts to categorize waqfs in Islam begun, or if it 
was necessary in the first place to do so. This is because, as Anderson (1959: 154) posits, “classical 
texts on waqf make no distinctions whatsoever between what are now termed ‘charitable waqfs’ 
on the one hand and ‘family waqfs’ on the other. Both, alike, were regarded as perfectly valid.” 
Concurring with Anderson, Baer (1969) and Hoexter (1995) hold that classification of waqfs is 
indeed a later development in the institution aimed at highlighting the underlying differences 
between initial beneficiaries of individual endowments. In their view, efforts to categorize waqfs 
were informed by Western legislations and ideologies (Hoexter 1995: 141; Baer 1969). 
Hoexter, Anderson, and Baer among others, further argue that categorizing waqfs on the bases of 
beneficiaries is misleading as beneficiaries tend to straddle between the various types of waqfs. 
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As a matter of fact, beneficiaries cutting across several waqfs are a feature regarded as reminiscent 
with the institution since earliest times. Conversely, mutawallis could end up disregarding shurut 
al-waqif in relation to purposes of the waqf. Thus, they observe that, it is the aspect of perpetuity 
that necessitates the apparent lack of differences in waqfs since to maintain this requirement, all 
waqfs must designate the indeterminate poor and needy as ultimate beneficiaries. Consequently, 
this makes the different types of waqfs to have no legal differences (Baer 1969; 1998; McChesney 
1991; Hoexter 1995). 
Lev (2005) identifies four distinct forms of waqfs based on the types of properties as adopted 
during the period of Mamluk Egypt. First was the al-rizaq al-ahbasiyya (endowed agricultural 
land) mainly created from approximately 130,000 faddan (acres) in the rural territory. These 
waqfs were administered by a nazir appointed among the civilian notables by the dynasty and 
supported mosques and zawiyas. Second was al-awqaf al-hukmiyya, normally administered by the 
chief Shafici kadhi, consisting of revenue-bearing estates in the towns of Fustat and Cairo. These 
were designated for the ransoming of Muslim prisoners of war, maintenance of the two holy 
mosques of Mecca and Medina, and other charitable purposes. 
At third position was waqf ahli administered either by mutawallis appointed by the dedicator, the 
kadhi, or the Sultans. This type of waqf departs sharply from the above classification criterion as 
is based mainly on purpose and designated beneficiaries rather than endowed properties. 
Proceeds of waqf ahli, whose sources of revenue are not clear, mostly benefited the endower’s 
progeny, religious, and educational causes. Finally, there was also waqf al-turaha’ established for 
the provision of burial rites of the indigents in the society. The first of such waqfs in Egypt is 
claimed to have been established by the Baybars before being common during the Mamluk period. 
Such social services were found mostly in hospitals including the eleventh century Samarkand 
and thirteenth century Mansuri hospital in Cairo (Lev 2005). 
Along the East African coast, the first formal classification of waqfs is believed to have been 
undertaken by shaykh Ahmad b. Sumayt (1861-1925), the Shafici kadhi of Zanzibar (Oberauer 
2008). On his part, shaykh Sumayt classified waqfs into private (waqf al-khassa) and public (waqf 
camm) continuum.32 While the former catered for the endower’s descendants and dependents, 
including manumitted slaves, concubines, and religious institutions like mosques and madrasas, 
the later was meant for the support of the poor in the society. At times, however, strict 
demarcation between the two types of waqfs was not observed as demanded in accordance with 
the endower’s wishes, further blurring the differences between the two categories (Oberauer 
2008). The majority of contemporary academic discourses, however, classify waqfs as indicated 
below. 
                                                 
32 Hoexter argues that these distinctions existed since earliest times as mentioned in the works of Mawardi though they 
were not strictly different types of waqfs according to beneficiaries as propounded in later studies. Rather, they involved 
how and who administers the manfaca of the waqf in relation to the claims of God and those of the community. See 
Hoexter, M. (1995). Huquq Allah and Huquq al-Ibad as Reflected in the Waqf Institution. Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and 
Islam, 19, 133-156 (here, pp. 140-141). 
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2.6.1 Waqf Dhurri (Family or Private Waqfs)  
Also known as waqf ahli or waqf al-awlad, these consecrations are established to cater for the 
maintenance of the endower’s progeny with a provision to benefit the indeterminate masakin, 
fuqara, or other public worthy causes upon extinction of the family chain (Deguihem 2008). In the 
several traditions attributed to the Prophet encouraging people to provide for their progeny, one 
typically stands out advising: 
…it is better for you to leave your inheritors wealthy than to leave them poor begging 
others, and whatever you spend for Allah’s sake will be considered as a charitable 
deed even the handful of food you put into your wife’s mouth…(Sahih al-Bukhari 4:5). 
The moral teaching of this tradition informing establishment of waqf dhurri is that providing for 
one’s family is a revered religious obligation and a form of charity that draws one closer to God. 
Among properties that were frequently endowed for the maintenance of the family include 
immovable possessions like agricultural lands, buildings, and plantations. Contrary to the 
majority opinion, however, the Hanafi madhhab requires that the endower provides for an eternal 
public cause as residual beneficiary upon extinction of the progeny as a prerequisite for validity 
of the consecration (Layish 1983: 4). The practical reality is, nonetheless, that the possibility of 
such corpus passing over to the benefits of the general poor and needy or some other charitable 
causes for the interest of the general public could be very slim, almost non-existent. This is 
because waqifs often stipulate how benefits should trickle down from one tacqib (generation of 
descendants) of the endower to the other, including the yet to be borne, until all the beneficiaries 
in this long chain have been exhausted (Sanjuan 2007; Powers 2011). 
According to Abu Hanifa, an endower could as well designate himself as a beneficiary of the family 
waqf.33Imams Abu Yusuf and Muhammad (Abu Hanifa’s disciples) and the Maliki madhhab, 
nonetheless, object this view. In the majority opinion, therefore, a provision in the waqf deed 
according the endower a share of usufruct renders the waqf invalid (Makdisi 1981; Layish 1983).34 
To circumvent the prohibition of an endower benefiting from his own waqf as opposed by the 
majority opinion, endowers occasionally dedicated the usufruct of waqf ahli to their minors or 
unborn children. This in turn accorded them the opportunity to remain as custodians, hence 
attaining unlimited access to the waqf until the birth and or upon maturity of the assigned 
beneficiaries (Layish 1983; Powers 2002). 
                                                 
33 The Ithna’ cAshari sect (Shica Islam) is also not in favor of the endower being a beneficiary. The validity of family waqfs 
became a subject of protracted court battles in India in 1894 owing to the long chains of beneficiaries making the 
charitable cause almost non-existent. This was, however, settled by the passing of the Waqf Validating Act of 1913. See 
Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India, op cit., pp.83-84; Khan, A. (2008). Commentary on the Law of Waqf in India, op. cit., 
pp. 103-104. 
34 Shica Islam allows a dedicator to be a beneficiary of his waqf if he provides for the poor and later becomes 
impoverished himself. See Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India, op. cit. 
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Significantly, endowers were morally obliged not to exploit waqf ahli to discriminate among heirs 
as beneficiaries of waqf or even give undue advantage over others (Sahih al-Bukhari 3:760). 
Accordingly, family endowments created in favor of males to the exclusion of females are 
abhorrent and could be invalidated according to the majority opinion of Sunni theologians 
(Powers 2011). There are, however, various strategies employed by waqifs to circumvent moral 
and religious prohibitions in using waqfs to the disadvantage of descendants. A waqif could infuse 
equality between genders on the distribution of the usufruct of family waqf contrary to the Qur’an 
guidelines on inheritance and preponderant view on validity of waqfs by renowned Muslim 
theologians. By designating the distribution of usufruct of waqf “in equal parts” between the 
beneficiaries, he clearly refutes the divine guidelines in ilm al-faraid (law of inheritance) requiring 
that to “the male the like of the portion of two females” (Qur’an 4:11-12).35 
Waqifs could also choose to discriminate between beneficiaries (i.e. to make the waqf exclusive), 
by employing certain measures including: (a) privileging the males in administering the waqf 
where they would have double shares as wages and shares of beneficence; (b) omitting females 
from the chain of beneficiaries; or (c) putting a conditional clause to females’ shares, e.g. providing 
that they shall benefit only if they do not marry, or upon divorce, or being widowed; and (d) 
excluding the daughters’ children to prevent the family wealth from trickling to the ‘outsiders’. 
According to the Malik madhhab, however, unless specifically mentioned by the endower, 
preference to one gender over the other is an exception rather than a rule in the institution of 
waqf. Equality of gender in the sharing of usufruct of waqf ahli has to be maintained in accordance 
with the Prophet’s traditions (Sanjuan 2007; Powers 2011). 
2.6.2 Waqf Khayri (Charitable) and Mushtarak (Mixed) Waqfs  
Endowers of charitable waqfs usually dedicate their usufruct to public causes or institutions from 
which they are believed to benefit from supplications made for them by the beneficiaries in return. 
Beneficiaries of waqf khayri could, therefore, range from the indeterminate disadvantaged social 
groups like the masakin, fuqara, and socio-religious groups inhabiting certain regions in 
expression of the endower’s attachment with them. Others could be public welfare institutions or 
projects such as education, health care, masjids, and road networks. Often included also are 
welfare programs like iftar (meal at the end of fasting day), sponsoring of hajj rites, burial rites, 
and organizing for marriage among others (Hoexter 1998a; Lev 2005; Deguilhem 2008). 
The beneficiaries’ base under waqf khayri is thus, ‘the indeterminate legal entity’ enabling 
widening of the family circle and strengthening the social fabric of the umma (Ghazaleh 2011:8-
9). As such, honest disposition of the usufruct to the greater public would, undoubtedly, rely on 
the mutawalli or it is otherwise susceptible to abuse. To avoid such abuses, mutawallis often zero 
                                                 
35 Waqifs could also invoke such phrases as thumma (thereafter) and awwalan fa-awwalan (one generation after 
another) in the waqf deeds to prohibit the progeny from sharing but draw the usufruct following each generation. They 
could, nonetheless, use waw (and) to indicate concurrence in the drawing of usufruct between generations of 
beneficiaries. See Powers, D. (2011). The Development of Islamic Law and Society in the Maghrib: Qadis, Muftis and Family 
Law. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
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in the beneficiaries base and distribute the usufruct among a few deserving cases, which according 
to some jurists, are “sufficient to discharge the executor from the duty related to such bequests” 
(Zaid 1986: 99). This analogy is said to be informed on a fatwa by shaykh Ibn Duhaish, head of the 
Grand Court of Makka (A. H. 1377) which provides: 
If a person makes a waqf (or bequest), with its revenue defined to be spent on the 
poor and needy people, and if among the children of the dedicator one is found to fit 
such a description, he or she is more entitled to it than the known poor or needy. 
Hence, he is to be given only the amount considered to suffice his or her need (as 
quoted in Zaid, 1986: 99). 
Waqfs could also be consecrated simultaneously as mushtarak (mixed, i.e. dhurri and khayri) on 
specified proportions as identified by the endower (Powers 1989; McChesney 1991; Deguihem 
2008). Thus in predetermined shares, beneficiaries could range from family members of the 
endower to public welfare institutions within or outside the endower’s geographical region of 
abode. Included among beneficiaries could also be the indeterminate poor of the two holy cities 
of Mecca and Medina as an expression of religious attachment with the two in the Muslim world 
(Hoexter 1998; Leeuwen 1999).36 
2.7 Purpose and Objectives of Waqfs in Islam: The Spiritual Motivation 
The underlying purpose for establishing waqfs is, ostensibly, to respond to the numerous divine 
calls in the Qur’an and Prophet’s traditions to relieve the economic hardships of the less fortunate 
in the community. By doing so, therefore, it is presumed that one aligns himself with the divine 
teachings so as to acquire sawab and qurba from God by appropriating the established charity as 
a means rather than an end in itself. In the several such divine calls, God says: 
They ask you, [O Muhammad], what they should spend. Say, "Whatever you spend of 
good is [to be] for parents and relatives and orphans and the needy and the traveler. 
And whatever you do of good - indeed, Allah is knowing of it." (Qur’an 2:215). 
While encouraging believers to seek divine grace, God is at the same time warning against selfish 
accumulation of wealth without regard to the economically disadvantaged in the society. He 
warns such defaulters of dire consequences where “their necks will be encircled by what they 
withheld on the Day of Resurrection” for being irresponsible with what had been entrusted to 
them weakening the social fabric of the umma (Qur’an 3:180; Sahih al-Bukhari 2:485-486). Within 
                                                 
36 Another type – waqf nuqud (cash waqfs) relies on money, whether cash, shares or government promissory notes, as 
its corpus. The corpus is lent out in a business contract called mudaraba that attracts a percentage fee as profit which 
is channeled to the designated beneficiaries as directed by the endower. See Mandaville, J. (1979). Usurious Piety: The 
Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire. The International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10, 289-308; 
Suhrawardy, A. (1911). Waqf of Movables. Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 7, pp. 342-358; Hoexter, M. (2002). 
The Waqf and the Public Sphere. In M. Hoexter, S. Eisenstadt & N. Levton (Eds.), The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies 
(p. 126). New York: State University of New York Press.  
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this context, therefore, establishing waqf becomes “a worthy moral gesture and piously religious 
act” (Doumani 1998: 15). 
Such demonstration of individual piety could be discerned in the waqf deeds as “most commonly, 
the founder indicates that he or she is seeking the face of God the Almighty and the abundance of 
His momentous reward” (Powers 2011: 384). As a matter of fact, the urge to seek the pleasure of 
God is not a preserve of any socio-economic group of believers in the community in the sense that, 
even a ruler who established waqfs “never did so as a representative of the realm. His act of 
endowment, like that by anyone else, was the act of a private individual”, opines Hoexter (2002: 
121). This view is also shared by the study as established among consecrations by former liwalis 
and mudirs in Kenya’s Muslim community.  
The desire to seek sawab and qurba through endowments is also not restricted to Islam. Religious 
minority groups like Jews and Christians in the predominantly Ottoman Muslim society, for 
instance, are claimed to have established ‘waqfs’ because “charity and pious endowments were 
concepts shared by the three monotheistic religions” as a way of communicating with God (Lev 
2005: 53). Jews (like those in Qayrawan, Tunisia) and Christians (in medieval Egypt) allegedly 
established and managed ‘waqfs’ that benefited their individual progenies, the indeterminate poor 
public, their religious institutions as well as the clergy (van Leeuwen 1994: 30-33; 1999; Macuch 
2004; Lev 2005). Neither is the religious motivation restricted to the male gender as established 
by Doumani (1998). The author observed in his study, for instance that, 47% of waqfs in Tripoli 
and between 25% and 40% in Istanbul, Cairo, Aleppo, and Jerusalem were established by women 
during the period 1800-1860.37 
Waqfs fit in the vast purview of charity, and sadaqa jariyya in particular. This partly explains the 
provision for social welfare causes or religious rites by some endowers of mushtarak and waqf 
khayri where beneficiaries would perform supplications for them (Doumani 1998; Ghazaleh 
2011). This was also observed by the present study as contained in some of the reviewed waqf 
deeds. In a nutshell, the spiritual viewpoint informs the principal reason for consecrations. 
Seeking qurba and sawab was encapsulated in the endowments whether by ensuring that one’s 
progeny would be catered for upon his demise (in the case of waqf ahli); or the non-revenue 
bearing religious institutions and causes would function uninterrupted for the service of the 
community (in the case of waqf khayri); or both (waqf mushtarak). It would be erroneous, 
nonetheless, to deny that waqfs could be used for various socio-political and economic reasons by 
different actors in the society since “politics and religion were not separate spheres but had an 
intricate entanglement” in the majority of Muslim societies (Lev 2005: 28). As Hennigan (2004), 
however, opines such circumstances should be viewed within the perspective of uses rather than 
                                                 
37 On distribution of endowers by gender in Syria, see Doumani, B. (1998). Endowing Family: Waqf, Property Devolution, 
and Gender in Greater Syria, 1800-1860. Journal of Society for Comparative Study of Society and History, 19(52), pp. 3-
41; Sanjuan, G. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth, op. cit., p. 95. 
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essence of waqfs. Taking cue from this background, we thus, in the following section of the 
discussion, seek to highlight the historical uses of waqfs among various Muslim communities. 
2.7.1 Politicization of Waqfs in Islam 
The appropriation of waqfs as a political tool was manifested in two perspectives: establishing 
waqfs to legitimize political authority as charitable and concerned with the public welfare or use 
existing waqfs to control the culama and by extension, the umma, by appointing the former as 
administrators that political elites could manipulate.For instance, “the Fatimids, the Ayyubids 
after them, and the Mamluks non-native dynasties, employed pious endowments as a means of 
cultivating an image of themselves as legitimate rulers, also supported by the creation of madrasas 
and hospitals that would foster the image of the ruling family as philanthropic monarchs,” argues 
Sanjuan (2007: 410). 
Significantly, appropriating waqfs as an economic tool for political ends was not a preserve of the 
ruling class, but also those with immense wealth with a view to gain entry into and negotiate the 
political field. Expounding this view, Kozlowski (1996: 203) notes: 
…individuals controlling surplus wealth who possessed or aspired to social, cultural 
and political prominence established endowments as a way of expressing as well as 
preserving social influence […] When the ra’is built a mosque, it was usually located 
within his home compound and served needs of his own retinue […] the communities 
activities of prominent men and women. 
Religious minority groups like the Jews and Christians in the predominantly Ottoman Muslim 
society were also alleged to have established ‘waqfs’ as a means to political legitimacy and identity 
(van Leeuwen 1994, 1999; Doumani 1998; Lefebvre 2005; Deguihem 2008). To such minorities, 
endowing and managing their ‘waqfs’ “by applying to the Sharica court, basing their applications 
on Sharica” accorded them the economic and social wherewithal to contribute to the socio-cultural 
welfare of the community as a block (Reiter 1996: 34). This in turn made them conspicuous and 
assertive as socio-political communities than it would have been were they to act as individual 
adherents. This suggests that it is not only individuals who could appropriate waqfs for political 
purposes, but also minority socio-ethnic and theological groups within the Muslim society as was 
established by the present study among some Asian migrants in Kenya. 
A cross section of scholars, however, holds the view that the line between religion and politics in 
Islam has always been blurred (Sheriff 2001; Hoexter 1998a, 1998b, 2002; Mwakimako 2007b). 
Eickelman and Piscatori observed that, there is a tendency to claim the inseparability between din 
and dawla in Islam. In their opinion, this was contingent on the belief that “religion and political 
power needed to be combined in one office to allow Sharica implementation and protection of the 
umma” (2004: 46). In this context, therefore, it becomes impossible or even unnecessary at times, 
to ascertain with clarity the primary objective of a believer, especially among the ruling elites, 
when undertaking a religious act involving charity. This is demonstrated in a study by van 
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Leeuwen on the thirteenth century Damascus under the Ayyubid. Accordingly, he maintains that 
endowments established by members of the ruling circle, were appropriated “to accord spiritual 
legitimacy to the policies of the ruling elites, express their personal inclinations, or even reflect 
official state ideology as all the while they remained covered under the veneer of religion” (1999: 
97-101). 
The view was further compounded by sultans who established waqfs or removed from the direct 
control of individual mutawallis those already established waqfs that produced considerable 
income and supported certain religious rites like hajj and zawiyas by appointing administrators 
on the basis of theological dispositions. Consequently, as Makdisi (1981: 39; van Leeuwen 1994) 
observed, waqfs enabled the “control of the popular masses by having their religious leaders in 
one’s pay.” Corroborating this view is Barnes (1986: 43) who submits that “a significant majority 
of waqfs during the 18th century Ottoman caliphate were founded by the ruling class with those 
endowed by the reaya accounting for only 10%.”38 
The argument also finds credence in the establishment of ministries and departments in-charge 
of waqfs across Muslim governments and invading colonial powers like the British East Africa 
Protectorate as established by the present study. These state bodies were managed by staff 
appointed by the rulers charged with the mandate of ensuring that control of waqfs remained 
under close imperial supervision (Barnes 1986; Lev 2005; Medici 2011). As a result, almost every 
educational institution, health care facility, mosque, and orphanages, particularly, around the 
Ottoman cities, that were established on waqfs became under state control. Within this context, it 
was opined that “the foundation of waqfs by the examples of the ruling family should be seen as a 
deliberate policy to enhance the grip of the ruling elite on the urban infrastructure” (Isin / 
Lefebvre 2005: 15). 
As life in the political sphere became unpredictable with those falling out of favor losing their 
fortunes, some Muslims allegedly consecrated waqfs to protect their wealth against confiscation. 
“By dedicating his estate as a family vakif, a government official could place his property in a 
condition of untouchability for the enjoyment of his family and his posterity,” posits Barnes (1986: 
16-17). The argument is also supported by research findings of Isin / Lefebvre (2005) that 
between 95% and 98% of all forms of waqfs in Tripoli and Nablus respectively from 1800 to 1860 
identify the endower as the first mutawalli. Based on these observations, the authors conclude 
that waqf as an institution, offers a dedicator a “protective shield against imperial confiscation 
while obligating the founder for benefaction” (2005: 14). 
The overwhelming incidences where waqfs were appropriated as a tool for entry in to and 
negotiation in the political sphere is not, however, in denial of several other waqfs by members of 
the ruling circle that could have been solely established for the salvation of individual souls as 
                                                 
38 Barnes explains ‘reaya’ as consisting of the Muslim and non-Muslim peasantry and merchant class of citizens in the 
Ottoman Empire who formed the bulk of the population then. See Barnes, J. (1986). An Introduction to Religious 
Foundations, op. cit. p. 43. 
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shown in the works of Singer (2003) and Lev (2005).39 The two authors assert that in the majority, 
if not all of the Muslim political establishments, women and eunuchs were the least expected to 
hold political offices. This was demonstrated in the waqfs of “the mother of Abbasids caliph Harun 
al-Rashid (786-809), and his wife, Zubayda; Khatun Safwat al-Mulk, mother of Duqaq; the Seljukid 
prince of Damascus; and wife of Tughtakin, the powerful Atabek and ruler of Damascus” (Lev 
2005: 31). Other waqfs were those by Safiye Sultan, wife of Murad III (1574-1595) and mother of 
Mehmed III (1595-1603) in Eminönü, Istanbul (Singer 2003). Also making it to the list were waqfs 
of the eunuchs like Masrur and Husam al-Din Lu’lu at the Fatimid palace and Fa’iq from the 
Abbasid caliph al-Mu’tamid (870-892) (Hathaway 1998; Lev 2005; Sanjuan 2007). These 
represent the exceptions within the ruling circles whose waqfs could not be satisfactorily 
explained by political motivations making the perception that the consecrations were solely 
appropriated for political ends untenable. 
The foregoing argument on the use of waqfs as a means to protecting wealth against confiscation 
elicits two significant considerations: first is the composition and political culture of the Mamluk 
and Ottoman societies. Apart from being predominant Muslim societies, the prevailing political 
culture allowed victors to confiscate private properties from their victims exposing them to social, 
economic, and political ruin. This, undoubtedly, necessitated the placing of ‘properties in a 
condition of untouchability’. As established by the present study, however, the ‘Mamluk/Ottoman 
like’ political culture did not exist in Kenya. This is, nevertheless, not to deny that there were 
seasoned politicians and Muslim administrators - liwalis and mudirs, who could be regarded as 
‘ruling elites’ in the society associated with several waqfs.40 More so, though the administrative 
positions of the liwali and mudir were retained as part of the British colonial policy of indirect 
rule, the occupiers of such positions were very few in the Protectorate (only ten, according to 
Partridge and Gillard 1995) to sustain the argument on using waqfs as a protection against 
confiscation of ill-gotten wealth. 
More importantly, statistics drawn from Kenya Population and Housing Census of 2009 by the 
KNBS place Muslims at 11.2%, translating to about four point three million of the thirty eight 
million Kenyans.41 With the predominant Muslim regions falling way below national averages in 
                                                 
39 The term ‘ruling class’ was used to denote people and families that had political authority. However, not all people 
within this class wielded political power, for instance slaves, eunuchs, and women who belonged to the ruling families. 
These people, with or without political power, could thus be put together in a broader class of the ‘ruling circles’. See 
Lev, Y. (2005). Charity, Endowments, and Charitable Institutions in Medieval Islam. Florida: University Press of Florida, 
p. 29. 
40On consecration of waqfs by wealthy merchants as part of social responsibility but turn to use the beneficiaries as 
political constituency. See Fair, L. (2001). Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban 
Zanzibar, 1890-1945. Athens: Ohio University Press; Sheriff, A. (2001). The Records of the ‘Waqf Commission’, op. cit., 
pp. 27-45.; Oberauer, N. (2008). ‘Fantastic Charities’: The Transformation of Waqf Practices in Colonial Zanzibar. Islamic 
Law and Society, 15(3), 315-370. 
41 The population of Muslims in Kenya is a controversial and emotive subject on the account of a state policy that 
allocates resources on the basis of group population. Though contested, figures given by the KNBS derived from the 
2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census remain the only official statistics.  
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the provision of socio-cultural services and general development (see Appendices 9.1 and 9.2), it 
clearly illustrates that Muslims are not only a minority, but also a marginalized group in a 
predominantly Christian society. Moreover, the institution of waqf is controlled by the 
government through a state agency, secular policies and civil institutions that not only make 
registration obligatory but also alienate normative precepts. Accordingly, this compounds the 
view that state control of waqfs was geared towards control of resources, and by extension, the 
Muslim community through the socio-cultural heritage. Significantly, Muslims’ marginality and 
the absence of a ‘Mamluk/Ottoman like’ political culture render the argument on the use of waqfs 
as a means to protecting wealth against confiscation or taxation untenable in the present 
circumstances. 
2.7.2 Use of Waqfs to Circumvent Laws of Mirath 
There is a dogma in Islam that “there is no hubs in circumvention of the shares of God, the Exalted”, 
(Shurayh al-Harith, d. 695-717 C.E. as quoted in Powers 1983:22; Hennigan 2004). However, this 
ethical precept did not deter some endowers from using waqfs to retain control of wealth by 
leaving it with preferred descendants and protect it against supposed fragmentation after their 
demise. Allegedly, other endowers resorted to waqfs to perpetuate age-old customs of locking out 
certain heirs, especially women, from inheritance. “Since Islam bars individuals from making wills 
as they choose, founding a waqf was the only possible way of circumventing the Sharica laws of 
succession,” argues Reiter (1996: 36). The perception of fragmentation of wealth through Sharica 
guidelines of inheritance could not have been explained better than by Layish (1983: 27): 
The Islamic system of succession is destructive of family property in that it causes its 
division among a great number of heirs and into uneconomic units. Succession 
involves a great number of participants; Qur’anic and agnatic heirs participate 
simultaneously (not successively) – subject, of course, to the rules of priorities and 
exclusion – and this increases the fragmentation of the property and the shrinking of 
the shares of the participants ad infinitum. 
More often, testamentary waqfs were particularly appropriated as a vehicle for circumventing the 
Sharica guidelines of mirath (inheritance). This is due to the view that “it does not involve 
quantitative or personal restrictions and that an estate could fully be withdrawn from the rigors 
of mirath and dedicated exclusively in favor of an otherwise legal heir,” alleges Layish (1983: 28). 
In his study, Layish established that 79% of 211 waqfs in Tripoli and over 96% of 138 in Nablus 
from 1800 to 1860 were waqf dhurri. This led the author into concluding that waqfs could at times 
be appropriated by ‘un-Godly minds’ to circumvent the divinely fixed laws of mirath “so as to 
preserve the integrity of the property and provide for a select group of descendants in the 
                                                 
Several sources, though, put the figure of Muslims between 8% and 25%. See KNBS, Kenya Population and Housing 
Census, Nairobi, 2009. Nairobi: Government Printers; Ndzovu, H. (2014b). Muslims in Kenyan Politics: Political 
Involvement, Marginalization, and Minority Status. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 
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exclusion of others” (1983: 28). Another investigation by Doumani compounded the view that 
waqfs accord the endower an opportunity to define social and family relations and structures in 
contradiction to the laws of mirath. He observes: 
Family endowments were flexible because, first, the endower could alienate his or her 
entire estate, not just the one-third maximum allowed for gifts […] The endower’s 
choice redefined his or her family members’ and descendants’ material base by 
restricting their rights of access to and ability to dispose of certain properties while 
committing them to follow a pre-determined formula for sharing the revenues or use 
of these properties. Second, the endower could choose what individuals or whole lines 
of descent can or cannot benefit from the use and the revenue of the endowed 
property (Doumani 1998: 7).42 
Owing to the perceived flexibility of the law of waqf as opposed to the law of mirath with regard 
to wealth distribution, endowers of waqf dhurri could as well decide who to appoint as mutawallis 
(mostly sons or close male relatives) and beneficiaries within the family. This, thereby, accorded 
endowers the excuse to prevent their estates, power, and prestige from being fragmented; retain 
connection to their properties; and by extension, perpetuate the age-old customary ideas of 
patriarchy in family descent and gender preference (Layish 1983; Shoenblum 1999; Hennigan 
2004; Lev 2005). 
Significantly, however, it is not entirely true that testamentary bequests and waqfs lack 
quantitative and personal restrictions allowing complete withdrawal of estates from the confines 
of mirath laws as opined by Layish (1983). The Sharica, based on traditions related to the Prophet, 
restricts the establishment of testamentary charities up to one-third of the total estate of a 
testator.Neither is a bequest in favor of a legal heir valid under the Sharica (Sahih al-Bukhari 4: 5-
7; Powers 1990: 23).43 This law is strictly applied in the Hanafi madhhab (Ghazaleh 2011: 8-9). 
More so, according to the Malik madhhab, “a waqf in favor of males to the exclusion of daughters 
is void (batala)” (Layish 1983: 9). 
Accordingly, appropriation of waqf ahli for the mentioned purposes is illegal in theory according 
to all Sunni Schools of law. This prohibition, nonetheless, as shown in various studies remains in 
principle, but violated in practice. Consequently, there ensued endless court battles to challenge 
the decisions by some endowers to exclude certain family members (particularly women) as 
                                                 
42 Testamentary waqfs (waqfs established on the basis of legal bequests) are prone to contradicting the one-third rule 
on charities, date of effect of the waqf, as well as the disposition of a legal heir as either a beneficiary or even an 
administrator. An endower could implicitly state in his bequest that the waqf would only take effect after his death, i.e. 
he reserves the right to revoke it during his life time, and even appoint a legal heir as administrator, hence giving him 
an undue advantage over other heirs. Legal limitations on testamentary waqfs were thereby at times not observed, 
hence leading to the violation of the law of inheritance. See Layish, A. (1983). The Maliki Family Waqf According to Wills 
and Waqfiyyat, op. cit., pp. 1-32. 
43 In one version of the tradition, the Prophet advised Sacad who wished to make a charitable bequest of half of his estate 
saying, “… one third, yet one-third is too much.” See Sahih al-Bukhari 8:725. 
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beneficiaries of waqfs in the later period of the Ottoman rule as well as British India in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Barnes 1986; van Leeuwen 1999; Powers 2002). These legal 
contestations were also established among beneficiaries of some waqfs in Kenya by the current 
investigation. It is this susceptibility to abuse of the mirath law that partly accounted for the 
reforms in waqf ahli among predominant Muslim societies like Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Lebanon, and 
Syria. The reforms involved restricting the period of benefits to not more than sixty years from 
the death of the waqif. In the worst case scenario, waqf ahli were invalidated and the properties 
distributed among heirs as inheritance (Schacht 1982; Pearl / Menski 1998; Shoenblum 1999; 
Kozlowski 2008).44 
A sharp departure from the use of waqf ahli to deny women of their legal rights as heirs and to 
safeguard wealth against alleged fragmentation was, however, noted in Algeria. Layish (1983) 
observes in another investigation that after the World War 1, testamentary waqfs were 
particularly used in Algeria to favor wives and daughters so as not to fall into the mercy of male 
descendants and benevolence. Figures of beneficiaries provided in this study point to the view 
that, some endowers of waqf ahli designated their children as mutawallis and primary 
beneficiaries “to emphasize the immediate connection between the sequence of generations and 
entitlement to the waqf” without regard to gender (1983: 8). 
The author further observes in another study during the period 1940s to 1960s that “waqf, as far 
as it existed in the Israel Muslim society, was not used as a means to deprive women of the family 
property or to curtail their rights” (1975: 298). This development was also noted among some 
waqfs that designated female relatives as beneficiaries in the exclusion of males in Kenya by the 
present study. In some of the identified cases, for instance, women took half of the share of 
usufruct alongside pious causes in mixed waqfs, or even all of it in some family waqfs, apart from 
being appointed as mutawallis. Thus, this protected females culturally considered as ‘weak’ 
against al-asabat (agnate heirs) who would have otherwise claimed a stake in the estate of the 
deceased under the law of mirath (See also Shaham 1997: 216-223). 
In a similar investigation on waqf ahli in Jerusalem under British mandate, Reiter (1996: 77-79) 
observes that ten out of forty seven endowers had designated their wives as first generation 
beneficiaries. According to the law of mirath, a wife is entitled to one-eighth share of the estate or 
one quarter in the presence or absence of direct descendants respectively. In the observed cases, 
therefore, spouses got more than what they were entitled to under mirath law. These later 
investigations particularly gainsay the generalization that waqf ahli were appropriated as an 
                                                 
44 Changes effected in majority of these communities were allegedly in line with Malik and Hanbali madhhabs. They 
included temporality and revocability of waqfs; reversion of waqf corpus to the waqif or his heirs upon expiry of purpose 
for which waqf was established; and invalidation of restrictive conditions on the freedoms of (female) beneficiaries such 
as marriage, and residence. Consequently, between 5% and 20% of the value of each dissolved waqf was channeled to 
charitable causes where such residuary provisions were catered for. See Cattan, H. (1984). The Law of Waqf, op. cit., pp. 
219-221. 
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avenue for circumventing the Sharica guidelines of inheritance to the detriment of female heirs 
and relatives. 
By contrast as indicated, according to Reiter (1996), Layish (1983), Shaham, (1997), as well as the 
current study, establishment of waqf ahli could also ensure retention of property within the 
nuclear family to the interests of women as cognate heirs. Accordingly, this prevented some 
portion of it from falling into the agnates or the general public through bayt al-mal were it to be 
administered according to mirath law. Clearly, these observations underscore the view that no 
single reason could adequately explain the complexities in the establishment and use of waqfs in 
the Muslim society (Hoexter 1998a, 2002; Hennigan 2004; Lev 2005). 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the significant elements constituting waqfs as proposed by the 
majority opinion in Sunni Islam. Clearly, perpetuity, irrevocability, inalienability, and divine 
ownership, are among the basic principles on which the institution of waqf was founded. We have 
also discussed the strength and weaknesses of various legal trajectories that seek to trace the 
origin of waqfs in Islam as espoused by authors across the scholarship divide. The institution of 
waqf, as is understood in contemporary times, bears striking similarities both in principle and 
practice with several other practices aimed at attaining qurba by early civilizations like piae 
causea (Byzantine), res sacrae (Roman) and pat ruvan (Persian). These apparent similarities were, 
allegedly unconsciously, adopted by the Islamic tradition in its contact with the different 
civilizations at alternating times in history. Thus, their existence in the institution of waqf is not a 
confirmation that the practice is strictly alien since several traditions of the Prophet and early 
companions’ practices attest to waqfs in Islam. Rather, they serve to demonstrate that charity and 
qurba are as old as humanity. In conclusion, therefore, charity is not a preserve of Islam as further 
evidenced in the practices of hekdesh and xenodochia among the Jewish and Christian 
communities respectively. 
Significantly, we have seen how, besides the spiritual motivation to attain sawab and qurba, waqfs 
also became a means towards the attainment of varied worldly goals. Through waqf, an endower 
could retain control of his wealth; protect it against alleged fractionalization under laws of 
inheritance; decide on the beneficence pattern; and even seek to privilege certain people among 
his own progeny. Waqfs, therefore, became an invaluable tool by which dedicators negotiated 
social relations on the one side, and accorded mutawallis, culama, and kadhis the immense 
economic, social, and symbolic wherewithal on the other. 
Moreover, we have internalized how Islamic traditions envisage management of waqfs as opposed 
to state supervision. The mutawallis, culama, and kadhis were at the center of waqf practices 
interpreting, executing, and mediating the institution. This centrality of the culama and the 
mutawalli, arguably, accorded them access to revenue-bearing waqfs, exerting economic and 
socio-cultural influence in the community that made them apparent threat to some political 
establishments. To stem their influence with a view to consolidating political hegemony, Muslim 
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and colonial governments established departments and ministries in which the culama were 
conscripted to oversee waqfs according to formulated legislations and within strict supervision. 
In the following chapter we, therefore, endeavor to contextualize secular policies and civil 
institutions established by the British colonial government with a view to controlling resources 
that effectively influenced waqfs.
  
3 Secular Legislations and Common Law Judgments on Waqf Practices 
in Colonial Kenya 
Colonialism is itself a word deeply imbued with political meanings, both unimaginable 
and difficult to discuss without reference to the power relationship it constitutes. Among 
Muslims in Kenya, the colonial experience was both historically and culturally specific. 
Its ways of knowing and ordering experience, that is, its power relations are inherently 
different for the colonizer and the colonized, [and most importantly], at the heart of the 
British colonial power was how to negotiate the relationship between the interlocutors 
of religious knowledge and authority in Muslim society (Mwakimako 2010: 109-110).  
This chapter highlights the contours of power dynamics and negotiation of relationships 
witnessed between the Muslim community and the British colonial authorities in the East Africa 
Protectorate spanning over seven decades. The conflicts and negotiations foremost took place in 
the juridical field, hence the opening of this discussion with an overview of the kadhi courts in 
relation to the British colonial government’s control of resources and waqfs in particular. The 
argument shows how significant it was for the British colonial government to gain control of the 
legal sphere (juridical and legislations) that informed their subsequent relations with the Muslim 
community in the economic, political, and cultural fields. We first witness the takeover of the 
Protectorate’s political hegemony from the Sultan followed by rapid constriction of the legal 
jurisdiction of the kadhi courts to a narrowly interpreted Muslim personal status law. Then swiftly 
came the establishment of a state agency – the Waqf Commissioners of Kenya (WCK) - not only in 
filling the void left by the kadhi courts in the supervision of waqfs, but also to enshrine centralized 
administration and supervision hitherto unknown in the Protectorate. Several other legislations 
were also established to ensure control of resources by the colonial government. The discussion 
in this chapter is significant in laying the foundations for the proceeding argument in the 
postcolonial times where administration and control of waqfs by the state mirrors colonial 
policies as significant statutes, particularly on waqfs, are unchanged. This does not only 
profoundly influence the development of the institution but also provides the vehicle through 
which internal dynamics of identity, belonging, supremacy, and beneficence to waqfs within the 
Muslim community are negotiated and mediated in adaptation to state control of the institution. 
3.1 Limiting the Jurisdiction of Kadhi Courts and the Establishment of Policies to 
Administer Waqfs in Colonial Kenya 
The year 1887 when the British East Africa Association was granted concession by the Sultan over 
his territorial hegemony is the appropriate starting point to understand the intricate relationship 
between waqfs and the kadhi courts on one hand, and the struggle for control of ‘economic capital’ 
for negotiating the political and social fields in the coast of East Africa between various actors on 
the other hand. Unwittingly, the concession not only made the Sultan concede political power but 
also the control of resources and ‘economic capital’ in the territory as the discussion here under 
reveals. 
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Extensive research on the coast of East Africa including those in legal studies (Anderson 2008; 
Kimeu 2011), history (Sperling 1988; Stockreiter 2015), and a host of Islamic academic endeavors 
(Hashim 2006; 2010b; Mraja 2011; Mwakimako 2011; Ndzovu 2014b) agree that kadhi courts had 
largely been in existence in the region as an integral part of the Muslim judicial system from as 
early as the eighth century.45 Though the Islamic legal system was uncodified, it is believed to have 
entrenched some rule of law that survived over two hundred years of Portuguese conquest from 
1698 under the Bu Sacidi Sultanate of Zanzibar whose dynasty also extended to the coast of Kenya. 
Under imperial supervision of the Sultan, despite there being no formal courts to implement the 
Sharica, dispensation of justice drastically changed from the traditional arbitration model under 
councils of elders to a centralized Sharica driven judicial system. Since then, kadhis became 
mediators and juri-consultants issuing legal opinions and spiritual advice to the society 
(Stockreiter 2015: 35; Hashim 2005). This judicial system, arguably, remained in use throughout 
the Sultanate preceding the British and the German colonial governments. 
Upon their arrival, therefore, Salim observes, “the British and the Germans found the coastal areas 
of East Africa under the dominion of the Sultanate of Zanzibar who had representatives along the 
coast administering it on his behalf and resolving disputes among his Muslim subjects” (Salim 
1978, as quoted in Kimeu 2011: 20). This opinion is rightly shared by others (Carmichael 1997; 
Hashim 2005; Anderson 2008). Stockreiter (2010: 561) summarizes how the Islamic judicial 
system operated under the Sultan: 
The law applied by kadhis, classical or uncodified Islamic law, was an ongoing 
discursive tradition driven by legal scholars’ consultation of the main sources of law, 
the Qur’an and hadith (deeds and sayings of the Prophet), and works of jurisprudence 
generated by legal scholarship of different schools, places and periods of time. 
Further, kadhi courts across the sultanate applied the Sharica based on their individual madhhab, 
notably the predominant cIbadi and Shafici legal codes (Bang 2001a; Stockreiter 2010, 2015).46 
Historical sources further posit that what prevailed along the Sultanate was a Muslim judicial 
system akin to what existed during the Islamic caliphate. It follows from logical deduction that 
with ‘full jurisdiction’ to Muslim subjects, hearing and determination of matters regarding waqfs 
were also within the mandate of the kadhi courts as evidenced across several Muslim societies.47 
                                                 
45 On introduction and spread of Islam along the East African Coast see Sperling, D. (1988). The Growth of Islam among 
the Mijikenda of the Kenya Coast, 1826-1933. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
46 These differences were later abandoned following entrenchment of the kadhis and the Sharica under the Islamic Law 
(Restatement) Act of 1964, which provided that Islamic law of any sect shall be followed by the courts in matters of 
personal status. See Hashim, A. (2005). Servants of Sharica: Qadis and the Politics of Accommodation in East Africa. 
Journal of Sudanic Africa, 16, 27-51. 
47 On Muslim communities where kadhis heard and determined cases involving waqfs, see Layish, A. (1975). Women 
and Islamic Law in a non-Muslim State: A Study Based on Decisions of the Shari’a Courts in Israel. Jerusalem: Israel 
Universities Press; Lev, Y. (2005). Charity, Endowments and Charitable Institutions in Medieval Islam. Florida: University 
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This presumption is further crystallized by the view that Muslim courts have historically no 
precedent of legal jurisdiction over matters affecting the society based on the nature of disputes. 
For instance, no separate courts for commercial disputes or civil litigation different from family 
law are recorded to have existed in the history of Islam (Reiter 1996; Layish 1997a, 1997b; 
Powers 2011; Stockreiter 2015). 
According to Hashim (2005, 2010b), and Mwakimako (2011), British colonial influence and 
control of resources started to be felt in Zanzibar, the seat of the Sultanate, spreading throughout 
the region from 1887 following the granting of concession to the British East Africa Association 
by the Sultan over his territorial hegemony. Consequently, “the Association assumed powers to 
pass laws for the government of districts, and to establish courts of justice and appoint judges” 
(Mwakimako 2011: 330). Under the concession arrangement, however, the Islamic judiciary 
framework was exempted from the British authority and the Sultan continued to appoint kadhis 
who administered justice according to the Sharica under his authority (Hashim 2005, 2010b; 
Anderson 2008; Chesworth 2011). Mwakimako (2011: 330) explains the philosophy for the 
exemption of the direct control of the Islamic judiciary from the British positing: 
The agreements deliberately emphasized the sovereignty of the Sultan so that the 
public understood that judicial or government powers and functions conceded to the 
Association were to be exercised by it only in the name and under the authority of the 
Sultan. 
In 1888, the Association experienced economic constraints that forced it to transfer its mandate 
to the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC). Consequently, IBEAC inherited the 
concession earlier granted to the Association by the Sultan. As its predecessor, IBEAC also agreed 
to abide by earlier ratified terms of the concession that, “these possessions [i.e. Protectorate] are 
to be held by the Company as His Highness’ wakil (plenipotentiary and agent) and they are to be 
administered according to the Sharica” (Anderson 2008: 82). This suggests that the Association 
officials were administrators with no judicial training or powers to exercise in the territory, hence 
the agreement that they utilize existing Islamic judicial institutions. As a matter of fact, “the first 
judge appointed by the British arrived in Mombasa with the title of ‘Legal Vice Consul’’ 
(Mwakimako 2011: 330). Incidentally, this arrangement perfectly suited the in-direct rule policy 
adopted by the colonial government. 
Clearly, the British administrative officers also exercised extra-territorial jurisdiction of the 
Crown over British subjects. “In administering their jurisdiction over the Sultan’s and British 
subjects, the administrative officers, thus, sat in dual capacity as the Sultan’s judges administering 
Islamic law or as consular officers administering the English laws,” continues Hashim (2010b: 
222). Similar observation was made by others (Ogot 1973; Hirsch 1994). In essence, this dual 
capacity employed by the British administrators reduced the Sultan to a symbolic head of state 
                                                 
Press of Florida; Powers, D. (2011). The Development of Islamic Law and Society in the Maghrib: Qadis, Muftis and Family 
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(Bakari 2001), a scenario that aptly demonstrates the struggle for control of political power and 
the economic wherewithal enveloped in what Hashim (2010b: 223) describes as “a self-appointed 
mission of civilization.”48 
My examination of the negotiations between the British colonial government and the Muslim 
community on the control of resources, and waqfs in particular, draws from Bourdieu’s concept 
of capital (power). Bourdieu (1986: 241) conceives capital in terms of “accumulated labor (in its 
materialized form or its incorporated, ‘embodied’ form), which, when appropriated on a private, 
i.e. exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the 
form of reified or living labor.” In simple terms, capital in its various strands (economic, social, 
cultural, and symbolic), is the specific quantity and structure of resources that qualify an agent to 
enter and survive the daily struggles and interactions of a given social space (Bourdieu 1986: 241-
243; Bourdieu / Waqcuant 2004). In the wider context, capital should be understood as “a social 
relation within a system of exchange, and the term is extended to all the goods, material and 
symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after in 
a particular social formation” (Bourdieu 1987, as quoted in Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes 1990: 13). 
Further, Bourdieu (1985: 16-17; 1987: 121) advances the concept of field, relevant to our 
discussion, not in terms of physical but “social space of objective relationships” where infinite 
amount of daily life and interactions of social agents (i.e. negotiation, competition, and even 
conflicts) take place. It is in the social space where various potentialities and networks of 
relationships determined by the positions of individual agents exist and infinite interactions of 
social agents take place. In other words, a field could be conceptualized in terms of dynamic 
sphere of forces or, “competitive arena of social relationships wherein variously positioned agents 
and institutions struggle over the production, acquisition, and control of forms of capital” (Rey 
2007: 41-46; Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes 1990). Not oblivious of the theoretical context in which 
the concepts were used, the study adopts them owing to their propensity to be applicable in 
“interpreting the relationship between religion, class, and power; and religion and colonial 
conquest” in the negotiation for control of resources taking waqfs as a microcosm (Rey 2007: 45, 
82).This is manifested in the struggles between the colonial state and the Sultan and by extension, 
the Muslim community as discussed and among various ethnic and jurisprudential Muslim groups 
in the Protectorate. In view of this, the study perceives waqfs, religion, the judiciary (law) as fields 
on one hand, and the culama, beneficiaries, endowers, kadhis, waqf commissioners, and the British 
colonial government among others as actors and agents with varying amounts of capital and 
knowledge in the various fields on the other hand. 
                                                 
48 The concept of ‘self appointed mission of civilization’ is used in the study strictly drawing from the colonized subjects’ 
point of view in relation to political control by the British colonial government. This is because there was virtually no 
difference between the various administrative policies of colonial powers in the eyes of the colonized who perceived 
them as invaders who assumed total control. This is, however, not to be oblivious of the differences between the British 
in-direct rule and the French assimilation policies in Africa. See further Seesemann, R. & B. Soares. (2009). ‘Being as 
Good Muslims as Frenchmen’: On Islam and Colonial Modernity in West Africa. Journal of Religion in Africa, 39(1), 91-
120. 
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Significantly, each of the foregoing fields has tacit (non-formal) rules of engagement (i.e. field-
specific rules), demands, features, and structures that agents or actors have to apply and adapt to 
future tendencies and opportunities in their daily interactions to survive. Therefore, the position 
of individual agents in the field is directly proportional to the capital they posses and bring into 
the field to access benefits and privileges. We also have to appreciate that, though different fields 
have relative autonomy from each other, they could as well influence one another since they are 
all embedded in one social space (Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes 1990; Rey 2007). 
Accordingly, control of resources, and waqfs in particular, perfected through control of the 
judiciary and the legislative organs as it unfolds here under should be understood in terms of 
power contestation, i.e. both economically and politically. As part of strategies to realize the ‘self 
appointed mission of civilization’, therefore, it was imperative for the British colonial authorities 
to embrace, but gradually suppress existing ‘native’ customs and institutions by interpreting and 
applying them according to English (British) perception and not as per the traditional wisdom in 
which they were established. Undoubtedly, this required enormous economic resources 
(revenues and fortunes in terms of currency and property rights) and political capital to conscript 
and sustain human capital (i.e. those operating within and outside the ‘native institutions’ 
including the kadhis and waqf commissioners as agents) that would sanction and legitimize state 
policies. 
It is also important to bear in mind that wielding and exercising political power subtly 
demonstrates symbolic capital - a quasi-magical power or credit that enables acquiring the 
equivalent of what is obtained by physical or economic force that is recognized and legitimized 
like a body of practices and representations (rites and beliefs). In essence, symbolic capital, 
according to Bourdieu (1977: 171-183; 1990: 112-121; 2000: 242) “is not a particular kind of 
capital but what every kind of capital becomes when it is misrecognized as capital, that is, as force, 
a power or capacity for (actual or potential) exploitation recognized as legitimate.” This 
encompasses language, charm, charisma, seduction, titles of nobility, and other human actions 
that lead to a relation of meanings that are socially founded and recognized, both internal and 
external. In other words, “to be seen as a person or class of status and prestige, is to be accepted 
as legitimate and sometimes as a legitimate authority. Such position carries with it the power to 
name activities and groups, the power to represent commonsense, and above all, the power to 
create the official version of the social world” (Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes 1990: 13). Thus, symbolic 
capital best explains what the British colonial government was assumed to wield upon imposing 
herself on the colonized subjects as “possessing the power to recognize, to consecrate, to state, 
with success what merits being known and recognized” (Bourdieu 2000: 242). Arguably, it is this 
power that enabled them to control the political sphere and the economic resources in the 
territory. 
By 1895, the British officially took over the concession agreement making the coast a colony under 
full British executive and judicial authority before issuing the first comprehensive Order in 
Council for the administration of the region as a Protectorate two years later (Mwakimako 2011). 
Within this context, the Commissioner for the Protectorate similarly assumed the position of an 
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administrator and Governor though all cases and law suits between locals continued to be decided 
according to the Sharica. Thus, at the very least, “the British colonial government initially allowed 
local Muslim judges, primarily resident Arabs, to hear most civil and criminal cases involving 
Muslims” (Hirsch 1994: 214-215).49 This was under the ‘non-interference’ concession terms 
ratified earlier in 1887. 
Of significance to the question under investigation, allowing kadhis to hear and determine civil 
and criminal petitions involving Muslims subtly underscores the argument that until the 
establishment of the Protectorate, there was neither a legal body in-charge of waqfs nor separate 
courts that heard and determined disputes arising there from. Hence, all litigation pertaining to 
waqfs also fell under the jurisdiction of the kadhi courts while administrative functions of the 
consecrations resided with mutawallis as Islamic traditions require. However, continued reliance 
of customary institutions and traditional modus operandi would not have worked to the colonial 
project of political and economic control in the region. Hence, the British cautiously adopted the 
existing institutions in their in-direct rule policy while gradually reforming them for economic 
and political expedience. 
Yet, as aptly asserted by Bang (2001a) and Hashim (2005), the colonial government’s 
administrative policy to incorporate existing judicial institutions like the kadhi courts to the state 
was not a sharp departure from the Sultan’s policy that also employed the culama to consolidate 
his rule and grip on the judiciary. As a matter of fact, “under Sayyid Said the office of the Sultan 
combined the legislative, administrative, and judicial functions of the government,” posits Lofchie 
(1965, as quoted in Hashim 2005: 29-30; Bang 2001a). In essence, this illustrates that waqfs were 
not fully independent from the political establishment since kadhis were an organ of the sultanate. 
More often, as discussed in chapter two, a section of the culama was occasionally appointed by 
Muslim rulers to oversee waqfs, particularly those with enormous significance to the community. 
True to this precedent, synchronized arms of government remained desirable to the British 
colonial authorities as kadhis and cooperating culama were conscripted into the civil service and 
for the control and administration of waqfs. 
The systematic restructuring of the Muslim administrative and judicial framework was 
undertaken in the auspices of the East African Order in Council of 1897. The Order in Council re-
organized the judicial system into two categories of ‘Native courts’.50 The first was composed of 
                                                 
49 In recognition of the office of the kadhi in dispensing justice among ‘native subjects’ professing Islam, the British 
colonial government expanded the jurisdiction of the kadhi courts beyond mwambao by appointing the first Muslim 
kadhi to the North Eastern Frontier District (NFD) in 1927. The law of waqf was, however, limited to the Protectorate. 
See Kerrow, B. (2010) as cited in Ndzovu, H. (2014a). Is the inclusion of Kadhi Courts in the Kenyan Constitution against 
the Principle of a Secular State? Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, p. 17. 
50 The ‘Native Courts’ Regulations (1897) define ‘native’ as “[…] any native of Africa not of European or American origin 
and any person not of European or American origin, who, within the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, would be 
subject to His Highness’ jurisdiction, even though such person should not have been born in Africa.” See Anderson, J. 
(2008). Islamic Law in Africa. London: Routledge, pp.82-83; Ndzovu, H. (2014b). Muslims in Kenyan Politics: Political 
Involvement, Marginalization, and Minority Status. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, p. 36. 
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the High Court, the Chief ‘Native court’, Provincial courts, District courts, and Assistant Collector’s 
courts. This category was presided over by a British judicial officer and guided by the Indian Civil 
Procedure Code (CPC) and the Indian Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes (PCPC). The second 
category consisted of the kadhi courts and Court of local chiefs (African local courts). This cluster 
of courts was presided over by a local authority and guided by the CPC and PCPC as well as the 
local laws or customs existing in their respective jurisdictions (Stockreiter 2015: 35-41; Anderson 
2008; Hashim 2010b).51 
Classifying judicial institutions in a binary opposition of ‘Native’–Western was clearly a conscious 
strategy by the British colonial authorities that consequently put the colonized subjects to the trap 
of ‘symbolic translations’ in relation to control of the legal field and perceptions to life in general. 
Referring to a culture in the common derogatory terms as ‘customary’, ‘native’, or ‘traditional’ was 
in line with the adopted racial hierarchy policy in which Africans were placed at the bottom strata 
of the society. Precisely, it was a means for the British colonial government to disqualify ‘native 
institutions’ since “to be a native implied one being denied of human rights and important 
privileges that were reserved for the ‘civilized groups’” (Ndzovu 2014b: 36). This was 
characteristic of the civilization of Africa mission where African institutions were perceived in 
terms of being ‘native’ or ‘traditional’, according ‘civilizing agents’ the means of qualifying them 
as antithetical to their ‘officially established’ social and political order. This classificatory scheme 
fitted as part of the strategies that preceded racial and class negotiations witnessed between the 
British, Arabs, Asians, and Africans, in that order, in the Protectorate. 
Further, categorization of the courts into ‘lower-higher’ or ‘native-English’ spectrum also meant 
that the lower chambers (kadhis and African local courts) became mere ‘subordinate courts’. 
Accordingly, this accorded the British colonial government the right to closely supervise and 
control the jurisdiction and powers of the local juri-consultants whom they conscripted, 
ostensibly, to sanction and implement their desired reforms (Bang 2001a: 59). ‘Native courts’ 
lacked appellate jurisdiction that only lied with the higher (read English) chambers that retained 
the mandate to interpret local customs using British lenses (Mwangi 1995). While dealing with 
Muslim subjects in the Protectorate, ‘Native courts’ were to be guided by the CPC and PCPC, and 
have regard to the general principles of the Sharica as ratified in the concession charter.52 This 
consideration was, however, weakened by a contradictory provision that allowed the High Court 
                                                 
51 The provision by the colonial government that kadhi courts apply the CPC and PCPC was strategically geared towards 
creating what Schacht calls ‘Anglo-Mohammedan jurisprudence’, i.e. dispensing of Islamic law based on modern English 
jurisprudence as they did in British India. Consequently, this had influence on some Islamic practices like waqfs as 
manifested in the Privy Council decision of 1894. See Schacht, J. (1982). An Introduction to Islamic Law. Clarendon: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 94-96; Stockreiter, E. (2015). Islamic Law, Gender, and Social Change in Post-Abolition 
Zanzibar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 44-45. 
52 Article 3 of the East African Order in Council of 1897 provides; “[…] all Muslims domiciled under the dominions of the 
Sultan of Zanzibar were to be governed by the Islamic law in matters related to criminal, civil and personal status laws.” 
See Hashim, A. (2010b). Coping with Conflicts: Colonial Policy towards Muslim Personal Law in Kenya and Post-Colonial 
Court Practice. In S. Jeppie, E. Moosa, & R. Roberts (Eds.), Muslim Family Law in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial Legacies 
and Post-Colonial Challenges (pp. 221-245). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
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when hearing appeals from the ‘Native courts’ to “take whatever steps it may deem right or 
desirable for satisfying itself as to the Muhammadan laws and customs applicable to the case” 
(Article 57, Order in Council, 1897, as quoted in Anderson 2008: 83). Thus, while it affirmed to 
respect and not to interfere with the dispensation of justice according to the Sharica, the British 
colonial government also gave itself the right to define what is ‘Islamic’, albeit not according to 
established Muslim practices of jurisprudence, but English interpretations (i.e. ‘Anglo-
Mohammedan jurisprudence’, Schacht 1982: 94-96) in clear exercise of the espoused symbolic 
capital. 
Using section 17 of the Courts’ Ordinance of 1931, we could also shed light on the jurisdiction and 
mandate of the subordinate courts established by the East African Order in Council of 1897. 
Conveniently, they could be explained according to: (i) the type of offence to be handled by the 
court; (ii) amount of fine to be imposed there in; and (iii) the type and severity of punishment that 
the judgment was likely to confer upon a plaintiff in the said court (Hashim 2005; Mwakimako 
2011; Stockreiter 2015). More particularly, kadhi courts were accorded jurisdiction over Muslim 
Arabs, Baluchis, and Africans in matters relating to personal status, marriage, inheritance, and 
divorce in which the value of the subject-matter in dispute did not exceed one thousand Kenya 
shillings (Article 55, British Native Courts Regulations, 1897, as cited by Hashim 2005: 30; 
Anderson 2008; Stockreiter 2015). 
Clearly, the reforms in the legal jurisdiction of the kadhi courts in the Protectorate were informed 
both by economic and political expediencies of the British colonial government as well as their 
experience of the kadhi courts in India,53 and Egypt.54 Prior to this limitation, matters of waqf lied 
within the jurisdiction of kadhis as it applied to several Muslim communities including India and 
Egypt (Layish 1975; Lev 2005; Miran 2009; Powers 2011). “Although there was no clear 
definition, personal status usually included marriage, divorce, inheritance, and, following the 
kadhis’ scope of jurisdiction in India, religious endowments (waqf)”, summarizes Stockreiter, 
(2010: 562; 2015: 45; Powers 1990; Hoexter 1995). Finally, and quite significant to the 
development of Islamic judicial practices, the East African Order in Council also established the 
office of shaykh al-Islam (Chief Kadhi). The Chief Kadhi was mandated with supervising the kadhi 
courts and hearing and determining appeals arising from therein and which could be channeled 
for decision at the High Court.  
Subjecting local judicial institutions like the kadhi courts to European systems of justice; 
supervising, controlling them, and limiting their jurisdiction; and demanding that they apply alien 
                                                 
53 See Makdisi, G. (1981). The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press; Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India: A Study of Legislative and Administrative Control. New Delhi: Gian 
Publishing House; Kozlowski, G. (2008). Muslim Endowments and Society in British India. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
54 See Layish, A. (1983). The Maliki Family Waqf According to Wills and Waqfiyyat. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London, 46, 1-32; Powers, D. (1989). Orientalism, Colonialism and Legal History: The 
Attack on Family Muslim Endowments in Algeria and India. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 31, 535-571. 
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procedures like the CPC and PCPC in the administration of justice mirrors what Bourdieu 
describes as symbolic violence. Bourdieu (1990: 127; 2000: 170) defines symbolic violence as the 
“gentle, invisible violence, unrecognized as such, chosen as much as undergone, that of trust, 
obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, debts, piety, in a word, of all the virtues honored by 
the ethic of honor.”55 Precisely, symbolic violence is vented upon a social agent with his or her 
complicity through the effects of misrecognition and encouraged by denial by those on whom that 
violence is exercised. This suggests that the victim, as a social agent, understands and “recognizes 
a violence which is wielded precisely in as much as one does not perceive it as such and, therefore, 
lead them to construct this relation from the stand-point of the dominant as ‘natural’ and which 
gives all its manifestations their hypnotic power” (Bourdieu / Wacquant 2004: 342; Rey 2007). 
Symbolic violence thrives in an environment of symbolic domination and perpetuated through 
disguised strategies that conceal them. Accordingly, the power to represent the legitimate social 
world was best exemplified through the legal field by use of symbolic violence by the colonial state 
to enforce what it regarded as ‘legitimate’ versions of both the legislative process and the judiciary 
in the Protectorate. In this case, therefore, “symbolic violence is the imposition of systems of 
symbolism and meaning upon groups or classes in such a way that they are experienced as 
legitimate” (Jenkins 1992: 104, as quoted in Rey 2007: 55; Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes 1990). 
As a matter of fact, majority, if not all the Arab kadhis were handicapped in the English legal 
training and procedures, and the British colonial authorities exploited this deficiency in cultural 
capital (i.e. English legal expertise) as a tool in defining the professional relations and negotiating 
the juridical field. Except for the submitted reasons as argued, it was illogical for the British 
colonial government to insist that kadhi courts adopt non-Islamic laws of evidence and 
procedures to administer the Sharica.56 Doing so, undoubtedly, led to miscarriage of justice. But 
owing to the political and symbolic hegemony coupled with the social ideology of the British, 
kadhis had to ‘accept’ the situation as a normal, even justifiable part of the judicial order, hence 
becoming unwitting social agents of symbolic violence. 
In essence, categorizing the courts as explained above and limiting their legal jurisdiction in terms 
of the value of fines to be imposed was the final step in the British strategies towards removing 
the jurisdiction of waqfs from the Muslim courts. As indicated, the value of litigation a kadhi court 
could hear and determine did not exceed one thousand Kenya shillings. Therefore, matters of waqf 
were taken out of the jurisdiction of the kadhi courts for three counts: (a) the narrow and 
compartmentalized interpretation of Muslim personal status law along English (British) 
perceptions to mean marriage, divorce, and inheritance; (b) majority of revenue generating waqfs 
included properties that were worth than the stipulated amount that Muslim courts could legally 
                                                 
55 See also Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (2004). Symbolic Violence. In Bourgois, P. and N. Scheper-Hughes (Eds.), 
Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology (pp. 272–274). Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
56 According to Stockreiter, non-Sharica procedures of evidence were put in place in 1899 and later buttressed by the 
Evidence Decree of 1917 that ultimately excluded Sharica rules of evidence all together. See Stockreiter, E. (2015). 
Islamic Law, Gender, and Social Change, op.cit. p. 43. 
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handle;57 and (c) waqfs matters were categorized as real estate contracts whose procedures did 
not only require English legal training and expertise but were mainly in English language that the 
Arab kadhis were not culturally endowed in. Thus, “waqf administration was among the tasks 
previously handled by the ‘ulama which now became increasingly governmentalized,” observed 
Bang (2001a: 75). 
Having removed the hearing and determination of matters of waqf from the Muslim courts, it 
meant that mutawallis and the culama would freely manage consecrated properties. However, 
from their experience in India and Egypt, the British colonial authorities were aware of the socio-
economic and political influence of the institution of waqf in the society vis-à-vis the colonial 
project. Not being oblivious of this fact, the British colonial government established the WCK in 
March 1899. The official position on the establishment of the state agency was to register, control, 
and administer the considerable amount of property endowed as waqfs for the benefit of families 
and Muslim institutions in the Protectorate (Bang 2001a). 
In essence, therefore, establishment of the WCK was, in itself, a noble idea that would have 
streamlined the institution and improve its efficiency. However, considering the political 
environment in which the state agency was conceived and operationalized, it became the vehicle 
through which popular modernizing capitalist ideals advocated by the colonial authorities were 
spearheaded (Fair 2001). More so, it was used to check the social, political, economic, and 
symbolic influence of the culama and the diverse groups of beneficiaries and mutawallis who 
mainly depended on the waqfs for their socio-cultural welfare (Kuran 2001). As a matter of fact, 
the enactment of the Waqf Commissioners Ordinance that formed the secular guide for 
administration of waqfs by the colonial state came a year later in 1900.  
The establishment of the WCK is indeed perceived by several authors to have been the last 
strategy in the overall control of resources (read economic capital) in the Protectorate by the 
British. This is because the colonial government had earlier interfered with mikoko (mangrove 
poles) business and abolished slavery denying plantation agriculture of the cheap labor that it 
relied on (Sheriff 1991; Bakari 2001; McIntosh 2009; Mwinyihaji 2014). Clearly, waqfs, according 
to the British, remained a potential economic and socio-cultural mainstay without whose seizure 
and control the local Muslim community could amass to challenge their political hegemony. The 
British understood the inherent power of waqfs to create a common identity of autonomous social 
groups keen on protecting and advancing particular interests of their members (Powers 1989; 
Kozlowski 1998; Hoexter 2002). Carmichael (1997: 209) articulates this fear saying: 
                                                 
57In Zanzibar, however, the value of the subject matter of the kadhi courts was not only higher (five thousand shillings) 
than that of Kenya but kadhis also continued with the adjudication of matters of waqfs as part of the civil jurisdiction to 
personal status law spelt out in the Zanzibar Courts Decree of 1923. This piece of legislation did not apply to the Kenyan 
side of the Protectorate. See Bang, A. (2001a). Intellectuals and Civil Servants: Early 20th Century Zanzibar Ulama’ and 
the Colonial State. In S. Amoretti (Ed.), Islam in East Africa: New Sources (pp. 59-98). Roma: Herder Editrice Libreria; 
Fair, L. (2001). Pastime and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945. 
Athens: Ohio University Press. Hashim, A. (2005). Servants of Shari’a, op. cit. 
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Waqf is a uniquely Muslim institution rooted in religious ideals. Yet, its role at the 
interface of private property and various religious foundations, such as the mosques 
and Qur’anic schools that waqf funds support, make it an obvious instrument for 
exerting influence in many spheres of Muslim life. Therefore, it should not be 
surprising that the British sought a role in waqf management. 
Thus, with limited jurisdiction of kadhi courts to Muslim personal status law and the WCK in place, 
the negotiation for control of waqfs as economic resources between the British and Muslim 
community was almost over in favor of the former.Therefore,controlling the judicial field turned 
out to be the perfect starting point in the Protectorate,and more importantly, to prevent “the 
culama who formed the core of the ideological apparatus” (van Leeuwen 1994: 33) that the society 
and institution of waqf relied for its interpretation and spiritual guidance on the one hand, and 
the community of endowers and beneficiaries “from acquiring a strong, independent economic 
basis” (1994: 31) to contest the economic and political hegemony of the colonial government on 
the other. 
3.2 Economic Space Control: The Effects of Colonial Policies on Waqf Practices in the 
Protectorate 
This section of the discussion highlights the diverse secular policies instituted by the British 
colonial government in the control of the economic sphere, and waqfs in particular, in the 
Protectorate. As discussed here under, the new policies hitherto unknown to the local Muslim 
community involved different sectors of the economy ultimately impacting the practices of waqfs 
in the region. This was manifested in the way the state appointed Commissioners and influenced 
the decision making process in the state agency in light of the new secular policies. 
Upon establishment, the WCK was composed of eight persons including the Civil Secretary 
(always a British) and the liwali as ex-officio members. Other members were Muslims, one 
appointed by the liwali and five others appointed by the Governor (also a British) from a panel of 
names submitted by the Civil Secretary. As Mwakimako (2010: 118) argues, except for “one’s 
ethnic affiliation together with proven loyalty to the colonial state”, no qualifications were 
necessary for appointment as Commissioner. Commissioners were also remunerated by the state 
and served for a renewable term of five years unless they either resigned or were removed by the 
Governor. However, many of them were retained for longer periods to perpetuate the colonial 
legacy (Carmichael 1997).58 Significantly, this suggests that endower’s and beneficiaries’ interests 
were neither represented nor taken into account when appointing the Commissioners. 
More often, as Carmichael posits, decisions of the Commission had to be sanctioned by the colonial 
government though, when the state desired to undertake any dealings for its convenience, it did 
not have to seek the authority of the Muslim Commissioners. This partly explains the lack of 
                                                 
58 The full board was for instance retained upon expiry of its mandate in 1957 to 1962, a trend that was repeated during 
the postcolonial period. See Appendix 9.3. 
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specific qualifications for appointment as a Commissioner so as to ensure that only cooperating 
Muslims served in the state agency under close supervision by European officers who were co-
opted as members of the Commission.59 Accordingly, this denied the Commissioners the 
independence and the right to use their judgment and discretion in accordance with the Sharica 
and ancient customs pertaining to waqf practices as they became mere instruments in discharging 
government orders (Carmichael 1997:301). 
State influence on the decision making process of the state agency was evident in several 
occasions interfering with the use of waqfs in ways not designated by endowers. For instance, 
from 1911 to 1912 the government through the provincial administration, i.e. the Provincial 
Commissioner (PC) and the District Commissioner (DC) in Malindi region, asked the WCK to use 
waqf funds in improving sanitation and public health as well as allocate undeveloped waqf lands 
to residents for farming (Carmichael 1997: 301). Although the Sharica allows qabala (also 
mukhabara, sharecropping) as a means of improving productivity of agricultural waqf lands, in 
the cited case, the government was not proposing qabala but opening the lands to private 
ownership.60 More importantly, the waqf lands in question had not become ‘unproductive’, but 
merely ‘undeveloped’. So, even the question of qabala becomes contestable under the Sharica, let 
alone using the same as private shambas or appropriate waqf revenues in total disregard of the 
shurut al-waqif. 
Again, from 1954 to 1955 the colonial government pushed to have the closed cemetery of the 
Mazrui and the ruined Jamia masjid of Wakilindini declared national monuments under the 
Preservation of Objects of Archaeological and Palaeontological Interest Ordinance, Cap 314.61 As 
opined by J. S. Kirkman, the in-charge Royal Gedi National Park Malindi, since the cemetery was 
closed, the site could be converted to a public garden in line of “the policy of the city of London 
and most English cities for the last twenty years to convert closed cemeteries and ruined Churches 
into Public Gardens with flowers that is open to the public (sic).”62 Therefore, Kirkman proposed 
that WCK leases out the two waqfs to the Municipal council of Mombasa to restore and protect 
them “as befitting the Mazrui family and also to maintain and beautify in the interest of Mombasa 
where it was seen by many visitors.”63 
                                                 
59 The last European WCK secretary, Mr. Hawkins retired around 1945 to give way to the first African secretary, shaykh 
Haidar Mohammad of Mombasa. WCK, archive, Mombasa; interview with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November, 
2014. 
60 On qabala see Sahih al-Bukhari 3:523, 532-537; Donaldson, W. (2000). Share Cropping in the Yemen: A Study of Islamic 
Theory, Custom and Pragmatism. Leiden: Brill; Sanjuan, G. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth: Islamic Pious Endowments 
in al-Andalus (9-15th Centuries). Leiden: Brill; Safari, M., Arif, M., & Muhammad, S. (2014). Sukuk Securities: New Ways of 
Debt Contracting Debts. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons Pte. Ltd.; Lahsasna, A. (2014). Sharicah Non-Compliance Risk 
Management and Legal Documentations in Islamic Finance. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons Pte. Ltd. 
61 The Ordinance is presently the National Museums and Heritage Act, Cap 216 [Revised 2012], Laws of Kenya. 
62 Letter by J. S. Kirkman to the District Commissioner, Mombasa, January, 1955, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
63 Minute 2 of the meeting held in the DC’s Office, Mombasa, February, 1955, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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This proposal was opposed by the Muslim community citing the same statute (Preservation of 
Archaeological and Palaeontological Interest Ordinance) which also protected such areas of 
worship from being used inconsistent with their character.64 Despite opposition, however, a 
seemingly skewed compromise was realized in favor of the colonial government and the Mazrui 
cemetery was gazetted as national monument. According to the compromise, the National 
Museums of Kenya (NMK) became co-trustees of the waqf with the WCK who retained the title of 
ownership bestowed upon it in 1909. Since both the NMK and the WCK are state agencies, it is 
clear that the colonial government influenced the decision making process in the dismemberment 
of the waqf. 
3.2.1 Compulsory Registration and Takeover of Waqfs 
For ease of supervision and control, the colonial government imposed compulsory registration of 
waqfs failure to which a mutawalli became “guilty of an offense and liable to a fine not exceeding 
two thousand Kenya shillings, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months” (WCK Act, 
section 10, 4). Mutawallis were required to register their waqfs within two months from the date 
of consecration giving precise details of the physical address, endower, type of waqf, related 
properties, details of legal ownership (i.e. land title deed), and revenues expected.65 Enforced 
compulsory registration and fear of consequences for non-compliance clearly accounted for the 
large number of waqfs under state control during the colonial period as shown in Table 1. Of the 
104 sampled waqf deeds, 83 (79.8%) were registered during this period with the highest number 
at 71 (68.3%) from 1920 to 1930. 
There was, however, no survey of waqfs during the colonial period making it impossible to 
ascertain the volume of properties that the British colonial government seized control of. From 
available evidence, nonetheless, it could be argued that the lack of survey was a conscious tactical 
move by the colonial government not to bring into public knowledge the exact worth of waqfs.This 
was probably meant to pre-empt public outcry and court battles as witnessed in India following 
the invalidation of some waqfs by the Privy Council judgment of Abul Fata v. Russomoy (1894), 
(Anderson 2008: 96-97; Schacht 1982; Banday 2013); and the usurpation of waqfs in Zanzibar 
among other British colonies (Fair 2001: 69-82). Accordingly, the lack of disclosure of the volume 
of waqfs through survey stemmed the need to make the state agency inclusive. This is because 
disclosure could have probably demanded the inclusion of Muslims with diverse backgrounds, 
knowledge, and interests in the state body, making control of the institution challenging on the 
part of the colonial government. 
                                                 
64 The National Museums and Heritage Act, CAP. 216, Section 42 (a) provides that, “[…] the Minister may acquire the 
monument by way of compulsory purchase […] but that power shall not be exercised in the case of a monument which, 
or any part of which, is periodically used for religious observances.” See also Section 43 (3a); letter of reply by shaykh 
Mbarak Ali Hinawy, the liwali of the coast, to the Town Clerk, Mombasa Municipality and copied to the PC, coast; DC, 
Mombasa; Secretary for Education, Labor and Lands, Nairobi and Secretary for Forest Development, Game and 
Fisheries, Nairobi, January, 1955, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
65 Interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, October, 2014. 
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Period  Number of waqfs Percentage 
1900s 2 1.92 % 
1910s 3 2.88 % 
1920s 24 23.88 % 
1930s 47 45.19 % 
1940s 3 2.88 % 
1950s  2 1.92 % 
1960s 2 1.92 % 
1970s 0 0 % 
1980s 1 0.96% 
1990s 1 0.96 % 
2000s 11 10.58 % 
Undated 8 7.69 % 
Total 104 100 % 
Table 1: Registration of waqfs from 1900 to 2000. (Source: WCK, 2014) 
The Act also empowered the Commission to take over the administration of privately 
administered waqfs (both family and public) in varying circumstances. Section 12, sub-sections 1 
(a) and (b) provide: 
Commissioners may take over administration of waqfs which are being conducted in 
an improper or unauthorized manner in any case in which it appears to the 
Commissioners that (a) there is no properly constituted trustee of a waqf; or (b) any 
trustee is acting in an improper or unauthorized manner … in the case of waqf khairi 
of their own motion, and in the case of waqf ahli on the motion of the majority of the 
beneficiaries, hold an inquiry. 
Thus the Commission could bring waqfs under its direct management whenever the state felt that 
they were not properly administered. One such instance involved the Wakilifi masjid at mji wa 
kale (Old town) in Mombasa in 1957. Upon inquiry as required by law it was established that the 
endower, Ali bin Muhammad bin Juma, had not established a precise formula for filling in the 
vacant position of the mutawalli.66 After the demise of the first two he had personally appointed – 
Abdulrahman bin Nasib bin Ali and Ali bin Khamis, Naaman bin Ali imposed himself as mutawalli 
                                                 
66 Section 12(2) requires that the WCK issues notices of inquiry to interested parties to appear and give evidence before 
the WCK. Notices were issued in local dailies in both English and Kiswahili and displayed in public places and the 
mosques. See Government of Kenya, Wakf Commissioners Act, Cap 109; Mombasa Times, November 3, 1957 and 
November 5, 1957. WCK records indicate that Abdulrahman bin Nasib bin Ali and Ali bin Khamis had died by June 1957, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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and also served as a mucadhdhin (adhan crier).67 WCK, therefore, took over the waqf allegedly for 
lack of a legal mutawalli and improper management. Naaman bin Ali was, nonetheless, employed 
as the caretaker by the WCK.68 
3.2.2 Colonial Policies on Land and Immovable Properties that Impacted on Waqfs 
The place of land as a factor of production both in the capitalist economy advocated by the British 
colonial government and in the institution of waqf cannot be gainsaid. However, capitalist 
economy perceived land ownership from a private view point different from the communal 
ownership as practiced in the Protectorate. Since then, acquisition and ownership of land in the 
region was marked by possession of a land title deed upon survey and demarcation. Consequently, 
from 1908, through the Land Titles Ordinance, huge tracts of land in the Protectorate changed 
ownership from community or ‘native reserves’ to Crown Lands despite widespread protests and 
claims of historical tenure from the locals (Hailey 1979: 106-107).69 
The Ordinance further empowered the Governor “to grant lease or otherwise alienate in Her 
Majesty’s behalf any Crown lands for any purpose and on any terms and conditions as he may 
think fit” (Anderson 2008: 91). This part of the Ordinance was particularly backed by the 1894 
Land Acquisition Act of India introduced in the Protectorate (later East African Land Regulations 
of 1897) that gave the British colonial government the right to seize ‘native land’ supposedly for 
public purposes (Pouwels 1987; Carmichael 1997; Ndzovu 2014b). The net effect of these 
Ordinances was to abrogate locals’ ownership of some of their customary lands and reduce them 
to squatters, majority of who were incidentally Muslims, thereby interfering with their socio-
economic welfare. 
By virtue of such Ordinances, the British colonial government also appropriated lands endowed 
as waqfs some of which were not compensated as required by law. A case in point was a cemetery 
land that was acquired for the construction of a railway line at Changamwe, Mombasa (Carmichael 
1997). According to the Sharica, waqfs acquired through compulsory acquisition by the state are 
to be paid for so that replacements could be established in line with the initial consecrations. The 
lack of compensation upon acquisition of waqf lands by the British colonial authorities meant that 
no substitute waqfs were established to carry on the aims of the previous ones as required by the 
                                                 
67 Correspondence between WCK’s Advocate and Naam bin Ali inquiring if indeed the former was the legally constituted 
mutawalli, June, 1957, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
68 Minute 50/94 of November, 1994; letter of appointment, October, 1994, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
69 The Crown Lands Ordinance (1951) defines Crown land as “[…] all public lands in the colony which are for the time 
being subject to the control of Her Majesty by virtue of any treaty, convention, or agreement, or by virtue of Her 
Majesty’s protectorate, and all lands which shall have been acquired by Her Majesty for the public service or otherwise 
howsoever, and includes all lands occupied by the African tribes of the colony and all lands reserved for the use of 
members of any African tribe, save only the lands declared to be native lands by the Native Lands Trust Ordinance.” See 
Hailey, W. (1979). Native Administration in the British African Territories. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, pp. 
106-107; Anderson, J. (2008). Islamic Law in Africa, op. cit. pp.90-91; Syagga, P. (2010). Public Land, Historical Land 
Injustices and the New Constitution. Society for International Development (S.I.D), Nairobi: Constitution Working Paper 
Series no. 9, 6. Retrieved from www.sidint.net/docs/WP9.pdf. (Last acess 6/3/2018). 
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Sharica. Undoubtedly, this had a ripple effect on the socio-economic and cultural well being of the 
chain of beneficiaries of those waqfs. 
This is not, nevertheless, to deny several other waqfs acquired by the colonial government under 
similar circumstances, but compensated during the period 1950 to 1960. They include the waqf 
land of shaykh Mbaruk bin Rashid bin Salim el-Kehlany in Mombasa in 1954 that was meant for 
the benefit of his two masjids in Mombasa and Gazi. Understandably, the WCK had bargained for 
a replacement land of equal value, but the colonial government paid in cash in compensation for 
the waqf land after allegedly failing to acquire “suitable land at the coast which could be the 
subject of an exchange.”70 Other waqfs acquired by the state include those whose usufruct were 
meant for masjid Mandhry and masjid Mwana Iki bint Suleiman in Mombasa. In both instances, 
the government also paid in cash. 
While the WCK records indicate that compensation for the waqf of bint Suleiman was divided 
between the two holy masjids – Mecca and Medina as well as masjid Kikeshi as designated by the 
endower, that of masjid Mandhry was claimed to have been “added to other amounts from similar 
waqfs for the purchase of other properties.”71 However, by the period of study, no replacement 
waqfs had been established in place of the land waqfs of shaykh Mbaruk. It was also not possible 
to ascertain whether the compensation funds remained in the WCK accounts and if indeed were 
immune to fluctuation since 1950s. Paradoxically, the WCK Act did not contemplate for 
compulsory acquisition of waqfs by the government. The Act, therefore, does not provide for the 
same. 
Moreover, no land transaction could be legally binding without first being confirmed as rightfully 
owned and sanctioned by the government as provided in Section 19 of the Ordinance: 
No rights or title to the possession of land within […] the dominion of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar, claimed under and in accordance with Muhammadan law, shall be 
recognized as against the Crown or Government, unless the person claiming such 
right or title shall not only establish in himself such right or title but prove […] that he 
or some predecessor in title was in possession […] prior to 14th December, 1895 (as 
quoted in Anderson 2008: 91). 
Such Ordinances particularly dealt a blow to claims of ownership by the locals in the Protectorate 
on the basis of lack of titles that were to present to the Land Registration Court to prove their 
                                                 
70 It would have been quiet contrary to British colonial principles of capitalist economy to replace the land waqf with 
yet another piece of land. Here, the government paid seventy two thousand eight hundred and thirty three Kenya 
shillings. See letter of response by the Government Collector to WCK, April, 1955; Government award notice of 
compensation, March, 1955; WCK’s letter of response to notice of acquisition, December, 1954, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
71 The colonial government paid nine thousand six hundred and sixty Kenya shillings for the waqf of Mandhry and seven 
hundred and seventy three Kenya shillings for the waqf of Mwanaiki. Interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, 
December, 2014. See also minute 2068 of April, 1957, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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ownership (Berg-Schlosser 1984; Syagga 2010). In other instances, mutawallis could also not 
develop some waqfs for lack of titles of ownership as demanded by the Crown Lands Ordinance. 
This is true of some waqf lands and wells in Malindi region where the WCK failed to develop them 
due to lack of title deeds from 1911 to 1912 (Carmichael 1997). This clearly illustrates that, the 
shift in the perception of land ownership did not only impact on the already established waqfs 
from being developed but also hindered the establishment of land-based waqfs due to lack of ‘legal 
ownership’.72 
While the statute did not contemplate for compulsory acquisition, it however, empowered 
Commissioners to dispose of waqfs in selected instances. Sections 16 (2) and 17 provides: 
If it appears to the Waqf Commissioners that in respect of any waqf the intentions of 
the maker cannot reasonably be carried into effect and that it is accordingly expedient 
that the property the subject of the waqf or any part thereof should be sold, the Waqf 
Commissioners may cause that property or part thereof to be sold, and shall apply the 
proceeds […] in such manner as the Waqf Commissioners think fit for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries of the waqf. 
Apart from Commissioners having the liberty to decide what is most suitable to the beneficiaries, 
albeit without necessarily consulting them, the Act does not place time span within which such 
use should be made with a view to maintaining utility of the sale proceeds. This could partly 
explain the delay by the Commission to acquire replacement waqfs in place of those dismembered 
through compulsory acquisition as it is not compelled by law to take fluctuation in to 
consideration. 
Further, some regulations on immovable properties impeded the development of waqfs by 
logically prohibiting their being endowed as such during the colonial era. This could be discerned 
from the African Property Preservation Ordinance (1916) that established: 
No building, standing coconut palm, standing fruit tree, or other standing tree situated 
in an area to which this Ordinance has been applied shall be sold, leased, 
hypothecated, mortgaged or pledged by any means whatsoever to any person who is 
not a member of an African tribe inhabiting such area and residing therein (as quoted 
in Anderson 2008: 91). 
By prohibiting any form of pledge – including waqfs, this piece of legislation undoubtedly impeded 
the establishment of new waqfs after its enactment. This is because it does not take cognizance of 
                                                 
72 At one instance around 2005-2006 before I embarked on the current project, I was involved in plans to establish a 
community integrated school at Marigiza village, Msambweni county, Kenya. Mzee Ali Athuman Mwachausa had offered 
a piece of land as waqf but due to lack of title of ownership, the project could not be registered with the local Education 
and Social and Cultural offices. This led to the abandonment of the project. 
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the fact that Islamic charity and qurba on which waqf is founded is not limited by race, ethnicity, 
or even locality. 
There are several waqfs that were consecrated by non-African Muslims, particularly Asian 
immigrants, who also maintained social and spiritual attachments with their ancestral homes as 
expressed in their waqf deeds. These include the waqf dhurri of Gulamhussein Adamji whose, 
though primary beneficiaries are the endower’s descendants in Mombasa, residual beneficiaries 
are the pilgrims of Karbala in Iraq;73 the waqf dhurri of Haji Ismael Haji Adam whose primary 
beneficiaries are Muslims of Asian descent of the Memon ethnic community while residual 
beneficiaries are poor and beggars at the two holy masjids in Mecca and Medina as well as 
Baghdad;74 and several other waqfs whose primary and residual beneficiaries are non-Africans.75 
Indeed, within the context of the WCK Act, not all Asians were recognized as Muslims and could 
not, therefore, consecrate legal waqfs.76 As such, the African Property Preservation Ordinance 
further inhibited them from establishing new waqfs considering the limitations on the choice of 
beneficiaries on their part. It is no wonder that there are very few waqfs by non-African Muslims 
in the WCK registry despite Asian Muslims forming a sizeable group in the community. It is 
possible to argue that they either did not register their waqfs as required or resorted to other 
charitable institutions besides waqfs, both of which remain possible as discussed in chapter five. 
What is evident in the above cases, therefore, is the appropriation of legislative instruments as 
political power and symbolic violence by the colonial government to control and negotiate the 
cultural and economic fields of the Protectorate even where it disregarded religious feelings of 
the community. As witnessed in some instances, either the government took away waqfs without 
compensation or used its powers within the WCK to see that the compensation did not realize its 
utility in acquiring substitute properties. Accordingly, colonial policies were not only a blow to 
practices of waqf in the region, but also set in motion the economic, social, and cultural 
subordination of the Muslim community. 
3.3 Contradicting Legislations and Civil Judgments against the Sharica on Waqf Petitions in 
Colonial Kenya 
As argued in the previous section, control of the judiciary and legislative fields by the British 
colonial state also influenced the judicial processes in the Protectorate as judgments were 
                                                 
73The waqf of Gulamhussein Adamji consisted of several parcels of land (shambas) and houses in Tudor, Mombasa. See 
waqf deeds of Gulamhussein Adamji, fols. 38/9, plots no. 3806/1 & 2519, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
74 See waqf deeds of Hajji Ismael Hajji Adam, fols. 51- 52; on plot no. 5158; Hajji Ebrahim Adam, on plot no. 8173/5, fol. 
67, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
75 See waqf deeds of Moosaji Issaji, fol. 120; Hajji Ismael Hajji Adam (above) for waqf al- Haramayn (Mecca and Medina); 
Minute 2039 of 17/2/1956 on the compulsory acquisition of waqf of Mwanaiki bint Suleiman whose compensation was 
distributed between the masjids of Mecca, Medina, and Kikeshi, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
76 Section 2 of the WCK Act (1900) defines a Muslim as “[…] an Arab, a member of the Twelve tribes [Thenashara Taifa, 
i.e. Swahili Muslims confederation], a Baluchi, a Somali, a Comoro Islander, a Malagasy or a native of Africa of the Muslim 
faith.” See Government of Kenya, Waqf Commissioners Act, Cap 109. 
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delivered in accordance with the British understanding of the Sharica, i.e. ‘Anglo-Mohammedan 
jurisprudence’. Among such decisions concerned waqfs and had serious ramifications on the 
future of the institution in the community. A case in point involves a High Court ruling in 1952 on 
the validity of waqf dhurri where Fatuma binti Mohamed bin Salim had designated her progeny 
and upon their extinction, the agnates. Three other masjids were also designated as residual 
beneficiaries of the waqf. 
The High Court invalidated the waqf based on the principle of precedence in Common law. Two 
legal precedents specifically influenced the decision of the High Court in this suit: that of a Privy 
Council judgment on Abul Fata v. Russomoy (1894); and the decision by the East African Court of 
Appeal on Said bin Muhammad bin Kassim, etc. vs. the Waqf Commissioners, Zanzibar (1946). Both 
judgments were allegedly informed by the Hanafi law that requires the inclusion of a charitable 
cause as ultimate beneficiary for the validity of a waqf. Accordingly, the waqfs were invalidated 
because of long chains of beneficiaries that made the perceived charitable causes so remote and 
almost non-existent (Anderson 2008: 96-97; Schacht 1982; Qureshi 1990; Banday 2013). 
The invalidation of the waqf dhurri of Fatuma binti Mohamed bin Salim in 1952 was, nonetheless, 
against both the preponderant view about Sharica (see chapter two) and the WCK Act of 1951 on 
the validity of waqfs. Sections 4 (1b, i and ii) of the Act provides: 
Every waqf heretofore or hereafter made by any Muslim which is made, either wholly 
or partly, for any of the following purposes […] the maker of the waqf is an Ibadhi or 
Hanifa Mohammedan, for his own behalf during his lifetime, is declared to be a valid 
waqf if – (i) it is in every other respect made in accordance with Muslim law, and (ii) 
the ultimate benefit in the property the subject of the waqf is expressly, or, in any case 
in which the personal law of the person making the waqf so permits, impliedly, 
reserved for the poor or for any purpose recognized by Muslim law as a religious, 
pious or charitable purpose of a permanent character. 
Like the Act as indicated above, the majority opinion in Sunni Islam would have, nonetheless, 
validated the contested waqf on the mere dedication of the same being charity on its own merit 
(Kozlowski 1998). All other Sunni madhhabs do not peg the validity of waqfs on the number of 
beneficiaries or residual charitable causes. Therefore, the court decisions that established the 
legal precedents were a clear case of misinterpretation of the jurisprudential positions in the 
Sharica. 
As a matter of fact, the Privy Council decision is also claimed to have been reversed in India by the 
Mussalman Waqf Validating Act of 1913 (Schacht 1982; Kozlowski 1998; Anderson 2008). Further 
evidence was also adduced to prove the contradictions of the court decision in Zanzibar over the 
Sharica as well as the Zanzibar Waqf Validating Decree of 1946. Clearly, these legal arguments 
rendered the basis of the High Court ruling on the case of Fatuma binti Mohamed bin Salim as 
untenable (Anderson 2008, 1951; Schacht 1982). By relying on the doctrine of precedence applied 
in English Common law which does not exist in Sharica (Anderson 2008), the judgment established 
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grounds for the contestation and invalidation of similar waqfs in the postcolonial era (see chapter 
four). This emphasizes that miscarriage of justice was not only to the economic and socio-cultural 
detriment of beneficiaries, but also with a view to putting into disrepute the institution of waqf 
altogether on the basis of non-Islamic jurisprudential practices. 
In another incident, the Supreme Court declared null and void some sections of the charitable 
waqf of Mohammed bin Rashid bin Badai in 1942. The corpus of the waqf consisted of two farms 
at Kisauni and Miritini and a residential plot in Mombasa Island for the benefit of his soul; those 
of his deceased parents and siblings; Ghazali madrasa; dacwa (propagation); and other charitable 
activities as deemed fit by the WCK as designated mutawallis.77 The court upheld the validity of 
the section of the waqf on the residential plot but nullified the other section on agricultural lands. 
This was paradoxical in the sense that there are no two ways in waqf according to the majority 
opinion in Sunni Islam. A waqf is either valid or not at all but cannot be split with some sections 
held as valid and others as invalid. Again, in 1949 the same court nullified the waqf of Mohammed 
bin Soud consisting of a piece of farm at Kisauni, Mombasa. Consequently, four heirs of the 
endower – Ahmad, Soud, Khadija and Salima – divided the properties in accordance with the law 
of mirath.78 
A landmark judgment involving another land waqf also delivered in a Mombasa court in 1949 
would suffice to explain the reasons for the invalidation of the previous two waqfs. In Said bin 
Abdalla and Sabahu binti Ali vs. the Waqf Commissioners and the Registrar of Titles,the court held 
that the creation of a land-based waqf was either a ‘transfer of land’ or ‘dealing in land’ under the 
terms and regulations of the Registration of Titles Ordinance (1901).79 In this context, the waqf 
was nullified for contravening the regulations regarding transfer of land (Anderson 2008: 98). 
This is because the Registration of Titles Ordinance barred the Registrar of Lands not to recognize 
any dealings that contradicted the provisions: 
A registrar must not register any instrument purporting to transfer or otherwise deal 
with […] land […] except in the manner herein provided nor unless such instrument 
be in accordance with the provisions hereof, but any instrument in substance in 
conformity with the forms annexed hereto shall be sufficient (as quoted in Anderson 
2008: 98).80 
                                                 
77 See testamentary waqf of Mohammed bin Rashid Badai dated September 12th1935 (English translation), the WCK, 
Mombasa. 
78 WCK archive, Mombasa. 
79 Civil Case no. 40 of 1949, High Court of Kenya, Mombasa, WCK archive, Mombasa. See also Anderson, J. (2008). Islamic 
Law in Africa, op. cit. p. 98. 
80 A similar legislation – the Land Transfer Ordinance of 1920 - existed in Jerusalem during the British mandate where 
it became impossible to register waqfs in the kadhi courts without the consent of the land registry department. See 
Reiter, Y. (1996). Islamic Endowments in Jerusalem under British Mandate. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., pp. 37-38. 
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Precisely, waqfs were considered real estate properties whose contracts were guided by English 
Common law and procedures. Accordingly, the Registration of Titles Ordinance did not recognize 
waqf deeds as valid documents in the establishment and transfer of waqf lands because the 
charters do not identify legal persons to whom the properties are transferred. Transfer of 
ownership of real estate, in view of the Ordinance, required that waqf lands be transferred to 
mutawallis or institutions as legal beneficiaries, but not to indeterminate entities like the poor and 
needy. Clearly, by not recognizing waqf deeds as binding documents in the transfer of waqf lands 
to mutawallis and beneficiaries, the statute technically invalidated land waqfs. Above all, since the 
Sharica places ownership of waqfs to God, who is in this case not a legal entity, the requirement by 
the Registration of Titles Ordinance was a case of a misapplied piece of legislation. 
There is no doubt that the British experience regarding waqf lands in Zanzibar influenced the 
dynamics of the legislations and court decisions regarding land in the Protectorate. It has been 
argued before in the study that though land formed a significant factor of production, it was 
perceived differently by the Muslim community and the British colonial government. The British 
viewed land in terms of capitalist economy that should be put into ‘productive use’ but not to be 
pawned or inhabited by a chain of dependents as largesse (Fair 2001). It would be recalled that 
during the 1900s in Zanzibar, mutawallis of huge tracks of waqf lands were forced to charge 
monthly rents to the occupants in a view to instilling capitalist economic ideals. The British 
colonial government, nonetheless, faced insurmountable challenges in convincing mutawallis to 
change their perceptions on waqf lands and occupants from mere acts of generosity to income 
generating ventures through house rents and land taxes (Fair 2001: 200-210; Oberauer 2008). 
Unlike in Zanzibar, however, where some beneficiaries were manumitted slaves who looked up 
to their former masters for dependence, majority of beneficiaries of land waqfs in the Protectorate 
were either descendants of the endowers or public causes. Therefore, nullification of land waqfs 
in Kenya could be interpreted as attempts by the British colonial government to stem a repeat of 
the Zanzibar crisis where mutawallis resisted embracing capitalist ideals advocated by the 
colonial government. Revocation of the waqfs, in essence, put the farms in the direct ownership of 
individual heirs who could then be swayed to adopt capitalism rather than allowing their shares 
to be used as charities by the community. This helped the British colonial government to achieve 
its “self imposed mission of civilization, progress, equity, and good government” at the expense of 
a religious tradition of charity and qurba in form of waqfs (Hashim 2010b: 223). 
In summary, the various secular policies and civil institutions instituted by the colonial 
government to control resources also influenced the institution of waqf. As discussed, the colonial 
government controlled the juridical and legislative processes from where authorities could invoke 
contradictory legislations and judgments against the Sharica demonstrating the application of 
‘Anglo-Mohammedan jurisprudence’ in the region. On the other hand, the selective appointment 
of waqf Commissioners who worked under strict guidelines and supervision ensured that the 
state would have a leeway in implementing its policies in the Protectorate. Clearly, this was a case 
of appropriation of political power and symbolic violence for the control of resources in a 
colonized territory. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has documented the contours in the conflicts, negotiations, and control of economic, 
political, and social resources among different actors and fields in the British East Africa 
Protectorate. Starting with the negotiation for political and economic power from the Bu Sacidi 
sultanate upon the coming of the British, we have established that subsequent control of the 
political field by the later accorded it the legitimacy to influence the juridical and legislative 
spheres. This enabled the British colonial government to establish laws and civil institutions that 
restructured and limited the jurisdiction of the kadhi courts as well as influencing the civil 
judgments emanating there from. From the inclusive understanding of Muslim personal status 
law, the colonial authorities also re-defined it to the exclusion of waqfs. Ultimately, this placed 
control of the economic mainstay of the interlocutors of Islamic knowledge and authority - the 
kadhis and culama – as well as the mutawallis and diverse groups of beneficiaries in the hands of 
the colonial government. 
To strengthen economic and political hegemony, the colonial government only conscripted 
Muslims perceived as ‘sympathetic’ with the ability to propagate state policies and according them 
religious legitimacy. This partly explains the formulation of the Waqf Commissioners Ordinance 
1900 (later Act of 1951) to accord the state an upper hand in the appointment of Commissioners 
who worked under British colonial officers seconded to the state agency. Moreover, the colonial 
authorities exploited existing ethnic rivalry between Muslims as evident in the appointment of 
Commissioners to represent competing and conflicting Muslim groups in the region (see 
Appendix 9.3). Ultimately, the general policies in managing waqfs as established by the colonial 
government provided fertile grounds for the negotiations for control of socio-cultural and political 
spheres in the Muslim community along ethnic and regional boundaries expounded in chapters 
four and six as internal umiji-wamiji (locale identity and belonging)dynamics.
  
4 Managing Waqfs in Postcolonial Kenya: Perpetuating State Control 
… I find the excuse that Malindi had no representation in the Commission rather 
wanting. How many other districts are not represented? Why do we want the Waqf 
Commission to look like a coastal affair that does not concern other Muslims in the 
country? (Shaykh Ibrahim Lithome, April 2010). 
Such are the sentiments that the position of a Waqf Commissioner arose during the postcolonial 
period as the WCK Act remains unchanged. With the active involvement of secular state in the 
control of waqfs, what informed the appointment of a Commissioner as a state mutawalli during 
the postcolonial period? Of what influence were secular policies on the development of waqfs in 
the postcolonial times? And how did Muslims negotiate the secular milieu in the practices of waqfs 
during the postcolonial era? The answers to these questions and the internal dynamics that inform 
the affairs of the state agency are the main focus of this section of the study, hence development 
of the chapter around the Waqf Commissioners of Kenya Act (1951) that established the state 
agency and the secular policies instituted since the colonial times. From the appointment of Waqf 
Commissioners to imposed compulsory registration; nullification of waqfs, allegedly, inconsistent 
both with the Sharica and the Common law; dismemberment of waqfs through executive decrees 
and adverse possession to the takeover of waqf administration by the state agency for lack of 
established mutawallis, the discussion unravels the influence of secular state policies and 
Common law judgments on the institution and how Muslims negotiated these developments 
during the postcolonial period. 
4.1 Appointment of Waqf Commissioners: Ethnic Affiliations and Loyalty to State Policies 
The normative precept that the position of a mutawalli is honorary with no fixed remuneration 
(Sahih al-Bukhari 3:507, 895) changed with the establishment of the WCK as a supervisory body. 
Since then, waqf Commissioners were appointed and remunerated by the state compounding the 
dynamics in the position, particularly during the postcolonial period, when filling it demanded 
varied and salient albeit unwritten considerations. In constituting the WCK as state mutawallis, 
Section 6 (1) of the WCK Act provides that the agency shall be made of eight persons of whom: 
(a) One shall be the Provincial Commissioner of the Coast province, who shall be ex-
officio a member; (b) one shall be the Chief Kadhi, who shall be ex-officio a member; 
(c) one shall be a Muslim appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of the 
Provincial Commissioner of the Coast province; and (d) five shall be Muslims 
appointed by the Minister from a panel of names submitted by the Provincial 
Commissioner of the Coast province after taking into consideration Muslim opinion 
in relation thereto. 
As provided, the Act does not specify the qualifications for appointment of Commissioners. 
Considering that the statute significantly remains unchanged, the colonial precedent for 
appointing Commissioners - socio-ethnic affiliations and perceived loyalty to state policies could, 
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therefore, be assumed to be effective in the postcolonial period. State officers – the PC and the 
Chief Kadhi – are also incorporated as ex-officio members.81 Within this context, appointments to 
the state agency during the postcolonial period were laden with socio-political and symbolic 
undertones that turned them to raw contests between the state and Muslims on one hand, and 
amongst socio-ethnic and political Muslim groups on the other. 
During field work, I was particularly intrigued by the stipulation that five members of the state 
agency were appointed from a panel of names that took ‘Muslim opinion’ into consideration. 
Despite being a Muslim and brought up in the coast region, I have not heard of Muslims’ opinion 
being solicited in appointing Waqf Commissioners. Neither is there a democratically elected 
Muslim body that could claim to speak for the majority of the Muslims in the country, let alone the 
coast province from whose position the nomination of Commissioners could be paramount owing 
to the legal limitation of the Act.82 So, how was Muslims’ opinion with regard to appointment of 
the Commissioners sought? Or what actually constituted Muslims’ opinion in as far as appointing 
the state mutawallis was concerned? 
Suffice to say that the positions and responsibilities of some state officers in the statute including 
the Governor, Civil Secretary, and the liwali acquired new names as Minister for legal and 
constitutional affairs or the Attorney General (AG); the Chief Kadhi; and the PC respectively during 
the postcolonial period.83 Even with these amendments, nonetheless, the government retained the 
power to appoint Commissioners. In this regard, as confided by some informants, Muslims’ 
opinion in the spirit of the amendments entailed the Chief Kadhi as the legal state adviser on 
Islamic issues. From logical deduction, it implies that the Chief Kadhi sanctioned 
recommendations made by the PC or he submitted the five names to the PC for approval by the 
AG.84 In simple terms, the state consults within its institutions and decides who to appoint as 
Commissioner on the basis of socio-ethnic affiliations and perceived loyalty to its policies. And 
how does the government identify from the diverse ethnic groups Muslims perceived as 
                                                 
81 According to the history of Provincial administration, there have been about two Muslim PCs in the coast province in 
independent Kenya – Ismael Chelang’a and Yussuf Hajj. Except for special cases when the Commission meetings were 
held in their offices, non-Muslim PCs sent Muslim representatives to the WCK meetings. Interviews with Mohammed 
Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
82 Section 1 of the WCK Act (1900) read in conjunction with legal notice no. 604 of 1963 restricts the legal jurisdiction 
of the Act to coast province. According to Hassan Ndzovu, establishment of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims 
(SUPKEM) in 1973 was meant to attain social control of the Muslim community by the state at the expense of political, 
economic, and theological development. This suggests that the board did not entirely represent Muslims’ interests. 
Therefore, several organizations were formed to offer alternative voices including the Council of Imams and Preachers 
of Kenya (CIPK); the National Muslim Leaders Forum (NAMLEF); National Union of Kenya Muslims (NUKEM); and 
Jam’at Ta’lam al-Quran (community for the Teachings of the Quran, JTQ) among others. However, none of these bodies 
could claim the legitimacy of being Muslims’ mouth piece. See Ndzovu, H. (2014b). Muslims in Kenyan Politics, Political 
Involvement, Marginalization, and Minority Status. Evanston: North Western University Press, pp. 79-105. 
83 Legal Notice 604 of 1963 on sections 1, 6, 24 and 26 of the WCK Act. 
84 Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
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sympathetic to state policies in the postcolonial era? The answer to this question echoes the 
concepts of social and cultural capital as advanced by Pierre Bourdieu. 
Bourdieu (1986: 248-249) conceives of social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition or in other words, to membership in a 
group.” Summarized differently, social capital is all about lasting social relationships, connections, 
and networks of family, friends, workplace, and neighbors based on trust and corporation to 
ensure common norms, social control, and most times, mutual benefits. These social networks are 
meant to provide a chance to the members within the group to “enjoy certain privileges they have 
not necessarily earned” (Svendsen / Svendsen 2003: 623; Bourdieu 1986; Rey 2007). According 
to Bourdieu (1986: 249), the relationships and networks are socially instituted to imply 
obligations and could be manifested “by the application of a common name, (the name of a family, 
a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, etc.) and a whole set of constituting acts designed 
simultaneously to form and inform those who undergo them [thus] enacted and so maintained 
and reinforced.” 
On the other hand, Bourdieu (1986: 243-248) espouses cultural capital in the form of long-lasting 
dispositions of the mind and body (embodied state, i.e. culture and cultural competence, 
cultivation, incorporation, socialization, and assimilation); in the form of cultural goods 
(objectified state, i.e. material objects and media including but not limited to writings, paintings, 
and instruments); and in the form of objectification (institutionalized state, i.e. academic 
qualifications and or certificates of cultural competence acquired through training in a socially 
recognizable institution) (emphasis in original; see also Svendsen / Svendsen 2003). In this sense 
cultural capital “denotes knowledge of or competence with aesthetic culture or specific distinctive 
cultural traits, tastes, and styles of individuals who share a common sense of honor based upon 
and reinforced by shared conventions” (Di Maggio 1982, as quoted in Lareau / Weininger 2003: 
574). In the wider context, cultural capital could be perceived in terms of instruments, both 
technical and social, for the appropriation of symbolic wealth (i.e. cultural heritage of the society) 
worthy of being sought and possessed (Di Maggio 1982, cited in Lareau / Weininger 2003). 
Based on the foregoing, appointment of Waqf Commissioners in the postcolonial era could be 
summarized by four important considerations: social capital, symbolic capital, cultural capital, 
and more importantly, regional (read the former Protectorate) balancing. The Chief Kadhi 
recommends five people within his social network who possess the requisite cultural competence 
that in the opinion of the PC, also based on his National Security Intelligence Services (NSIS) 
reports are ‘loyal to state policies’. It goes without saying that this arrangement gives the Chief 
Kadhi the audacity to recommend, hence, literally appoint his allies and avoid his distractors with 
ease.85 A critical look at the appointed Commissioners over time confirms this view. The list 
                                                 
85 This also opened the door for potential candidates or socio-ethnic and political groups to lobby with the Chief Kadhi 
or the PC for appointment as Waqf Commissioners. See correspondence between Coast Peoples’ Party (CPP) and the 
WCK, March, 1961; correspondence between O.K.T. Kashero of Harambee masjid and the WCK, July, 1970; 
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includes renowned politicians and business men as opinion makers and symbolic figureheads 
from respective socio-ethnic groups being reappointed several times on recommendation of the 
Chief Kadhi (see appendix 9.3).86 This practice maintained the status quo not only in waqf 
administration but also in the internal socio-ethnic equilibrium of Muslim groups, particularly, in 
the former Protectorate. Borrowing from Mwakimako’s (2010) terminologies, this brings us to 
the notion of umiji (locale) and wamiji (townspeople) in the institution of waqf. 
4.2 Competing for Supremacy: Muslims’ Internal Rivalry and Ethnic Dynamics in 
Constituting the Waqf State Agency 
There existed a number of autonomous but symbiotic cosmopolitan city-states along the Eastern 
coast of Africa including Mombasa, Gedi, Pate, Lamu, Malindi, Zanzibar, and Kilwa from as early as 
the eighth century attracting visitors from across the globe.87 The Mazrui became liwalis and 
representatives of the Yacrubi dynasty in many of these city-states after overthrow of the 
Portuguese in 1698 (Said-Ruete 1929; Berg 1973; al-Mazrui 1995).88 When the Bu Sacidi replaced 
the Yacrubi dynasty in 1749 A.D., the Mazrui shifted their allegiance to the former. However, 
protracted succession disputes that pre-occupied the Bu Sacidi in Oman enabled many of the 
governorates under Mazrui liwalis to exist as autonomous and rival city-states for over a century 
until 1837 (Spear 1978; Freeman-Grenville 1988; McIntosh 2009). 
Over time, the city-states grew into important towns distinguishing themselves in a binary 
contrast – with Malindi and Mombasa as political nerves of the region while Lamu and Takaungu 
(Kilifi) developed into legendary centers of Islamic knowledge and authority.89 This suggests that 
                                                 
correspondence between Malik Said Basheik and the PC, February, 1975, WCK archive, Mombasa. Interview with Zubeir 
Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
86 Correspondence between Chief Kadhi and the PC on the re-appointment of Waqf Commissioners, Ref 3/4/86; 
16/9/81; 3/5/82; 11/6/86; January, 1962; March, 1986; Gazette Notices no. 1943, July, 1982; 2050, May, 1986. It was 
also customary for the WCK to request serving commissioners to be re-appointed or their potential replacements 
debated and agreed upon in Commission sittings. See correspondence between the WCK and Commissioners, January, 
1962; minute 2176 of January, 1961; letter to Hon. Abdallah Ndovu Mwidau, February, 1962; the WCK’s letter to PC 
seconding the appointment of shaykh Said Mohammed Mandhry, August, 1965; the WCK’s letters to Hon. Mohammed 
Jahazi and Ahmed Ali Omar, June, 1968, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
87 Fair, L. (2001). Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945, 
Athens: Ohio University Press, pp.10-12; East African City-States. Retrieved from: http://www.blackpast.org/gah/east-
african-city-states (Last access 6/3/2018); East Africa’s Swahili Coast. Retrieved from 
http://www.africanworldheritagesites.org/cultural-places/swahili-coast.html (Last access 6/3/2018); Kilwa and the 
Swahili Coastal Trading States. Retrieved from: http://www.vhinkle.com/africa/kilwa.html (Accessed April, 2016).  
88On the emigration of the Mazrui to the East African coast see al-Mazrui, A. (1995). The History of the Mazru’i Dynasty 
of Mombasa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21-22; Fair, L. (2001). Pastimes and Politics, op.cit; Nicolini, B. (2014). 
Notes on Asian Presence along the Swahili Coast during the Nineteenth Century. Quaderni Asiatici 107, (September), 
61-86. 
89 See Sperling, D. (1988). The Growth of Islam among the Mijikenda of the Kenya Coast, 1826-1933 London: University 
of London, School of African and Oriental Studies; Seesemann, R. (2006). African Islam or Islam in Africa? Evidence from 
Kenya. In R. Loimeier and R. Seesemann (Eds.), The Global Worlds of the Swahili: Interfaces of Islam, Identity and Space 
in 19th and 20th Century (pp. 229-250). Berlin: Lit. 
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old aged negotiations and conflict for supremacy in the economic, political, social, and cultural 
fields as witnessed in the close to two centuries’ autonomous life of the centers only mutated but 
did not end at least from the viewpoint of waqfs. This is true considering the fact that the British 
colonial authorities, through in-direct rule policy, upheld the socio-ethnic hierarchy according 
Arab Muslims preferential treatment over African Muslims and recognized the former as 
legitimate leaders of the coastal communities (Ndzovu 2014b). With the waqf Act un-changed, 
post-British regimes continued to ape this hierarchy as evident in the appointment of the Chief 
Kadhi (Mwakimako 2010), and the waqf Commissioners. 
Postcolonial state policies, therefore, aped the colonial ones giving impetus to Muslims’ socio-
ethnic negotiations in the society. This could be explained better in Mombasa as a microcosm. 
According to Mwakimako, Mombasa’s socio-political sphere has been traditionally decorated by 
tribal alliances and rivalry pitting the Mazrui on the one side and the TisaTaifa and Thelatha Taifa 
(i.e. Thenashara Taifa, twelve ethnicities) Swahili Muslim groups on the other.90 The relations 
between the two Swahili Muslims’ federation and the Mazrui were determined by changing needs 
and circumstances for the mutual benefits of either side. For instance, despite their antipathy, 
issues of shared concern, like the appointment of the Chief Kadhi, could easily unite the Thelatha 
Taifa and Tisa Taifa against the Mazrui. This is due to the fact that “Muslims recognized the 
authority of culama on the basis of their influence within the boundaries of miji (sing. mji, locales), 
racial, and ethnic groups” (2010: 110). Therefore, appointment of the Chief Kadhi who also 
influences the nomination of Commissioners and the affairs of the waqf state agency has ever been 
a socio-ethnic and regional contest between the Swahili Muslims’ confederation and Mazrui in 
Mombasa on one hand, and Mombasa vis-à-vis her neighboring former city-states, especially 
Lamu, on the other since the position was established.91 
Etymologically, the term umuji (pl. umiji) is derived from a Swahili noun mji (pl. miji) meaning 
town. The verb umuji (i.e. of belonging to a town) and the compound noun wamiji (towns’ people) 
were primarily used as socio-ethnic tags in relation to the ambiguous spatial boundaries between 
the two groups in the Mombasa milieu. The Mazrui family inhabited the present Old town and 
areas neighboring Fort Jesus from where they established their political base after the expulsion 
of the Portuguese. In the classical sense, therefore, typical Swahili Muslims would refer to the Old 
                                                 
90The Thenashara Taifa represents a federation of Swahili Muslim groups consisting of Wakilindini, Tangana and 
Changamwe, (also called Thelatha Taifa) on one hand, and Mvita, Jomvu, Mtwapa, Kilifi, Pate, Faza, Shaka, Gunya and 
Katwa, (the Tisa Taifa) on the other. According to Hassan Ndzovu, the socio-ethnic formations were critical in the 
negotiations for inclusion and exclusion in the British political landscape facilitating the formation of political 
associations to advocate for ethnic temporal interests that could be felt in the present times. See al-Mazrui, A. (1995). 
The History of the Mazru’i Dynasty of Mombasa, op.cit; Mwakimako, H. (2010). Conflicts and Tensions in the Appointment 
of Chief Kadhi in Colonial Kenya 1898-1960s. In S. Jeppie, M. Moosa & R. Roberts. (Eds.), Muslim Family Law in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Colonial Legacies and Post-Colonial Challenges, (pp. 109-134). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; 
Ndzovu, H. (2014b). Muslims in Kenyan Politics, op. cit. 
91There have been ten Chief Kadhis since establishment of the position in Kenya. Mombasa has produced five, four from 
the ethnic Mazrui Arabs while Lamu has produced 4. The only non-Kenyan Chief Kadhi was shaykh Abdallah Salih Farsy 
(1912-1982). See Seesemann, R. (2006). African Islam or Islam in Africa? op. cit., pp. 229-250; Mwakimako, H. (2010). 
Conflicts and Tensions in the Appointment of Chief Kadhi, op. cit., pp. 109-134. 
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town as mjini (town) from where Mombasa city-state was administered in contrast to the shamba 
(farm land) peripheral neighborhoods where the Swahili Muslims were associated with.92 Thus, 
appointment of Commissioners to the state waqf agency always sought to have representatives 
(wamiji) from these two locales (i.e. urban and peri-urban) and the surrounding former city-states 
(also miji) to safeguard the intricate socio-ethnic and political dynamics of the Mazrui–Swahili 
Muslims’ confederation divide, and that of Mombasa vis-à-vis her rival neighbors. 
Informing this perception was a critical analysis of the list of serving and former Commissioners. 
Mombasa normally got three or more (out of the six ordinary) seats while the rest were shared 
among neighboring towns – Takaungu, Malindi, Lamu, and rarely, Kwale.93 It was on the context 
of these considerations that the appointment of shaykh Ibrahim Lithome in 2009 caused uproar 
from the coastal miji that had been overlooked in the appointment cycle.94Shaykh Lithome was a 
legal adviser to the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) and an expert in the Sharica. 
Based on these attributes, he possessed the requisite cultural, symbolic, and even social capital to 
merit his appointment as Commissioner of the state agency. However, despite being an invaluable 
resource to the Muslim community, his nomination was strongly contested by Lamu and Malindi 
on the claims that he was an ‘outsider’ from the coast region. 
It is a fact that section 1 of the WCK Act read in conjunction with Legal Notice No. 604 of 1963 
restricts the jurisdiction of the state agency to the coast province. However, this does not prohibit 
the appointing of Commissioners from outside the region. Precisely, section 6(1) on the 
composition of Commissioners is ambiguously silent on the areas of abode of nominees contrary 
to what was erroneously alleged by the complainants (see section 4.1). Consequently, Muslims 
across the country have equal chances and rights of being appointed as Commissioners of the 
WCK. It was further argued by the disgruntled parties that being an ‘outsider’, it would be difficult 
for shaykh Lithome to be available for Commission assignments given the long distance to 
Mombasa, (the headquarters of the WCK), from Nairobi, where he resided.95 Clearly, Lithome’s 
                                                 
92This view is further emphasized by the location of present administrative offices including the PC’s, High Court, 
Central Bank, Mombasa town hall, and most importantly, the State house and the historical Fort Jesus within the 
precincts of Old town. The socio-ethnic tags could also relate to the fluid ‘uungwana’ (civilized) and ‘ushenzi’ (un-
civilized) boundaries of the Arab, African, and Swahili Muslims. Interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 
2014. See also Ndzovu, H. (2014b). Muslims in Kenyan Politics, op. cit. 
93Some informants justified the appointment policy based on the amount of waqfs available in each town with those 
having no waqfs being left out. However, this view is weak considering that there has never been a survey of waqfs to 
support this position. Further, to demonstrate the close relations between the former governorates in the concept of 
umiji, members of the ‘moon sighting committee’ are only drawn from Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu. See Friday Bulletin 
Reporter. (Friday Bulletin, June 10, 2016, Issue No. 684). Reconstitute Moon Sighting Committee. Nairobi, pp. 1-2. 
Retrieved from: www.jamiamasjidkenya.org (Accessed April, 2016). Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, 
November, 2014; Aboud Hadi, Malindi, October, 2015; Shaykh Muhdhari A. S. Hussein, Mombasa, October, 2015. 
94 Letter of complaint by Ahmad Aboud Hadi, Malindi, September, 2009; correspondence between Abdurahman A. 
Abdurahman, Lamu, and the WCK, June, 2009, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
95Conservative estimates put the distance between Mombasa and Nairobi at five hundred kilometers, taking about 8 
hours to cover by bus or 50 minutes by charter plane. 
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cultural, symbolic, as well as social capital was deemed irrelevant in as far as the internal socio-
ethnic and political dynamics of the wamiji (Mazrui–Swahili Muslims’ confederation) and 
neighboring coastal miji’s Muslim groups were concerned. For this reason, his appointment was 
revoked and was replaced by a Commissioner from Malindi.96 Therefore, in the context of umiji-
wamiji and waqfs in particular, individual identity and ‘Muslimness’ is contingent to socio-ethnic 
affiliation and locale (or regional) belonging with some perceived to be more inclined than others. 
In conclusion, though serving the state agency as a Commissioner was a prestige that every 
Muslim wished to attain, it tended to be a preserve of some powerful cartel of Muslim elites from 
the coastal towns. In other words, “waqfu una wenyewe” (i.e. WCK [and waqf] has its owners).97 
The appointment of other Muslims outside the umiji-wamiji continuum, their cultural 
competencies and symbolic resources notwithstanding, is not guaranteed as evident in the case 
of shaykh Lithome. This view was subtly compounded by an incident that occurred around May 
2013 involving two Swahili women as narrated by an informant. The women had visited the WCK 
office to protest rent increment on waqf houses they were occupying. Despite incessantly 
explaining their dissatisfaction, the Commission Secretary remained adamant that the status quo 
would stand in reflection of ijar al-mithal for the interest of the waqfs. The women were infuriated 
by this reply and ranted against the Secretary saying, “hizi [nyumba za] waqfu ni zetu sisi. 
Ziliwekwa na mababu zetu wa Mandhry, siyo zenu nyie Wabajuni” (the waqf houses belong to us 
[while thumping their bosoms]. They were consecrated for us by our Mandhry fore-fathers; they 
are not for the Bajunis [i.e. ethnic-Muslims from Lamu to which, incidentally, the Secretary 
belongs]).98 This incident was twin fold: it illustrated a preponderant perception among the 
wamiji that waqfs are their exclusive right and should be left for them to manage and use as they 
deem appropriate, and the deeply entrenched antipathy among Muslims in the region along socio-
ethnic and locale affiliations. 
4.2.1 Levels and Influence of umiji-wamiji Dynamics in Waqfs 
Departing from the appointment of Commissioners to the state agency, we discern two levels of 
umiji - national and regional - that influenced the institution of waqf in the postcolonial period. At 
the national level, socio-ethnic and political negotiations for control of waqfs between locales with 
considerable Muslim populations was seemingly sanctioned and perpetuated by the WCK statute 
that limits the jurisdiction of the state agency to coast province. In effect, Muslims outside the 
coast region could not establish waqfs in the spirit of the Act, except for non-labeled waqfs like 
private trusts, zakat, and sadaqa as part of Islamic charity. This legal limitation partly accounts 
                                                 
96 Gazette Notice no. 1260 of February, 2010 on the revocation of the appointment of shaykh Ibrahim Lithome (Nairobi) 
and his replacement, Prof. Abdallah Nadji Said (Malindi). Lamu has had no commissioner since 2009. This makes the 
claim that Waqf Commissioners were appointed on the basis of amount of waqfs in a town to be superfluous. Group 
interviews with Mwalimu Hussein Said, Hamid Abdurahman and Abdallah Swaleh, Lamu, December, 2015; Muhammad 
Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014. See also minutes 17/2010, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
97 Interview with Rashid Mwandeo, the WCK, Mombasa, October-December, 2014, (translation is mine). 
98 Interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014, (translation is mine). 
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for the inability by the state agency to administer consecrations beyond the coastal area or even 
resolve reported claims of misappropriation of waqfs in Kisumu (Nyanza region) in the 1980s and 
Narumoru (Central province) around 2010.99 
On the other hand, although the WCK Act does not bar the appointment of a Muslim outside coast 
province as a Commissioner, the furor that followed the nomination of shaykh Lithome and his 
subsequent nullification suffices to understand the negotiations for the control of waqfs between 
Muslims and the state, and amongst Muslims themselves along umiji-wamiji perspective. Among 
issues that Lithome observed upon nullification of his appointment was the tendency to make the 
WCK, and waqf in general, exclusively a coastal affair.100 Lithome’s appointment was questioned 
and nullified on the basis of not being a coastal Muslim, the legal area to which the WCK Act defines 
national umiji. In essence, therefore, national umiji perpetuates negotiations of disconnect 
between Muslims and the state, and amongst Muslims along geographical boundaries in as far as 
waqfs are concerned. 
Below national umiji is the regional (town locales) that encompasses only a few coastal miji where 
the WCK Act is actualized. Here, it departs from two levels of struggle for control of waqfs as an 
economic capital for the negotiation of social and political fields – Mombasa as a microcosm and 
the neighboring towns’ locales. Within Mombasa town and its environs as explained before, the 
socio-political negotiations for waqfs were ever a contest pitting two sections representing the 
fluid spatial boundaries between the Swahili Muslim federation and their allies on the one side, 
and the Mazrui and their sympathizers on the other. These were, undoubtedly, deep rooted 
struggles that endowers had imbibed and were constantly aware of even as they consecrated 
waqfs, and largely informed the choice of Commissioners with a view to maintaining the internal 
equilibrium of the Mombasa Muslim protagonists. 
Outside Mombasa, umiji regards the historical relations between the town and her neighbors that 
informed considerations on the appointment of waqf Commissioners. Some respondents argued 
that Commissioners were appointed from among “waqf producing regions only.”101 However, 
                                                 
99 Muslims in Nyanza had raised concerns to the District Officer (DO) over mismanagement of waqfs in Kisumu town. 
The Commissioner of Lands (not the WCK), later appointed the Kisumu Muslim Association (KMA) as trustees of the 
contested waqfs. Similar claims were lodged by Muslims in Narumoru (Central Kenya) who petitioned the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR). The KNCHR referred the matter to the WCK who replied of being tied 
by law to handle the case. See correspondence between the KMA, the WCK, kadhi, Nyanza region and the DC Nyanza, 
August, 1981- January, 1982; Narumoru Medina mosque committee, KNCHR, and the WCK, November, 2011- February, 
2012, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
100 In the letter questioning revocation of his appointment, shaykh Ibrahim Lithome wondered; “[…] I find the excuse 
that Malindi had no representation in the Waqf Commission rather wanting. How many other districts are not 
represented? Why do we want the Waqf Commission to look like a coastal affair that does not concern other Muslims 
in the country?” See correspondence between shaykh Lithome and the WCK through the Chief Kadhi, April, 2010, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
101 Interviews with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November 2014; Ahmed Aboud Hadi, Malindi, October, 2015; Shaykh 
Muhdhar A.S. Hussein, Mombasa, October, 2015. See also correspondence between the WCK and Abad B. Muyongo, 
August-September, 2006, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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since the WCK Act does not provide for survey, it was impossible to ascertain the volume and 
distribution of waqfs to support this assertion. WCK only manages registered waqfs that could not 
be held as representative of the total volume of waqfs in the coast province, let alone the entire 
country. Precisely, the twin incidents of Narumoru and Kisumu confirm the hundreds of waqfs 
dotting the country that because of one reason or the other remained unregistered or are 
registered under various institutions besides the WCK.The probable justification in the criteria of 
appointing Commissioners, therefore, lied in the urge to have people representing and 
safeguarding the socio-ethnic, political, and cultural interests of individual locales and city-states 
that existed in the coast region during the Bu Sacidi sultanate. 
The conspicuous disregard of areas within the coast province, but outside the former Protectorate 
like Tana River and Taita-Taveta in the waqf negotiations further corroborates the foregoing 
opinion. The Protectorate extended inland only ten nautical miles from the coast line (Hailey 
1979; Eliot 1996; Ndzovu 2014a, 2014b). This makes the two hinterland regions of Taita-Taveta 
and Tana River not being part of the former Protectorate despite being in the coast province and 
commanding considerable population of Muslims, and by extension, waqfs. Consequently, waqfs 
from these areas have been overlooked and no Commissioner has been appointed since the 
establishment of the state agency. Thus, establishment of waqfs within the Protectorate was 
constantly informed by these historical incidents as endowers sought to advance and safeguard 
temporal locales’ interests as evidenced in various waqf deeds (see chapter six). 
As socio-political and ethnic interests of the wamiji and umiji took precedence in appointing 
Commissioners, beneficiaries, waqifs, mutawallis, merit, gender, and other considerations were 
disregarded.102 The result was the entrenchment of inefficiency and complacency within the WCK 
causing widespread dissatisfaction and apathy among majority Muslims who felt exploited and 
marginalized in successive appointment cycles and administration of waqfs by the state. 
Disgruntled Muslims also accused the state agency of gross failure and nepotism, particularly, in 
the award of lease and rent contracts of waqfs and how the body generally transacted business. 
This could not have been articulated better than in the lament by the beneficiaries of the waqf of 
Bamkele in Mombasa town. 
The waqf of Bamkele has a vast corpus base composed of a total of forty four parcels of land and 
other properties within and outside Mombasa town. Of these, plot no. 84/XLI was contested 
because it was a prime premises comprising three commercial sites in the heart of the town leased 
to a local entrepreneur for 99 years from 1988 at a salf of sixty thousand Kenya shillings with two 
                                                 
102 By 2010, there was no female Waqf Commissioner in the WCK. The WCK Act does not, however, bar a female Muslim 
from being appointed as a member of the Commission. Their being overlooked from appointment could be attributed 
to male chauvinism prevalent in the local Muslim community who also legitimize the same through religious 
prohibitions that restrict free mixing of the genders. Interviews with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; 
Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
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thousand six hundred shillings as monthly rent.103 According to the beneficiaries, the lease 
contract was not in good faith for the economic interest of the waqf but to the benefit of the 
entrepreneur. They argued that apart from the contract being concluded without their 
involvement, the price was below ijar al-mithal. Accordingly, they concluded that economic, social, 
and symbolic capital were the possible considerations in the award of the lease.104 
The above incident serves to highlight Muslims’ dissent against the WCK compounded by the lack 
of transparency and representation in the state agency. Unlike in Kenya, the Indian law of waqf is 
particular on the election (not appointment) of members of waqf boards in a system of 
proportional representation that brings together Muslim politicians, mutawallis, Muslim 
organizations, members of various madhhabs, and experts in the Sharica among others.105 The 
specificity of the Indian statute also rules out possible scenarios of socio-ethnic and political 
favoritism in the election of Commissioners that bedevils the WCK. As such, it instills confidence 
in the hearts of Muslims in the community as well as efficiency in the board. 
Therefore, the apparent lack of specific qualifications for the appointment of Commissioners in 
the statute was possibly meant to render the appointees easy to manipulate for the economic and 
political conveniences of the British colonial government. However, this was inadvertently 
inherited and perpetuated in the postcolonial Kenya, albeit for similar ends as was consequently 
hijacked by certain individuals and cartels along the umiji-wamiji considerations. However, as the 
state-WCK relationship took an ambivalent turn from the recent past, the void in the specific 
qualifications when appointing Commissioners accorded the historical umiji-wamiji negotiations 
for control of economic and socio-cultural spheres among ethnic-Muslim groups, particularly in 
the former Protectorate, an invaluable platform for its reenactment. 
4.3 Compulsory Registration: Challenges and Protests against State Control vis-à-vis 
Revival of Waqfs 
Compulsory registration of waqfs remained an important requirement even during the 
postcolonial period. However, the inability to enforce the rule, political interference, and weak 
penalties on non-compliance made state supervision and control of waqfs a challenging task 
during this era. Unlike the British colonial period where the state employed a hands-on approach 
to ensure control of resources, the culama, and various groups of beneficiaries for political 
hegemony, the postcolonial regimes developed an ambivalent attitude towards hands-on control 
of the institution. 
                                                 
103 Letter by Zubeda bint Salim bin Iddi Bamkele to the WCK, July, 1999, cc. the Chief Kadhi, the PC coast Province, and 
tenants of the contested plot along Biashara Street, Mombasa. See also communication to the WCK by the complainant, 
July, 1988, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
104 Group interviews with Ali Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman Bamkele, Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele and Hamid Salim 
Bamkele, Mombasa, November, 2015. See also internal memo by the Secretary, WCK, to Commissioners, July, 2010, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
105See the Waqf Act of India of 1995, sections (9) and (14); Waqf (Amendment) Act of India of 2013. 
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As a matter of fact, registration of waqfs declined sharply from the 1940s as shown in Table 1. 
Only 7 (6.7%) waqfs were registered between 1940 and 1960, i.e. two decades before 
independence. The scenario worsened in the postcolonial period as the central registry realized 
13 (12.5%) waqfs from 1970s to 2000s. This scenario begs for answers as to why compulsory 
registration started to decline during the colonial period despite hands-on approach by the 
colonial government. By neither means does this decline suggest that Muslims stopped 
establishing waqfs; nor is it a pointer that waqfs stopped being the economic, social, and symbolic 
means worthy the negotiations witnessed then and for a long period in the postcolonial era 
manifested in protracted court battles involving waqfs and the internal intrigues that 
characterized appointment of Commissioners. Clearly, registration of waqfs declined in 
expression of Muslims’ dissatisfaction with centralized administration and control of the 
institution. 
Precisely, state control of waqfs was resented because major actors – endowers, diverse groups of 
beneficiaries, culama, and Muslim socio-cultural institutions – gradually lost independence and 
control of the institution. Consequently, this weakened the sectors catered for by waqfs; rendered 
the traditional positions obsolete; and eroded the privileges and influence of the actors in the 
society in sharp contrast to the steady socio-political ascendance of the British colonial 
government. In other words, control of resources by the colonial government, and waqfs in 
particular, had accorded it the economic and political power to dictate the level and nature of 
negotiations on the relationship between them and the Muslim community on the one side, and 
amongst Muslims themselves on the other. This caused apathy in a cross section of Muslims who 
responded through non-compliance with the requirement for compulsory registration of waqfs. 
The situation was no different during the postcolonial period as successive regimes failed to undo 
the colonial state policies and legislations in relation to waqfs. These include lack of reforms in the 
WCK statute; continued appointment of Commissioners along socio-ethnic and locale 
backgrounds; political interference on waqfs; as well as dismemberment and invalidation of waqfs 
through secular policies and institutions (see sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.3). To retain control of 
resources and fulfill the religious requirement on charity and qurba, a cross section of Muslims 
established non-labeled waqfs that they registered with other state bodies like the prisons, 
military, ministries of education and health (see also Mwakimako 2007a), or private trusts and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as discussed in chapter five. 
Significantly, compulsory registration became impossible to enforce in the postcolonial period as 
the state body also lost the vigor to pursue non-complying mutawallis. This is mainly due to the 
minimal fine imposed on defaulters that in essence even when imposed upon offenders it does 
not benefit the state agency (WCK Act, section 10, 4). This, evidently, placed the state agency in an 
awkward situation with so many waqfs out of its control while at the same time battling with 
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inherited battered image.106 The Act further bestowed upon the agency the audacity to disregard 
endowers’ wishes as contained in various waqf deeds, and by extension, the Sharica on waqfs 
whenever they deemed fit. This created discontent in the Muslim community. Section 16(2) of the 
WCK Act provides: 
In any case where in the opinion of the Waqf Commissioners the intentions of the 
maker of a waqf are unlawful or unascertainable or are incapable of being carried out, 
or where any surplus revenue remains after fulfilling the intentions of the maker of 
the waqf, the Waqf Commissioners shall […] apply the property or surplus property 
or revenue in such manner as the Waqf Commissioners think fit for the beneficiaries 
of the waqf. 
As expressed in the clause, the Act thus granted the Waqf Commissioners the authority to 
disregard the shurut al-waqif and spend waqf revenues against designated causes provided that it 
found the execution of the endower’s stipulations unlawful or unascertainable. Included among 
these are recitation of the Qur’an at the endower’s grave yard, salaries for Qur’an teachers, and 
organizing religious rites like hajj, mawlid, khitma, and iftar. This occasionally led to dissents and 
protests by the diverse groups of beneficiaries and progeny of endowers.107 
More so, by providing that the WCK could use the property of waqf or its surplus revenue in such 
manner as the Commissioners think fit, the Act subtly enshrined impunity to commit or omit 
important decisions without consulting the concerned parties. Ostensibly, this was on the belief 
that decisions made by the state agency would be to the best interests of the diverse groups of 
beneficiaries and waqifs. On the contrary, this was not always the case as established by the study 
crystallized by the lament by the Bamkeles above and, the apparent failure by the WCK to re-invest 
compensation funds from some compulsory acquired waqfs as was evident in chapter three. 
Disenfranchised beneficiaries of these and many other waqfs were at logger heads with the state 
agency questioning its decisions to lease them out to private investors allegedly at minimal rates 
and without consulting them. Consequently, some of the beneficiaries sued the Commission.108 
This demonstrates that not all decisions made by the state agency on behalf of the beneficiaries 
                                                 
106 Group interviews with Ali Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman Bamkele, Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele and Hamid Salim 
Bamkele, Mombasa, November, 2015; Mohammed Abdallah, Ali bin Khamis, Rahman Abdallah and Rashid Khamis, 
Mombasa, November, 2015; Said Sharif Abdallah, Malindi, November, 2015. 
107 Most of the rites were disregarded allegedly for lack of funds. Once in a while, however, the WCK claimed to give 
some usufruct of the waqfs to madrasas, mosques, and other public institutions in fulfillment of endowers’ wishes. 
Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Mohammed Abdallah, Rahma Abdallah, and Ali bin 
Khamis, Mombasa October, 2015; Said sharif Abdallah, Malindi, October, 2015. 
108 The Bamkeles have had protracted legal battles against the WCK among them challenging alleged usurpation of 
administration of their private waqfs and leases to Shigog investments limited believed to be owned by a renowned 
businessman in the town. Group interview with Ali Salim Bamkele, Hamid Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman Bamkele and 
Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele, Mombasa, November, 2015. See also Civil Suit no.165 of 1926 in the High Court of Kenya at 
Mombasa; correspondence between Shigog, the WCK, and the Attorney General, 2010-May, 2012, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
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and waqifs as empowered by the Act were popular, causing dissatisfaction and apathy among a 
cross-section of the Muslim community, hence the non-conformity with the compulsory 
registration rules. 
In interpreting the socio-economic and political subordination of traditional actors of waqfs that 
caused resentment and subsequently, non-compliance with imposed registration rule, we draw 
from Bourdieus’ concept of symbolic violence– “the violence exercised upon a social agent with 
his or her complicity” (Bourdieu / Wacquant, 2004: 272; Bourdieu, 1990, 2000). In the case of 
waqfs, it is clear that the state policies established an environment of symbolic domination against 
traditional actors in the Muslim community since the colonial period. The victims – waqifs, 
mutawallis, culama and the general community of beneficiaries - as social agents understood and 
recognized the violence wielded precisely against them (i.e. being subordinate in the economic, 
social, and symbolic fields and capital). However, due to the political power of the colonial 
authorities and subsequent postcolonial government, particularly in the 1960s to 1970s, they 
‘feigned’ not to perceive it as such, thereby constructing their relationship with the state from the 
stand-point of their being subordinate as natural (Bourdieu / Wacquant 2004). Conversely, this 
perception also instilled apathy and resentment among Muslims manifested in the low figures 
captured in the central registry of the state agency. 
In the last decades of the twentieth century, however, the opening up of the democratic space in 
the country also meant slackening of conspicuous presence by the state in the supervision and 
control of waqfs. Direct interference by the government through the provincial administration as 
was the case of Malindi waqfs (see chapter three) and the waqf of Salim bin Mbaruk bin Dahman 
at Kanamai (see section 4.5.3) was relatively relaxed. As a matter of fact, the relationship between 
the state agency and its benefactor in the twenty-first century could aptly be described as 
ambivalent. According to a pre-independence agreement that incorporated the former 
Protectorate to the Kenya colony, the state was bound to protect Muslims’ historical claims to land 
and religious institutions (see chapter five). 
Despite this historical and constitutional obligation, nonetheless, the postcolonial government 
faced a dilemma. It could not risk conspicuous involvement in the development of Muslims’ 
religious institutions (like the WCK and kadhi courts) and their supervision without drawing the 
anger of the majority Christian population for alleged bias as evidenced during the review of the 
constitution. Within this context, the state resorted to controlling the WCK from the periphery. It 
engaged the WCK in-directly on need basis so as to maintain control of the institution for more or 
less the same reasons that led to its establishment without drawing the wrath of either religious 
community. Accordingly, this accorded the WCK and Muslims in general an ambiguous degree of 
hands-off in the control of waqfs. 
Around the same time, the judiciary also demonstrated some independence from the political 
elites by delivering land mark rulings including the revocation of legislations that earlier nullified 
some waqfs like the case of Mazrui lands (see section 4.5.2 below). This further eased the apathy 
among some Muslims against the state agency. More imperatively, there was a new development 
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in the institution across the Muslim world in the last decades of the twentieth century – the 
renewed zeal to resuscitate waqfs. In their study, Siraj and Hilary (2006) and Dafterdar and 
Cizakca (2013) observe that several countries with significant Muslim majority like Sudan, 
Kuwait, Malaysia, and Qatar established legal and legislative reforms to recover, preserve, and 
develop waqfs to help finance socio-economic and cultural development (see also Kahf 2003; 
Nabaa 2016). 
It could not be conclusively established to what extent the renewed zeal influenced the 
establishment of new waqfs amongst Kenyan Muslims. However, as established by the study, there 
were new waqfs registered with the WCK. This could appropriately account for the rise in the 
registration figures to 11 (10.6%) during the first decade of the twenty-first century as shown in 
Table 1. This suggests a gradual change of heart lessening the apathy among a cross-section of 
Muslims who had earlier refused to register their waqfs in protest to centralized administration. 
Clearly, this is a significant pointer towards revival of the institution as observed earlier by Kahf, 
Siraj and Hilary, and Dafterdar and Cizakca that could be difficult to ignore.109 
4.4 State Control of Waqfs and Jostling for Power and Privileges by Interest Groups 
The normative obligation of the kadhi taking over the management of waqf in the absence of a 
mutawalli with a view to protecting the interests of the endower and the diverse groups of 
beneficiaries was transferred to the state agency. Accordingly, the state agency continued to take 
over management of private waqfs allegedly for lack of precise mutawallis during the postcolonial 
period. As provided by section 11(b) of the WCK Act, nonetheless, state takeover, particularly of 
waqf dhurri where the process is initiated by the majority, negates the interests of the minority 
beneficiaries. This is demonstrated in an incident narrated by Mohammed Shalli. According to 
Shalli, a beneficiary sought intervention of the state agency for allegedly being denied of his share 
of usufruct of waqf ahli by his germane siblings but the WCK became legally barred from helping 
him since he was the minority in that circumstance.110 Within this context, the statute could be 
seen as condoning violation of the rights of some beneficiaries fanning family feuds. 
Another incident where the state agency took over the management of waqfs merits brief 
comments. This involved masjid Msalani at Bondeni, Mombasa in 1976. Upon inquiry as required 
by law, it was established that the first mutawalli – Mohammed bin Rashid Basami – had died 
leaving a vacuum in the custody of the waqf since it was unclear if the endower had provided for 
the succession to the position. In the absence of a precise mutawalli, mwalimu Said bin Ahmed 
who was also the imam (prayer leader) usurped the position on self appointed basis exposing the 
masjid to frequent quarrels for control. The WCK, therefore, took over management of the masjid 
                                                 
109 In Kenya, efforts to resuscitate waqfs begun in February 2016 with the government establishing a task force to review 
the Waqf Commissioners Act. See Friday Bulletin Reporter. (Friday Bulletin, March 4, 2016, Issue No. 670). Calls for 
Views as Waqf Commission Act Review Starts; Friday Bulletin Reporter. (Friday Bulletin, March 18, 2016, Issue No. 672). 
Waqf Review Commission to Hold Public Hearings. Retrieved from: www.jamiamasjidkenya.org (Accessed April, 2016). 
110 Interview with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
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for lack of a legitimate mutawalli. For a long time upon the demise of mwalimu Ahmed, Khamis 
Omar Shaibo became the de facto imam. In the year 2000, WCK confirmed Shaibo as mutawalli 
and imam but was opposed by a self imposed ‘executive committee’ that went ahead to establish 
a ‘trust of the mosque of Msalani.’111 
Apparently, a mucadhdhin or imam of a mosque is not only an honorific spiritual title in a Muslim 
community. Apart from demanding that the holder of these titles exhibits the requisite cultural 
capital – basic knowledge of Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) - the position is also laden with privileges 
and influence akin to what Bourdieu describes as symbolic and social capital that place the holder 
in a level above ordinary ratibs (worshipers), especially in well endowed masjids. In the context 
of waqfs, social capital could as well be institutionalized in socially constructed titles like 
mucadhdhin, liwali, imam, kadhi, maclim, shaykh,or ‘member of an executive committee of a masjid’ 
among others. Holding any of such honorific titles, therefore, places the holder in a vantage 
position to acquire and manage economic resources like donations and other charities made in 
the masjid. Since economic capital has the highest convertibility rate (Bourdieu 1986: 252-255), 
it is obvious that holders of such titles are better placed to exchange it into various other capitals 
when the need arises, i.e. social, cultural, and at times, even political. 
It is against this background that the conflicts witnessed at Msalani masjid upon confirmation of 
the imam by the state agency should be understood as contestation for the control of social, 
economic, and symbolic privileges.112 Informing this perception is the remuneration (i.e. 
economic capital) of the mucadhdhin and imam as well as catering for utility bills including water 
and electricity by the WCK upon takeover of the masjid. Around 2011 the state agency also applied 
for and acquired title of ownership (i.e. symbolic capital) for the waqf cementing the takeover.113 
During the cause of this research, the waqf was declared a historical monument (i.e. symbolic 
capital) and had attracted a renovation grant of about thirty five million Kenya shillings from a 
private donor (i.e. economic capital).114 Drawing from the above narrative, events in the Msalani 
waqf clearly corroborate our view of contestation for economic, social, and symbol capital. 
Majority, if not all masjids under the state agency have their imams, mucadhdhin, and some times, 
cleaners drawing salaries from the Commission. Even those not under the state agency are catered 
for by independent committees and sponsors. This demonstrates that attaining any of the 
                                                 
111 Khamis Omar Khamis (Shaibo) had usurped the role of imam since the demise of mwalimu Said bin Ahmed causing 
contestation from the ‘executive committee’ of the mosque, led by Salim Awadh. See copy of inquiry, March, 1976; 
Shaibo’s correspondence to the WCK, March, 2000; WCK’s letter of appointment to Shaibo, July, 2000; Awadh’s 
correspondence with the WCK, May-July, 2001; the WCK’s correspondence to the Registrar of Titles, January, 2003, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
112 Records of inquiry in to the mosque of Msalani, October, 1957, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
113 Correspondence from Lands Registrar, December, 2011, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
114 Communication between the WCK and donor, June, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa; interview with Mohammed Shalli, 
Mombasa, November, 2014. 
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positions in a masjid guarantees the holder of some economic mainstay directed to such 
institutions through waqfs or ordinary donations, charities, and other related privileges. 
Above all, entry of the NMK through declarations of waqfs as national monuments as evidenced in 
the cases of masjids Msalani, Wakilindini, as well as the Mazrui cemetery (see chapter three) 
among others, occasionally transforms the contestation to intra-state agencies’ conflict. In the 
circumstances, the WCK had to contend with the interests of the diverse groups of beneficiaries 
and ratibs apart from its state counterpart – the NMK. At stake is probable economic and symbolic 
capital encapsulated in donations to renovate waqfs as witnessed in masjid Msalani that could also 
draw the interests of local politicians and contractors. These struggles and lack of consensus by 
various actors often stall the reconstruction processes leaving the waqfs in structurally 
condemned state. More so, because of being non-revenue generating properties, some waqfs, like 
masjid Msalani, rely on others through tasrif as well as donations from well wishers to support 
them, thereby, periodically inflaming the contestation.115 
4.5 Invalidation of Waqfs: The Effects of Secular Legislations and Judicial Rulings on Waqfs 
in Postcolonial Kenya 
The Sharica holds waqfs established contrary to basic principles including those that favor one 
gender; or contradict the law of mirath; or bear other inconsistencies with guidelines on waqf in 
view of the majority opinion as null and void. Moreover, the preponderant view holds that waqfs 
could neither be alienated on the basis of adverse possession nor opened up for inheritance. 
However, in a legal plurality society, particularly where the Sharica comes second to English 
Common law, this may not necessarily be the case. Besides, the limitation of the jurisdiction of the 
kadhi courts to a narrowly defined Muslims’ personal status law and the lack of Appellate Court 
of the kadhis in postcolonial Kenya meant that maters arising from waqf could only be adjudicated 
in the civil courts where presiding judges are not bound by the Sharica. Consequently, some waqfs 
that could have otherwise been upheld as valid in the Sharica milieu were invalidated as 
expounded in the following scenarios: 
4.5.1 Invalidation of Waqfs: Conflicts between the Sharica and the Common Law 
The influence of the doctrine of precedence in Common law on court decisions continued to be 
felt in the postcolonial era causing legal conflicts with the Sharica regarding the validity of waqfs. 
Even so, the WCK Act pre-empted the Islamic jurisprudential conflicts that informed the legal 
precedents in Common Law by holding waqfs consecrated according to varying madhhab as valid 
(see chapter three). Nonetheless, questions were raised in the civil courts with a view to 
invalidating some waqfs in the postcolonial period. This was evident in Civil Suit no. 55 of 2011 in 
the High Court in the matter of the waqf of Said bin Rashid al-Mandhry. 
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In this litigation, one of the alleged administrators, Ali Said Mohammed, sued to have the waqf 
invalidated for inconsistencies with laid down procedures. The petitioner avowed that the “waqf 
lacks an expression to the effect that the ultimate benefit in the property the subject of the waqf 
is reserved for the poor or for any other purpose recognized by Muslim law as religious, pious, 
and charitable purpose of a permanent nature.”116 He also argued that the waqf had become un-
economical to maintain as it realized little revenue, thereby requesting that it be dissolved to 
enable inheritance of the properties according to the Sharica guidelines of mirath. However, one 
fundamental flaw that the court established in the petition was that the applicant failed to enjoin 
the WCK as respondents despite the waqf having been registered by the state body. On the basis 
of this technical default, the mater was differed to grant WCK the right of reply.117 
The petitioner in the above litigation raised concerns that warrant brief comments. Both issues 
raised by the complainant are based on the jurisprudential differences that characterized the legal 
debate in the formative period of the institution of waqf. On the issue of formula, preponderant 
view on the Sharica would uphold the validity of the waqf on its own merit as Islamic charity 
established for the purpose of attaining qurba. This position is subtly held by the WCK Act for it 
does not confine the validity of waqfs to a specific theological dispensation. More so, the contested 
waqf was presumably established under Shafici legal code to which the majority of Kenyan 
Muslims ascribe (Freeman-Grenville 1988; Stockreiter 2015). Except for Hanafi law, the 
overriding opinion, including Shafici theology, do not insist on the inclusion of a charitable cause 
as ultimate beneficiary for the validity of waqfs rendering the applicant’s claims of inconsistency 
with the Sharica, at least as held by the majority of renowned Sunni theologians, superfluous. 
The second concern regarded the economic viability of the waqf. As alleged by the complainant, 
the waqf had become ‘uneconomical’ to maintain, though not in ruins. As provided by the 
appellant, the question of continued viability could appropriately be explained under the principle 
of (ir-)revocability of waqfs. Except for imam Malik, the majority position on this context holds 
that the property could be exchanged, leased, or even sold and its revenue invested in another 
waqf (see chapter two). Yet, a quick perusal of the endowment deed revealed that the corpus 
included 8.92 acres of prime residential land in Tudor estate, Mombasa, valued at four hundred 
and forty six million Kenya shillings from fifty million shillings per acre according to ijar al-
mithal.118 Within this premises, the claims of economic viability of the waqf clearly do not hold. 
On the other hand, the WCK at some point started to file a ‘no objection motion’ to suits seeking 
dissolution of posterity waqfs in civil courts that were not under its direct management, the 
                                                 
116 Amended originating summons, ground 2, Civil Suit no. 55 of 2011 in the High Court of Kenya, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
117 Order of the High Court, Civil Suit no. 55 of 2011, September, 2011, WCK archive, Mombasa. The matter was, 
however, still pending during research. 
118 Interviews with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Zubeir Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
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current one included.119 This implied that the right of reply accorded to the state agency on the 
petition could not necessarily impede the applicant. Therefore, on the basis of the doctrine of 
precedence in Common Law, the petitioner sought to capitalize on the jurisprudential disparities 
in Sunni Islam to have the waqf invalidated for economic expedience. This explains his appeal that 
the consecration be dissolved to allow inheriting of the property rather than disposing it and using 
the proceeds to establish a substitute waqf as required under the Sharica. 
Moreover, the failure to review the judicial framework in relation to the jurisdiction of the kadhi 
courts in the postcolonial period also meant a continued application of the ‘Anglo-Mohammedan 
jurisprudence’ (Schacht 1982). Since kadhi courts lacked Appellate powers, Muslims dissatisfied 
with decisions of the ‘subordinate court’ could appeal at the High Court where adjudication is not 
bound by the Sharica, a scenario that occasioned legal clashes between the kadhi and civil courts 
in relation to waqfs as aptly illustrated in two cases: The first involved Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2014 
at the High Court lodged against a decision by the kadhi court on Succession Petition No. 103 (A) 
of 2004 in the matter of family waqf of Athman bin Kombo bin Hassan. 
It was alleged that in establishing the above waqf, the endower denied his daughter, Fatuma 
Hassan Momo, and wife, Skotchi Shame Mwidau, of their Qur’anic rights of inheritance by not 
including them among beneficiaries of the waqf. The applicant, Hassan Kadi Omar, also claimed 
that the respondents, Bakari Kombo and Hassan Kombo, denied him of his share of the usufruct 
despite being a legal heir of a descendant of the endower born after consecration of the waqf and 
covered by the waqf deed as provided.120 Upon careful review of the submitted waqf deed, the 
kadhi court declared the waqf invalid on the basis of inconsistency with the Qur’an guidelines on 
mirath.121 
In the Civil Appeal at the High Court, the disgruntled respondents in the Succession Petition 
challenged the kadhi’s decision on the annulment of the waqf. The appellants argued that the 
respondent was not heir of the endower as claimed, but a descendant of the mutawalli of the waqf 
who was incidentally a brother of the endower. In this regard, the mutawalli was not a joint 
endower of the waqf and the respondent could not, therefore, challenge its legality. It turned out 
that Hassan Kadi Omari was an agnate relative who could not claim usufruct of the waqf in the 
existence of cognate descendants of the endower. However, though the relationship between the 
complainants in the appeal case and the female relatives in the inheritance petition was not put 
                                                 
119 The WCK’s reply to Advocate regarding Civil Suit no. 55 of 2011 in the High Court, January, 2012. See also WCK’s 
reply to summons against Miscellaneous Cause no. 10 of 2012 in the High Court, May, 2013; Miscellaneous Application 
no. 4 of 2013 in the High Court (Family Division); communication between the WCK and beneficiaries of the waqf of 
Omar Mohammad Bakar of Lamu on dissolution, February, 2008; the WCK’s reply to the request by beneficiaries of the 
waqf of Yabu bint Saburi on dissolution, April, 2011; Miscellaneous Cause no. 14 of 2015 in the High Court, (still 
pending), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
120 The endower had provided for his ‘children yet to be borne’ as part of the beneficiaries. See waqf deed of Athman 
bin Kombo bin Hassan, folio No. 97, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
121 See Court Order, May, 2010, Succession Petition no. 103 (A) of 2014 at the kadhi court, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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into doubt, the High Court set aside the decree of the kadhi court and reinstated the waqf 
effectively denying the latter of their right to inheritance as outline in Quran 4:11-12.122 
According to the argument by the applicants of the Succession Petition corroborated with the waqf 
deed produced before the kadhi court, one would argue that the family waqf was void in 
accordance to the Sharica for denying legal heirs of their right to mirath. As discussed in chapter 
two, the preponderant view gives precedence to Qur’an guidelines and right to inheritance over 
the right to waqfs. However, the High Court was not bound by the Sharica or even applied it as 
understood since the colonial period. It is, therefore, possible to relate that the decision by the 
High Court did not take cognizance of the normative principles on the validity of waqfs overruling 
the ‘subordinate court’ to uphold an invalid waqf that was inconsistent with the Sharica. This was 
a mistake that the kadhi court sought to correct in its decision on the Succession Petition, an 
apparent miscarriage of justice that could have possibly been rectified in an Appeal Court of the 
Kadhi that is lacking in the present circumstances. 
The second case in this scenario involved application of the Common law on adverse possession 
to invalidate a waqf. As provided both by the Sharica and the Waqf Commissioners Act, however, 
the law of adverse possession – where one becomes entitled to property owing to a prescribed 
period of uncontested occupation or squatting – does not apply to waqfs.123 A departure from this 
legal exception could, nonetheless, be noted from Civil Suit no. 60 of 2006 at the High Court that 
resulted in the dismemberment of waqf. In this suit, Hamzaali petitioned the court to recognize 
him as proprietor of the corpus of the waqf of Adam Abdulhussein based on the law of adverse 
possession. 
According to the plaintiff, the last surviving beneficiary of the posterity waqf who was also his 
aunt and a widow of the endower, Rukiyabhai, appointed him through bequest as sole beneficiary 
of the estate before her demise in 1986. Therefore, Hamzaali requested the court to grant him 
right of possession for having been in “continuous and uninterrupted possession for a period of 
twenty years.”124 Significantly, the WCK was not enjoined in the case though the court raised a 
genuine question on “whether or not the Limitation of Actions Act will apply to land held in trust 
by the waqf?”125 However, while delivering his ruling, the judge made reference to section 569 of 
Halbury’s laws of England regarding trespass in possession of charity land and ruled in favor of 
the petitioner.126 
                                                 
122 See Decree of the High Court, Civil Appeal no. 17 of 2014, September, 2014, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
123 Section 15 of the WCK Act provides; “[…] notwithstanding anything contrary in any Act or law for the time being in 
force, no title to any property the subject of a waqf shall, after the commencement of this Act, be acquired by any person 
by reason of that person having been in adverse possession thereof or by reason of any law of prescription.” 
124 Order of the High Court, Civil Suit no. 60 of 2006 in the matter of MSA/XLII/13, p.2, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
125 Order of the High Court, Civil Suit no. 60 of 2006 in the matter of MSA/XLII/13, p.3, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
126 Vol. 24 article 569 of the Halbury’s Laws of England on trespass in possession of charity land as quoted in the 
judgment provides; “[…] if the trespasser, or a person who claims independently of the right of the charity, gets into 
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Three issues in the above petition are of major concern: First, the waqf deed was not produced in 
court making it difficult to ascertain the residual beneficiaries of the waqf. It is, nonetheless, safe 
according to the Sharica to hypothesize that some charitable cause, and not the petitioner, could 
have been designated or assumed as ultimate beneficiary. In this regard, the alleged wasiyya 
appointing the petitioner as beneficiary of the estate becomes irrelevant. Secondly, as a corporate 
body in charge of waqfs, the WCK was denied its right of reply to the petition. Consequently, the 
court relied on evidence from one party. Finally, although the court raised a fundamental question 
on the relevance of the law of limitation of actions, it was oblivious of the differences between 
waqfs and trusts thereby using the latter as a benchmark to the former leading to the miscarriage 
of justice.127 
4.5.2 Invalidation of Waqfs through Parliamentary Acts 
The Mazrui land trust commonly known as the Takaungu land at Kilifi district comprised of 2,716 
acres consecrated as waqf ahli of the Mazrui Shak’si followers of Salim bin Khamis. This land trust 
was established by the British colonial government through the Mazrui Lands Trust Act of 1914 
for private ownership of the Mazrui family in clear illustration of the colonial policies that 
accorded some ethnic Muslims preferential treatment over others.128 In 1989, however, the 
postcolonial parliament established the Mazrui Lands Trust (Repealed) Act revoking the private 
ownership of the land, hence the waqf.129 
In debating the Repeal Act, it was argued that the initial Act that established private land 
ownership for the Mazrui family disregarded ancestral land rights of the Mijikenda inhabiting the 
area. The Repeal Act, therefore, invalidated the waqf ostensibly to enable settling of other 
deserving landless Kenyans. Nevertheless, this was without compensation to the beneficiaries of 
                                                 
possession of charity land, time will run against the title of the charity just as it would against any cestui que trust entitled 
under a trust, if the trustee were out of possession and the property was held by a stranger.” See Order of the High 
Court, Civil Suit no. 60 of 2006 in the matter of MSA/XLII/13, p.3, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
127 Trusts differ from waqfs as religious institutions in that the later are guided by a law believed to be divine and could 
not be alienated though they could be exchanged or sold and their proceeds used to establish replacement waqfs to be 
managed according to the shurut al-waqif. See Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India: A Study of Legislative and 
Administrative Control. New Delhi: Gian Publishing House; Kozlowski, G. (2008). Muslim Endowments and Society in 
British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Khan, A. (2008). Commentary on the Law of Waqf in India (The 
Waqf Act, 1995). Hyderabad, Saraswathi Printers. 
128The land was registered as private under certificate of ownership number 409, of April, 1914, issued under the Land 
Titles Act (Cap 282) Laws of Kenya to shaykh Ali b. Salim. See Kenya National Archives – KNA/PC/Coast/1/11/41. 
129 The waqf was administered by a lands board of trustees composed of C.W Hobley (PC, Mombasa), shaykh Rashid b. 
Salim (head of Mazrui), shaykh Mohammad b. Soud (liwali, Takaungu), shaykh Khalfan b. Abdallah (kadhi, Takaungu), 
shaykh Muhammad b. Juma (mudir, Roka) and Riziki b. Mohammad. See the Mazrui Lands Trust Act (1914), section 3; 
KNA/PC/Coast/1/11/41; judgment on Civil Suit no. 185 of 1991 in the High Court in the matter of Mazrui Lands Trust 
(Repeal) Act and in the matter of the Constitution of Kenya between the Mazruis and the Attorney General, 2-3, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
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the waqf contrary to the Sharica and the Land Acquisition Act (1983).130 The repeal infuriated the 
Mazrui for the loss of their private property, and by extension, a cross section of Muslims for the 
invalidation of the waqf. This scenario was occasionally reenacted in public forums to epitomize 
perceived historical injustices in relation to land ownership, marginalization, and economic 
exploitation of the Muslim community in the region (al-Mazrui 2004: 7). 
In a Civil Suit no. 185 of 1991 in the High Court in the matter of Mazrui Lands Trust (Repeal) Act 
and the Constitution of Kenya, the aggrieved beneficiaries petitioned the court against acquisition 
of the waqf land without compensation. The applicants argued that the Repeal Act violated their 
constitutional right to property and desecrated the waqf ahli protected by the Sharica, thereby 
asking that the Act be nullified to restore the land waqf.131 In its ruling, more than two decades 
later, the court granted the request of the applicants and ordered for the compensation of the 
complainants.132 During the two decades’ seizure of the waqf land without compensation, 
however, the state had made it impossible for an alternative waqf to be established as required by 
the Sharica. Therefore, although the waqf land was restored, its development lagged behind for 
more than twenty years. 
4.5.3 Dismemberment of Waqfs through Executive Decrees 
The waqf of Salim Mbaruk bin Dahman was established in 1933 on 9.74 acres of beach farm at 
Kanamai, (Takaungu) Kilifi district as waqf khayri “for the benefit of his soul and of the local 
Muslims.”133 Around January 1953, the waqf land was leased to Hassanali Hussein Suleiman Virjee 
for a period of 99 years, but transferred it to Goolshan eight years later upon consent from the 
WCK.134 Again, one year later, the waqf changed hands when Goolshan sold his lease-hold rights 
to the Christian Council of Kenya (renamed National Council of Churches of Kenya, NCCK).135 
Before sanctioning the transfer of lease, however, the WCK sought to establish the NCCK’s use of 
the waqf land. When the NCCK confirmed that they wished to erect a Church, the WCK objected to 
                                                 
130 The Land Acquisition Act (1983), Section 5 on compensation provides; “[…] as soon as practicable after entry has 
been made, the Commissioner shall make good or pay full compensation for any damage resulting from the entry.” See 
also Section 75(1), Constitution of Kenya (1963) and Article 40(3), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
131 Article 40(3) of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) prohibits the state against depriving a person of his property or 
interest over a property without compensation. See also applicants’ requests 1-6 as contained in the High Court 
judgment, Civil Case no.185 of 1991, Mombasa, July, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
132 Judgment of July, 2012 by the High Court on Civil Suit No. 185 of 1991, WCK archive, Mombasa. See also section 8, 
Land Acquisition Act, Cap 295 Laws of Kenya. 
133 Letter by the WCK Secretary, K. S. Riyami to the PC coast province, October, 1972, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
134 Transfer of lease from Hassanali H. S. Virjee to Goolshan Ladies Wear Ltd, March, 1961. See also lease agreement 
between Virjee and the WCK, January, 1953, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
135 Transfer of lease from Goolshan Ladies Wear Ltd to the NCCK, July, 1962, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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the transfer explaining that “it would be contrary to the principles of the Sharica for the property 
to be used for the purposes indicated.”136 
In reply to the withheld consent, the NCCK dispelled the WCK’s fears by assuring that the premises 
would be a retreat center for all people without regard to ethnic or religious affiliations though 
the WCK was not moved.137 To secure the land, the NCCK gave in to the imposed conditions and 
signed the lease contract. However, the NCCK violated the agreement by refusing to pay ground 
rent; fell down coconut trees without the consent of the WCK; and constructed a Church. It turned 
out that the NCCK contravened the contract on the auspices of the provincial administration that 
coerced the Chief Kadhi to use his authority to repeal restricting clauses in the lease agreement 
despite opposition from the WCK.138 
All the while, refusal by the NCCK to pay rent also inhibited execution of shurut al-waqif that 
included maintenance of an orphanage and madrasa at Takaungu. This was contested by the 
beneficiaries forcing the WCK to seek the intervention of the Registrar General to compel the 
NCCK to honor the agreement and enable it to execute the waqf’s mandate.139 Despite this 
intervention and several meetings between the NCCK and the WCK at the behest of the PC, the 
NCCK refused to pay. As a matter of fact, the NCCK changed the argument claiming to have 
acquired the premises as ‘freehold’ without rent requirements and that the WCK should consider 
selling the waqf altogether to end the standoff.140 While launching the center in October 1971, the 
NCCK used the occasion to petition the President (Mzee Jomo Kenyatta) to have the WCK 
terminate further encumbrances to the waqf land. Subsequently, the WCK succumbed to a forced 
istibdal of three-bedroom Swahili house offered by the NCCK in waiver of claims to the beach farm. 
As observed by al-Mazrui (2004: 11-13), the WCK accepted the substitute property “with a view 
of not embarrassing the President to remove the relationship existing between the WCK as 
landlords and the NCCK as lessees.”141 It is clear from these events that pressure from political 
elites led to the dismemberment of the waqf. 
                                                 
136 Correspondence between the WCK and the NCCK’s Advocate, August, 1962, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
137 Correspondence between the WCK and the NCCK’s Advocate, September - November, 1962, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
138 Correspondences between the PC coast province, the Chief Kadhi and the WCK, May, 1967. See also al-Mazrui H. K. 
(2004). Memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry, op.cit, pp.10-11, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
139 Correspondence between the Registrar General, the WCK and the NCCK, May - October, 1971, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
140 Minutes of the WCK meeting held in the PC’s office, September, 1970; minutes of the meeting of January, 1972; 
correspondences between the WCK, the NCCK, Commissioner of Lands, and the PC coast Province, October - September, 
1972. 
141 See also minutes of the WCK meeting held in the PC’s office at Mombasa, December, 1973; minute 143 of special 
meeting of the WCK and the NCCK, July, 1974; minute 26/76(1) of WCK meeting, July, 1976; the NCCK’s correspondence 
to the PC coast province, September, 1972; PC’s correspondence to the WCK, October, 1973; correspondence between 
the NCCK and the WCK, January – July, 1974; correspondence between the NCCK and the WCK, July - August, 1974; WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
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Examined from a broader perspective, the foregoing events that culminated in the establishment 
of a ‘Christian resort center’ in the heart of a ‘Muslim region’ arguably pass for a religio-political 
contestation. This is because, prior to independence, two of the predominantly Muslim regions in 
Kenya – the Protectorate and the North Eastern Frontier District (NFD, later Northeastern 
province) agitated for secession. While those in the Protectorate wanted to join Zanzibar so as to 
remain under the rule of the Sharica, the NFD wanted to secede and join Somalia for similar 
reasons (McIntosh 2009; Ndzovu 2014b). Significantly, the two regions had grown suspicious of 
the Christian up-country Kenya given their historical (dis-)engagement with the British colonial 
authorities that left the former economically and socio-culturally neglected and marginalized.142 
Therefore, Muslims feared that under a unitary system of government, they would be 
economically, politically, and religiously subordinate to their majority Christian compatriots who 
were also well endowed in cultural and economic prowess. These fears were, even so, allayed in 
a pre-independence agreement that undertook to respect and preserve Muslim institutions and 
registered freehold titles to land among other efforts to integrate the Muslim community (al-
Mazrui 2004; Mwakimako 2007b; Chesworth 2011). 
However, considering the frequently enacted historical injustices narrative against the two 
Muslim regions;143 the deliberate attempts to nullify land waqfs through legislations (e.g. the 
Mazrui Lands Repeal Act, 1989); and the impunity with which the NCCK negotiated the leasehold 
agreement with the WCK, it suggests that a complex configuration of interests were at play in the 
contestation for religio-political and economic spaces in the region that manifested in the waqf 
incident. The NCCK violated the lease agreement with support from political elites and state 
administration epitomized by the President during the inauguration of the center whose presence 
could not have merely been coincidental.144 Precisely, the President’s alleged executive order to 
the WCK (read Muslims) to terminate their claims of ownership of the waqf land was laden with 
political power and symbolic violence meant to intimidate the minority Muslims to recognize the 
prevailing officialdom (read Christian) after the fall of the sultanate. Consequently, “keeping in 
mind the political realities of that time”, writes al-Mazrui (2004: 12), “when none could safely be 
                                                 
142 See also Adow, M. (2013). Not yet Kenyan. (Documentary). Retrieved from: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeracorrespondent/2013/10/not-yet-kenyan-
2013102885818441218.html (Last access 6/3/2018). 
143On historical injustices against the Muslim regions, see Africa Center for Open Governance (AFRICOG) (2009). 
Mission Impossible: Implementing the Ndung’u Report. Nairobi. Retrieved from: 
http://www.africog.org/reports/mission_impossible_ndungu_report.pdf. (Last access 6/3/2018); al-Mazrui, H. K. 
(2004). Memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry, op. cit. pp. 1-15, WCK archive, Mombasa; O’Brien, E. (2011). 
Irregular and Illegal Land Acquisition by Kenya’s Elites: Trends, Processes and Impacts of Kenya’s Land Grabbing 
Phenomenon. Nairobi. Retrieved from: http://www.kenyalandalliance.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/KLA-
commercial-pressure.pdf (Last access 6/3/2018). 
144 The NCCK was then under the chairmanship of Rev. Thomas Kalume who was also a Member of Parliament (MP) for 
Malindi North constituency from 1969. See also correspondences between the PC, coast province, the Chief Kadhi, and 
the WCK, May, 1967; al-Mazrui, H. K. (2004). Memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry, op. cit, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
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seen to resist or opposed presidential directives”, dismemberment of the waqf passes for a 
political duel between Muslims and the Christian political elites. 
On the other hand, erecting a Church and a Christian resort center on a waqf land in the midst of 
the perceived heartland of Islam in the country was, arguably, a move in the NCCK’s stake for 
negotiation and control of the religious field. By appropriating political power, the NCCK was 
determined to test and question the dominance of Islam in the coast region by establishing a 
Christian center with a view to fight for a share of adherents. These negotiations resonate so well 
with the Church’s spirited opposition witnessed three decades later during the constitutional 
debate that frustrated Muslims’ efforts to expand the legal jurisdiction of the kadhi courts to 
include the adjudication of waqfs (see chapter five). It is within this context that the establishment 
of the Christian center at the predominantly Muslim region, and importantly, on waqf land, stands 
appropriately as contestation for the religious field between Muslims and their Christian 
compatriots. Needless to emphasize the economic gain that the NCCK eyed in the establishment 
of the resort center on the beach farm in contrast to the Swahili house offered to the WCK as 
substitute waqf. 
4.5.4 Invalidation of Waqfs through Precedents on Muslims’ Popular Practices 
Dissolution of family waqfs is not a new phenomenon in the history of the institution. It is alleged 
that predominant Muslim societies like Turkey, Egypt, and Syria not only opened existing waqf 
ahli for inheritance but, also banned the establishment of new ones owing to their susceptibility 
to abuse the Sharica guidelines of inheritance and perpetuation of discriminative gender based 
cultural practices (Schacht 1982; Pearl / Menski 1998; Kozlowski 1998, 2008). The ban subtly 
implied that until proved to contradict divine injunctions, the majority opinion on the validity of 
waqf ahli remains. As it turned out, however, annulment of waqf ahli in the cited Muslim lands 
established historical precedents that could be an affront to the preponderant view about Sharica 
as evident in the Succession Petition no. 29 of 2014 at the kadhi court. 
In the mentioned petition, Mwarabu bint Mohammad bin Abdallah Zeheniyah had established 
waqf dhurri in favor of Amina bint Adam Dadrahman el-Balushiya failure whom her descendants, 
with masjid Mazrui as the residual beneficiary.145 Owing to family feuds, a section of third 
generation beneficiaries applied to have the waqf administered by the WCK in 2012. Then another 
section of disgruntled beneficiaries sued the WCK two years later for usurping the administration 
of the waqf despite the existence of Amina’s progeny. However, the complainants also requested 
that due to the large number of beneficiaries involved, (thirty, including males and females), the 
waqf be revoked and the property inherited as it had become un-economical to maintain.146 
                                                 
145 Mwarabu bint Muhammad bin Abdullah Zeheniyah had no children, so Amina could have been the closest relative. 
There is no mention of a husband or other descendants in the waqf deed where she appointed shaykh Khamis bin 
Masoud Zeheniyah to execute her will. See waqf deed of Mwarabu bint Abdallah dated June, 1946 (unmarked), WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
146 Clause 9, Succession Petition no. 29 of 2014, Chief Kadhi Court, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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In its order of July 2014, the kadhi court granted the first appeal of the complainants and removed 
the waqf from the WCK’s administration, but refused to invalidate the waqf on the claims of 
continued economic viability. Arguably, the decision by the kadhi court not to invalidate the waqf 
was informed by the majority opinion on the principle of tacabbid (see chapter two). Yet, upon 
review of the judgment by the Chief Kadhi in January 2015, the order of the lower court was 
quashed and the waqf was dissolved. Commenting on this review, the Chief Kadhi asserted that 
“family waqfs could also be dissolved and property inherited by heirs as is the case in other Arab 
lands,”147 (emphasis added). Accordingly, this suggests that the basis of the Chief Kadhi’s order is 
the popular historical precedent in the Muslim societies mentioned before where similar waqfs 
were invalidated rather than legal merit of the present case. By disregarding the historical and 
cultural contexts in which the waqfs were invalidated in those Muslim societies, this was, arguably, 
a veiled attempt to introduce the doctrine of precedent despite the Sharica remaining uncodified. 
In the mentioned Muslim societies where waqf ahli were invalidated, the failure probably rested 
on the judiciary and the culama to create awareness and reform the perceived rigid operational 
and institutional law of waqfs (Kuran 2001), rather than ban a section of the practice altogether. 
Therefore, the preponderant view is that only waqfs that are inconsistent with the Sharica are void. 
Clearly, this does not apply to all waqf ahli. 
As established by the study, claims of disputes and diminutive shares of usufruct of waqf ahli 
owing to large numbers of beneficiaries warranting dissolution of the consecrations should not 
be blamed on the consecrations. Rather, the blame could be apportioned to the inability by 
beneficiaries and mutawallis to rise above the perceived rigidity to invest and expand the corpus 
as provided by the principles of cana, hikr and istibdal (see chapters one and six). Therefore, claims 
to dissolve waqfs citing diminutive shares could further be mere ploys to dismember the 
consecrations for economic (read capitalism) and symbolic expedience as was evident in the case 
of waqf of Said bin Rashid al-Mandhry (see section 4.5.1). Such petitions to dissolve family waqfs 
notwithstanding, the institution demonstrated the potentiality to guarantee not only the socio-
economic stability of its beneficiaries, but also the wider community without regard to religious 
and social affiliations. 
4.6 Other Civil Policies Influencing Waqfs in Contemporary Kenya: The Land Acquisition 
and National Museums and Heritage Acts 
Waqfs in Kenya do not subsist in isolation but within a conflagration of civil procedures and 
agencies outside the Sharica that their establishment and management have to negotiate to 
survive. First among such statutes is the Land Acquisition Act, Cap 295 (1983) that accords the 
state unlimited access to land for public interest and development. Precisely, section 6(1a) 
provides: 
Where the Minister is satisfied that any land is required for the purposes of a public 
body, and that the acquisition of the land is necessary in the interests of defense, 
                                                 
147 Interview with shaykh Muhdhar A. S. Hussein, Mombasa, October, 2015, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning 
or the development or utilization of any property in such manner as to promote the 
public benefit; and so certifies in writing to the Commissioner, he may in writing 
direct the Commissioner to acquire the land compulsorily under this part. 
Going by the statute, immovable waqf properties like land and buildings are not immune to 
compulsory acquisition. This eventuality is, nonetheless, provided for by the Sharica through the 
principle of istibdal where ruined or depleted consecrations could be sold or exchanged to acquire 
replacement corpuses that would be managed according to the aspirations of the endower. On the 
basis of the Act as provided above, some waqfs were acquired by the government during the 
postcolonial times as evident in a number of cases: 
The first regards the waqf dhurri of Mwinyifaki bin Matano at Jomvu Chaka Reli, Mombasa, which 
was acquired in 1972 but was, nonetheless, not compensated allegedly because of missing records 
at the lands registry.148 The second involved the waqf khayri of Duweiky at Malindi acquired in 
1974 and compensated in cash.149 By the time of research, however, like similar cases during the 
colonial era, the WCK had not established replacement waqf for Duweiky.150 The inability to 
acquire replacement waqfs from compensations dating back to the colonial period weighs heavily 
against the state custodian. Owing to market fluctuations, it could be difficult to acquire 
replacement waqfs after some years or even commit the funds to non-designated expenses. More 
so, the delay does not help in achieving the requisite rule on perpetuity of waqfs, hence 
disadvantaging endowers in their spiritual aspirations as well as causing untold suffering to the 
diverse groups of beneficiaries. 
The second statute is the National Museums and Heritage Act (1910). The NMK was established 
to “identify, protect, conserve, and transmit the cultural and natural heritage and promote cultural 
resources” in the country (NMK Act, section 4). The agency is empowered to purchase or 
exchange, take on lease, or acquire by gift properties of scientific and cultural significance. 
Alongside acquisition, it could also declare a place or immovable structure to be of historical and 
cultural interest worthy protecting.151 In this context, the Act accorded the state agency unlimited 
access to properties some of which were waqfs. Among these are the Mazrui cemetery and the 
ruined Wakilindini jamia masjid that were declared as protected sites between 1954 and 1955 
(see chapter three). Others include Rodha masjid in Lamu (since 1980); a ruined masjid at 
                                                 
148 Kenya Gazette Notice no. 799/800, March, 1972. The details of the three acre plot were formerly given as 
MN/V/135R, WCK archive, Mombasa. Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Zubeir Hussein 
Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
149 The government offered One million forty thousand eight hundred and forty two Kenya shillings as compensation. 
See notice of compulsory acquisition, plots 1147 & 1148, October, 1974;payment notice, October, 2002; payment 
voucher, November, 2002; Gazette notice no. 3490 & 3492, July, 1998, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
150Minutes 3/2003(9); 116/2008(25), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
151 See also Lamu Old town as UNESCO world heritage site. Retrieved from: http://whe.unesco.org/en/list/1055 
(Accessed April, 2016). 
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Kikambala; plus a host of other waqfs in Mombasa’s Old town like masjids Mandhry and Basheikh, 
and the Kongo masjid in Diani, Kwale district. 
Although acquisition of properties of cultural interest by the state body precludes areas of 
religious significance like masjids and cemeteries, the Act allows the NMK to enter into 
partnership with owners or custodians of such sites, thereby placing the NMK as co-trustees with 
the WCK on some waqfs.152 In this regard, consulting the NMK in relation to renovation of waqfs 
becomes compulsory failure of which it is punishable by law (Section 41, 2).153 This partly explains 
the conspicuous presence of the NMK in some waqfs as consultant engineers since renovations 
must conform to specified standards. As a matter of fact, there were instances when the WCK only 
sanctioned reconstruction of waqfs but delegated the work to the NMK from the issuing of tenders 
until hand over of the property to the WCK.154 
The regional office of the state agency at Mombasa allegedly offers free consultation and 
architectural designs on waqfs under its co-trusteeship as part of its social responsibility. Most 
probably, it is due to the fact that the resident officers are indigenous Muslims who feel obliged to 
give back to the society. Whether or not this social responsibility would be continued when the 
indigenous Muslims are replaced with non-indigenous, or even non-Muslims, remains to be seen. 
On the other hand, the NMK does not finance the reconstruction of these waqfs yet it collects 
substantial foreign exchange from them since they are part of tourist attraction sites. Neither does 
it remit portions of the proceeds to its co-trustee (the WCK) nor beneficiaries of the waqfs. This 
lack of monetary remittances from the NMK partly impedes some beneficiaries from maintaining 
their waqfs. Moreover, since reconstruction has to conform to structural designs approved by the 
state body, it is also impossible for the beneficiaries to dispose the waqfs to private developers 
most of whom have expressed the desire to put up high rise residential and commercial buildings 
contrary to regulations by the NMK.155 Consequently, majority of waqfs under the co-trusteeship 
of the NMK and the WCK are in disrepair.  
                                                 
152 Section 42(a) of the National Museums and Heritage Act provides; “[…] if the Minister considers that a monument is 
in danger of being destroyed, injured or allowed to fall into decay, he may acquire the monument by way of compulsory 
purchase under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (Cap. 295) but that power shall not be exercised in the case 
of a monument which, or any part of which, is periodically used for religious observances.” 
153 Section (2) of the National Museums and Heritage Act provides; “[…] the owner or occupier of a monument which is 
the subject of any such [guardianship] instrument or agreement intends to build or to do any other act or thing in 
contravention of the terms of the instrument or agreement, the High Court may grant an injunction to restrain that 
building or other act or thing.” 
154 The NMK was involved in the renovation of several mosques including Ibadhi and Mandhry in Mombasa as well as 
Rodha and Msikiti wa Pwani in Lamu. Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, December, 2014; Kalandar Khan 
and Abu Swamad A. Ali, National Museums of Kenya (NMK), Mombasa, September, 2015. 
155 Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, December, 2014; Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
Kalandar Khan and Abu Swamad A. Ali, National Museums of Kenya (NMK), Mombasa, September, 2015; Mohammed 
Abdallah, Rahma Abdallah, and Ali bin Khamis, Mombasa October, 2015. 
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A closer analysis of the relationship between the NMK and the WCK on waqfs reveals a scenario 
akin to the use of political power and symbolic violence in negotiating and shaping the economic 
and socio-cultural fields with the beneficiaries of the waqfs, and by extension, the Muslim 
community. The state, through the NMK Act, dictates on how the waqfs should be maintained with 
regard to structural designs but does not finance their maintenance, yet it is the largest beneficiary 
of their output through tourism. On the other hand, beneficiaries of the waqfs survive in a state of 
symbolic domination deprived of their economic, social, and cultural privileges. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Attainment of independence in Kenya did not necessarily herald new beginning, particularly with 
regard towaqfs, as secular policies and civil institutions established by the British colonial 
government remain effective. Except for amending the WCK Act to re-align it with the 
restructured provincial administration, the statute, therefore, puts the institution of waqf into 
extended control by the state. Accordingly, compulsory registration; takeover of waqfs allegedly 
for improper management; and delays in the establishment of replacement waqfs dismembered 
through compulsory acquisition continue unabated. In constituting the state agency, only Muslims 
perceived as loyal to state policies are appointed as Commissioners at the expense of waqifs, 
mutawallis, and beneficiaries. 
Significantly, appointing Commissioners on the basis of socio-ethnic affiliations and perceived 
loyalty to state policies rekindled negotiations for cultural, social, and economic supremacy and 
control along umiji-wamiji dispositions akin to life during the period of city-states. It was within 
this context that some Muslims perceived appointment to the waqf state agency or positions of 
the mutawalli and imam as an opportunity not only to protect temporal socio-ethnic and economic 
interests of certain groups but also to acquire individual social, symbolic, and even economic 
capital. This was the preponderant view, particularly in the alleged traditional waqf-rich zones 
that turned the appointments into constant negotiations and a delicate balance with those left out 
crying foul. 
More so, owing to limited jurisdiction of the kadhi courts, there abounds miscarriage of justice as 
adjudication of matters of waqfs in the civil courts is not in accordance with the Sharica causing 
dismemberment of waqfs. With this perpetuation of state control of the institution, the subsequent 
chapter would, therefore, seek to understand how the Muslim community responded or even 
adapted to the situation in practicing waqfs.
  
5 Muslims’ Response to State Control and Adaptation to Internal 
Dynamics of Waqfs 
Secular state policies and civil constructs that herald supervision and control of waqfs caused a 
paradigm shift in the socio-cultural life of the institution and the community as a whole. They cast 
aside the Sharica normative precepts on waqf practices; sidelined traditional actors in the affairs 
of the institution; disrupted the social fabric of the community as waqf resources were used 
contrary to designated causes; and threatened the institution since the Sharica was applied as 
understood by the colonial government. This chapter, therefore, seeks to analyze how Muslims 
responded to this scenario in the practices of waqfs. The use of James C. Scott’s concept of symbolic 
resistance is critical in understanding the silent but spontaneous and effective efforts by the 
subordinate community not only to reverse the control of resources without attracting the wrath 
of the secular government, but also to uphold the religious obligation of practicing charity. 
Significantly, Muslims’ switching to the uncontrolled charitable institutions and non-labeled waqfs 
was a ready alternative provided by the Sharica under the expansive concept of charity. As 
illustrated in the discussion, waqfs adopted wide range of local customs and traditions at different 
times since its inception making it to be lived and mediated variedly across the umma. Use of the 
different alternatives, therefore, reflects a stage in the evolution of the institution calling for the 
understanding of the response in the perspective of a continuous process of adaptation to internal 
and external dynamics in waqfs. 
5.1 Symbolic Resistance: Muslims’ Response to State Control of Waqfs 
The establishment of the WCK in the British East Africa Protectorate in 1899 fits the scenario 
where both Muslim and invading colonial governments controlled waqfs to stem the influence of 
the culama and the diverse groups of beneficiaries for political hegemony (see chapter two). 
Accordingly, on the strength of civil legislations and the judiciary that was not bound by the 
Sharica, the colonial government appropriated political and symbolic capital as well as symbolic 
violence to enforce what it regarded as ‘legitimate’ versions of the social world. Using Muslims 
perceived as sympathetic to state policies to serve as Commissioners under the supervision of 
European officers, the state controlled the economic mainstay and the socio-cultural sphere of the 
diverse groups of beneficiaries and actors of waqfs in the community. 
However, as established by the study, use of symbolic violence by the British colonial government 
to whip Muslims into ‘Islamic officialdom’ (Hyden 1985) in light of British lenses in as far as waqfs 
were concerned, was short-lived. The fallout begun immediately it became apparent that the 
community was under immense symbolic, economic, socio-political, and cultural subordination. 
Consequently, the community unwittingly ‘exited’ from the state sponsored Islamic officialdom in 
a way aptly described by James C. Scott as symbolic (ideological) resistance. In his writings on 
peasant societies, Scott (2009: 34) espouses symbolic resistance as “the ordinary means of class 
struggle [and] techniques of first-resort in the common historical circumstances in which open 
defiance was impossible and entailed mortal danger.” 
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Symbolic resistance offers a framework to understand the behavior and actions of subordinate 
groups in power relations when the powerful may have an interest in over-dramatizing their 
reputation and mastery (Scott 1990: xii; Martin 2000). The main purpose of symbolic resistance 
is to avoid notice and detection that could result into direct confrontation with the authorities. 
This involves “no overt protest and requires little or no organization or planning” (Scott 1987: 
417). While engaging in symbolic resistance, subordinate groups would, therefore, employ a wide 
range of ‘infrapolitics’, i.e. actions practiced outside the visible spectrum of what usually pass for 
political activity. These include sabotage, desertion, withdrawal, feigned ignorance, and non-
compliance to official demands which are perceived as safe and require neither formal 
organization nor make headlines (Scott 1987: 419; 1985; 2009). Within this context, therefore, 
Muslims’ response to state control of waqfs in the former Protectorate adequately passes for 
symbolic resistance as explained below. 
5.2 The Rise of a Community of ‘Muslim Peasants’ 
The economy of the former city-states in the Protectorate was mainly slave labor driven but was 
first destroyed by the Portuguese when they occupied the coast, before it became vibrant again 
after their expulsion in the seventeenth century. In the early twentieth century, slave trade was 
abolished by the British colonial government permanently interfering with the economy of the 
city-states (Sheriff 1991; Partridge / Gillard 1995; McIntosh 2009; Mwinyihaji 2014). Other than 
seeking to control labor and resources, abolition of slavery was, however, not followed by 
contingent plans for the former slaves like repatriation or resettlement with the majority having 
been sourced from the present day Tanzania (McIntosh 2009: 28, 55-58). More so, centuries of 
slave labor had produced a distinct Muslim Arabo-African culture called Swahili owing to 
intermarriages between the masters and their slaves. Therefore, without contingency plans upon 
abolition of slavery, a large indigenous population, manumitted slaves, and the Swahili were 
rendered jobless, economically insecure, without permanent residence, and condemned to 
permanent squatting. 
In the British colonial project of resource control, land became the central factor of production. 
Accordingly, the colonial government established various policies that helped them convert large 
tracts of ‘native land’ into Crown lands in the Protectorate. These policies effectively rendered the 
local community to be squatters due to lack of title deeds that since then became the evidence of 
land ownership (see chapter three). Alienation of land exacerbated the worsened socio-economic 
fortunes in the community owing to the collapse of plantation agriculture and mikoko business 
following abolition of slavery, and compounded by compulsory acquisition of land waqfs either 
without compensation or ambiguous use of their proceeds. These developments put the Muslim 
community into subordination as the colonial government was on steady ascendancy and firm 
control of resources. Above all, political, cultural, and economic relations between locals in the 
Protectorate and the British colonial government took a turn for the worst following the change 
of base of operation to Nairobi. As a result, the colonial government tended to favor upcountry 
Christians than Muslims in the Protectorate who endured long periods of neglect and 
disengagement (McIntosh 2009; Ndzovu 2014b). 
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With resources, particularly waqfs, strictly under control of the British colonial government, the 
largest impact was arguably felt in the sector of Muslim education. Ordinarily, Muslim educational 
institutions – madrasas and duksis (elementary Quranic schools) were attached to mosques and 
the culama who attended to those institutions were expected to be full time servants of the 
community in imparting knowledge being maintained through waqfs. Orphanages were also 
among major beneficiaries of waqfs.156 State control of waqfs, therefore, adversely affected this 
sector through loss of its major source of support as resources could be utilized in non-designated 
causes throwing it into disarray. 
As a substitute, Christian missionaries introduced formal education with the support of the 
colonial government that many Muslims viewed with suspicion. Their apathy was premised on 
the fact that missionaries were using education as a disguise for evangelization since baptism 
became a prerequisite to admission into mission schools (Mwakimako 2007b; Loimeier 2007).157 
With few racial-based and ill-equipped formal schools that developed much later, the baptism 
requirement impeded the majority of Muslim children from accessing formal education. 
Consequently, this created resentment informing the urge among Muslims to secede in the eve of 
independence fearing further subordination by their upcountry Christian compatriots (see 
chapter four). 
The inadequate levels of formal education disadvantaged Muslims from competing favorably with 
their Christian counterparts in economic development, political negotiations, job placements, and 
civil service appointments creating the minority-marginalization narrative in the region (Ndzovu 
2014a: 1-23; McIntosh 2009). Clearly, British colonial policies on land and control of resources 
were favorable recipe for the gradual growth of a community of ‘Muslim peasants’ in the 
Protectorate. However, owing to the imperial power of the colonial government, Muslims could 
not openly question the policies that put them under subordination. Rather, they resorted to 
symbolic resistance appropriately manifested in the institution of waqf as a microcosm. 
5.3 Trends and Patterns of Symbolic Resistance against State Control of Waqfs in the 
Protectorate since Colonial Period 
The change from the Sharica normative of waqf practices started with the establishment of the 
WCK where centralized supervision and control through compulsory registration was imposed. 
However, as Scott (1985: xvi; 2012: xx) observed, one does not necessarily need to “risk an open 
land invasion” while squatting would secure access to land; or “openly petition for rights to wood, 
fish, and game” where poaching would accord the same goods and services. Accordingly, since the 
spiritual, socio-economic and cultural purposes of waqfs could as well be accomplished through 
                                                 
156 Among waqfs designated for Muslim education include those of Latifa bint Saleh bin Awadh, fols. 100-101; Rehema 
bint Ali, fol. 254; Ali bin Salim, fols. 94-95; Amria bint Ali bin Khamis, fol. 36; Seif bin Salim bin Khalfan el-Bu Sai’di, fols. 
20-21, WCK archive, Mombasa. Main expenses were salaries of teachers, auxiliary staff, students’ stipends, and books. 
157 See also Kresse, K. / Mwakimako, H. (2016). Guidance (Uwongozi), Shaykh al-Amin bin Mazrui: Selected Essays from 
the First Swahili Islamic Newspaper (here sahifa no.3, 7thJamad’ Thani 1349 A.H./29th October 1930), Leiden: Brill. 
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several alternative charitable activities including sadaqa, zakat, community associations, and 
private trusts as provided by the Sharica, Muslims turned to them as a means to protest the 
imposed state control. 
According to the figures captured in Table 1, registration of waqfs experienced a decline from the 
colonial period (see chapter three). Only 7 (6.7%) waqfs were registered from 1940 to 1960, two 
decades before the end of colonial rule. Compared to 74 (71.2%) waqfs registered from 1910 to 
1930 upon establishment of the state agency, this represents 54.8% decline over an equal length 
of time. This suggests that a cross section among Muslims did not register their waqfs when it was 
dangerous to question imperial policies. Yet, as depicted in the figures, non-compliance with 
compulsory registration of waqfs was not a coordinated response in the Muslim community, 
neither was it openly declared in the conventional sense of a resistance movement. Rather, it was 
a kind of ‘everyday form of resistance’ (Scott 2009) and a means by which the socially, 
economically, culturally, and politically subordinate Muslim community manifested their dissent 
against centralized management of waqfs by the state. 
During the postcolonial period, the land problem in the former Protectorate was not addressed 
but was rather exacerbated. Apart from invalidating waqf lands, political elites in subsequent 
regimes grabbed Crown and community lands. From the 1970s to 1990s particularly, land in the 
region was used to reward political loyalty apart from resettling of non-locals commonly referred 
in an essentialist term as wabara (upcountry folk) at the expense of the wapwani (indigenous 
coastal dwellers). This became (and remains) a recurrent emotive and sensitive issue that 
occasionally flares into bloody clashes between the wabara and wapwani over control and 
ownership of land (McIntosh 2009; Ndzovu 2014b). Neither did postcolonial regimes establish 
policies to help the region catch up with the rest of the upcountry areas in development. As 
illustrated in the Kenya Population and Housing Census (2009), predominant Muslim regions lag 
behind in development and provision of social welfare including education, electricity, water, and 
employment opportunities (see appendices 9.1 and 9.2). As a result, locals in the former 
Protectorate are disenfranchised owing to prolonged periods of political marginalization, 
economic exclusion, and exploitation. In the words of Cooper (1980: 293), this makes them “less 
independent, less secure, and more exposed to the vagaries of markets and politics… [where] food 
shortages have become chronic… [and] wage labor is more often a necessity…” (as quoted in 
McIntosh 2009: 29). 
Drawing from figures illustrated in Table 1, Muslims’ disenfranchisement is demonstrated in the 
continued non-compliance with the compulsory registration rule. Only 13 (12.5%) waqfs were 
registered from 1970 to 2000. Apart from non-registration of waqfs, a cross section of Muslims 
also established non-labeled waqfs like private trusts and community associations. These are 
valuable means by which the Muslim community symbolically expressed its displeasure against 
continued government control of waqfs and extended socio-economic and cultural subordination 
in the postcolonial period. This was particularly the norm from the 1990s following expansion of 
the democratic space in the country as evident in several cases. 
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The first involves the Mazrui land waqf that was revoked through government legislation but later 
restored by the court (see chapter four). Upon restoration of the waqf land in 2012, the 
beneficiaries established a Mazrui community land trust “for the sake of preservation into 
perpetuity of the assets and properties comprised in the 2,716 acres of land in Takaungu.”158 As 
contained in the spirit of the trust deed, the Mazrui trust is a non-labeled waqf. This is because it 
provides for the administration of the corpus “according to Islamic Sharica law [and the] waqf land 
cannot be sold, but the benefit accruing thereof may be enjoyed, leased, transmitted and/or 
passed on to the next generation.”159 However, since it was designated as a trust, it technically 
became independent from the rigors of the WCK and by extension, the political maneuvering and 
direct control by the government. 
The second case involves the ‘trust of the mosque of Msalani’ established in 2011 by the self-
appointed executive committee in defiance of the WCK (see chapter four). As administrators of 
the masjid upon inquiry and takeover allegedly owing to lack of an established mutawalli, the WCK 
appointed a caretaker who was opposed by the ‘executive committee’ that defiantly established 
the ‘trust of the mosque of Msalani’ instead. Save for the land title deed that the WCK used to 
petition the Registrar of Titles and the Land Registry not to recognize the mosque committee, this 
would have taken the waqf out of the mandate of the WCK.160 This is not to forget the uncountable 
number of orphanages, masjids, integrated schools and madrasas, as well as health centers and 
trusts run by local committees and registered under different bodies (see also Mwakimako 
2007a). Majority, if not all of these social welfare institutions, demonstrate group cohesion and 
solidarity that capitalized on the principles of waqf to harness resources for the well-being of the 
community outside the purview of the state agency. 
The Muslim Education and Welfare Association (MEWA) of Mombasa and Tawfiq hospital in 
Malindi would suffice as illustrations of community associations established through the 
principles of waqf. MEWA was founded in 1985 as a local initiative in response to the appalling 
standards of formal education of Muslims in the town owing to the systemic neglect of the region 
by colonial and successive postcolonial regimes. The community pulled resources together to 
provide bursaries, educational materials, and partial scholarships to advancing students. Since it 
must align itself to a legal framework, the project was registered as an NGO in 1993. Presently, it 
also runs a hospital offering health care at subsidized rates apart from offering library facilities, 
career training, and Ramadan iftar to poor Muslims.161 
                                                 
158 Clause 3 of the trust deed of the Mazrui Community Land Trust, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
159 Clause 2(a) of the trust deed of the Mazrui Community Land Trust, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
160 Trust deed of the Mosque of Msalani, Mombasa, May, 2001; the WCK’s correspondence to the Registrar of Titles and 
the Lands Registry, January, 2003, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
161Interviews with Mohammed Shalli, Zubeir Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. See also 
https://www.betterplace.org/en/organisations/10087-mewa-muslim-education-and-welfare-association (Last 
access 6/3/2018). 
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Tawfiq hospital in Malindi, a brainchild of two local groups, Tawfiq Muslim Youths and Muslim 
Education and Development Association of Malindi (MEDA), was established in the 1990s to 
provide subsidized health care in an area that suffered similar neglect by the government. 
Nowadays, the hospital operates from the support of the local community, volunteers, and a 
plethora of well wishers, both local and international, including the Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB); World Assembly of Muslim Youths (WAMY); the International Islamic Relief Organization 
(IIRO); and the Islamic Foundation (Saudi Arabia).162 The hospital also runs Ramadan iftar 
program, zakat al-fitri, funerals for the poor, caring for the elderly and orphans, and dacwa 
through a well established masjid within the hospital. The hospital’s appeal for support as stated 
in its website -“whatever good you put forward for yourselves you will find it with Allah. Indeed, 
Allah of what you do is seeing” - is drawn from Qur’an 2:110 in relation to Islamic charity and 
qurba religiously legitimizing giving back to the community. 
Clearly, Muslims dissented state control of waqfs. Majority of respondents during research also 
demonstrated lack of confidence in the state agency and cast aspersions on the impartiality of the 
Commissioners. They perceived the WCK as an agent of internal colonization and subordination 
calling for its replacement with miji-based waqf boards.163 My interaction with the Muslim public 
in the course of the study also upholds the hypothesis that despite being an old institution in-
charge of a significant socio-cultural heritage, the WCK is unknown beyond the borders of the 
alleged traditional waqf towns of Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu, and more specifically, among the 
‘wenyewe wa waqfu’ community. While many respondents revealed basic knowledge about waqfs, 
their alleged unawareness on the existence of the state body illustrated some level of feigned 
ignorance that was difficult to ignore. Conversely, it subtly confirmed the view that the largest 
majority of Muslims in the country, and the coast province in particular where the WCK is legally 
confined to, expresses qurba and charity in other ways outside the confines of the state agency. 
Thus, the proliferation of charitable trusts; preference to un-controlled and decentralized qurba 
initiatives like community associations evidenced in the cases of MEWA and Tawfiq hospitals; 
feigned ignorance over WCK; and non-compliance with compulsory registration rules, should be 
understood within the lenses of symbolic resistance against state control of waqfs in Kenya. These 
are valuable, but inconspicuous means of expressing dissatisfaction with state policies on the 
institution of waqf that sought to re-establish control over economic, symbolic, and social capital. 
As Scott (2012: 7-8) posits, “such petty acts of insubordination typically make no headlines. But 
as just millions of entozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so do thousands acts of 
insubordination and evasion creates an economic or political barrier reef of their own.” In the 
                                                 
162 The bulk of help from the renowned international Muslim bodies and individuals come in the name of Islamic charity. 
Some organizations, like WAMY and the Africa Muslim Agency (AMA) also run Muslim schools and orphanages. 
Interviews with Ahmed Aboud Hadi, Malindi, November, 2015; Hamdoun, WCK Agent, Malindi, November, 2015. 
163 Interviews with Ahmed Aboud Hadi, Malindi, November, 2015; Ali Salim Bamkele, Hamid Salim Bamkele, 
Abdurahman Bamkele and Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele, Mombasa, November, 2015. 
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same way, non-registration of waqfs with the WCK and ‘exit’ to alternative qurba initiatives denied 
the state the much needed control of the socio-economic and symbolic power espoused by waqfs. 
5.4 Constitutional Negotiations to Free Waqfs from State Control in Postcolonial Kenya 
The constitutional negotiations to free waqfs from state control in postcolonial Kenya were 
undertaken in the auspices of reforming the kadhi courts during the change of the constitution in 
2000s. Like the kadhi courts, the WCK Act was retained in the Independence Constitution courtesy 
of a tripartite agreement between the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Prime Minister of Kenya, and the 
British Secretary of State. The charter provided that Islam would be the official creed in the 
Protectorate and that “all cases and law suits between natives will continue to be decided 
according to Sharica” (Carmichael 1997: 292; Anderson 2008). In the opinion of al-Mazrui (2004: 
3), guarantee for the use of the Sharica as provided by the charter entailed “freedom of worship 
and the preservation of religious buildings and institutions like waqfs.” Accordingly, these ought 
to have been collated in the kadhi courts and entrenched in the constitution as part of the 
postcolonial judicial structure. 
However, the Independence Constitution adopted the kadhi courts with the narrowly defined 
Muslim personal status law (Mwakimako 2007b, 2010; Chesworth 2011; Osiro 2014). Section 
66(3) of the Independence Constitution provides: 
A kadhi’s court shall have and exercise the following jurisdiction, namely the 
determination of questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, 
divorce or inheritance in proceedings in which all the parties profess the Muslim 
religion; but nothing in this section shall limit the jurisdiction of the High court or of 
any subordinate court in any proceeding which comes before it.164 
The ambiguous relation between waqfs and kadhi courts was thus carried over to the independent 
period as the Act left out waqfs, despite being an integral part of Islamic inheritance, to be 
managed differently in accordance with the WCK Act. Since then, various amendments were 
carried out in the Independence Constitution in Kenya at different times until a new one was 
promulgated in August 2010. However, the kadhi courts statute and the WCK Act were virtually 
untouched. In the course of review of the Constitution in the 2000s, Muslims’ desire to expand and 
enhance the jurisdiction of the kadhi courts included the determination of commercial and civil 
disputes arising from waqfs. Clearly, this was an attempt to broaden the scope of personal status 
law and inheritance as understood in the Sharica to include waqfs, wasiyya, and hiba (gifts) 
(Powers, 1990: 19-20). This was captured in Article 2000(1) of the Bomas Draft constitution 
(2004):165 
                                                 
164 See also section 5, Kadhi Court Act, 1967. 
165 The proposed draft constitution draws its name from the venue where it was conceived – the Bomas of Kenya –and 
from where the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) operated. This also differentiates it from parallel 
drafts, like the Wako and Kilifi that came up later in opposition to the Bomas one. See also Wario, H. (2014). Debates on 
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The jurisdiction of a kadhi’s court extends to (a) the determination of Muslim law 
relating to status, marriage, divorce, including matters arising after divorce, and 
inheritance, and succession in proceedings in which all parties profess Islam; (b) the 
determination of civil and commercial disputes between parties who are Muslims, in 
the manner of a small claims courts as by law established, but without prejudice to 
the rights of parties to go to other courts or tribunals with similar jurisdiction; (c) the 
settlement of disputes over or arising out of the administration of waqf properties.166 
It was further proposed that there be established a High Court of the kadhi and a Kadhi Court of 
Appeal (Bomas Draft, Article 1999, 1). However, dissenting decisions of the proposed Kadhi Court 
of Appeal, according to the Draft, could as well be appealed against in the Supreme Court (Bomas 
Draft, Article 1999, 4). The suggestion to grant appellate jurisdiction to kadhi courts stemmed 
from the urge to accord Muslims dissatisfied with decisions of lower chambers of the kadhis to 
have their cases revisited by a bench of Muslim judiciary who could exercise their joint opinion 
based on the Sharica rather than the Common law applied in the existing judicial system. As 
subordinate courts in the judiciary structure, decisions by the kadhi courts, as established by the 
current study, have in a number of occasions been overruled by the High Court causing 
miscarriage of justice (see chapter four).167 
As proposed in the Bomas Draft Constitution, nonetheless, the enhancement of the kadhi courts 
did not preclude the right to seek legal redress from civil courts by Muslims, or even in cases 
pitting Muslims against non-Muslim litigants. The choice of the kadhi courts for the purpose of 
arbitration remains the private conviction of individual Muslims. However, the proposals were 
misconstrued as being both spiritual with the view of favoring one religious community over 
others as well as legal, aspiring to establish a parallel religious judicial system for Muslims. The 
proposals were, thus, opposed by an adhoc group of Christians, the ‘Kenya Churches’, (composed 
mainly of the Pentecostals with support from Methodist and Anglican leaders), a move that did 
not only raise tension and mistrust between Muslims and Christians in the country, but also 
                                                 
Kadhi’s Courts and Christian-Muslim Relations in Isiolo Town: Thematic Issues and Emergent Trends. In J. Chesworth, 
& F. Kogelmann (Eds.), Sharia’a in Africa Today: Reactions and Responses. Vol. 15 (pp. 149-176). Leiden: Brill. 
166 See also Hassan, I. (2002). Working Document for the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission on the Kadhi’s 
Courts, Chief Kadhi and Kadhis. Retrieved from: http://www.commonlii.org/ke/other/KECKRC/2002/10.html (Last 
access 6/3/2018). 
167 For further discussion on miscarriage of justice in civil courts involving Muslims owing to clash of Regulations 
between Civil law and the Sharica, see Hirsch, S. (1994). Kadhis Courts as Complex Sites of Resistance: The State, Islam 
and Gender in Post-Colonial Kenya. In M. Lazrus-Black, (Ed.), Contested States (pp. 207-230). New York: Routledge; 
Mwangi, K. (1995). The Application and Development of Sharica in Kenya: 1895-1990. In M. Bakari, & S. Yahya (Eds.), 
Islam in Kenya (pp. 252-259). Nairobi: MEWA Publications; Hashim, A. (2006). Unity within Diversity: Unification and 
Codification of Muslim Law of Personal Status in East Africa. Khartoum: African Universities Congress, pp. 328- 349; 
Anderson, J. (2008). Islamic Law in Africa, op. cit., pp. 86 – 107; Hashim, A. (2010b). Coping with Conflicts, op. cit., pp. 
221-245. 
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temporarily stalled the constitutional review process (Mwakimako 2007b; Tayob / Wandera 
2011; Wario 2014).168 
To understand the opposition by the alliance of ‘Kenya Churches’ to expand the legal jurisdiction 
of the kadhi courts we engage the concept of religious field as propounded by Bourdieu. A religious 
field is characterized by “competition for religious power [which] owes its specificity… to the fact 
that what is at stake is the monopoly of the legitimate exercise of the power to modify, in a deep and 
lasting fashion, the practice and world-view of lay people, by imposing on and inculcating in them 
a particular religious habitus” (Bourdieu 1987: 126, emphasis in original). Significantly, a religious 
field has both internal and external stakes as religious groups compete for control over 
production, consumption of religious capital, and dominance of the religious space. Hence, the 
positions of power in the religious field results from the confrontation of ‘religious demands’ (i.e. 
the religious interests of different groups). This is because, “the position of power that a religious 
formation occupies within the religious field, depends on the power of the social group from which 
it draws its support in the field” (Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes 1990: 538). 
It is an undisputed fact that Islam preceded Christianity in Kenya from as early as the eighth 
century. Since the coming of the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, however, Islam and 
Christianity have competed ‘for the soul of Africa’ mission in Kenya’s religious landscape. The 
competition was compounded in the late nineteenth century with the establishment of British 
colonial rule that provided conducive environment for Christian missions (Mwakimako 2007b: 
290-292; Loimeier 2007). More so, the negotiations ‘for soul of Africa’ were heightened in the 
wave of advocacy for the Sharica in some parts of Africa in the early 2000s that culminated in the 
declaration of the Sharica in several parts of West Africa particularly, in some states in Nigeria and 
Mali (Frederiks 2010; Chesworth / Kogelmann 2014). Accordingly, the opposition by the alliance 
of ‘Kenya Churches’ to improve kadhi courts in the new constitution should be understood within 
the historical context of the two faiths contesting over religious legitimacy and control of the 
religious field. As the constitutional talks in Kenya coincided with the Sharica debates among some 
countries in Africa, the fear of the ‘Kenya Churches’ was probably hinged on the misconception 
that Islam would gain a formidable constitutional legitimacy in the negotiation for control and 
dominance of the religious space. In the worst case scenario, it was polemically claimed by the 
‘Kenya Churches’ that Muslims were intending to impose the Sharica on the majority Christians in 
the country, thus stocking fear and mistrust between the two religious communities (Mwakimako 
2007b: 287-307). 
Contrary to the perception by the ‘Kenya Churches’, it was not the intention of Muslims to use 
constitutional amendments to compete for numbers and control of the religious field. Therefore, 
                                                 
168 See also Kadhida, J. (Daily Nation, May 24, 2010). Kadhi Courts Illegal, Judges Rule. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Kadhi%20courts%20illegal%20judges%20rule/-/1056/924614/-/rcndgfz/-
/index.html (Last access 6/3/2018); Nation Reporter. (Daily Nation, July 21, 2010). Clerics Insist on Removal of Clauses. 
Retrieved from: http://www.nation.co.ke/Referendum/Clerics%20insist%20on%20removal%20of%20clauses%20/-
/926046/962348/-/sw9atdz/-/index.html (Last access 6/3/2018). 
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to ease the tension and continue with the review of the constitution, it was resolved that kadhi 
courts be retained as they appeared in the Independence Constitution – as subordinate courts 
with the narrowly interpreted and limited jurisdiction to Muslim personal status law among 
litigants. The failed negotiations to empower kadhi courts thus effectively dealt a blow to the 
efforts to free the control of waqfs from the state.169 
5.5 Adaptation to Internal Dynamics in Waqfs 
Muslims’ exit from state controlled waqfs should, on the other hand, be understood within the 
wider context of waqfs being a ‘discursive tradition’ (Asad 2009; see chapter two). The 
development of the institution of waqf assumed different faces at various epochs in response to 
local customs and needs making it to be lived and mediated variedly across the Muslim world. 
Accordingly, the various alternatives assumed by Kenyan Muslims during symbolic resistance 
represent a phase in the internal dynamics of the institution as part of Islamic charity. To 
demonstrate that waqf is a ‘discursive tradition’, we reconstruct its development as follows: 
 The ‘formative phase’ beginning in the seventh century (first century A.H). During this period, 
for lack of precise textual legitimacy in the Qur’an, the institution was believed to have been 
initiated by the Prophet through a number of traditions and the actions of his companions. 
Thus the main concern during this period was to establish the religious legitimacy and 
essentials of waqf. The growth and development of the institution during this period was also 
perceived to be progressive and adaptive to various local customs and needs with a view to 
balancing between theory and practice. Waqfs attained stability in the thirteenth century 
following the formation of the different madhhabs (Barnes 1986; Kozlowski 1996; Hennigan 
2004); 
 Waqfs entered the ‘classical phase’ in the fourteenth century. This was, arguably, the golden 
age of waqfs as the institution flourished becoming an essential part of the Muslim society and 
social welfare. Most public institutions and social welfare services including water, education, 
urban housing, health care, madrasas and mosques were either waqfs themselves or 
maintained through waqf revenues (Hodgson 1974: 124; Hoexter 2002); 
 Waqfs entered the ‘transformative stage’ from the first decades of the fifteenth to the 
seventeenth century. The main debate here was whether or not to adopt cash as a corpus. Cash 
waqfs were dominant throughout the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the sixteenth century 
but faced opposition in Syria owing to the aspect of riba (interest) which is abhorrent in Islam. 
The debate, however, closed with the adoption of cash waqfs as part of the curf for the public 
good (istihsan) given that its abolition would have dealt a blow to the hundreds of social 
welfare services that they supported in the community. Other forms of movables such as 
                                                 
169 Unlike in Kenya, similar proposals to reform and enhance the efficiency of the kadhi courts were adopted and ratified 
in Zanzibar. As contained in the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2003, the jurisdiction of the kadhi court 
in Zanzibar now includes hearing and determination of matters of waqf while an Appellate Court of the Kadhis was also 
established. See Hashim, A. (2005). Servants of Shari’a, op. cit., p. 38. 
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ornaments, armor, and animals for their products were also adopted as waqf corpuses 
(Suhrawardy 1911; Mandaville 1979; Hoexter 2002; Gerber 2002); 
 From the eighteenth to early nineteenth century, nonetheless, the institution of waqf entered 
the ‘redundancy and stagnation age’. Owing to their immense influence in the social welfare 
of the society, waqfs had established diverse groups of economically secure and independent 
Muslims that were antithetical to political hegemony. Muslim rulers in the Ottoman Empire, 
for instance, established the Ministry of Imperial Religious Endowments that put waqfs under 
state supervision, effectively controlling the mainstay of the diverse groups of beneficiaries. 
Part of the culama was also conscripted as mutwallis along theological biases to accord the 
state a religious legitimacy. This coincided with colonial invasion as evident in British India 
and Egypt; French Algeria, Syria, and Lebanon; and the Italian colony of Libya where the main 
concern of the colonial project was resource control. Like Muslim rulers, colonial powers also 
put waqfs under control by establishing departments and ministries with personnel working 
under strict guidelines and supervision. Consequently, state control, mismanagement, and use 
of waqfs against designated causes paralyzed social welfare in the Muslim society rendering 
the role of waqfs almost obsolete during this period (Barnes 1986; Kozlowski 1996; Sanjuan 
2007; Medici 2011); 
 Upon the end of colonial rule in the mid nineteenth century, most Muslim states embarked on 
land reforms that also affected the institution of waqf. This could be regarded as the ‘period of 
botched reforms and extended state control’. Apart from inheriting colonial infrastructure to 
control the institution, majority of land waqfs were either nationalized or redistributed in the 
ensued reforms that extended to the early twentieth century. In other countries like Egypt, 
Turkey, Libya, Lebanon, and Syria, waqf dhurri were limited to sixty years after the death of 
the waqif or abolished altogether. Accordingly, except in Morocco where waqfs are said to have 
flourished, many of the reforms by new nation states put the institution under extended 
control and supervision (Schacht 1982; Kozlowski 1998, 2008; Kogelmann 2004, 2005); 
 From the last decades of the twentieth century, however, the institution of waqf entered the 
‘disillusionment and new awakening phase’. It was a period of new awakening in the sense 
that some predominantly Muslim countries including Kuwait, Sudan, Iran, Qatar, and Malaysia 
embarked on genuine reforms on waqf policies and reviewing perceived rigid jurisprudential 
interpretations with a view to returning the institution to its pristine time. This period was 
also characterized by the upcoming of the civil societies that were disillusioned by failures in 
some of the independent states to reform colonial policies and provide social welfare services. 
Muslim civil society groups, therefore, pushed to free waqfs from state control by establishing 
community based charitable organizations some of which acquired transnational status 
(Kozlowski 1998; Kuran 2001; Hennigan 2004; Dafterdar / Cizakca 2013). 
The transnational Muslim charitable organizations are using the goodwill of the institution to 
harness resources in form of waqf shares and certificates the usufruct of which is channeled to 
specific social welfare causes across the Muslim umma. Included among others are the 
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International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO, Saudia); Islamic Relief Organization (IRO, UK); 
World Assembly of Muslim Youths (WAMY); Al-Haramayn Islamic Foundation (AHIF); and Africa 
Muslim Agency (AMA). The IDB also runs a number of subsidiaries that revive waqfs across the 
Muslim world like the Awqaf Properties Investment Fund (APIF) and the World Waqf Fund 
(WWF). Included also in the provision of social welfare in the Muslim umma are private trusts 
including the King Faysal Foundation (KFF); Alwaleed bin Talal Foundation; and Shaykh Zayid al-
Nahyan (Kuran 2001; Benthall / Bellion-Jourdan 2003; Siraj and Hillary 2006; Dafterdar / Cizakca 
2013). 
In summary, therefore, though Muslims dissented state controlled waqfs and exited to non-labeled 
waqfs, they remained within the ambit of Islamic charity and qurba. Significant, however, were 
their inconspicuous efforts as subordinate group to decipher the contradictions in the secular 
state policies and civil institutions of subjugation and re-define the control and excise of social, 
symbolic, and cultural capital provided by waqfs. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Preceding discussions illustrate the significant role of waqfs in the socio-cultural and religious life 
of a Muslim community where life is perceived as one totality. It is not just about resource 
distribution, but also performing a religious duty and maintaining the social fabric of the 
community. The secular state (both colonial and postcolonial) policies and civil institutions that 
governed waqfs, therefore, interfered with the life pattern of the Muslim community subjecting it 
to subordination. In the face of imperial power, however, the community could only turn to the 
silent but effective means to reverse the control of resources without attracting the wrath of the 
state. This explains the non-compliance with the imposed compulsory registration rules and use 
of sadaqa, community based organizations, and private trusts. 
The discussion in this chapter has also shown that Muslims engaged the state within the 
constitutional boundaries with a view to manage waqfs for their welfare. This was, nonetheless, 
faced by conflicting religious interests and rendered futile. Significantly, the use of alternative and 
uncontrolled charitable options does not only demonstrate the urge to control resources, but also 
exploration of the varied options that the Sharica provides under the expansive umbrella of 
Islamic charity in the face of restrictive socio-cultural and political conditions for the fulfillment 
of spiritual obligations.
  
6 Safeguarding Socio-Cultural Interests through Distribution of Waqf 
Usufruct 
Islamic charity was a sacred charity, a form of worship, rather than a form of altruism 
behavior. It would be wrong, nonetheless, to depict Islamic charity, or the charities in 
other monotheistic religions, as driven only by bad conscience or by an expectation of a 
divine reward. Complex motives were at work, and the distinctly human trait of altruism 
and its existence within the system of a sacred charity cannot be denied (Lev 2005:144). 
This observation by Lev (2005) does not depart sharply from Hennigan’s (2004) view on the 
essence and uses of waqfs in Muslim societies, i.e. both agree on the intricate nature of the 
institution, particularly on the aspect of waqfs as gifts inter vivos. Waqf accords the dedicator the 
freedom to choose what to endow and whom to include as beneficiary, bringing into fore the 
fusion of religion, economy, and culture in Muslim societies (Shahin 1998; Hennigan 2004; Lev 
2005). It is in this context that the chapter attempts to situate the institution of waqf among 
Muslims in Kenya and understand its place in the socio-cultural negotiations between diverse 
competing and conflicting groups in the society. Central to the argument in this chapter are the 
different types of waqfs available in Kenya’s landscape; the choice of formula - Qur’anic and non-
Qur’anic, in the distribution of usufruct in relation to ‘domestic’ and ‘public economy’ as well as 
gender considerations; and the questions of cana, hikr and istibdal vis-à-vis improvement of the 
output of revenue generating waqfs. The use of relevant case studies and the perception of umiji-
wamiji propounded in chapter four are pertinent in understanding how the unfolding ethno-social 
negotiations shaped the development of waqfs in the community. 
Distribution of usufruct of waqf departs from two perspectives – Qur’anic and non-Qur’anic 
shares. The Qur’anic model is informed by the divine law of mirath–“for the male what is equal to 
the share of two females”- enshrined in Qur’an 4:11-12.170 Distributing usufruct of waqf based on 
this dogma strictly follows the divine guidelines giving preference to male over female 
beneficiaries. A cross section of scholars regards this dogma as rigid since disregarding it amounts 
to kufr (disbelief) (Barnes 1986; Reiter 1996; Powers 2002; Kozlowski 2008). The second formula 
of distributing usufruct of waqfs – non-Qur’anic, allegedly draws its legitimacy from Hanafi 
scholars’ fatwa traced to second century A.H. It espouses that if a founder fails to specify the mode 
of distributing usufruct, it was to be assumed that he had intended to have it equally shared among 
designated beneficiaries. This opinion is allegedly anchored on a tradition attributed to the 
Prophet regarding gifts inter vivos that advises parents to share them out equally amongst their 
children and give preference to daughters only when necessary (Sahihal-Bukhari 3:758-
760).171Against this backdrop, the various types of waqfs in the former Protectorate are 
                                                 
170 For further discussion on Islamic inheritance, see Qur’an 4:176; Sahihal- Bukhari 8:731, 736. 
171 Powers defines gift inter vivos (gift between living people) as “a voluntary gratuitous alienation of property by a 
person to another not made in contemplation of death.” See Powers, D. (1989). Orientalism, Colonialism and Legal 
History: The Attack on Muslim Family Endowments in Algeria and India. Journal of Comparative Studies in Society and 
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contextualized and the impact of the adopted formulas in distributing usufruct to beneficiaries by 
different endowers analyzed here under. 
6.1 Safeguarding Family’s ‘Domestic Economy’: The Ambiguous Place of Women in Waqf 
Ahli in Kenya 
Family or posterity waqfs constituted 63 of the 104 sampled waqf charters representing 60.6% of 
the total waqfs registered by the WCK. From these figures, one could discern that majority of 
endowers were primarily concerned with the welfare of their progeny and the urge to retain the 
usufruct within the family parameters. This is undoubtedly informed by the nature of waqf itself 
– as sadaqa in which case the main beneficiaries are those within the precincts of the endower. 
Establishing charity for the benefit of one’s family is believed to be a meritorious act in Islam as 
propounded in a tradition of the Prophet: 
…The most excellent dinar is one that a person spends on his family, and the dinar 
which he spends on his animal in Allah's path, and the dinar he spends on his 
companions in Allah's path […] who is the person with greater reward than a person 
who spends on young members of his family (and thus) preserves (saves them from 
want) (and by virtue of which) Allah brings profit for them and makes them rich 
(Sahih Muslim 5:2180).  
Several verses of the Qur’an and hadiths of the Prophet also emphasize the need to spend on one’s 
family as a form of sadaqa while warning against the lack of it effectively breaking the social 
fabric.172 Accordingly, a number of the waqf deeds reviewed in this study had elaborate chains of 
beneficiaries suggesting that the usufruct would be confined within the ‘domestic economy’ 
(Sanjuan 2007). Included among these were two waqfs of Mwanajumbe bint Ali bin Khamis el-
Mandhry. In these waqfs, the dedicator designated her nieces, Amina and Mwanamkuu bint Said 
bin Ali bin Khamis el-Mandhry and their descendants from generation to generation with el-
Mandhry masjid in Mombasa as the ultimate beneficiary.173 Neither of the waqf deeds indicated 
the formula for distributing usufruct assuming equality in share distribution among the first two 
generations of beneficiaries.  
The second case concerns the family waqf of Mwanajuma bint Kulo who designated her nephew 
and niece Abdallah Mwinzagu and Mwanasha Mwenyehija respectively and their descendants as 
beneficiaries from one generation to the next.174 A third example is the waqf dhurri of Adam 
Dadrahman in which he designated his wife, three daughters, “and to those who may hereafter be 
                                                 
History, 31(3), 535-571; Reiter, Y. (1996). Islamic Endowments in Jerusalem under British Mandate. London: Frank Cass 
& Co. Ltd, pp. 100-101. 
172 See Qur’an 2:264; Qur’an 3:7; Sahihal- Bukhari 3:763-764; 767, 802; 4:11, 20, 22-24; 166, 232; Sahih Muslim 5:2181, 
2183. 
173Waqf deed of Mwanajumbe bint Ali bin Khamis el-Mandhry, fols. 32; 34-35, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
174Waqf deed of Mwanajumbe bint Kulo, fol. 15, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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borne unto me and their children.”175 By designating the yet to be borne, Dadrahman, like in 
several similar cases, was bent to ensure that the usufruct of the sadaqa remained within the 
family circle. Again, as in the earlier two waqfs, no precise formula for the distribution of the 
usufruct was given. 
A sharp contrast from the above is the waqf dhurri of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam Naserpuria in which 
the endower designated her three daughters as equal beneficiaries of the family waqf in the 
exclusion of his two sons.176 Moreover, male descendants were sidelined in later generations since 
usufruct was to trickle down to the daughters’ children from generation to generation. In these 
and some other cases where the non-Qur’anic model of sharing usufruct was adopted, whether 
assumed or prescribed, it turns out that women – daughters, wives, and other female cognates, 
were the most preferred beneficiaries of family waqfs.177 This could be understood in the context 
of waqfs as gifts inter vivos where, in relation to the Prophet’s tradition above, women were 
accorded priority where gender was the main consideration in the distribution of usufruct. This 
is in contrast to the Qur’anic formula where shares are predetermined in favor of male 
beneficiaries. Taking the waqf dhurri of Naserpuria for instance, the three daughters would have 
shared the usufruct with their two brothers in the ratio one to two (1:2). The same case would 
have applied to the beneficiaries of usufruct of the family waqf of bint Kulo above. Precisely, the 
Qur’anic principle of distributing usufruct of waqfs was adopted in the waqf dhurri of 
Gulamhussein Adamji where four sons and two daughters were designated as beneficiaries.178 
Two waqf dhurri of Mohammed bin Omar bin Aish el-Auf present yet another instance where 
Qur’an guidelines of inheritance were preferred in distributing usufruct of the waqf among three 
sons.179 Interestingly, the wife was left out as beneficiary but named as mutawalli in both waqfs 
instead. The Qur’anic formula was again used in the waqf dhurri of Nassor bin Mohammed el-
Nahdy and Haji Kassim Haji Mohammed where male beneficiaries got bigger shares compared to 
their female counterparts.180 
Examining the preference on Qur’anic guidelines of inheritance in sharing the usufruct of waqf 
dhurri by endowers reveals a tendency to protect descendants from competition by agnates as 
well as retaining portions of the estate within the ‘domestic economy’ that would have otherwise 
trickled to the agnates or surrendered to the bayt al-mal as required under mirath law.181 This is 
                                                 
175Waqf deed of Adam Dadrahman, fols. 26-27, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
176Waqf deed of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam Naserpuria, fol. 30, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
177Waqf deeds of Khamis bin Tabibu, fol. 28; Mishi bint Mwalimu, fols. 40-41, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
178Waqf deed of Gulamhussein Adamji, fols. 38-39, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
179Waqf deeds of Mohammed bin Omar bin Aish el-Auf, fols. 48-9; 56-57, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
180Waqf deeds of Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy, fols. 62-63; 64-65; Haji Kassim Haji Mohammed, fols. 69-70, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
181 There is no bayt al-mal in Kenya. Properties of Muslims who die without heirs are given to the WCK by the Public 
Trustee in monetary form to be placed in to a “Surplus Funds Account” and utilized as deemed fit by the state agency. 
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clearly discernible in the waqf dhurri of Mwarabu bint Mohammed bin Abdallah who designated 
her only daughter, Amina bint Dadrahman el-Balushiya then to her children from one generation 
to the next with the Mazrui masjid as residual beneficiary.182Another case involves one of the waqf 
dhurri of Mohammed bin Said Adnan Bamkele where a daughter, Bukheiti bint Mohammed was 
designated as the sole beneficiary then her descendants.183 The tendency was also evident in the 
waqf dhurri of Nanachema bint Athuman al-Famawiya where Aisha bint Manswab bin 
Abdurahman was designated as the first generation beneficiary and thereafter her descendants 
from generation to generation.184 
According to the Qur’an guidelines of mirath, a daughter who survives the deceased as the only 
heir is entitled to one half of the estate after deductions of other expenses and legacies. Where 
there are more than two daughters, they share two-thirds of the estate with the remainder going 
to agnates or the public treasury for the benefit of the general poor and beggars in the community 
(Qur’an 4:11-12).185 Therefore, significant portions of the endowers’ estate in the mentioned cases 
above were retained within the ‘domestic economy’ by use of waqf as a means of sharing wealth 
in the family than it would have been under mirath law. This is because as waqf, non-designated 
beneficiaries could not lay claim to the usufruct as they would possibly do under mirath. 
Another way to ensure that the usufruct of waqf dhurri did not go out of the ‘domestic economy’ 
was to restrict women’s shares of the usufruct, especially wives and daughters, from being 
inherited by their descendants and relatives regarded as ‘outsiders’ from the endower’s 
viewpoint. This included placing conditions such as compulsory return of the wives’ shares to 
donor’s descendants upon the former’s demise, while daughters were entitled to shares only if 
they remained unmarried.186 Contrary to waqfs, Qur’an guidelines of mirath grant the daughter’s 
children (grandchildren of the endower) with their husbands and relatives of the wife some 
shares of the property upon their demise (Qur’an 4:11-12). Had the endowers allowed female 
beneficiaries to take their shares to the marital and parental homes respectively, it would have 
                                                 
This may not necessarily include investing the funds for the spiritual benefit of the dedicator. See section 18, WCK Act 
(1951). Interviews with Muhammad Shalli; Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
182Waqf deedof Mwarabu bint Mohammed bin Abdallah, (unmarked), WCK archive, Mombasa. See also Succession 
Petition no. 29 0f 2014 at the Kadhi court, Mombasa in relation to plot 406/3 on this waqf, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
183Waqf deed of Mohammed bin Said Adnan Bamkele, fol. 130, WCK archive, Mombasa. The endower had several other 
waqfs where different beneficiaries shared the usufruct according to different formulas. 
184Waqf deed of Nanachema bint Athuman al-Famawiya, fol. 160, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
185 The bayt al-mal, according to imam Malik, has the right to seize the property of a Muslim who dies without legal heirs 
or where some portions of wealth remain after legal heirs get their rightful shares. In the principles of awl (increase) 
and radd (return), however, remaining portions of inheritance (and waqfs distributed according to this formula) may 
in such circumstances also remain with the cognates. See Bhala, R. (2011). Understanding Islamic Law (Sharica) (here, 
pp. 1089-1163). New Providence: New Jersey; Ghazaleh, P. (2011). Pious Foundations: From Here to Eternity? In G. 
Pascale (Ed.), Held in Trust: Waqf in the Islamic World (pp. 1-22). Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 
186Waqf deeds of shaykh Said bin Rashid bin Abdullah el-Mandhry, fols. 16-17; Mohammed bin Kaili el-Kilindini, fol. 105; 
Haji Ismail Haji Adam, fols. 51-52; Alibhai Adamji Dhar, fols. 78-88, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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been akin to sanctioning the taking out of the usufruct beyond the confines of the family circle. In 
both cases however, the conditional entitlement to shares of usufruct as well as locking out what 
would have been legal heirs suggests denial of the right to inheritance, making the waqfs 
inconsistent with the Qur’an guidelines. Such waqfs are often prone to legal challenges by 
aggrieved beneficiaries in the kadhi court as was established by the study (see chapter four). 
It was, nevertheless, not only female beneficiaries who were capped from taking usufruct of the 
waqfs from the endower’s cognates as was demonstrated in the waqf ahli of Mwanakombo bint 
Jaka. In this waqf, the dedicator designated her daughter, Mwakazije bint Bwana Amir and her 
children as beneficiaries in the exclusion of the husband, Beujas bin Amir.187 As a husband, Beujas 
was denied of his right to inheritance where he was entitled to one quarter of the usufruct 
according to the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance. Had he petitioned this waqf before the kadhi 
court, it could have possibly been invalidated on the basis of inconsistency with the Sharica as held 
by the majority opinion. 
These cases demonstrate the use of waqf as sadaqa inter vivos to protect cognates against 
competition from agnates. It also helps to retain portions of the usufruct within the confines of the 
‘domestic economy’ that would have otherwise gone to benefit the ‘public economy’. Significantly, 
they subtly illustrate the flexibility of the Sharica to balance between textual demands and 
practical realities of life. Nonetheless, it is not possible to determine the circumstances that 
informed the choice of one method of distributing usufruct of waqfs over another. Different 
endowers adopted different formulas depending on predisposed circumstances that deemed 
suitable at the time of establishing their endowments. Undeniably, though, as corroborated by the 
cited cases, the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance were flouted to the detriment of both genders, a 
misdemeanor that kadhi courts were petitioned to redress. 
6.2 Waqf Khayri and Mushtarak Waqfs: Charitable Endowments and the Concern for 
‘Public Economy’ 
Charitable waqfs accounted for 37 (35.6%) of the total waqfs reviewed during the period of study. 
In all the registered charitable waqfs, endowers clearly expressed the desire to consecrate their 
wealth purposely for the social welfare of the community and for the spiritual goal of attaining 
qurba with the Creator. In one example, the waqf of Naserpuria was consecrated for the benefit of 
the poor and beggars “as decided by the trustees except among descendants of Haji Adam Fakir 
Mohammed,” and for the annual dinner of the Naserpuria Memon community.188 Clearly, the 
endower’s urge was to ensure that the waqf would benefit majority of the poor in the community 
than limiting it within his family circle. A number of possibilities could explain the shurut al-waqif 
to single out the descendants of Haji Mohammed as non-deserving beneficiaries: 
                                                 
187Waqf deed of Mwanakombo bint Jaka, fol. 118, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
188Waqf deed of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam Naserpuria, fol. 31, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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First, it could be postulated that Haji Mohammed and Haji Adam were close relatives, probably 
cousins. In this scenario, if the poor descendants of Haji Mohammed were not excluded, they could 
have laid exclusive claims as the most deserving beneficiaries of the endower by blood relations 
based on the fatwa of shaykh Ibn Duhaish (A. H. 1377) (see chapter two). The poor and needy 
relatives of an endower, according to the fatwa, have beneficence priority to waqfs established by 
their relatives than the general poor and beggars in the community. Granted, the poor 
descendants of Haji Mohammed would have taken back the usufruct of the waqf to the ‘domestic 
economy’. Secondly, as relatives, it could be possible that Haji Adam aimed at restraining them 
from getting double shares both as beneficiaries of the waqf and agnate heirs as is provided for 
under the Qur’an guidelines of mirath. 
Another case of charitable endowment involves the waqf khayri of Seif bin Salim bin Khalfan el-
Busaidi, which was designated for his Liwali Seif Masjid in Lamu. In a typical demonstration of 
control of property long after demise through shurut al-waqif, the dedicator detailed how usufruct 
should be channeled towards salaries for the mucadhdhin, Qur’an teacher, and annual mawlid 
feast.189 Salim bin Khalfan bin Amir el-Busaidi also consecrated a piece of land at Kikowani, 
Mombasa, as cemetery for the benefit of the Memon Muslim community.190 Accordingly, as 
contained in the various waqf deeds, establishing waqf khayri is not only indicative of endowers 
seeking qurba with God but also enables the usufruct to trickle to the ‘public economy’. 
More so, designating religious institutions like masjids, madrasas, and orphanages, also brings into 
light the endower’s spiritual attachment with such institutions in the community. Unwittingly 
though, socio-religious attachments by endowers as exemplified in the choice of such institutions 
as well as locales gravitate towards safeguarding temporal ethnic and cultural interests of select 
groups of Muslims in the exclusion of others crystallizing the view of umiji-wamiji in waqf 
practices among Muslims in the region as argued. The waqf khayri of Haji Adam for the poor and 
annual dinner of the Naserpuria Memon community; the waqf of Seif bin Salim for his Liwali Seif 
Masjid at Lamu; and the exclusive cemetery for the Memon Muslim community as consecrated by 
bin Amir el-Busaidi in Mombasa aptly corroborate the view on umiji-wamiji dynamics vis-à-vis 
socio-ethnic and political alignments of Muslim groups in the former Protectorate as elaborated 
elsewhere in this study. 
Mushtarak (mixed) waqfs were the third type of endowments registered with the WCK and 
constituted a paltry 4 (3.8%) of the total. As discussed in chapter two, mushtarak waqfs 
concurrently benefit the endower’s progeny and other charitable causes in a predetermined 
                                                 
189 Salaries for mucadhdhin, Qur’an teachers, water carriers, mawlid feasts, Ramadan iftar, annual khitma recitations, 
and performance of hajj by proxy are some of the recurrent rituals emphasized by endowers for the purpose of reaping 
spiritual recompense in their afterlife. See the waqf deeds of Latifa bint Saleh bin Awadh, fols.100-101; Rehema bint Ali, 
fol. 254; Ali bin Salim, fols. 94-95; Amria bint Ali bin Khamis, fol. 36; Seif bin Salim bin Khalfan el-Busaidi, fols. 20-21, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
190 This was an extension of the cemetery earlier consecrated by Haji Mohammed Haji Kassim for the Memon Muslim 
community. See waqf deeds of Salim bin Khalfan bin Amir el-Busaidi, fol. 109; Haji Mohammed Haji Kassim, fol. 110, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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proportion as provided in the waqf deed. In one example of recently (2006) registered waqfs, 
Mariam Mohammed Mwanjira consecrated a mixed waqf for the benefit of her eight agnates (three 
females and five males) in equal shares alongside a local masjid and madrasa.191Another case 
involves the waqf of Mohammed bin Khamis bin Mbwana Kheri el-Bajuni in which usufruct was 
to be shared between the progeny of the endower and a masjid he had established.192 In a similar 
case, Aisha bint Abdullah bin Jabir designated reciters of the Qur’an for the benefit of her soul. At 
the same time, the usufruct was to benefit her granddaughter Aisha bint Khamis, then her children 
from generation to generation with the Muslim poor and beggars in the community as ultimate 
beneficiaries.193 Much as endowers were keen on their spiritual afterlife, therefore, they were also 
not oblivious of their social responsibilities within their extended family chains even in instances 
when they had no direct descendants. 
6.3 Gender and Waqfs: Negotiations for Socio-Economic Space between Sexes among 
Muslims in Kenya 
The question of gender remains one of the most contested issues in waqfs with regard to the actual 
endowing and beneficiary trends in Islam. This is because majority of studies (the current partly 
being no exception) tend to compartmentalize waqfs in the perspective of revenue generating 
corpuses pitting economic dynamics against gender in relation to property ownership and 
disposal in Muslim communities. Consequently, establishing waqfs is widely conceptualized in 
terms of negotiations between genders for the control of socio-economic space with its associated 
benefits that is most times perceived to be skewed in favor of males. Males are particularly 
claimed to use waqfs as a means to retain control of family wealth and protect it against both the 
alleged fragmentation through mirath and to perpetuate customary traditions of patrilineal 
property ownership in the community (Layish 1983; Doumani 1998; Hennigan 2004; Kozlowski 
2008). 
Taking cue from the above narrative, male endowers accounted for 72 (69.2%) compared to 
females’ 29 (27.9%) of the total.194 Accordingly, this suggests that Kenya’s Muslim community is 
not an exception in the traditionally held view of the peripheral status of women vis-à-vis 
property ownership. However, their minimal contribution notwithstanding, women are active 
actors in the institution both as endowers and protected beneficiaries. As a matter of fact, a 
significant number of women were designated as first mutawallis even in waqfs established by 
men. Of the 29 waqfs established by women, 20 (69%) had female mutawallis. Added to 8 others 
consecrated by male endowers in which women were designated as second mutawallis, this 
makes an average of about 26.9% of all waqfs under the custody of female Muslims in the former 
                                                 
191Waqf deed of Mariam Mohammed Mwanjira dated June, 2006, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
192Waqf deed of Mohammed bin Khamis bin Mbwana Kheri el-Bajuni, fol. 279, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
193Waqf deed of Aisha bint Abdullah bin Jabir, fol. 201, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
194Trusts and waqfs established jointly by social groups of both men and women accounted for 3 (2.9 %). 
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Protectorate. Clearly, women were significant co-partners with their male counterparts in the 
development of the institution of waqf, as far as the Kenyan context is concerned. 
The active involvement of women in waqfs among Muslims in the former Protectorate is an 
indictment against the sustained policy of appointing Waqf Commissioners as national mutawallis. 
Despite women making up 27.9% and 26.9% of endowers and mutawallis respectively, by 2010, 
no woman was appointed in the state agency as Commissioner. Socio-ethnic and political 
dynamics of umiji-wamiji that tended to inform the appointment of Commissioners had no room 
for female actors, hence their conspicuous absence from the state body. This is despite the agency 
dealing with properties whose beneficiaries cut across the gender divide. Apart from constituting 
a sizeable proportion of endowers and mutawallis, women were also major beneficiaries as 
evident in some waqf deeds explained elsewhere in the study. Through waqfs, endowers protected 
female relatives including daughters and wives as beneficiaries against competition with the 
agnates under mirath law. 
This could further be deduced from the waqf of Khamis bin Tabibu el-Kilindini in which his four 
daughters were the only beneficiaries.195 Were the usufruct of the waqf distributed according to 
the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance, the daughters would have shared two-thirds of the estate 
with the balance going to agnates or the bayt al-mal. Another case concerns the waqf of Haji Adam 
where three daughters were the designated beneficiaries in the exclusion of two sons (see section 
6.1). In this waqf while females seem to have been outright favored, the sons were made joint 
mutawallis with the position becoming the exclusive right of their descendants upon their demise, 
just as usufruct was exclusively for the daughters and their descendants.196 This arrangement 
ensured that only up to one third of the family estate would be controlled by male descendants as 
wages while the daughters shared the remaining two thirds usufruct of the waqf. 
In other waqfs, however, women were the victims than they would have been were the properties 
distributed purely as inheritance. Among cases were those successfully appealed against in the 
kadhi court but eventually rescinded by the High Court (see chapter four). Another instance 
involves the waqf dhurri of Mwanakame bint Juma bin Mwinyingwisa where a sister of the 
endower, Mwanajuma bint Juma bin Mwinyingwisa, was designated as the sole beneficiary of the 
first generation before the endower’s daughter, Fatuma bint Abu Bakr bin Rashid and her 
children. The husband of the endower, Abu Bakr bin Rashid, was on the other hand excluded all 
together. The sister was again the first mutawalli to be succeeded by the husband of the 
endower.197 It could not immediately be established why the endower chose her sister in place of 
                                                 
195Waqf deed of Khamis bin Tabibu, fol. 28. See also the waqf deeds of Mwarabu bint Mohammed bin Abdallah, plot no. 
406/3 in the Civil Suit no. 29 of 2014 in the Kadhi’s court, Mombasa in the matter of estate of Mwarabu bint Abdallah; 
Mohammed bin Said bin Adnan Bamkele, fol. 130; Nanachema bint Athuman al-Famawiya, fol. 160, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
196 WCK, waqf deeds of Haji Ebrahim Adam Naserpuria, fols. 30; 31; 66-67; WCK archive, Mombasa. 
197Waqf deed of Mwanakame bint Juma bin Mwinyingwisa, (unmarked), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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her daughter and husband as first generation beneficiary and mutawalli though the waqf clearly 
flouted the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance. The same fate befell the husband in the family waqf 
of bint Jaka (see section 6.1). 
Therefore, the use of waqfs as gifts inter vivos, at least among Muslims in Kenya as shown in the 
foregoing cases, could be an affront to the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance despite the varying 
circumstances informing the decisions. This is an outright inconsistency with the divine law and 
basic principles of waqf as held by the majority opinion that departs from two perspectives: In the 
first scenario, which incidentally tends to be the most conspicuous, Qur’an guidelines were flouted 
to retain the usufruct of waqfs within the domestic economy and protect female heirs who would 
have otherwise been exposed to undue competition from agnates. Informing this opinion is the 
view that it was illogical for an endower to claim to seek qurba and sawab through waqf but turn 
round to violate the means by which the divine closeness was sought. In other words, majority if 
not all endowers who flouted the Qur’an guidelines through waqfs were probably ignorant of the 
divine law in the first place. This finds credence in several waqf charters written in clear legal 
jargon with endowers making finger imprints as signatures in the presence of kadhis, Registrar of 
Titles, and Advocates.198 
In this regard, the legal experts, who were probably not adequately informed about the Qur’an 
guidelines and Sharica in general, failed to advice endowers leading to the flouting of the divine 
law. This is likely considering that kadhis were mainly Arab Muslims who were not necessarily 
experts in the Sharica appointed in consideration of socio-ethnicity and perceived loyalty to state 
policies. The rest were mostly civil officers and private legal practitioners not adept in Sharica. In 
the second scenario, benefits were to the males pointing to the widely held assumption of the urge 
to retain family wealth in their control and to spearhead cultural practices of male dominance in 
the community. These two seemingly contradicting aspects present a significant observation that 
gainsays a widely held assumption premised on the latter scenario as the claimed overall objective 
underlying the use of family waqfs in majority of the Muslim communities. 
6.4 Designating Waqf Beneficiaries along Socio-ethnic Considerations: A Perpetuation of 
the umiji-wamiji Dynamics 
We established that the Mazrui settled in the former city-states as liwalis of the Yacrubi and the 
Bu Sacidi dynasties after the fall of the Portuguese rule and existed as autonomous governorates 
before the coming of the British in the 1890s. Upon establishment of the Protectorate, Mombasa 
became a strategic regional hub and administrative center. This economic and political growth of 
the town did not, however, end the deep rooted socio-cultural and political alignments between 
the former liwalis and the Swahili confederation that remained key considerations in the relations 
between the two Muslim groups. 
                                                 
198Waqf deeds of Clara bint Juma, (unmarked) dated September, 1971; Mwanakame bint Juma bin Mwinyingwisa, 
(unmarked), dated June, 1933; Mwanajuma bint Kulo (unmarked), dated February 1927, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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To appreciate the ambiguous relations between the Mazrui and the Swahili Muslims’ 
federation,we need to recall the establishment of the post of Chief Kadhi (see chapter three); the 
postcolonial provincial administrative changes that affected the position of the liwali in relation 
to waqfs; and how the liwali’s replacement in the Waqf Commission shaped future development 
not only in the Islamic judiciary, but also the appointment of Commissioners (see chapter four). 
Significant also are the considerations that informed the appointment of the occupier of the 
position of the Chief Kadhi during the colonial and postcolonial periods, precipitating endless 
negotiations between culama from Lamu and Mombasa (miji) on the one side, and between the 
Mazrui and Swahili Muslim federation (wamiji) of the Mombasa locale on the other. One does not 
need to look far to realize how umiji-wamiji socio-political dynamics were nurtured under the 
supervision of the state. The list of occupants of the position of the Chief Kadhi, who incidentally 
have an upper hand in the appointment of Waqf Commissioners, would readily corroborate this 
viewpoint. As appointment to this office oscillated between culama from Lamu and Mombasa, the 
Mazrui were preferred every time the appointments were made from Mombasa despite lament 
by other Muslim groups including the Swahili confederation, thereby cementing socio-political 
animosity between the latter and the former.199 
Since the WCK Act does not qualify the selection of Commissioners, it is argued that appointments 
were undertaken in consideration of socio-political and economic interests of the various ethnic 
and religious groups within the former Protectorate as evidenced in Mombasa as a microcosm. 
Consecration behaviors captured in a cross section of the waqf deeds as shown in Table 2 
appropriately suggest that historical negotiations were imbibed by endowers and accounted for 
the choice of beneficiaries along socio-ethnic affiliations. This is because shurut al-waqif forms one 
of the canons of waqf in Islam and its disregard is only an exception but not a rule. When an 
endower, therefore, stipulates in the waqf charter that primary or residual usufruct of his 
consecration shall “pass over to poor beggars of the Naserpuria Memon community of 
Mombasa;”200 or “to el-Mandhry masjid in Mombasa;”201 or to “the poor of the Arab and Swahili 
communities of Mombasa,”202 the mutawalli has to effect this to the latter not only in fulfillment 
of the aspirations of the endower but also in perpetuation of the umiji-wamiji dynamics.203 
                                                 
199 See Mwakimako, H. (2010). Conflicts and Tensions in the Appointment of Chief Kadhi in Colonial Kenya, 1898-1960s. 
In S. Jeppie, E. Moosa & R. Roberts (Eds.), Muslim Family Law in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial Legacies and Post-Colonial 
Challenges (pp.109-134). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
200Waqf deeds of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam Naserpuria, fols. 30-31; 66-67; Haji Ismail Haji Adam Mohammed, fols. 51-52; 
Salim bin Khalfan bin Amir el-Busaidi, fol. 109, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
201Waqf deeds of Mwanajumbe bint Ali bin Khamis el-Mandhry, fols. 32; 34-35; Kassim bin Rashid bin Abdallah el-
Mandhry, fol. 23; WCK archive, Mombasa. 
202Waqf deeds of Mohammed bin Abdurahman Basheikh, fols. 4-5; Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy, fols. 62-65; 75-76, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
203 Around 2008-2009, some Muslim activists in Mombasa allegedly went on air in local media blaming the WCK for 
corruption, inefficiency and failure to use waqfs to help fight poverty among Muslims in the region. This prompted media 
personalities to visit the WCK to seek clarification the following day. In response, the Secretariat refuted the allegations 
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This view is further crystallized by the existence of other waqfs consecrated by the same endowers 
but dedicated to the social welfare of the poor and beggars of the Muslim community without 
regard to socio-ethnic affiliations. A case in point regards the waqf of Haji Adam designating a 
madrasa established by his late father and other charitable institutions for the benefit of the 
widows and poor as decided by the trustees.204 This particular waqf contrasts with the one above 
established by the same endower in which he designated the Naserpuria Memon community of 
Mombasa as residual beneficiaries. In another waqf, Haji Mohammed established a cemetery and 
madrasa for the exclusive benefit of the same socio-ethnic group (Memon Muslim community) 
that was later extended through the waqf of bin Amir el-Busaidi.205 This partly explains the 
occasional appointment of Muslims of Asian descent as Waqf Commissioners as well with a view 
to representing such minority groups in the Muslim community.206 
Therefore, designating one particular socio-ethnic group as exclusive primary or residual 
beneficiaries of waqfs in the Muslim community in a given geographical locality within the former 
Protectorate, particularly in Mombasa, echoes the view of wamiji espoused in the study. Muslims 
negotiated the socio-cultural and religious fields within the premises of group identity, and in the 
case of Mombasa locale, it was in relation to the Mazrui–Swahili Muslims’ federation continuum. 
Since relations in the socio-cultural sphere and religio-political landscape in the Mombasa locale 
were determined by alliances and rivalry, it made group identity (read social capital) of 
significance in making members relevant in the respective negotiations. 
There are various groups of migrant ethnic Asian and Arab Muslims, including the Baloch (Swa. 
Baluchi), the Basheikhs, Hadhramis, and the Mandhrys, caught in the socio-ethnic negotiations of 
the main protagonists – the Mazrui and Swahili Muslims in the Mombasa locale. Historical sources 
reveal how these migrant communities, especially from the Indian sub-continent and the Persian 
Gulf, settled along the East African coast from as early as the eighth century as traders, guards, or 
religio-political refugees (Fair 2001; McIntosh 2009; Lodhi 2013; Nicolini 2014). Drawing from 
the socio-ethnic narrative of the Mombasa locale, it is clear that migrant Muslims also became 
aware not only of their foreign identity but also their place in the socio-political and religious 
negotiations in the host community. 
Therefore, to remain relevant, migrant groups adapted the negotiations in the locale to maintain 
their respective socio-ethnic interests and identities. Consequently, they consecrated waqfs for 
                                                 
on the strength of availed waqf deeds that tied usufruct to specific beneficiaries and families. Interview with Muhammad 
Shalli, Mombasa, October - December, 2014. 
204 The trustees of this waqf were incidentally the endower and his sons (jointly). Based on socio-ethnic trends, it was, 
however, likely that the poor and beggars of the Memon Muslim community would be accorded preference over non-
Memon Muslims who may consider approaching the trustees for assistance based on the waqf deed. See waqf deed of 
Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam, fol. 67, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
205Waqf deed of Haji Mohammed Haji Kassim, fols. 110; 172, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
206 See the list of Waqf Commissioners, appendix 9.3. 
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the benefit of their socio-ethnicities including cemeteries, masjids, and madrasas, in the range of 
2.9% (Mandhrys), 3.8% (Basheikhs), and 7.7% (Memons) as shown in Table 2.207 As an 
established migrant community, Hadhramis also consecrated waqfs for their socio-cultural well 
being as evidenced in the waqf khayri of sharif Muhammad Abdallah Riday whose usufruct was 
meant for the “general welfare of the al-Hadhrami masjid” in Mombasa.208Masjid Mbaruk (also 
Baluchi masjid) in Mombasa was on the other hand established by Mbaruk bin Rashid bin Salim 
el-Kehlany but mainly patronized and managed by the migrant Baloch Muslims. 
Socio-ethnic group No. of waqfs Percentage  
Mazrui 5 4.8% 
Mandhrys 3 2.9% 
Basheikhs 4 3.8% 
Naserpuria Memon 8 7.7% 
Thenashara Taifa 11 10.6% 
Table 2. Waqfs with specified beneficiaries in relation to umiji-wamiji dynamics in 
Mombasa. (Source: WCK, 2015). 
As former liwalis, the Mazrui cultivated wider social, political, and symbolic clout above the 
Swahili confederation and the rest of the immigrant Muslim communities in the locale. However, 
as shown in Table 2, the Mazrui commanded a paltry 4.8% compared to 10.6% of the Swahili 
Muslim federation of the overall 29.8% of registered waqfs designated for the primary and 
residual benefits of socio-ethnic enclaves. This suggests that social and symbolic capital was the 
ripple effect of the political clout among the Mazrui that partly accounted for their influence in the 
state agency compared to other Muslim groups. This again emphasizes the significance of the 
position of the Chief Kadhi, as was held in ‘hereditary’ by the ethnic Mazrui, both in waqfs as well 
as socio-ethnic negotiations of the wamiji. 
At stake in the socio-ethnic negotiations of the wamiji in relation to waqfs was the protection and 
advancement of temporal socio-economic and symbolic interests in the Mombasa locale 
manifested in the control of a wide range of endowments from real estate to madrasas; 
orphanages to masjids; and cemeteries. Within this context, control and management of waqfs 
became a constant negotiation between the various socio-ethnic groups as well as individual 
beneficiaries against the WCK. Several scenarios would attest to this observation including 
                                                 
207 See the waqf deeds of Haji Ismail Adam, fols.51- 52 for the benefit of Memon Muslim madrasas; Salim bin Khalfan 
bin Amir el-Busaidi fol. 109 and Haji Mohammed Haji Kassim, fol. 110 for the cemetery of the Memon Muslim 
community; Kassim bin Rashid bin Abdallah el-Mandhry fol. 23; Mwanajumbe bint Ali bin Khamis el-Mandhry, fols. 32; 
34-35, and Amria bint Ali bin Khamis, fol. 36 for the benefit of the Mandhry mosque, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
208Waqf deed of sharif Muhammad Abdallah Riday, dated September, 2005, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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negotiations pitting the state agency against the waqf of the Mazrui (cemetery, see chapter three); 
the Bamkele (see chapter four); and the masharifu cemetery. 
Taking cue from the Mazrui cemetery, inter-state agency negotiations placed it under the co-
management of the WCK and the NMK with the title of ownership being in the former.209 Besides, 
the cemetery was used in the past for the burial of combatants of different nationalities who fell 
in the wars first between the Portuguese and the Mazrui, then between Mazrui and Sayyid Said 
bin Sultan of the Bu Sacidi dynasty in Zanzibar (Freeman-Grenville 1988; Spear 1978). In view of 
this, the cemetery is a public waqf. Owing to its proximity to Fort Jesus from where the Mazrui 
ruled Mombasa, however, political power was clearly core to its usurpation hence the name 
Mazrui cemetery. Accordingly, since it is a public waqf, the Mazrui’s ceremonial association with 
it could not qualify their claim on adverse possession. Nonetheless, this did not stop different 
forums of the Mazrui since the 1980s from persistently pushing to have un-official exclusivity over 
the cemetery confirmed by the WCK.210 
Another case concerns the waqf of shaykh Mvita commonly referred to as the ‘masharifu 
cemetery.’211 Endowed in the 1930s primarily for the burial of the Tisa Taifa group of Swahili 
Muslims, the waqf fell in the management of the WCK upon the death of the first mutawalli, 
Abdallah bin Ridhwan.212 Along the way, however, the WCK relaxed its control over the waqf and 
some descendants of the endower seized the opportunity to run it as a ‘clan’ cemetery. By 1998, 
the cemetery had a caretaker committee under hereditary leadership of the sharif Shatry family. 
While managing the waqf, the Shatrys also rented some sections that realized considerable 
revenue to enable maintenance of the graveyard.213 Citing old age, however, the chair of the 
Shatrys at one time invited the WCK to establish a management board and take active role in the 
affairs of the cemetery, an idea that the WCK agreed to implement though they left it largely in the 
                                                 
209 Order of the Civil case no. 36 of 1909 at the High Court of East Africa by acting Principal Judge in the matter of the 
Mazrui cemetery between the Waqf Commissioners of Kenya and others (applicants) and Adam bin Suleiman 
Mohammed bin Ali and others (respondents), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
210 Correspondence between the WCK and ‘Women of the Mazrui Community,’ May, 1981- April, 1983; correspondence 
between the WCK and ‘Mazrui Cultural and Welfare Society,’ January, 2006 - November, 2013, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
211 The honorific title sharif (pl. ashraf, Eng. sharifs) denotes that the bearer claims genealogy from the Prophet, i.e. has 
a social and spiritual class above ordinary believers. Sharifs are also believed to possess and capable of transmitting 
baraka (blessings) from God. The cemetery acquired this name after falling in to the control of the sharif Shatry family. 
The name mashaykh is also interchangeably used in reference to this cemetery. 
212 Correspondence between the WCK and mutawalli’s heir, Mohammed bin Ridhwan, who had usurped management 
upon the demise of his father, November, 1934; Order of Court on Civil case no. 4 of 1935 in accordance with section 12 
of the WCK Act; correspondence between the WCK and Register of Titles, February 20th, 1935; correspondence between 
the WCK and Town Clerk, May, 1935, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
213 The WCK records indicate that the cemetery had a positive balance of thirty three thousand seven hundred and 
twenty nine Kenya shillings and ten cents as at December, 1998 which rose to forty five thousand shillings by December 
2005, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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hands of the Shatrys.214 From 2013 to 2014, the Shatrys insistently petitioned the WCK to 
terminate its claim over the cemetery for their private use though the state agency turned down 
the appeals.215 Around the same time, the WCK secretariat had to intervene to allow a non-sharif 
to be interred in the cemetery after some members of the committee had objected.216 This 
illustrates that the sharifs had ‘privatized’ the cemetery. 
This is not to deny that the Sharica allows private cemeteries. On the contrary, there are hundreds 
of private graveyards endowed specifically as such but the two cases were not exclusive. More so, 
private graveyards could also become public on the strength of the principle of ‘waqf by user’ as 
long as their owners do not object to the burial of a non-family member.217 In this regard, the 
interment of non-Mazrui soldiers and non-sharifs in the Mazrui and masharifu graveyards 
respectively disqualifies claims of exclusivity by both groups. Accordingly, the fight for exclusivity 
of the cemeteries by the two groups was informed by the internal socio-ethnic dynamics of the 
wamiji in the Mombasa locale. While the Mazrui banked on their established political clout, the 
sharifs sought to capitalize on ‘nobility’ (read social capital) with their genealogy supposedly 
traceable to the Prophet. This echoes the pre-colonial socio-ethnic hierarchy that was upheld 
during the British colonial era and by subsequent postcolonial regimes as explained before. And 
since both cemeteries are strategically located and attracted monetary benefits from merchants, 
the economic aspect in the negotiations needs not to be overemphasized. 
6.4.1 Waqf as a Tool for Regional Socio-Cultural Identity and Political Control  
The growth in economic and political strength of Mombasa since the British colonial times, 
undeniably, overshadowed the rest of the neighboring former city-states. However, the eclipsed 
towns did not sink into oblivion. Rather, they reinvented themselves as distinguished centers of 
Islamic culture, knowledge, and authority. It is this cultural capital base that gave these towns the 
much needed clout for the continued negotiations with their nemesis. Within this context, 
negotiations between the former city-states departed from the premise of contrast and 
complimentary binary. As evidenced in the various waqf deeds, endowers designated social and 
religious institutions or communities in specific locales as primary and residual beneficiaries for 
the purpose of advancing temporal socio-religious interests. 
                                                 
214 Correspondence between sharif A. Shatry and the WCK, July - August, 1998; the WCK minute 41/98, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
215 Correspondence between the WCK and Shatrys, February, 2013 – April, 2014; the WCK minute 24/2014. See also 
list of cemetery board members of 1998 and 2014 dominated by the Shatrys and consisting of the Mandhrys and the 
Mazrui, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
216 There are also several public cemeteries in Mombasa including Manyimbo and Kikowani. However, trends point to 
the use of the cemeteries along socio-ethnic affiliations of the Mombasa locale. Interview with Muhammad Shalli, 
Mombasa, October-December, 2014. 
217 For further discussion on waqf by user, see Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India: A Study of Legislative and 
Administrative Control. New Delhi: Gian Publishing House; Banday, B. (2013). Administration of Waqfs: Law and Practice 
in Kashmir. New Delhi: Dilpreer Publishing House. 
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The waqf khayri of bin Khalfan el-Busaidi whose usufruct was designated for his Liwali Seif Masjid 
in Lamu aptly fits this description.218 This is particularly because part of the corpus of the waqf 
was in Mombasa but its usufruct was meant to benefit Lamu. It beats logic, despite freedom of 
choice of beneficiaries guaranteed by the law of waqf, to bypass similar deserving religious 
institutions within the vicinity of the corpus to benefit a far flung institution. Clearly, this does not 
only demonstrate spiritual attachment with the religious institution at Lamu but helped to 
strengthen the position of the town in the continued negotiations for umiji supremacy. Contrasted 
to this are the waqf khayri of bin Dahman at Takaungu designated for the local Muslims; and the 
family waqfs of Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy whose residual beneficiaries were “the poor and 
beggars of Mohammedan Sunni of Mombasa.”219 
Administered from Mombasa, waqfs in neighboring towns became central to the struggle for 
control of socio-cultural and political space of umiji. As emphasized before, nomination and 
appointment of Waqf Commissioners was allegedly made in consideration of waqf-producing 
zones with Mombasa taking the pole position owing to its perceived large contribution to the waqf 
economy (see chapter four). Therefore, Takaungu, Malindi, and Lamu locales had their shares of 
representation determined by the whims of appointing authorities on the basis of perceived 
loyalty with a view to maintaining the political and cultural relationship between the coastal miji 
but disguised on their contribution to the waqf economy. This partly explains the public outcry 
which led to the nullification of the appointment of shaykh Lithome in 2009 and his position 
awarded to Malindi. Paradoxically, Lamu has had no representative in the state agency since 2009 
despite insistent laments by locals, making the claims of representation based on amount of waqfs 
per region superfluous.220 This also subtly illustrates the fading significance of Lamu while at the 
same time emphasizing the pole position of her rival, Mombasa, in the negotiations for umiji 
supremacy. 
Commissioners are only policy makers, yet the actual management of waqfs is bestowed upon a 
skeletal secretariat in Mombasa. To help the secretariat discharge its mandate in Malindi and 
Lamu, the WCK engages agents. This emphasizes the relationship between these miji vis-à-vis 
other miji within the coast but outside the former Protectorate and away from the umiji-wamiji 
internal dynamics. Further, the long distance between the former city-states, especially with Lamu 
where communication and road network was erratic, meant that important decisions affecting 
waqfs outside Mombasa were delayed. This occasionally resulted in disenfranchisement among 
beneficiaries as decisions were at times not forthcoming since the WCK board did not meet 
regularly.221 Dissatisfied by the WCK’s improper attention on far flung waqfs, some beneficiaries, 
                                                 
218Waqf deed of liwali Seif bin Salim bin Khalfan, fols. 20-21, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
219Waqf deeds of Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy, fols. 62-65; 75-76, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
220 Group interview with Mwalimu Hussein Said, Hamid Abdurahman and Abdallah Swaleh, Lamu, December, 2015. 
221 There were no Waqf Commissioners from 1968-1972. This partly affected negotiations between the NCCK and the 
WCK that led to the dismemberment of the waqf of Salim Mbarak bin Dahman at Takaungu. Again, internal wrangles 
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with the support from their Commissioners, often demanded that the WCK terminate 
management of the waqfs and return them to respective heirs and beneficiaries, or establish miji-
based waqf boards.222 
Disenfranchisement by beneficiaries and Commissioners from the various towns against the WCK 
in Mombasa is reminiscent of old age negotiations between the former city-states with feelings of 
domination and marginalization evident. The conflict and struggle for control of masjid Rhoda in 
Lamu between the WCK and the descendants of the endower with the support of local 
Commissioners makes a suitable reference. Abu Bakr Manswab Seyyid Hassan and sharif Abdallah 
Salim, the heirs of Shee Batte who consecrated the said waqf,insistently petitioned the WCK to 
hand over its management to them citing alleged embezzlement and lack of proper maintenance 
by the state agency.223 For a long time, this conflict inhibited development of the waqf as parties 
engaged in protracted war of words.224 At one point a retired Commissioner, sharif Abdallah Salim, 
rallied his lawyer and allies in the WCK to support the bid that had degenerated into a contest 
between Lamu and Mombasa over the management of the waqf.225 The WCK did not, however, 
relent on its hold over the waqf. 
By 2013, masjid Rhoda had attracted sponsorship for refurbishment from outside Kenya and like 
other waqfs, the WCK tasked the NMK to undertake the structural designing and award of tender 
for its renovation.226 This was in line with the NMK requirements since the waqf sits in a section 
of Lamu town declared as protected site and recognized by the UNESCO as well. The renovation 
grant and entrance of the NMK in the fray complicated the negotiations further with economic, 
social, and symbolic interests by different actors at stake.227 The Lamu case is one among several 
others illustrating the delicate relationship and continued negotiations between the former city-
states at the level of regional umiji. Taking waqf as an economic and symbolic tool in the 
negotiations for socio-cultural and religio-economic fields at the former Protectorate, one would 
                                                 
among Commissioners that led to the resignation of the chairman, Prof. Nadji Said (Malindi) around June 2015 inhibited 
sittings of the board until its term expired in November 2015. 
222 Group interview with Mwalimu Hussein Said, Hamid Abdurahman and Abdallah Swaleh, Lamu, December, 2015; 
Ahmed Aboud Hadi, Malindi, October, 2015; Said Sharif Abdallah, Malindi, October, 2015. 
223 Correspondence between Abu Bakr Manswab bin Seyyid Hassan and the WCK, January, 1969; February - March, 
1973; the WCK minute 69/1 of February, 1973, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
224 Correspondence between the WCK and different groups with diverse interest in the waqf from Lamu, February – 
May 1978. 
225Correspondence between WCK and Advocate, July, 1978; November, 1978; January, 1979; February, 1980; minutes 
3/1979(28), WCK archive, Mombasa.  
226 Correspondence between the WCK and donors, July- September, 2014; award of restoration contract to the NMK, 
July, 2013; interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, October-December, 2014, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
227 When the NMK officers visited the waqf at the onset of renovations, it took the intervention of elders to control rowdy 
youths opposed to the NMK’s interests in the waqf. The renovation grant is claimed to have been secured by a local 
Lamu Muslim who is working outside the country. Interviews with Kalandar Khan and Abuswamad A. Ali, NMK, 
Mombasa, September, 2015. 
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not fail to appreciate the logic in the appointment of Waqf Commissioners and their role in 
maintaining internal socio-regional equilibrium of the coastal miji. 
6.4.2 Waqfs and Intra-Religious Jurisprudential Interests: Protecting Sectarian Values, 
Competing for Symbolic and Social Power 
It is acknowledged that the Muslim community is not a monolithic body. It is in this context that 
competing and conflicting ethnic, social, regional, and most importantly, jurisprudential 
affiliations among Muslims in Kenya as explained here under should be understood. Foremost was 
the greatest binary contrast in Islam – the Shica-Sunni divide that came out vividly in a number 
ofwaqf deeds. The waqf ahli of Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy and the mixed waqf of Aisha bint 
Abdallah bin Jabir in which “the poor and beggars of the Sunni Mohammedans” were designated 
as residual beneficiaries aptly fit this description.228 Contrasted to these was the waqf ahli of 
Gulamhussein Adamji in which “pilgrims of Karbala in Iraq” [Shica ithna’cashari] were identified 
as ultimate beneficiaries.229 Comparing the two sets of waqfs above, it becomes evident that 
endowers were determined to protect their sectarian religious traditions. 
Among Shica Muslims, the urge was even ardent as endowers sought to further distinguish their 
jurisprudential affiliations as contained in some waqf charters. In the waqf ahli of Alibhai Adamji 
Dhar,230 and Hassanali Karimjee Dossaji,231 social welfare institutions of the Daudi Bohra 
community of Mombasa were the designated residual beneficiaries. Alibhai also warned in his 
waqf deeds that “any beneficiary who renounces the doctrines of Esmaiclia Mustacali sect of Daudi 
Bohra community shall forfeit his interest in the waqf.”232 In a separate waqf ahli by Moosaji 
Issaji,233 Faize Hussein of Karachi, Pakistan, and the supreme religious leader of the Bohra 
community of Mombasa were the ultimate beneficiaries and nazir respectively. This was not 
different from the waqf ahli of Jamal Sunderji Mitha in which “the poor and beggars of Ismaiclia 
Khoja community” were designated residual beneficiaries, all of which point to the protection of 
temporal sectarian interests.234 
Within mainstream Sunni, there also existed varied jurisprudential undertones that endowers 
protected and advanced through consecrations. Although the majority of Muslims in Kenya 
ascribe to the Shafici theology of Sunni Islam, there are also pockets of non-Shafici followers 
                                                 
228Waqf deeds of Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy, Mombasa, fols. 62-65; 75-76; Aisha bint Abdallah bin Jabir, fol. 201, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
229Waqf deed of Gulamhussein Adamji, fols. 38-39, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
230Waqf deedof Alibhai Adamji Dhar, fols. 78-88, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
231Waqf deed of Hassanali Karimjee Dossaji, fol. 71, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
232Waqf deed of Alibhai Adamji Dhar, fols. 78-88, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
233Waqf deed of Moosaji Issaji, Mombasa, fol. 120, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
234Waqf deeds of Jamal Sunderji Mitha, fols. 89; 92-93, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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especially among migrant communities including the cIbadi. This could be discerned from the 
waqf charters of Muhammad bin Omar el-Aufi in which the poor of the cIbadi sect in Mombasa are 
the designated ultimate beneficiaries.235 The most contemporary jurisprudential discourse 
witnessed in Sunni Islam, however, regards the question of reform vis-à-vis modernism (Salafism) 
against perceived conservatism.236 Islamic reformism in Kenya dates back to early nineteenth 
century through efforts of local scholars like shaykh al-Amin al-Mazrui (1891-1947) and shaykh 
Salih Abdallah Farsi (1912-1982). The reform agenda gained impetus in the 1980s following 
return of indigenous Muslims from universities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan (Seesemann 
2006; Kresse 2007; Kresse / Mwakimako 2016). 
Commonly referred to as ahl al-sunna wacl-jamca (people of the sunna and of the community) and 
ahl al-tariqa (lit. people of the way, conformists), the two protagonists have interpretative and 
jurisprudential conflicts revolving around tawhid (unity of God); a return to the ‘true Islam’ as 
envisioned in the Qur’an and Sunna and exemplified in the lives of early generation Muslims; the 
significance of some Prophetic traditions over others; the evils of bidca (un-Islamic innovations); 
religious imperative of jihad (striving in the course of God); and the threat of Westernization on 
Islam among others (Gauvain 2013: 11; Richard 2013; Lauziere 2016). In this context, ahl al-sunna 
wacl-jamca, drawing mainly from Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) and Saudi’s 
interpretation of Islam, are the local Salafis who claim to champion for puritan Islam devoid of 
bidca allegedly characterizing their nemesis in the faith. Amidst the jurisprudential conflicts, waqfs 
have offered a platform in the range of separately established institutions like masjids, madrasas, 
and orphanages to propagate religious sectarian ideologies. 
As basically a response against perceived conservatism in Sunni Islam, Kenya’s Salafis have a 
commanding presence in almost every village in the Kenyan coast. Their network of waqf 
institutions includes those at Ramisi, Nganja, Vingujini, and Maganyakulo in the South (Kwale); al-
Mahdi Islamic Institute at Kisauni (Mombasa); and Kikambala/Takaungu in the North. Salafis have 
in some instances also taken control of waqfs from their conservative brethren causing protracted 
bloody conflicts as was witnessed in masjids Musa in Majengo; Bahero in Kisauni; and Mlango wa 
Papa at Old town in Mombasa from 2012 to 2015.237 Other takeovers, were nonetheless, ‘peaceful’ 
                                                 
235cIbadis are an off-shoot of the Khawarij (Kharijites) splinter group that emerged following the arbitration of Ali bin 
Abi Talib and Muacwiyyah bin Abi-Sufyan (seventh century). See Nicolini, B. (2014). Notes on Asian Presence along the 
Swahili Coast during the Nineteenth Century. Quaderni Asiatici 107 (September), 61-86; Waqf deeds of Mohammad bin 
Omar el-Aufi, fols. 48-49; 56-57; 58-59 and 99, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
236 The study loosely use the terms ‘Salafi’ and ‘Conservatism’ in relation to the two distinct ideologies on Islamic reform 
discourse. This is not to deny that both camps are essentially reformists though the former are seen as radicals 
(jihadists/fundamentalists) with literal interpretations of the text compared to their protagonists who are seen as 
moderates or conservatives. See Seesemann, R. (2006). African Islam or Islam in Africa? Evidence from Kenya. In R. 
Loimeier & R. Seesemann. The Global Worlds of the Swahili: Interfaces of Islam, Identity and Space in 19th and 20th Century 
(pp. 229-250). Berlin: Lit; Richard, G. (2013). Salafi Ritual Purity in the Presence of God. London: Routledge; Lauziere, H. 
(2016). The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press. 
237Masjids Musa, renamed shuhada (martyrs’ mosque) and Bahero were suspected of being centers for militant sermons 
and recruitment of sympathizers of the Al-Shabab jihadists in Somalia. In March 2012, security officers invaded the 
martyrs’ mosque killing and arresting some youths with jihadist propaganda materials and weapons. Following the 
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where the conservative group chose to avoid bloody mess as was in the recent cases of Vingujini 
(2008) and Bomani (2015) in Kwale. What is evidently characteristic with the Salafis in Kenya as 
is in other parts of the world is their rigid approach to interpretation of religious dogmas claiming 
absolute authority to Islam (Gauvain 2013: 3-4). Consequently, this easily accords the group 
symbolic wherewithal to negotiate the socio-religious landscape.238 But why have masjids 
increasingly become fields of ideological and socio-economic negotiation and confrontations 
between Muslims in Kenya? From the experiences of Msalani masjid (see chapter four) to the 
recent (2012 to 2015) Salafi-conservatism confrontations witnessed in masjids Musa, Bahero, and 
Mlango wa Papa among others, intra-jurisprudential negotiations among Muslims in Kenya could 
be explained within the context of two possible lines of thought. 
In Kenya, apart from mosques serving as “centers of community worship” and other socio-political 
functions (Banday 2013: 110), they are also institutions that can play “a vital role of directing 
Muslim opinions and compensate for the absence of strong supporting civic institutions amongst 
Muslims” (Mwakimako 2007a: 3). Therefore, controlling a mosque space in the socially 
constructed positions of an imam, mucadhdhin, shaykh, or committee member subtly accorded an 
individual the symbolic and social power as an opinion maker. These honorific titles and positions 
associated with masjids and madrasas became conduits through which holders benefited from 
economic and symbolic capital directed to such institutions either as waqfs or ordinary donations 
as was the case at Rhoda and Msalani masjids in Lamu and Mombasa respectively. Accordingly, 
Kenya’s Salafi-conservatism confrontations should also be understood as typical negotiations for 
the control of economic, social, and symbolic capital in the community through the platform of 
waqfs. 
Since the U.S.A 9/11 attacks and the ‘war against terror’, Muslim institutions and personalities in 
Kenya have bared the brunt of state and international security institutions against alleged 
indoctrination and radicalization of Muslim youths. Several madrasas, orphanages, masjids, and 
charitable organizations (both local and international) were shut down while imams alleged to 
harbor connections with terror networks were extra-judicially exterminated (Seesemann 2007: 
157-176; Ndzovu 2014b: 118-126). Despite growing disillusionment among cross section of 
Kenyan Muslims due to perceived political marginalization, economic exclusion, and exploitation 
                                                 
sacrilege vented upon the mosque, the government shortly closed it before it reverted to its original name and re-
opened a few months later. Two imams associated with radical Islam in the area – shaykh Aboud Rogo Mohammad 
(August 2012) and Abu Bakar Sharif Makaburi (April 2014) were also assassinated under unclear circumstances 
triggering protests and violence in Mombasa. See also Mwangi, W. (Daily Nation, January 23, 2015). Mombasa Mosque 
Renamed Masjid Musa as Normalcy Returns. Retrieved from: http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Mombasa-mosque-
renamed-Masjid-Musa/-/1056/2599900/-/6ir2dd/-/index.html (Last access 6/3/2018); waqf of Buker, (waqf deed 
unmarked), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
238 For discussion on the spread and development of Salafi ideology in the coast of Kenya, see Mraja, M. (2007). Islamic 
Impacts on Marriage and Divorce among the Digo of Southern Kenya. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag. 
134 Competing and Conflicting Power Dynamics in Waqfs in Kenya, 1900-2010 
Bayreuth African Studies Online (6) 
of the Muslim population by successive independent regimes,239 none of the reviewed waqf 
charters designated qital (fighting) as beneficiary purpose.240 
Arguably, Kenya’s Salafi-conservatism confrontation is a discourse over ‘correct interpretations’ 
of Islam manifested in the negotiation between new and old local socio-cultural orders. In the 
ensued controversies and conflicts that could narrowly be misconstrued for political negotiations, 
waqfs – particularly masjids, orphanages, and madrasas – only accorded the two parties the 
needed platform.241 This is, however, not to deny that Kenyan Muslims are informed of the global 
grievances by the umma including the American policy in the Middle-East and its support of Israel 
over Palestine; its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq; and the ‘war against terror’ in 
which Muslims have become the obvious targets. 
6.5 Exploitation of Waqfs: Non-Sharica Activities, Disregarding Principles of Sound 
Investment, and Challenges of Attaining Qurba 
As explained elsewhere in this study, cana, hikr and istibdal are commercial transactions whereby 
ruined and non-performing revenue generating waqfs are leased, rented out, sold, or exchanged, 
to improve revenues or even acquire better alternatives to fulfill the aspirations of the waqif. It is 
not so common that a mutawalli would disregard shurut al-waqif on these profit maximizing 
investments that put waqf properties in private hands for long periods of lease or rent. However, 
with the authority of the kadhi, shurut al-waqif, especially on period of lease, could be disregarded 
based on best management practices for the good of the waqf. Within this background, therefore, 
cana, hikr and istibdal are clearly an exception rather than a rule undertaken in the best interests 
of the waqf. Yet it turns out that there are some waqfs whose rent or lease contracts fell short of 
the expectations of Sharica as elaborated in this section of the study. 
The Sharica holds that waqfs should only be used in perpetuity for the purpose of seeking qurba. 
This include acts within the legal framework of Sharica that do not stray from the halal (permitted) 
parameters like promotion of religious ideologies other than Islam, engaging in the sale of alcohol, 
and brothels among others. While establishing waqf, therefore, the endower essentially sets out 
to fulfill this basic dogma but how the corpus and usufruct are used in future determines whether 
or not the initial aim remains. This is true when waqfs are looked at through the prism of 
perpetuity. To attain perpetuity, the Sharica allows cana, hikr and istibdal of the corpus, but does 
                                                 
239 This position finds credence in the existence of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) – a quasi-political and 
militant group that advocates for secession of the coast region citing economic exclusion, exploitation, and political 
marginalization by the state. Sympathizers of this group are drawn primarily from coastal ethnicities but cut across the 
religious divide. 
240Qital is the specific concept that denotes physical force or fighting in the generic term jihad that generally stands for 
‘striving in the course of God.’ See Qur’an 22:39; Qur’an 2:190-191; Alterman, J. (2007). Saudi Charities and Support for 
Terror. In J. Alterman & K. von Hippel (Eds.), Understanding Islamic Charities (pp.64-80). Washington D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. 
241 See also Anderson, D. and McKnight, J. (2015). Understanding al-Shabab: Clan, Islam and Insurgency in Kenya. Journal 
of Eastern African Studies, 9(3), 536-557. 
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not preclude non-Muslims in the business contracts. Although non-Muslims who benefit from 
these contracts are expected to conduct legal businesses according to Sharica, this may not 
necessarily be the case as evident in two scenarios. 
The first case involves unclaimed estate of a deceased Muslim handed over to the WCK by the 
public trustee.242 As early as 1938, records indicate that the property was leased several times to 
different people until 1950 when it fell in the leasehold rights of a non-Muslim entrepreneur who 
converted it into a bar and restaurant.243 Since then, the waqf changed hands between 
leaseholders until 1992 when the current lessee renovated it to a popular night club in town 
commonly known as Casablanca. All the while, the WCK could only sanction the transfer of 
leasehold rights and obtain minimal consent fee and annual rent but efforts to prevail upon the 
lessees to stop the un-Islamic business have proved futile.244 
The second case involves some corpus of waqf ahli of the Bamkele at Tudor in Mombasa town that 
underwent similar experiences as the one above until it was converted into a Church. Like the 
previous one, efforts by the beneficiaries to stop the leaseholders from conducting un-Islamic 
worship in the waqf failed. As established by the study, beneficiaries and the WCK lose control of 
how leasehold rights should be enjoyed because early cana and hikr contracts did not include 
prohibitive clauses against un-Islamic uses of waqfs.245 To reverse this trend, the WCK embarked 
on re-drafting the contracts to provide for such clauses and deny the renewal of expired leases 
until lessees complied with the requirement to ensure that businesses undertaken in waqf 
premises were Sharica compliant.246 
Another, though yet to be explored, alternative to liberate the above waqfs is the invocation of 
sections 16(2) and 17 of the WCK Act on the disposal of waqfs (see chapter three). The Act 
provides for the disposal of waqfs whose initial goals cannot be met and the proceeds used in 
alternative social welfare causes. Presently, the initial purposes of the waqfs have adequately been 
                                                 
242 Section 18 of the WCK Act, CAP 109 (1951) provides; “[…] notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Law of 
Succession Act, any property of a deceased Muslim to which no claim has been established within one year from the 
date upon which that property vested in the administrator of the estate or in the Public Trustee shall be handed over to 
the Waqf Commissioners by the administrator or Public Trustee […] in the form of money […] into a Special Fund created 
for the purpose to be known as the Surplus fund.” 
243 Plot 226/xx1, Majestic /Kilindini hotel, currently Casablanca bar and restaurant, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
244 From 1950 to 1960, the property was sub-leased at three thousand Kenya shillings per month while the WCK was 
entitled to ninety shillings per month as rent. In April 1992, the lease holder sold his rights for three million and five 
hundred thousand Kenya shillings where the WCK got one thousand shillings only as consent fee, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
245 Contemporary lease hold contracts drawn by the WCK have a prohibitive clause over non-Islamic use of waqfs. It 
provides; “[…] the lessee hereby covenants with the leaser not to permit or suffer illegal use of the premises or any part 
thereof which would offend in any law and, in particular, the beliefs of Muslims which the leaser in its sole and exclusive 
discretion considers improper and prohibitory under Islam.” Clause (e), lease contract, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
246 Leasehold of plot xx/62/A Mombasa to Almasi M. Mukira. See also correspondence between lessees and the WCK, 
November, 2011; January - February, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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tampered with inhibiting the attainment of sawab and qurba. Thus, this provides enough ground 
for the disposal of the waqfs to acquire alternative corpuses to fulfill the aspirations of the 
endowers rather than wait until 2040 when the leases are set to expire.247 
Moreover, a close scrutiny of decisions by the state agency to invest some waqf properties to 
improve their output reveals a disturbing picture. Foremost among violations of principles of 
sound investment regards the period of lease of waqfs in the community. A cross section of waqfs 
that provided for the leasing of the properties restricted the period to ten years.248 Undoubtedly, 
this was meant to allow for periodic review of the terms of the agreement in view of ijar al-mithal. 
However, the period of lease in Kenya as informed by the land policy ranges from 33, 66, to 99 
years where properties could be transferred in between from one leaseholder to another.249 As a 
matter of fact, majority if not all leased waqfs were committed to the maximum period from as 
early as the 1890s shortly after the establishment of WCK. Even those whose leases expired in the 
1990s were further renewed for the same period. Considering that cana and hikr require that 
priority be accorded the economic and spiritual interests of the waqf, it is difficult to imagine that 
this is achievable in circumstances where waqfs are eternally committed. 
A number of grounds could substantiate the foregoing: First, pre-independence lease contracts, 
as narrated elsewhere, were devoid of prohibitive clauses against use of waqfs contrary to the 
Sharica. This partly explains the quagmire facing the waqfs of Casablanca and Bamkele that were 
converted into night club and Church respectively. Secondly, committing waqfs to perpetual leases 
did not consider fluctuation of the economy such as providing options for periodic review of rates 
in relation to ijar al-mithal. Consequently, with the passing of time, leased waqfs realized 
miserable returns in old rates as lessees refurbished and sub-let the corpuses at higher prices.250 
Thirdly, the lease contracts lacked withdrawal clauses that could help recover waqfs whose 
lessees breached the agreement. Against this backdrop, leases became avenues for the 
dismemberment of waqfs and to privilege some ‘noble’ individuals and business people contrary 
to what cana and hikr envisage. 
A review of some waqf leases could aptly corroborate the above observation. First is the lease of 
Mombasa/Block X1/295 to Lucy Wanjiku Ndichu for a period of 99 years at the rent of twenty five 
Kenya shillings per annum from 1942. In March 2014, the lessee used the premise as security for 
a bank loan of four million Kenya shillings.251 This implies that the WCK would receive two 
shillings and eight cents per month as rent of the waqf until the expiry of the lease in 2041 while 
                                                 
247 Interview with ustadh Abdulkadir Mao, Bayreuth, April,2014. 
248Waqf deeds of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam, fols. 30-31; Mwanajumbe bint Ali bin Khamis, fols. 32; 34-35; Mohammed bin 
Omar el-Auf, folio nos. 48/49; Haji Ismael Haji Adam, fol. 51, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
249 See Sections 85 and 88, Registered Land Act, Cap 300 (Revised 2010), Laws of Kenya. 
250 Interviews with Muhammad Shalli and Zubeir Noor, Mombasa, October-December, 2014. 
251 Certificate of lease of Mombasa/Block X1/295, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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the lessee continues to benefit immensely. Clearly, even if the rent was economical then, it ceased 
being so but the contract could not be renegotiated owing to the explained reasons. 
Apart from bank loans that lessees benefit from charging waqfs, they could as well trade their 
leasehold rights for profit as provided for by the civil statute, a scenario exemplified by several 
cases. For instance, Rashid Abdallah Ruweiny applied to lease waqf plot no. 165/30 in Mombasa 
in 1981 and offered five thousand Kenya shillings as premium and three hundred shillings annual 
rent for 66 years.252 Six years later, Ruweiny sold his leasehold interest to Naushadhussein 
Mohammed Jiwa for thirty thousand Kenya shillings where the WCK only got six hundred and 
forty shillings as consent fee.253 Three years later, Jiwa transferred the same plot to Abdushakoor 
Mohammad Hashim Khandwalla for nine hundred and fifty thousand Kenya shillings.254 
By 1992, the waqf plot was worthy one million Kenya shillings when it changed ownership again 
from Khandwalla to Ali Islam Said. This time, the WCK got one thousand shillings as consent fee.255 
In July 2001, Ali traded the plot again for two point seven million Kenya shillings to Grace Mumbi 
and Edith Wamatha Njuguna while the WCK got one thousand shillings as consent fee.256 In 2004, 
the leasehold right of the waqf was again transferred at three million Kenya shillings by Njuguna 
and Mumbi to Jeylan M. Kollatein with the WCK getting its traditional share of consent fee and 
twenty five shillings monthly rent.257 Thus, within a span of two decades, the waqf lost about three 
million Kenya shillings at the expense of ten thousand six hundred and forty shillings as consent 
fee and annual rent. This scenario reverberates in most of the leased waqfs across the community 
as shown in Table 3. 
  
                                                 
252 Lease of plot 165/30 Mombasa. See also minutes 86/1981(27); 19/1982(16), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
253 Transfer of lease agreement of plot 165/30 Mombasa, March, 1987, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
254 Transfer of lease agreement of plot 165/30 Mombasa, May, 1990, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
255 Transfer of lease agreement of plot 165/30 Mombasa, February, 1992, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
256 Transfer of lease agreement of plot 165/30, Mombasa, July 2001; correspondence between the WCK and Advocate, 
June - July, 2004, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
257 Transfer of lease agreement of plot 165/30, August, 2004, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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S/No 1 2 3 4 
Waqf Corpus Empty land, 
0.0535 acres (SFA 
4, plot 165/30) 
Empty land, 
0.1315 acres, Old 
Town (SFA 1, plot 
175/30) 
House with land, 
0.9504 acres, 
Kilindini (SFA 5, 
plot 176/21) 
Empty land, plot 
132/XLII (SFA 8, 
waqf of Salim b. 
Ali, Lamu) 
Period 
 
Value at 1st 
lease 
1981 
 
Ksh. 5,000/= 
1981 
 
Ksh. 35,000/= 
1942  
 
Ksh. 900/= @ year 
1974 
 
Ksh. 780/=@ year 
Period 
 
Value at 2nd 
lease 
1987 
 
Ksh. 30,000/= 
1986 
 
Ksh. 650,000/= 
1972  
Sub-leased at 
Ksh. 1, 010/= @ 
year 
1984 
Lease Extended at 
Ksh. 40, 000/=@ 
year 
Period 
 
Value at 3rd 
lease 
1990 
 
Ksh. 950,000/= 
1987 
 
Ksh. 840,000/= 
2008 
 
Ksh. 7,000, 000/= 
1987 
Sub-leased at 
Ksh. 7, 000/=@ 
Month 
Period 
 
Value at 4th 
lease 
1992 
 
Ksh. 1,000,000/= 
2009 
 
Ksh. 7, 500,000/= 
2009 
 
Ksh. 25, 000, 
000/= 
2013 
 
Ksh. 6, 000, 000/= 
Period 
 
Value at 5th 
lease 
2001 
 
Ksh. 2, 700,000/= 
__________ 
 
Yet to be 
transferred 
____________ 
 
Yet to be 
transferred 
______________ 
 
Yet to be 
transferred 
Table 3. Appreciation of some leased waqfs in Mombasa and Lamu towns. (Source: WCK 
archive, Mombasa). 
As evident from the Table, the value of waqfs shot drastically almost immediately they were leased 
from the WCK at minimal rates. The value of land particularly appreciated in the 2000s, making 
lessees of land waqfs to benefit immensely at the expense of designated beneficiaries and causes. 
Taking waqf corpus no. 3 for instance, the value appreciated at 257.1% within one year. The most 
dramatic rise was that of waqf no. 2 between its third and fourth transfer of the lease when the 
value shot to seven point five million Kenya shillings from eight hundred and forty thousand 
shillings. This represents 792.9% rise within one decade at an average appreciation rate of about 
66.1% per annum. 
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All the while, the WCK was getting one thousand Kenya shillings as consent fee and probably less 
for annual rent. More ironical is the offer for lease of empty waqf lands as evident in cases 1, 2, 
and 4 in the Table that are most likely held for speculative purposes. To redress this scenario, the 
WCK undertook valuation of waqfs around 2010 where renewal of leases was since then pegged 
at 30% of the market value of the property with annual rent equal to municipal rates or increased 
at 25% every ten years as decided by the WCK.258 It equally restricted the use of waqfs against the 
Sharica including bars, night clubs, and Churches. These efforts, nevertheless, benefited a small 
portion of waqfs whose leases were expiring around that time, but did not affect those whose 
contracts were running. Worse still, they failed to redress the administrative loopholes that ‘noble’ 
individuals and business people exploited with impunity in total disregard of the principles of cana 
and hikr. This could not be so vividly captured than in the following illustrations. 
6.5.1 The Case of Munir Mazrui versus Zubeda Nahdy 
The lease contract of waqf plot 103/30 Mombasa presents a clear case where principles of sound 
investment of waqfs were compromised for the economic benefit of ‘noble’ individuals. The corpus 
was an empty piece of land that attracted two bids when it was offered for lease in 1983. The first 
bidder, Zubeda M. A. Nahdy, offered twenty thousand Kenya shillings premium and fifteen 
thousand shillings annual rent for 66 years. The second bidder, Munir Mazrui, offered fifteen 
thousand Kenya shillings premium with two hundred and forty shillings annual rent for 99 years. 
Paradoxically, upon deliberation, the WCK “felt that although [bidder] number two above has 
quoted low figures both premium and rent, they had every reason to believe that it will be proper 
to lease the plot to Munir Mazrui.”259 
Accepting a lower bid in rejection of a higher offer was undoubtedly not in the interest of the waqf 
as expected by the principles of cana and hikr. Above all, the alleged winner of the bid had by 
October 1984 paid only half of the premium and annual rent as required.260 Despite several 
reminders and petitions from Commissioners, the payments had not been concluded by 2004, two 
decades after award of the lease and the WCK sought to cancel the offer.261 In a twist of fate, four 
days after the ‘cancellation’ of the offer, the lessee paid the premium minus the annual rent that 
had accumulated to forty four thousand nine hundred and ninety four Kenya shillings.262 The 
payment of the premium cooled down the tempo in the WCK and the lease was not recalled as 
scheduled. 
                                                 
258 Correspondence between the WCK and Advocate, March, 2011, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
259 Minute 27/1983(26) of April, 1983, the WCK, Mombasa. See also letter of offer of lease to Munir Mazrui, April, 1983; 
lease contract of January, 1984, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
260 Payment notice of October, 1984, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
261 Correspondence between the WCK and Munir Mazrui’s Advocate from January, 1997 – January, 1993. See also 
minutes 57/93(25); 23/98(7), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
262 Rent demand notice of February, 2005 to Munir Mazrui, the WCK, Mombasa. See also cancellation letter of January, 
2004; minute 3/2004(3), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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Argued from the perspective of best management practices and the objectives of cana, Zubeda 
should have won the bid. More so, continued gross violation of the preferred winner of the bid 
provided sufficient ground to annul the lease so that it could be re-tendered. Could the socio-
political position of the Mazrui in Mombasa and the coast region as a whole influenced the 
decision?263 It is clear that social and symbolic power of the Mazrui informed the award of the 
lease and continues to accommodate the gross violation of the contract. The resultant effect of 
these compromises is to suppress the economic interests of the waqf to buttress the social and 
symbolic privileges of some ‘noble’.264 
6.5.2 The Case of Waqfs Leased to Shigog and other Rent Contracts. 
Shigog Investments limited was an enterprise by a prominent Muslim businessman who 
immensely benefited from waqf leases during the 1980s.265 With possible social, symbolic, and 
economic influence, Shigog won bids floated for lease of waqfs stretching from Mombasa to 
Malindi and Mambrui in the north coast. The enterprise was awarded a total of thirteen leases in 
one bid that beneficiaries claimed to be against ijar al-mithal eliciting uproar that forced the WCK 
to seek for renegotiation.266 As established during the period of study, indeed the rates of several 
waqfs were due for review as negotiated between the WCK and the lessee with others earmarked 
for surrender as shown in Table 4. 
                                                 
263 Apart from being an Arab descendant, Munir Mazrui is also an activist associated with Muslims for Human Rights 
(MUHURI), an NGO established in 1997 and based in Mombasa. He also served as vice chairman of the Supreme Council 
of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM). 
264 In 1998 when the lessee had not completed paying the premium despite several reminders, a relative and 
Commissioner then, shaykh Khamis Muhammad Omar Mazrui volunteered to follow up the matter but failed to yield 
results. In 2003, the lessee undertook to pay the balance in ten days when WCK referred the matter to an Advocate with 
a view to taking court action, a promise that he also failed to keep. While making partial payment upon threats to 
terminate the contract for breach of trust, he left accumulated balances totaling almost forty five thousand Kenya 
shillings and still the contract was not revoked. It is this impunity hindering fulfillment of the endower’s wishes in the 
waqf that some beneficiaries questioned and cited ‘nobility’ as a likely reason for his being tolerated while other tenants 
were either evicted or had their properties auctioned to recover rent arrears. See minutes 23/98(7); 3/2004(3); 
Munir’s letter to the WCK, 27/11/2003; notice of cancellation of lease, 16/1/2004; demand notice, 14/2/2005, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. Group interviews with Hamid Salim Bamkele, Ali Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman Bamkele and Ahmed 
Bahaidar Bamkele, Mombasa, November, 2015. 
265 The WCK also leased thirteen waqfs to Kermally Jaffer for 99 years from December 1913. The contract was un-
procedurally renewed in 1985, seventeen years before the scheduled expiry of the lease. This was contested by the 
beneficiaries leading to court petitions that cost the state agency Kenya shillings eight million as out of court settlement 
for the surrender of the lease in 2010. See Civil Suit no. 156 of 2000 in the High Court in the matter of Sultanali Kermally 
(plaintiff) against the WCK (defendants); memo of November, 2006, minute 6/2007, the WCK, Mombasa; 
correspondence between the WCK and Advocates, December, 2007 to October 2010; minutes 108/2007; 10/2010; 
29/2010(5); Fairlane Valuers Limited report on waqfs leased to Kermally Jaffer, October, 2010, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
266 Since lease agreements had sealed the rates, there was no way other than appealing to the lessees to consider the 
fate of poor beneficiaries of the waqfs either to surrender or increase their annual rents in view of prevailing market 
rates and persistent protests by beneficiaries. Some lessees, however, volunteered to increase the rates even before 
being persuaded to do so by the WCK. Interviews with Muhammad Shalli and Zubeir Noor, Mombasa, October - 
December, 2014. See also correspondence between the WCK and Shigog investments limited, Mombasa, November, 
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Waqf name Location Current rent 
@month in 
Ksh. 
WCK 
proposed 
rent @ month 
in Ksh. 
Shigog 
proposed 
rate @ 
month in 
Ksh. 
Agreed 
rate 
Said & Atiya Magogoni, 
Lamu 
500.00 35,000.00 2,000.00 Under review 
Ali Mutwafy Old Town, 
Mombasa 
750.00 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,200.00 
Rashid bin Soud Old Town, 
Mombasa 
750.00 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,200.00 
Bamkele Biashara St., 
Mombasa 
3,250.00 10,000.00 5,000.00 6,500.00 
Mwinyikombo Ndia Kuu, 
Mombasa 
1,875.00 1,875.00 1,875.00 1,875.00 
Mandhry 1 Ndia Kuu, 
Mombasa 
1,250.00 1,250.00 1,250.00 1,250.00 
Mandhry 2 Kibokoni, 
Mombasa 
750.00 1,000.00 1,000.00 1,000.00 
Mwijabu 1 Makadara Rd, 
Mombasa 
6,250.00 25,000.00 7,000.00 8,400.00 
Mwijabu 2 Biashara St., 
Mombasa 
1,250.00 5,000.00 2,000.00 3,000.00 
Shimbwa Mzizima Rd., 
Mombasa 
750.00 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,000.00 
Islam bin Ali Mambrui 433.00 433.00 600.00 600.00 
Muhammad 
Shaksy 
Watamu 833.00 ______ ________ Surrender 
Lali Hadaa Malindi 2,292.00 2,292.00 ________ Under review 
Table 4: A cross section of the waqfs leased to Shigog investments limited, Mombasa 
proposed for review to reflect prevailing market rates. (Source: WCK archive, Mombasa). 
Nevertheless, the negotiations were very delicate and involving several efforts to persuade the 
lessee to cede grounds with the view of “assisting the Muslim community.”267 The WCK could not 
force the lessee to renegotiate or surrender any of the waqfs since the deal was sealed in his favor 
                                                 
2005; minute 42/2011(4); letter to Shigog Investments Ltd requesting for surrender of lease of plot XLI/84 (the waqf 
of Bamkele), Mombasa, May, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
267 Correspondence between WCK and Shigog investments limited, Mombasa, November, 2005, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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the questionable circumstances notwithstanding. It is one thing to conclude lease contracts based 
on informed valuation of waqfs and it is another to ask the lessee to renegotiate the terms of a 
running lease in view of changed economic circumstances. The later is not guaranteed based on 
mere convictions to sway the lessee to ‘fear God’ at the expense of his economic interests in a 
legally concluded business agreement. Until the re-negotiations were concluded, the waqfs 
realized revenues below ijar al-mithal. 
Closely related to leases were also waqfs offered for residential occupancy contracts contrary to 
best management practices of cana and hikr. Like the leases, a closer scrutiny of how the WCK 
negotiates the tenancy landscape also unveils a pattern with most of the waqfs under its custody 
as pointed out in a brief survey. The first involves a house in Mombasa endowed as waqf khayri 
for the usufruct of masjid Mandhry. This waqf was rented out at modest rates and faced revenue 
decline due to defaulting tenants.268 To coerce tenants into paying, the WCK threatened legal 
action against them and this realized some payments though tenants reverted to default shortly 
thereafter.269 
All the while the WCK did not get prompt revenue from the waqf as expected, beneficence 
aspirations of the endower were affected; and when revenue finally came, repair, maintenance, 
municipal taxes, and administration costs took precedence. On the other hand, tenants who 
accumulated rent arrears disappeared without paying and some even vandalized the waqf as they 
moved out.270 
To improve the waqf’s revenue, WCK leased it for 99 years from 1988. Surprisingly, among the 
bidders were tenants who were perennial rent defaulters. The tenants, nevertheless, lost and the 
successful bidder paid fifty thousand Kenya shillings as premium and committed to one thousand 
shillings monthly rent increased at 25% every ten years.271 The lessee then renovated and sub-let 
the waqf for higher income but became a perennial defaulter to the WCK rents and municipal 
taxes.272 Despite rent default by a lessee being a breach of contract that qualifies cancellation of 
the agreement as provided in the new (1980s) contract regulations, the WCK failed to repossess 
                                                 
268 Letters of reminder to tenant on unpaid rent, April - June, 1938; April, 1954; October, 1955, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
269 Letter to tenants, June, 1942, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
270 Interview with Rashid Mwandeo, the WCK, Mombasa, October-December, 2014. 
271 Lease contract on property no. 45/30, waqf of Mandhry, November, 1988; minute 29/88(18) of 1988, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
272 By September 2004, the lessee owed the WCK four hundred and ninety five thousand, four hundred Kenya shillings 
in unpaid rent. By August 2007, the arrears had fallen to two hundred and twenty two thousands, one hundred and fifty 
one shillings after part payment but shot again to four hundred and eighty two thousand five hundred shillings by April 
2009 due to default. See also letters of reminder of unpaid rent arrears of August, 2007, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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the waqf making it to suffer revenue deficiency at the expense of economic interests of the 
lessee.273 
The second waqf, also in Mombasa, concerns residential properties endowed for the benefit of 
masjid Mwijabu and rented out to improve revenue. By 1970s, the tenants owed the WCK 
thousands of Kenya shillings in unpaid rent prompting the state agency to take legal action to 
recover the arrears.274 But why are tenants of waqfs perennial rent defaulters? Despite the WCK 
offering the modest rates in town, most tenants are alleged to be of the low socio-economic 
stratum – widows, unemployed, small-scale merchants, and casual laborers to name but a few.275 
This narrative is, however, largely untrue and misleading as established by the study. Faced by 
financial constraints, the WCK failed to maintain the waqf and it became structurally damaged 
attracting the attention of municipal public health officers who threatened to sue for negligence 
and cause of public health hazard.276 
Efforts by the WCK in 1987 to raise monthly rent in relation to ijar al-mithal were objected by 
tenants terming the move unfair and inconsiderate to their socio-economic plight.277 Against a 
market rate of twenty thousand Kenya shillings the waqf was realizing one thousand seven 
hundred shillings only.278 The WCK, therefore, called for bids to lease the waqf and as usual, it 
attracted interest including those from the defaulting tenants.279 Finally, it was offered for the 
maximum period at seven hundred and fifty thousand Kenya shillings premium and five thousand 
shillings monthly rent increased at 25% every ten years. Not without a fight though as tenants 
who lost the bid challenged the award.280 A year later, the lessee sought permission to develop the 
waqf to which the WCK consented. 
                                                 
273 Clause 7 of the Lease agreement states; “[…] in the event of rent herein remaining unpaid for a space of fourteen (14) 
days from the date on which the same becomes due and payable or if there be any breach or non-observance of 
covenants herein on the part of the lessee to be performed then in such event the leasers will be at liberty to determine 
this lease and re-enter the leased premises without prejudice to their rights for bringing separate actions for the 
enforcement of any such antecedent breaches.” See lease agreement template, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
274 Letters of reminder on rent arrears and notice to institute legal proceedings to recover rent from tenants, June, 1971- 
June, 1984, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
275 Drawing from land rates in Lamu, for instance, the WCK charges one thousand one hundred and twenty Kenya 
shillings annually against County rates of three thousand two hundred and fifty shillings for a similar property. 
Interviews with Municipal Lands Officer, Lamu, December, 2015; Mohammad Shalli, Mombasa; November, 2014; Thabit 
Abu Bakar Omar al-Maawy, Lamu, December, 2015. 
276 Warning notices from the Municipal Health Department, July, 1971-July, 1984, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
277 Letter of reply by tenants on notice to increase rent, July 1987, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
278 WYCO Valuers Company Limited report, January, 2011, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
279 Invitation for bids to lease properties 77/38 & 78/38, Mombasa, WF/169/68, July, 1988; letter of application to 
lease, July, 1988, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
280 Correspondence between Advocate of the complainant and the WCK, October -September, 1988, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
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In July 1998, the WCK was sued by the municipal council for unpaid taxes on the waqf. It turns out 
that the lessee reneged on this responsibility as agreed in the contract.281 Despite several pleas, 
he failed to pay council taxes prompting the WCK to invoke breach of contract to repossess the 
waqf. Two weeks after ‘cancellation’ of contract, however, the lessee paid the municipal taxes and 
the takeover was halted. By September 2004, he owed the WCK four hundred and ninety five 
thousand, four hundred Kenya shillings in unpaid rent. It was further established that he failed to 
renovate and develop the premises as earlier agreed, thereby leaving the waqf in ruins. 
Plot no. 46/VI at Makadara Road, Mombasa is the third and final in this brief survey. The property 
was consecrated as waqf khayri by Mohammed bin Rashid Badai and vested in the trusteeship of 
the WCK. The corpus of this waqf was a residential flat with two units whose rent experience is 
not different from the previous two. Again, the WCK sued the tenants to recover rent arrears 
where they were subsequently evicted for default.282 Upon eviction of the tenants, the flat was 
rented again but went through the same ordeal and the WCK was unable to maintain it to fulfill 
the aspirations of the endower. By 1987 the waqf was being rented to a composite tenant at five 
hundred and twenty five Kenya shillings per month. In its rent assessment of July 1994, however, 
the Ministry of Public Works and Housing recommended a raise to two thousand four hundred 
and fifty Kenya shillings per unit and the WCK notified its tenant of the proposed changes.283 
Since the WCK was unable to renovate the flat, the tenant undertook the repairs and recovered 
his costs from the rent as well as by direct refund from the WCK. Clearly, the tenant was accorded 
preferential treatment because every time there were repairs, he only informed the Chief Kadhi 
who authorized him and initiated refund of his incurred expenses.284 This was against a policy by 
the state agency that neither allowed repairs by tenants nor refunded unsanctioned renovations 
undertaken by them. Amidst this scenario where the waqf was realizing minimal rent but 
incurring huge maintenance costs, it experienced financial challenges that could only be remedied 
through tasrif as summarized in its account statement of December 1987 to December 1996 (see 
                                                 
281 Article 4 of the lease agreement states; “[…] the lessee shall pay such rates, taxes, duties, assessments and outgoings 
of whatever description as may be imposed, charged or assessed by any government or local authority upon the land 
or the building erected thereon.” See also correspondence between the WCK, Municipal Council of Mombasa and Shigog 
Investments Ltd, July, 1998-March, 1999, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
282 Civil Suits nos. 50 of 1943 and 271 of 1945, High Court, between the WCK (Applicant) vs Harban Singh Kalsi 
(Respondent). See also correspondence between the WCK’s Advocate and tenant, February, 1943to April, 1945, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
283 Notice of assessment by Ministry of Public Works and Housing, July, 1994; notice to increase rent by September, 
1995, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
284 Correspondence between shaykh Ali Muhammad Mwinzagu and the Chief Kadhi, November, 1990 to November, 
1996; April, 1997to July, 1999. See also payment vouchers, January, 1991 to November, 1996; invoice for repairs, 
November, 1999; payment voucher, December, 1997; minutes 8/98; 32/98; 3/99(32), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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Table 5). More so, continued internal borrowing to sustain the waqf contradicted a requirement 
by the WCK Act that such funds be refunded within five years.285 
To turn round the waqf output, the WCK applied to the Rent Restriction Tribunal (hereafter the 
Tribunal) to have the rent revised in view of ijar al-mithal.286 Upon assessment, the Tribunal 
recommended five thousand Kenya shillings and forty down from the WCK’s plea of seven 
thousand five hundred shillings per unit. Therefore, the composite tenant was to pay ten thousand 
and eighty Kenya shillings per month in total rent.287 However, he appealed to the WCK to pay two 
thousand five hundred Kenya shillings instead, leading to a tug-of-war between the two parties. A 
compromise was, nevertheless, reached in July 1999 with the two parties consenting to four 
thousand Kenya shillings per month waiving six thousand and eighty shillings. 
Particulars/Date Debit (Ksh.) Credit (Ksh.) 
Rent (Dec. 1987- Dec. 1996) 
@ 525/=monthly 
--- 73,950.00 
Municipal taxes 6, 939. 75 --- 
Administration fees 7, 844. 65 --- 
Repair and maintenance 59, 344. 00 --- 
Totals 74, 128. 40 74, 128. 40 
Balance --- - 178. 40 
Table 5. Statement of account for the waqf of Mohammed bin Rashid Badai, Mombasa, for 
the period from December 1987 to December 1996. (Source: WCK archive, Mombasa). 
When the WCK commissioned a valuation of some of its waqfs in Mombasa town in 2010, the 
disparity of its rates on waqfs in prime locations in relation to ijar al-mithal came to the fore as 
illustrated in Table 6 below. This made the WCK to implement the rates proposed by the valuer in 
disregard of the rate guidelines from the Tribunal. While others accepted the changes, the tenant 
to plot 46/VI objected and sought audience with the state agency to present counter proposals. 
During the consultative meeting, it was agreed that the tenant would pay six thousand Kenya 
                                                 
285Section 19 (ii) of the WCK Act provides; “[…] if satisfied that any property the subject of a waqf khairi is urgently in 
need of any expenditure for repairs or for any other purpose, the waqf commissioners may, not withstanding that there 
exists property the subject of that waqf, utilize the revenue arising from the subject of some other waqf khairi for the 
purpose, if the waqf commissioners are satisfied that the amount of the revenue so utilized will, without prejudice to 
the purposes of waqf in connection with which it is used, be repaid out of the property of that waqf within five years 
from the date of being so utilized.” 
286 The Rent Restriction Tribunal works under the auspices of the Landlord and Tenant Act (reviewed 2007). It seeks 
to protect tenants against exploitation and adjudicate tenancy disputes arising from premises rented for less than 
fifteen thousand Kenya shillings per month. See section 3, Landlord and Tenant Act 2007 laws of Kenya. 
287 Rent Restriction Assessment case no. 89 of 1994 in the matter of plot 46/VI, the WCK (landlord/applicant) Vs. shaykh 
Ali M. Mwinzagu (tenant/respondent); Tribunal Assessment no. 89 of 1994, March, 1997; Rent Control Certificate, April, 
1997, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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shillings monthly for the rest of his life.288 “It is one thing for a tenant to be permanently in arrears 
in his rent”, observed Scott (1987: 423), “it is another for him to claim the de facto lower rent as a 
formal privilege. The former is an informal concession that can often, when the opportunity arises, 
be reclaimed. The latter is likely to be territory lost for good.” In this regard, conceding to the 
tenant’s counter proposal for life was clearly a misconceived hikr contract for the waqf. 
A number of issues in the brief survey of hikr cases merit comments. It turns out that there exists 
profound perception among cross section of Kenyan Muslims, particularly in the former 
Protectorate, that waqfs should be reasonably cheap if not entirely free. This perception was no 
where obvious in three incidents experienced during field work. The first concerns the two 
Swahili women who complained of increased rent on waqf houses (see chapter four). The second 
concerns a rhetorical question common among tenants of waqfs in Lamu posed to the agent 
whenever he goes round collecting rent thus, “kwani cha nskiti nchako?” (Is it yours that which 
belongs to the mosque?).289 The irony here is why one would be bothered by public rather than 
personal issues. 
Plot No. Type of waqf 
property 
Location of 
property 
WCK Rent as at 
2010 (in Ksh.) 
Valuers’ 
proposed market 
rates (in Ksh.) 
Msa, 33/38 2 units residential 
flat 
Kibokoni, 
Mombasa 
15, 000.00 20, 000.00 
Msa, 17/697 4 units residential 
flat 
Gulshan, Mombasa 12, 000.00 16, 000.00 
Msa, 24/41 2 units residential 
flat 
Makadara Rd, 
Mombasa 
30, 000.00 36, 000.00 
Msa, (37/72)46/VI 2 units residential 
flat 
Makadara Rd, 
Mombasa 
4, 000.00 12, 000.00 
Table 6: Monthly rent charged on selected residential waqfs in Mombasa town as at 2010. 
(Source: WYCO Valuers Co. Ltd report, January, 2011, WCK archive, Mombasa). 
The third incident involved a tenant who came to the WCK office to pay his rent following threats 
to sue him for default. While paying, he lamented against the rates being so ‘high’ not different 
from municipal ones yet the property was waqf. “By nature waqf kitu cha rahisi bana!” (waqf is 
naturally cheap!), remarked Jelian Haji Badawi Boosri. In this occasion, Badawi was paying thirty 
                                                 
288 Correspondence between the WCK and shaykh Ali Mwinzagu, June – October, 2011. See also minute 53/2011(8), 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
289 Interview with Thabit Abu Bakar Maawy, Lamu, December, 2015 (translation is mine). 
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four thousand four hundred and seventy Kenya shillings as three years’ rent arrears.290 While 
lamenting paying this lump sum as accumulated arrears, he was oblivious of having denied the 
execution of the aspirations of the endower for the past three years. Accordingly, drawing from 
these incidents, perennial default by tenants of waqfs should be interpreted as being attitudinal 
with little to do with the low socio-economic stratum of the tenants. In their thinking, tenants are 
enjoying rights bestowed upon them by their predecessors - the endowers. In this view, rent 
restrictions by the Tribunal on some waqfs in disregard of location and market forces of demand 
and supply only worsen an already bad situation. 
Again, since waqfs are perceived as cheap, they are susceptible to dismemberment by 
entrepreneurs. Prospecting entrepreneurs, or their cronies who claim to be of low socio-economic 
background, occupy the waqfs as tenants waiting for the moment when the property shall be 
offered for lease to acquire and develop it to gain higher profits and pay low rents to the WCK. 
This view could not be far from the truth given the propensity by some defaulting tenants turning 
round to bid to lease the waqfs once they were offered or even challenge lost bids.291 Nevertheless, 
this is not to deny that there could be genuine people of low socio-economic status occupying the 
waqfs, but they must be very few with the majority mainly renting them for speculative purposes 
as argued. 
Another concern regards the apparent inability by the WCK to offer leases and rents 
commensurate to ijar al-mithal as well as implementing terms of the contracts with the view of 
repossessing waqfs from defaulting lessees. However, this could be the tricky part considering the 
aspect of umiji-wamiji being, arguably, a significant consideration in the award of some contracts. 
The main purposes for cana and hikr are to improve the output of revenue-bearing waqfs to 
maintain their perpetuity, and the economic interests of waqfs should, therefore, reign supreme 
over other considerations when undertaking such business contracts. However, as evident in the 
majority of cases in this section of the study, it is difficult to rule out the socio-ethnic umiji-wamiji 
dynamics at the expense of sound investment ideals of cana and hikr based on competitive open 
tendering processes. 
This view is further augmented by protests from several beneficiaries including those of the waqf 
of Bamkele (Mombasa) and the waqf of al-Darmaky (Malindi).292 Despite several tenants and 
lessees being perennial defaulters, the WCK do not revoke their contracts with a view of awarding 
them to other interested bidders. Clearly, there is conceivably a complex configuration of social 
                                                 
290 Researcher’s field experiences, Mombasa, November, 2014. Badawi is a tenant to waqf property Block XX/57, 
Mombasa, paying nine hundred and fifty seven Kenya shillings and fifty cents per month as ground rent fixed on 
Municipal rates (translation is mine). 
291 Group interviews with Hamid Salim Bamkele, Ali Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman Bamkele and Ahmed Bahaidar 
Bamkele, Mombasa, November, 2015; Mwalimu Hussein Soud, Hamad Abdurahman and Abdallah Swaleh, Lamu, 
December, 2015. 
292 Interviews with Said sharif Abdallah, Malindi, October, 2015; Hamid Salim Bamkele, Ali Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman 
Bamkele and Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele, Mombasa, November, 2015. 
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and symbolic forces within the state agency that safeguards the economic and social interests of 
some ‘noble’ individuals and locales. This was aptly summed up by an informant that rent 
defaulters in waqfs “ni jamaa zetu, tutafanyaje”? (…they are our people, what can we do?).293 
In this regard, social and symbolic capital are not only key to establishing, but also maintaining 
meaningful networks for negotiating the lease and rent terrain in the WCK for economic benefits. 
While those belonging to the network of ‘our people’ (read wamiji) or their cronies are considered 
for appointment to the state agency; awarded lease and rent contracts below ijar al-mithal; 
tolerated for default; or even accorded room to re-negotiate the rates, those outside the network 
are denied similar favors making the former to behave like a cartel in the Muslim community. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has summed up the socio-cultural landscape of waqfs in the Kenyan Muslim 
community. Of significance, the discussion has endeavored to bring into fore the various types of 
waqfs and how their manfaca were distributed in relation to the Qur’anic and non-Qur’anic 
formulas. It has been established that though waqfs were consecrated for the purpose of attaining 
qurba and sawab, the ‘distinctly human trait of altruism’ was also an important consideration 
among endowers in relation to the socio-ethnic and cultural negotiations of the Muslim 
community. Consequently, waqfs were also endowed for the purpose of safeguarding temporal 
social, ethnic, regional, as well as jurisprudential interests. 
Relevant case studies have shown that claims of establishing waqfs as an avenue to retain the 
control of wealth, particularly within the confines of male descendants, do not cut across the 
global Muslim community. This was evidenced by various females being designated as 
beneficiaries and mutawallis in the exclusion of males in some waqfs among Muslims in Kenya. On 
the other hand, use of waqfs as gifts inter vivos, as shown in several instances, could be an affront 
to the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance, albeit unwittingly. However, owing to the limited 
jurisdiction of the kadhi courts, such violations could not easily be rectified even as the will was 
evident among some beneficiaries in the community. 
The flexibility and compatibility of waqfs with the ever changing socio-economic and cultural 
needs of the society are aptly propounded by the principles of cana, hikr, istibdal, and perpetuity. 
The Sharica allows for the contravention of shurut al-waqif, particularly, on lease period so as to 
improve the economic viability of revenue generating waqfs. However, due to competing interests, 
best management practices of cana, hikr and istibdal were flouted jeopardizing perpetuity of the 
waqfs and designated beneficiaries and causes. This underscores the significance of requisite 
qualifications and unquestionable virtues in the holder of the position of mutawalli to see to the 
best of the waqf under his custody, and by extension, the beneficence ambitions of endowers.
                                                 
293 Interview with Rashid Mwandeo, the WCK, Mombasa, October-December, 2014, (translation is mine). 
  
7 Conclusion 
At the onset, this study endeavored to explore the development and administration of waqfs as an 
Islamic socio-cultural heritage in a secular state milieu from the British colonial to the postcolonial 
times. The underlying objective was to establish how the interplay of secular state policies and 
civil courts’ judgments during the period under investigation generated trends that informed waqf 
practices among Muslims in Kenya. This is because, as an Islamic institution, waqf was expected 
to be administered by and according to the Sharica with the institutions of the kadhi, mutawalli, 
and the culama not only interpreting the normative precepts, but also guiding the waqifs towards 
attainment of qurba and sawab. In chapter three, the study relied on historical data to reconstruct 
this interplay in the trajectory of administration of waqfs. It was established that there existed 
profound state involvement that consequently interfered with normative traditions in 
administration and development of waqfs. 
The urge by the colonial government to control resources as perpetuated by subsequent 
postcolonial governments interfered with normative precepts on waqfs, effectively creating a 
disillusioned community of ‘Muslim peasants’. In the pre-British colonial times, the Islamic judicial 
institution of the kadhi had an extensive mandate in the Sharica including civil and criminal 
matters affecting Muslims. Accordingly, the kadhi and the culama also retained their traditional 
roles in waqfs as interlocutors of Islamic knowledge and authority. This changed upon 
establishment of the Protectorate where the jurisdiction of kadhi courts was restricted to a 
narrowly defined Muslim personal status law that excluded waqfs (see chapter three). The 
resultant effect was a vacuum in the administration of waqfs that justified the establishment of a 
state agency (WCK) to discharge the role once performed by the kadhis. 
The study pointed out that redefining the jurisdiction of kadhis with a view to establishing a state 
agency to control waqfs by the British colonial government was a conscious process and strategy 
informed by past experiences in India and Egypt where uncontrolled waqfs posed a significant 
opposition to the colonial project. Having waqfs under state control, therefore, meant not only 
controlling resources but also checking the influence of the mutawallis, culama, and the diverse 
groups of beneficiaries, both institutions and individuals, who relied on waqfs in the society. This 
was made possible by appointing Muslims perceived as loyal to the colonial government as Waqf 
Commissioners who worked under strict guidelines and supervision of British officers seconded 
to the state agency (see chapter three). 
The British colonial government also used its legislative powers to establish policies that in effect 
hindered the development of waqfs in the region. Through land laws, it was impossible to 
consecrate or even develop land waqfs without titles of ownership that were difficult to attain by 
the majority of locals (see chapter three). Neither did civil land statutes recognize waqf deeds as 
valid documents in the transfer of waqf lands to the beneficiaries and mutawallis for 
administration as they did not identify legal persons to whom the transfers were made. This was 
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because, since the restriction of the mandate of the kadhi courts, waqfs were categorized as real 
estate whose contracts were guided by civil statutes. As a result, some waqfs were ruined. 
The study further indicated that under the compulsory acquisition policy, the colonial government 
could alienate properties, some of which were waqfs, for public interests. Some of the alienated 
waqfs were, however, not compensated making it impossible to establish alternative waqfs as 
required by the Sharica. Yet, even those compensated, the colonial government used its powers 
within the state agency to ensure that no replacement waqfs were consecrated (see chapter three). 
This dealt a blow both to the spiritual aspirations of endowers and the social, economic, and 
cultural output of the large numbers of beneficiaries. 
The study confirmed that control of the judiciary by the British colonial government also 
influenced the judicial process as rulings were made based on the British understanding of the 
Sharica. This occasioned the ambiguous application of the Sharica consequently invalidating some 
waqfs that would have otherwise been valid (see chapter three and four). The study also revealed 
that civil policies and institutions on waqfs established by the British colonial government were 
seamlessly inherited by subsequent postcolonial regimes. Efforts to question and amend the 
policies on state control to restore waqf administration to traditional Muslim institutions and 
precepts were thwarted during the review of the constitution (see chapter five). As a result, the 
status quo thus remains. This scenario confirmed that indeed civil legislations and judicial 
constructs in a secular state milieu influenced waqf practices among Muslims in Kenya. 
Using extensive empirical data to derive the analysis presented in chapter three and four, it was 
established that strict control of waqfs by the state consequently entrenched socio-economic and 
cultural subordination of the Muslim community. The state did not only influence the decision 
making process in the WCK, but also used waqf resources against designated causes denying 
traditional actors, institutions, and beneficiaries their economic mainstay, ruining their social, 
economic, and cultural significance in the society. Accordingly, a cross section of Muslims was 
disenfranchised and exited from state controlled waqfs to non-labeled waqfs and uncontrolled 
charitable institutions including zakat, sadaqa, private trusts and community associations. These 
did not only guarantee freedom, control, and exercise of social, symbolic, and economic power 
once found in waqfs, but also accorded Muslims the opportunity to express piety within a wider 
framework of Islamic charity and qurba (see chapter five). 
More so, Muslims’ exit from state controlled waqfs was intrinsic, spontaneous, uncoordinated, and 
not declared in the conventional sense of a resistance movement against state control of waqfs. 
Majority of Muslims did not comply with the rule on compulsory registration of waqfs during the 
colonial period when none could be seen to contradict imperial authority. During the postcolonial 
times, imperial control of waqfs was relaxed, though secular state policies, civil institutions and 
judicial constructs on waqfs were not amended, causing an ambiguous relation between the state 
and the institution of waqf. Consequently, Muslims continued with the non-compliance with 
registration rule on waqfs apart from relying on non-labeled waqfs and uncontrolled charitable 
institutions as provided by the Sharica for socio-cultural welfare in the community (see chapter 
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five). This demonstrates that subordinate communities have the ability to discern the 
contradictions in state policies and react appropriately in proportion to their capital at disposal. 
The alternative charitable practices accorded Muslims the opportunity to reverse ownership and 
control of resources, power, and privileges without arousing suspicion that could put them at 
cross path with imperial authorities. 
In synthesizing waqf as a discursive tradition in Islam, the study reconstructed the historical 
trajectory with a view to exploring and situating the contours in the evolution and development 
of the institution at various epochs in the Muslim world. Significantly, the analysis sought to 
understand the nature of waqfs in Kenya as an evolving tradition vis-à-vis the global Muslim 
landscape. Arguably, the institution of waqf in Kenya suffered stunted growth. It got stuck in the 
‘formative age’ though it exhibits symptoms akin to the ‘redundancy and stagnation’ and 
‘disillusionment and new awakening phases’ (see chapter five). This explains the ambiguous 
nature of waqfs in the community for its potential as a socio-cultural heritage remains to be fully 
exploited. Waqfs in Kenya are largely perceived along traditional utility patterns and corpuses – 
masjids, madrasas, dacwa, and cemeteries among others rather than means to socio-cultural and 
economic development. In the backdrop of changing dynamics of waqfs and Islamic charity in the 
global Muslim civil society, only small portions of waqfs contribute to job creation, health care 
provision, education, and food aid during Ramadan and cid festivities in the community. 
This is to emphasize that there is limited link with transnational Muslim charitable institutions 
and private foundations, particularly those that have survived state onslaught against the ‘war 
against terror’ in the country. They include the IR (UK), AMA, WAMY, and KFF among others. 
Consequently, very little is felt of the IDB products like APIF and WWF in form of interest free 
loans, grants, waqf shares or other facilities and contemporary trends adopted by the Muslim civil 
society in other parts of the Muslim world to spearhead Islamic charity and provide alternatives 
to state controlled waqfs. Accordingly, the lack of information on the contemporary trends on 
waqfs among the majority of Muslims in Kenya renders the twenty-first century wave on the 
resuscitation of Muslim civil society and Islamic charity sweeping across global Muslim umma 
largely of no effect in the country. 
As pointed out in chapter six, despite their limited contribution, waqfs have an indispensable role 
in the socio-cultural well-being of the Muslim community and the Kenyan society at large in the 
provision of health care, education, housing, and job creation. The spiritual benefits that a waqif 
is believed to derive from an endowment needs not to be emphasized. The study further 
confirmed the central place of waqfs in the preservation of the sixteenth century Swahili history 
and culture as evident in the active engagement of the NMK and UNESCO in masjids, cemeteries, 
and whole sections of miji ya kale in Mombasa and Lamu (see chapter three and four). 
It was pointed out in the study that institutionalization of socio-ethnic segmentation among 
Muslims in Kenya, and the coast region in particular, predates the British colonial period. During 
the Bu Saicdi Sultanate, Arab Muslims were accorded preferential treatment over African Muslims, 
especially, in administrative positions of the liwali, mudir, and in the judiciary as kadhis (see 
152 Competing and Conflicting Power Dynamics in Waqfs in Kenya, 1900-2010 
Bayreuth African Studies Online (6) 
chapter three). The study found out that the British colonial government upheld this socio-ethnic 
hierarchy placing African Muslims at the bottom strata by recognizing Arabs as leaders of the 
communities at the coast. Apparent failure by subsequent postcolonial regimes to redress the 
socio-ethnic hierarchy in the Muslim society only served to heighten socio-ethnic tensions among 
Muslims as evidenced in the appointment of the culama occupying the positions of Chief Kadhi and 
Waqf Commissioners (see chapter four). 
Analysis presented in chapters four and six indicates that historical ethnic and regional struggles 
for identity, belonging, and supremacy are endemic in the community manifested in the 
microcosm of the institution of waqf. The Chief Kadhi being the government adviser on Islamic 
issues is also the ‘Muslim opinion’ in the appointment of Waqf Commissioners. The study revealed 
that Commissioners were appointed on historical inclinations as opinion makers and symbolic 
figureheads to maintain socio-ethnic and regional equilibrium rather than on professional 
qualifications and religious virtues (see appendix 9.3). This provided fertile ground for the 
development of cartel like behaviors that locked out qualified Muslims, waqifs, mutawallis, and 
other stake holders from the state agency not only from the coast region, but also the entire 
country. Consequently, consecration, administration, and benefiting from waqfs are perceived as 
privileges preserved for certain Muslim groups and locales. 
In exploring the complex internal dynamics of the Muslim community in Kenya, the study 
proposed the concept of umiji–wamiji. It is one thing to demonstrate seeming uniform response 
against subordination and it is another to be actually united in purpose. Islam in Kenya is, 
apparently, an insufficient factor of identity, belonging, and mobilization amongst Muslims in a 
predominantly Christian society rendering the umma non-monolithic. The perception of umiji-
wamiji, therefore, provides an invaluable paradigm in re-assessing and understanding the 
relations amongst Muslims themselves and between Muslims and the secular state taking 
negotiations for the control of waqfs as a microcosm. 
The study has appropriately illustrated how the perception of umiji–wamiji is central in Muslims’ 
negotiation of the secular state and civil milieu in the performance and trends of waqfs and charity 
practices (see chapter four and six). Muslims in Kenya have a rather peculiar history and society 
making process as they grapple with multiple internal and external challenges dating back to the 
pre-colonial times. Three incidents particularly, warrant recall: the furor that followed the 
appointment of shaykh Lithome as Commissioner in 2009 (see chapter four); the hostile reception 
of NMK officials at Lamu where they had gone to inspect the renovation of masjid Rodha; and the 
persistent calls by beneficiaries and the community in Malindi and Lamu to disband the state 
agency and replace it with miji-based waqf boards (see chapter six). 
These foregoing scenarios present different readings. First, they illustrate group cohesion and 
solidarity among wamiji in these miji with a view to excluding non-wamiji. Within this context, 
Muslims strongly identify themselves with miji that in essence, due to colonial and postcolonial 
structures, were socio-ethnically constructed and maintained. There are conscious efforts by 
some Muslims, owing to shared history of socio-economic and cultural exclusion, marginalization, 
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and exploitation by the state, to identify themselves with particular locales. Consequently, they 
feel obliged to protect and advocate for temporal interests while perceiving the non-wamiji as 
potential threats to their well-being. The discontent by Lamu and Malindi against the appointment 
of shaykh Lithome aptly fits this description. It was not that Lithome was not a qualified Muslim. 
Neither was the position to be simultaneously occupied by the two miji nor the entire wamiji. 
Rather the mere perception that he was an ‘outsider’ and not ‘one of our own’ suffices to 
understand the urge to protect temporal interests of a socio-ethnic group in a given locale. 
Moreover, the above position is corroborated by the apparent ‘behavior’ by some Muslims who, 
despite migrating and settling in other miji, continue to identify themselves with their parent miji 
and even perceived as such by their hosts. This begs the question as to what point an ‘immigrant’ 
ceases to be one? Or what does it take for a supposedly ‘immigrant’ to be accepted in the host 
community and be able to shade off his tag? Muslims from Lamu in Mombasa, for instance, remain 
as ‘watu wa Amu’ (people from Lamu). This also applies to other ‘non-indigenous’ groups in 
Mombasa and elsewhere in the former city-states as established by the study. This explains, for 
example, the preference to local dialects by such ‘immigrants’ like kiamu (Swahili dialect) as 
evident in some Lamu culama in their sermons and teachings in waqf institutions – madrasas, 
masjids, etc. in the town (and elsewhere in the former Protectorate) despite settling there for long 
periods. This is also true among Muslim socio-ethnic groups within one mji across the former city-
states. 
Taking Thenashara Taifa in Mombasa, for instance, their being perceived as one group has 
undoubtedly not stopped them from identifying themselves in the distinct sub-groups within the 
Swahili Muslim federation in relation to the Mazrui-Thenashara Taifa continuum. Thus, in the 
wider context, mentioning one’s mji of origin evokes fond memories of long held traditions of 
identity, belonging, and culture, including scholarly traditions and political alignments. These 
markers of identity, therefore, not only point to who one really is but also what he is capable of 
within the context of fluid umiji-wamiji identity and belonging, and waqfs ownership, control, and 
access in particular (see chapter four and six). 
Secondly, the hostile reception of NMK officials in Lamu and unwavering calls to replace the WCK 
with miji-based waqf boards illustrate the Muslims’ perception of the state agencies as tools and 
symbols of imperial subordination that have not only outlived their usefulness but also ought to 
be dismantled, or better still, re-invented. Through such calls, Muslims have shown that their ‘exit’ 
from state controlled waqfs to retain control of resources within their socio-ethnic spaces and 
locales through symbolic resistance is not only important, but there is also the ardent urge to erase 
such state images within their midst that evoke memories of socio-ethnic and regional 
exploitation, exclusion, and marginalization. On the other hand, the calls also point to internal 
dynamics within the Muslim community to exclude non-wamiji from waqf benefits and 
administration, and by extension, perpetuate the umiji-wamiji discourse among diverse Muslim 
groups in the country. Within this context, it becomes easier to talk of ‘Muslim communities in 
Kenya’ rather than a ‘Kenyan Muslim community’. 
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Clearly, relationship among the diverse Muslim groups in the country as evident in the three 
incidents above is ambiguous. This ranges from coastal Muslims against their up-country brethren 
(read national umiji) to Mombasa against her neighboring miji like Takaungu, Malindi, and Lamu 
(read regional umiji); those within one mji like Mombasa as vivid in the case of Mazrui against 
Swahili federation (read wamiji) to Muslims within one theological and doctrinal persuasion like 
the Sunni as manifested in the case of Salafi-conservatism acrimony. It is this fluid but complex 
and internal rivalry with history and trajectory that inhibits crystallization of Muslims into a 
monolithic community. In view of this, though still part of the global umma, unfolding events 
involving Muslims in some distant parts of the world may not necessarily trigger a united 
response in the local ‘Muslim communities’ owing to the concerns pre-occupying them. Thus the 
perception of umiji–wamiji is particularly important in understanding the internal dynamics of 
the ‘Muslim communities’ in Kenya as opposed to the shared concerns of a global umma and could, 
therefore, form the basis for further research on the ‘Muslim communities’ in Kenya. 
7.1 Theoretical Implications 
My study endeavored to investigate the enacting of an Islamic socio-cultural practice in the midst 
of a secular state milieu spanning close to a century. Accordingly, invoking Pierre Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice (1977), specifically the concepts of field, capital (social, economic, political, and 
symbolic), and symbolic violence, was relevant as it appropriately fits the state-society 
negotiations between the Muslim community and the British colonial and postcolonial 
governments. As argued in chapter one of the study, constituent concepts in the theory of practice 
appropriately fit the interrogation “of the relationship between religion, class and power; religion, 
race and ethnicity; and religion and colonial conquest” that the investigation undertook (Rey, 
2007: 82). In essence, religion is only one of the significant yet interrelated elements constituting 
human society that Bourdieu envisaged in his works (Rey 2007; Echtler / Ukah 2015). This 
complex yet ambiguous relationship between the constituent elements came to the fore during 
the decades of colonial project in the East African Protectorate. Waqfs proved an important socio-
economic resource and an avenue for power control that the British colonial government took 
keen interest in, a scenario that was replicated during the postcolonial period. 
With waqfs among other resources under imperial supervision and control, the socio-economic 
welfare of the Muslim community was dealt a blow. Consequently, this created the power binary 
between the dominant colonial and postcolonial governments and the subordinate Muslim 
community. In his view, Bourdieu understands “the dominated as virtually and structurally un-
free and thus unable to rise up, resist, and act to change the very social order that enables their 
oppression” (Rey 2007: 122; Martin 2000). However, as demonstrated through Scott’s (1976) 
symbolic (ideological) resistance, the perception that subordinate communities are unable to 
challenge oppression is no longer tenable. Bourdieu’s view partially understands resistance in 
terms of public, and at times bloody protests, and political activities. Accordingly, it fails to take 
cognizance of the subordinates’ silent yet effective acts of sabotage, desertion, withdrawal, feigned 
ignorance and non-compliance with official demands that require no formal organization (Scott 
1985, 2009). 
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Symbolic resistance against state control and supervision of waqfs was vividly demonstrated in 
the non-compliance with official requirements for compulsory registration of waqfs by a cross 
section among Muslims; the establishment of community associations; private trusts; and non-
governmental organizations. All these ‘exit’ strategies were in essence vehicles through which the 
subordinate community practiced in fulfillment of religious obligations to attain qurba and sawab 
in place of state controlled waqfs. Significantly, they were (still are) not only uncontrolled and 
uncoordinated, but also accorded Muslims the control over resources and privileges similar to 
those of waqfs. This subtly illustrates that resistance by subordinate groups in the society does 
not necessarily have to take the political dimension especially when it involves mortal risks. The 
main goal of symbolic resistance is to re-create autonomy to resource ownership and control but 
not to confront imperial authority as was illustrated in the alternative acts of qurba and sawab. 
As a socio-cultural heritage, practices of waqf also go beyond the binary power relations between 
the colonizer and the colonized; the ruler and the ruled; or the dominant and the subordinate. In 
view of this, while Scott’s concept of symbolic resistance was relevant in challenging Bourdieu’s 
perception of the subordinate community in the face of imperial authority and control of 
resources, neither of them could adequately explain the non-state waqf milieu amongst Muslims 
themselves in the society. Consecrating waqf is a religious undertaking with wider ramifications 
in the socio-cultural fabric of the society. It involves the waqif’s urge to demonstrate piety to the 
creator while at the same time showing responsibility to the community; the recipients’ role in 
appreciating the waqif in understanding their plight and maintaining the social fabric; the place of 
the culama in interpreting and guiding the waqif in living to the Sharica of consecration to the later; 
the role of the mutawalli in ensuring that the waqf fulfills the designated causes; and the political 
leaders, if necessary, not only to endow as part of their individual social responsibility and qurba, 
but also provide conducive environment where waqfs would fulfill their designated causes. These 
are significant aspects of waqf that neither Bourdieu’s nor Scott’s concepts could aptly account 
for, hence the coinage and adoption of the concept of umiji-wamiji. 
Moreover, Muslims and waqfs existed before, during, and after colonization. Accordingly, the 
concept of umiji-wamiji takes cognizance of the socio-cultural forces and factors that informed 
identity and belonging during and after colonization (the period under investigation) that 
guaranteed or even denied individual’s access to rights and privileges within the ‘Muslim 
communities’. Significantly, it seeks to explain the practices of waqf among Muslims outside the 
secular state milieu. 
The concept of umiji-wamiji, therefore, goes beyond the struggle for material control and 
domination; the power binary between colonizers and the colonized; and relations between the 
secular state and the Muslim community. It aptly describes how ‘intra-Muslim communities’ 
relations are negotiated and mediated outside the glare of the secular state authorities and civil 
institutions in Kenya. It provides a framework to understand how waqfs are appropriated as a 
vehicle through which the complex local Muslim socio-cultural fabric is mediated and the trends 
it generates. More importantly, the concept is efficacious in answering questions (iv) and (v) of 
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the study in exploring the various waqfs and how Muslims use them for socio-cultural 
development in the society.
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9 Appendix 
9.1 Socio-Economic and Cultural Development Opportunities in Kenya, 2009 (Provincial percentages) 
National 
totals/ 
Provincial 
Percen-
tages 
Formal Education Attainment Employment EC Sewage  PWC 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 E* UE*  Main PL  
6,491
,975 
17,82
6,430 
6,084
,320 
1,185
,430 
526,3
02 
68,33
0 
234,9
21 
15,786,3
31 
2,186,88
2 
1,989,74
0 
973,5
71 
6,100,23
4 
2,626,629 
Nairobi 
province 
2.5 6.0 15.5 24.3 36.5 12.1 3.9 8.9 11.1 35.8 58.1 6.1 28.4 
Coast 
province 
10.0 8.2 7.2 8.0 5.7 9.7 6.7 7.5 10.3 11.1 10.2 6.6 12.9 
Central 
province 
4.8 12.0 16.5 16.4 13.4 19.7 0.3 13.3 6.6 19.3 11.1 16.8 18.5 
R/Valley 
province 
32.4 25.1 22.3 21.8 20.8 18.2 0.8 25.2 23.0 18.4 12.2 24.1 18.6 
N/Eastern 
province 
20.6 2.6 1.4 0.7 1.0 1.6 85.6 4.0 22.5 7.1 0.3 1.6 1.4 
Distribution of opportunities and essential services according to Provincial administrative boundaries. Note how predominantly Muslim 
regions (Coast & N/Eastern) fared. (Source: The Kenya Population and Housing Census (KNBS), 2009). Nairobi: Government Printer 
Key: (1) never attained formal education (2) attained primary school level (3) attained secondary school level (4) attained tertiary level 
(5) attained university education (6) attained at least basic literacy (7) attained madrasa education (E) employed (UE) unemployed (EC) 
Electricity Connection (PWC) Piped Water Connection (PL) Pit Latrine.  
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9.2 Socio-Economic and Cultural Development Opportunities in Kenya, 2009 (District percentages) 
National 
totals/ 
District 
Percentages 
Formal Education Attainment  Employment EC Sewage PWC 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 E* UE*  Main PL  
6,491,
975 
17,826
,430 
6,084,
320 
1,185,
430 
526,3
02 
68,33
0 
234,9
21 
15,786,3
31 
2,186,88
2 
1,989,74
0 
973,57
1 
6,100,23
4 
2,626,
629 
Nairobi West 0.5 1.4 3.2 4.5 9.2 2.2 0.2 1.9 2.4 35.8 5.6 2.4 4.6 
Mombasa 0.7 1.2 2.1 2.9 2.8 2.1 1.4 1.2 2.0 4.5 4.7 1.3 1.7 
Kirinyaga 0.7 1.6 1.9 1.3 0.9 2.4 0.1 1.9 0.5 1.3 0.6 2.2 2.4 
Nakuru 0.5 1.1 2.0 2.4 2.3 1.3 0.1 1.1 1.7 3.6 3.4 1.3 3.3 
Mandera C. 3.3 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 23.0 0.6 2.9 0.01 0.003 0.2 1.1 
Malindi 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.4 1.6 
Lamu 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Kwale 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 
Isiolo 0.5 0.2 0.2 2.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 
Distribution of opportunities and essential services in Kenya according to District administrative boundaries. Note how predominantly 
Muslim Districts (Mombasa, Mandera Central, Malindi, Lamu, Isiolo, Kwale) fared. (Source: The Kenya Population and Housing Census 
(KNBS), 2009). Nairobi: Government Printer. 
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9.3 Waqf Commissioners (1957-2010) 
Until 1957: 
 Sh. Al’Amin b. Said al- Mandhry (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Abdallah Salim (cIbadi Muslim, Mombasa) 
 Sh. Mohammad b. Abdallah Shatry (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Ma’amun b. Suleiman al-Mazrui (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Amir b. Naheed al- Nahdy (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Hyder Mohammad al-Kindi (Mombasa) 
*There was no Chief Kadhi from1950 to 1963 after the resignation of Sh.Sayyid Ali b. Muhammad 
Badawy (Lamu) in 1950. Besides, kadhis were more of judicial officers, so, liwalis could nominate 
one person to the Waqf Commission, though they never sat in the waqf board themselves. 
1957-1962: 
Board retained except for Sh. Al’Amin b. Said al-Mandhry. It is not clear who replaced him. 
1962-1967: 
 *Sh. Al-Amin b. Said al-Mandhry (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Abdallah Salim (Mombasa) 
 *Sh. Muhammad b. Kassim al-Mazrui (replaced Ma’amun b. Suleiman al-Mazrui, Mombasa) 
 Sh. Abdallah Ndovu Mwidau (replaced Sh. Mohammad b. Abdallah Shatry, Mombasa) 
 Sh. Amir b. Naheed al-Nahdy (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Hyder Mohammad al-Kindi (Mombasa) 
*Sh. Muhammad b. Kassim al-Mazrui was appointed the Chief Kadhi in 1963. He was replaced in 
the Commission by Sh. Abdurahman Muhammad Hatimy. 
*Sh. Al-Amin b. Said al-Mandhry resigned in 1965 citing commitment after being transferred to 
serve in Kerugoya, Central Kenya. It is not clear who replaced him. 
1968-1972: 
There were no Waqf Commissioners during this period. Neither was there a Chief Kadhi following 
the resignation of Sh. Muhammad b. Kassim al-Mazrui in 1968 citing ill-health. This was also a 
period of changes in the administrative structure of the government where the positions of the 
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liwali and mudir were abolished. Following this change, the mandate to nominate one ‘prominent 
Muslim’ to sit in the waqf board was given to the Provincial Commissioner, Coast Province, and 
the Commissioners’ term reduced to three years from the previous five. 
1972-1975: 
 Sh. Ali Abdallah Ali Maawy (Mombasa) 
 Hon. Juma Ferunzy ((Mombasa) 
 Sh. Awadh Saleh (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Salim Muhammad Muhashamy (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Majid b. Said al-Busaidi (Malindi) 
 Chief Keya Swedi (Mombasa) 
 Chief Kadhi: Sh. Salih Abdallah Farsi (ex-officio) 
1975-1978: 
 Hon. Juma Ferunzy (Mombasa) 
 Sharif Alwi Muhammad Alwi (Takaungu, Kilifi) 
 Sh. Hassanali Mussa Jetha (Indian descent, Mombasa) 
 Sh. Awadh Saleh Sherman Nguru (Hadhramy Muslim, Mombasa)  
 Sh. Hyder Muhammad al-Kindi (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Salim Muhammad Muhashamy (Mombasa) 
 Chief Kadhi: Sh. Salih Abdallah Farsi (ex-officio) 
1978-1983: 
 Sh. Alwi Muhammad Alwi (Takaungu, Kilifi) 
 Sh. Salim S. Bahamadi (Lamu) 
 Hon. Juma Ferunzy (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Ahmad Muhammad Jahadhmy (Lamu) 
 Sh. Hassanali Mussa Jetha (Indian descent, Mombasa) 
 Sh. Seif Salim Omar (cIbadi Muslim, Mombasa) 
 Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa)  
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1983-1986: 
 Sh. Mwinyihamisi Mohammad Haji (Kwale) 
 Sh. Muhammad Salim Shirazi (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Al’amin Said al-Mandhry (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Rashid Ali Riyami (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Ahmad Muhammad Jihadhmy (Lamu) 
 Sh. Rashid Azzan (cIbadi Muslim, Malindi) 
 Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa) 
1986-1989: 
Board retained on recommendations by the Chief Kadhi, Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy. 
1990-1993: 
 Sh. Salim Ali Jeneby (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Ali Abdallah Shikely (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Salim Ali Hussein al-Hadhry (Lamu) 
 Sharif Hussein S. Aidarus Saggaf (Lamu) 
 Sh. Rashid Azzan (cIbadi Muslim, Malindi) 
 *Sh. Al’amin Said Abu Said al-Mandhry (Mombasa) 
 Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa) 
*Sh. Al’amin al-Mandhry resigned shortly in 1990 after being re-appointed citing poor health. It is 
not clear who replaced him. 
1993-1995: 
 Sharif Alwi Muhammad Alwi (Takaungu, Kilifi) 
 Sh. Abdulmalik Abdurahman Maawiyah (Lamu) 
 Sh. Bakari Abdallah Mwawasaa (Kwale) 
 Sh. Awadh Swaleh Sherman [Nguru] (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Abdurahman Mwinzagu (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Hamisi Omari al-Mazrui (Takaungu, Kilifi) 
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 Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa) 
1996- 1999: 
 Sharif Alwi Muhammad Alwi (Takaungu, Kilifi) 
 Sh. Abdulmalik Abdurahman Maawiyah (Lamu) 
 Sh. Bakari Abdallah Mwawasaa (Kwale) 
 Sh. Abdurahman Mwinzagu (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Awadh Swaleh Sherman [Nguru] (Mombasa) 
 Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa) 
1999-2003: 
 Sh. Ahmed Aboud Hadi (Malindi) 
 Sh. Bakari Abdallah Mwawasaa (Kwale) 
 Sharif. Alwi Muhammad Alwi (Takaungu, Kilifi) 
 Sh. Abdulmalik Abdurahman Maawiyah (Lamu) 
 Sh. Abdurahman Mwinzagu (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Awadh Swaleh Sherman [Nguru] (Mombasa) 
 Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa) 
2003-2005: 
 Sharif Hussein Ahmad Hussein (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Nassor Muhammad al-Nahdy (former Chief Kadhi, Mombasa) 
 Sh. Abdurahman Mwinzagu (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Abdurahman A. Maawiyah (Lamu) 
 Sh. Khamis Muhammad al-Mazrui (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Ahmed Aboud Hadi (Malindi) 
 Chief Kadhi: Sh. Hamad Muhammad Kassim al-Mazrui (ex-officio, Mombasa) 
2006-2009: 
Board retained on recommendation by the Chief Kadhi, Sh. Hamadi Muhammad Kassim al-Mazrui. 
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2009-2012: 
 Dr. Abdallah Muhammad Abu Bakar Khatib (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Said Muhammad Ali Machele (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Athman Errey (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Hafidh Shihabudin Chiraghdin (Mombasa) 
 *Sh. Ibrahim Lithome (Nairobi) 
 Sh. Amir Swaleh (Mombasa) 
 Chief Kadhi: Sharif Hussein Muhdhary (ex-officio, Lamu) 
*Sh. Ibrahim Lithome (Nairobi) was replaced by Prof. Nadji Said (Malindi) in 2010 following 
complaints from Malindi and Lamu citing lack of representation. 
2012-2015: 
 *Prof. Nadji Said (Malindi) 
 Sh. Juma Ngao (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Zuber Noor (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Said Errey (Mombasa) 
 Sh. Amir Swaleh (Mombasa) 
 Dr. Hamadi Boga (Kwale). 
 Chief Kadhi: Sharif Hussein Muhdhary (ex-officio, Lamu) 
 *Prof. Nadji resigned in June 2015 but was not replaced. (Source: WCK archive, Mombasa
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9.4 Key Informants 
1. Abu Swamad A. Ali, National Museums of Kenya, Mombasa. 
2. Abdallah Juma Mwakuyugika, Tiwi. 
3. Abdallah Nassor Said, Malindi. 
4. Abdallah Swaleh, Lamu. 
5. Abdulmalik Sharif, Lamu. 
6. Abdurahim Bakathir, Mombasa. 
7. Abdurahman Bamkele, Mombasa. 
8. Ahmed Aboud Hadi, former Waqf Commissioner, Malindi. 
9. Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele, Mombasa. 
10. Ali Darusi, Waqf Commission, Zanzaibar. 
11. Ali bin Khamis, Mombasa. 
12. Ali Salim Bamkele, Mombasa. 
13. Amuru Omar, Waqf Commission, Zanzibar. 
14. Dr. Abdallah Kheri, Nairobi. 
15. Dr. Esha Fakii, Nairobi. 
16. Dr. Kalandar Khan, National Museums of Kenya, Mombasa. 
17. Dr. Wario Halkano, Nairobi. 
18. Hamdoun, Waqf Commission Agent, Malindi. 
19. Hamid Abdurahman, Lamu. 
20. Hamid Salim Bamkele, Mombasa. 
21. Maulid Abdi, Tiwi. 
22. Muhammad Abdallah, Mombasa. 
23. Muhammad Hussein Abdulkadir, Malindi. 
24. Muhammad Shalli, Waqf Commission Secretariat, Mombasa. 
25. Mwalimu Hussein Soud, Lamu. 
26. Omar Jenjewa, Waqf Commission Secretariat, Mombasa. 
27. Rahma Abdallah, Mombasa. 
28. Rashid A. Mwandeo, Waqf Commission Secretariat, Mombasa. 
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29. Rashid Ali, Mombasa. 
30. Rashid Muhammad Salim al-Mazrui, Takaungu. 
31. Said Hussein Chiphele, Tiwi. 
32. Said Sharif Abdallah, Malindi. 
33. Shaykh A.S. Hussein Muhdhary, Chief Kadhi, (current) Mombasa. 
34. Shaykh Hamad Muhammad Kassim al-Mazrui, Chief Kadhi, (former) Mombasa. 
35. Thabit Abu Bakar Omar al-Maawy, Waqf Commission Agent, Lamu. 
36. Ustadh Abdulkadir Mao, Lamu (informal talks at Bayreuth, Germany). 
37. Ustadh Hamisi Swalehe Mwambewe, Msambweni. 
38. Ustadh Muhammad Hussein Abdulkadir, Malindi. 
39. Ustadh Salim Swaleh (Swadi), Msambweni. 
40. Ustadh Yussuf Bakari Mwamzandi, Msambweni. 
41. Zubeir Hussein Noor, Waqf Commissioner, Mombasa.
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9.4 Photograph of masjid Mandhry, Mombasa 
 
Masjid Mandhry, Mombasa. Note the 16th century architecture and minaret. (Source: Chembea, 
S.A., 2014).  
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9.5 Photograph of masjid Mandhry, Mombasa 
 
Inside masjid Mandhry, Mombasa. Note the infusion of modern and ancient architecture in the 
banaa (manaa) ceiling. (Source: Chembea, S.A., 2014).  
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9.6 Copy of a waqf deed 
 
A copy of a waqf deed in Arabic transcript. The English versions of such deeds were offered by the 
kadhi courts and attached alongside the Arabic versions. (Source: WCK archive, Mombasa, 2014)
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9.7 Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AGAttorney General 
AFRICOGAfrica Center for Open Governance 
AHAfter Hijra 
AHIFAl-Haramayn Islamic Foundation 
AMAAfrica Muslim Agency 
APIFAwqaf Properties Investment Fund 
BHBefore Hijra 
CIPKCouncil of Imams and Preachers of Kenya 
CKRCConstitution of Kenya Review Commission 
CPC Civil Procedure Code 
CPPCoast Peoples’ Party 
DC District Commissioner 
DO District Officer 
IBEAC Imperial British East African Company 
IDBIslamic Development Bank 
IIROInternational Islamic Relief Organization (Saudi Arabia) 
IR (UK)Islamic Relief (United Kingdom) 
JTQJamacat Taclam al-Quran 
KFFKing Feisal Foundation 
KMAKisumu Muslim Association 
KNBS Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
KNCHRKenya National Commission on Human Rights 
MEDAMuslim Education and Development Association (Malindi) 
MEWAMombasa Education Welfare Association 
MPMember of Parliament 
MRCMombasa Republican Council 
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MUHURIMuslims for Human Rights 
NACOSTI National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (Kenya) 
NAMLEFNational Muslim Leaders Forum 
NCCKNational Council of Churches of Kenya 
NFDNorth Eastern Frontier District 
NGONon-Governmental Organization 
NMKNational Museums of Kenya 
NSISNational Security Intelligence Services 
NUKEMNational Union of Kenya Muslims 
PCProvincial Commissioner 
PCPCPenal and Criminal Procedure Codes 
RRTRent Restriction Tribunal 
SUPKEMSupreme Council of Kenya Muslims 
UNESCOUnited Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
WAMYWorld Assembly of Muslim Youths 
WCKWaqf Commissioners of Kenya 
WWFWorld Waqf Fund
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9.8 Glossary of Terms 
While transliteration of Arabic words and terminologies followed the Encyclopedia of Islam and 
Muslim World (2004), translation of Qur’anic verses followed the Sahih International. Plurals of 
Arabic nouns are in the Anglicized form. Abbreviation of languages: Ar. is Arabic; Per. is Persian; 
Lat. is Latin; Heb. is Hebrew; Swa. is Swahili. 
Term Translation 
cada (Ar.) local customs, recurring habits and social morals of the people. 
adhan (Ar.) the call for prayer. 
cadl (Ar.) being just. 
ahbas (Ar.) consecrated properties or charitable trust in Islam, also habus.  
ahbas mucayyana (Ar.) purpose specific waqf. 
ahl al-bayt (Ar.) people of the house i.e. family members of Prophet Muhammad. 
ahl al-sunna wacl-jamca 
(Ar.) 
people of the sunna and community, or followers of strict and puritan 
traditions of Islam who seek to emulate practices of pious 
predecessors, a return to pristine Islam, Salafi. 
ahl al-tariqa (Ar.) the term used in describing an ideological disposition of Muslims 
perceived to rely on medieval authority (taqlid) different from those 
advocating for return to pristine Islam (salafiyya); also conservative, 
or literally, people of the way, Sufis. 
ahmadiyya (Ar.) a messianic reform movement in Sunni Islam that believes in the 
teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908). 
al-asaba (Ar.) an agnate heir. 
al-awqaf al-hukmiyya 
(Ar.) 
revenue generating waqfs in form of estates in the towns of Fustat 
and Cairo during the reign of the Mamluk. 
al-rizaq al-ahbasiyya 
(Ar.) 
endowed agricultural lands. 
al-Shabab (Ar.) the youngsters, literally, a jihadist terrorist group based in East 
Africa. 
cana (Ar.) long term lease of a revenue-generating waqf. 
al-nazir al-mashrut 
(Ar.) 
waqf custodian (nazir) appointed by stipulation and not related to 
the endower. 
al-nazir bicl asala (Ar.)  waqf custodian (nazir) appointed by right of birth, i.e. blood relative 
of the endower. 
ansar (Ar.) helpers, the Muslim community in Medina who welcomed the 
migrants from Mecca. 
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canwatan (Ar.) arms struggle, or invasion and combat. 
apotropos (Heb.) trustee or guardian. 
asl al-mal (Ar.) subject matter of waqf. Also corpus. 
awacil (Ar.) the first (in relation to the earliest waqf in Islam). 
awl (Ar.) increase (principle used in the distribution of inheritance). 
awwalan fa-awwalan 
(Ar.)  
one generation after the other. 
baraka (Ar.). blessings, ordinarily from God, but believed to be held and wielded 
by members of the Prophet’s family, sharifs. 
batala (Ar.) null and void, also invalid. 
bay’ (Ar.) sale. 
bayt al-mal (Ar.) public treasury. 
bidca (Ar.)  un-Islamic religious innovation in theology, ritual or customs that did 
not exist in early Islam but came into existence in the course of 
history. 
birr (Ar.) righteousness or piety in the context of Allah’s grace or paradise. 
cy press (Lat.) as near as possible. 
darura (Ar.) prevailing public concern or need, (also haja). 
dacwa (Ar.)  Islamic discourse of mobilization or missionary aspect in Islam 
calling people to the religion and reminding believers to remain 
steadfast in the faith, summons. 
dawla (Ar.) dynastic succession, particularly in the period after the rise of 
Abbasid power implying empire or nation-state. 
din (Ar.) religion. 
divini juris (Lat.) heavenly jurisdiction, concerned with gods and religious symbols. 
diwan al-awqaf (Ar.) state department or ministry in-charge of waqfs. 
duca (Ar.) spontaneous, unstructured conversation with God, supplication. 
duksi (Sw.) elementary Qur’anic school. 
faddan (Ar.) acres (of agricultural land). 
fatwa (Ar.) legal or advisory opinion issued by a recognized authority on law and 
tradition in answer to a specific question or broader issue facing the 
community. 
faqih (Ar.) Muslim jurist practicing fiqh. 
fay’ (Ar.)(also fai). immovable property, lands conquered by Muslims, subject to tribute  
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fidei commissum (Lat.) practice where foreigners and exiled persons unable to establish res 
sacrae entrusted their properties to a trustee for the benefit of the 
progeny. 
fiqh (Ar.) Islamic jurisprudence or science of law. 
fi sabil Allah (Ar.) in the course of God. 
fuqara (Ar.) needy persons in the society. 
ghanima (Ar.) booty in form of moveable properties. 
hadith (Ar.) a genre of Muslim literature or individual text of this genre from early 
period of Islamic history conveying Prophet’s accounts, traditions, or 
teachings on religion and morality. 
haja (Ar.) See darura. 
hajj (Ar.) Muslim pilgrimage. 
halal (Ar.) permitted or lawful. 
hawacit (Ar.) walled gardens in Medina believed to have been among the first 
waqfs. 
hekdesh (Heb.) consecrated property. 
hiba (Ar.) gifts. 
hikr (Ar.) renting out a revenue-generating waqf property to improve output. 
hujaj al awqaf (Ar.) see waqfiyya. 
hunafa’ (Ar.) monotheistic ascetics in Arabia during the times of prophet Abraham. 
cibadi (Ar.)  also called ‘ahl al-istiqama’ or cibadiyya- the people of straightness. 
cIbadis are also part of the Khawarij (Kharijites, or ‘Exiters’). 
cid (Ar.) Muslim holidays including the end of Ramadan (cid al-fitr) and cid al- 
adha. 
iftar (Ar.) meal at the end of the fasting day. 
ilm al-faraid (Ar.) Qur’anic regulations governing inheritance, the ‘science of shares’. 
ijab (Ar.) offer of beneficiary of waqf given to a legal heir as a requirement of a 
valid waqf in Shica Islam. 
ijar al-mithal (Ar.) the prevailing market rate or value of a given property. 
imam (Ar.) a leader, a model, an authority, or an exemplar; also a leader of the 
congregational prayer, leading Sunni theological scholars, or the 
infallible guide of the community in Shica Islam. 
istibdal (Ar.) sale or exchange of worn out or unproductive waqf. 
istihsan (Ar.) the common social good or welfare. 
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ithna’ cashari (Ar.) branch of Shica Islam that believes in twelve imams, also Twelver 
Shica. 
jihad (Ar.) Striving or exerting oneself towards some goal, or (in the Islamic 
context) to attain and maintain the Islamic faith, or a virtuous 
struggle toward some praiseworthy end as defined by religion. 
kacba (Ar.) sacred cube-shaped house or holy mosque built and consecrated by 
Abraham in Mecca 
kadhi (Sw.) See qadi. 
khalifa (Ar.) political leader of the Muslim community or successor of the Prophet 
(Eng. caliph). 
kharaj (Ar.) land tax levied on lands owned by non-Muslims in a Muslim state. 
khitma (Ar.) recitation of the Qur’an by proxy seeking the grace of God with a view 
to benefiting the deceased. 
khums (Ar.) one fifth. 
khutba (Ar.) sermon. 
kiamu (Sw.) one of the Swahili language dialects spoken around Lamu region in 
Kenya. 
kufr (Ar.) disbelief or infidelity. 
legatum sub modo (Lat.) indirect legacy. 
liwali (Sw.) Muslim administrative officer (district governor) during the East 
African Bu Sacidi Sultanate before the coming of the British. 
madhhab (Ar.). manner followed, ideology, or institutionalized school of law 
espousing distinct jurisprudential disposition 
madrasa (Ar.) Qur’anic school, Islamic college, or place of instruction in religious 
law in Islam. 
mahbusa muharrama 
(Ar.) 
consecrated properties, synonym for waqf. 
mahram (Ar.) close (blood) relative with whom marriage is disallowed. 
maclim (Ar.) teacher. 
manfaca (Ar.) usufruct or benefits derived from waqf. 
masjid (Ar.) customary place for performing the obligatory ritual prayer in the 
Muslim tradition, a mosque. 
masakin (Ar.) the poor. 
maslaha (Ar.) see istihsan. 
mawlidal-nabi (Ar.) celebration of the birth day of Prophet Muhammad. 
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mikoko (Sw.) mangrove poles (sing. mkoko). 
milk (Ar.) ownership.  
milkiyatAllah (Ar.) divinely owned by God or property of God. 
mirath (Ar.) total estate of a bereaved person to be shared among heirs as 
inheritance in Islam. 
mitzvah (Heb.) religious duty. 
mji (Swa.) town or locale (pl. miji). 
mucabbad (Ar.) principle of perpetuity in waqf, (also tacabbid). 
mucadhdhin (Ar.) person performing the call to prayers, adhan. 
mudaraba (Ar.) contractual business relationship or partnership between two 
parties one offering capital and the other contributing labor and 
expertise with a view to sharing profits according to predetermined 
ratios. 
mudir (Ar.) third-class magistrate (or director) during the East African Bu Sacidi 
Sultanate of Zanzibar before the coming of the British. 
muhajirun (Ar.) Muslim migrants to Medina from Mecca. 
mukhabara (Ar.) sharecropping. 
musala (Ar.) informal place of prayer usually in places or buildings other than 
mosques. 
mushaf (Ar.) hard copy or written text of the Qur’an. 
mutawalli (Ar.) a male manager or administrator of waqf (also wali or nazir-a). A 
female administrator is mutawaliyya. 
mwalimu (Sw.) see maclim, also name of a person. 
mwambao (Sw.) the coastal Kenya Protectorate during British colonial period. 
mzee (Sw.) old person, title of respect or address. 
nadhir (Ar.) pledge, consecration, or vow. 
nazir (Ar.) see mutawalli. 
nizara (Ar.) trusteeship. 
pat ruvan (Per.) practice where properties were consecrated and thought to be a 
possible origin of waqfs in Islam. 
piae causea (Lat.) practices of charity among Byzantines touted as a possible origin of 
waqf in Islam. 
qabala (Ar.) see mukhabara. 
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qabul (Ar.)  acceptance, especially of an offer (Ar. ijab) of beneficence as a 
requirement of waqf ahli in Shica Islam 
qadi (Ar.) Muslim judge, (also kadi). 
qital (Ar.) physical force or fighting, also part of jihad. 
qiyas (Ar.) analogy. 
qur’an (Ar.) Muslims’ holy Book. 
qurba (Ar.) divine closeness. 
rabbi (Heb.) a Jewish religious leader with mastery knowledge of the scriptures, 
oral traditions, and competence in interpreting the law. 
radd (Ar.) return (principle used in the distribution of inheritance). 
ratib (Ar.) people frequenting a specific mosque for prayers. 
res nullius (Lat.) owned by ‘no one but God’. 
res sacrae (Lat.) sacred objects or consecrating objects in Roman tradition thought as 
possible origin of waqfs. 
riba (Ar.) interest. 
ruvanagan (Per.) see pat ruvan. 
sadaqa (Ar.) charity, alms giving. 
sadaqa jariyya (Ar.) charity whose benefits are believed to be perpetual. 
sadaqa mawqufa (Ar.) immobilized alms. 
sahih al-Bukhari (Ar.) authoritative hadiths collection in Sunni Islam by imam Bukhari (d. 
870). 
sahih Muslim (Ar.) authoritative hadiths collection in Sunni Islam by imam Muslim (d. 
874). 
salafi (Ar.) see ahl al-sunna wacl-jamca. 
salf (Ar.) advance payment for the lease of waqf, also premium. 
sarf (Ar.) transfer of surplus benefits from one waqf to another. 
sawab (Ar.) divine grace (merit) attained after doing good deeds. 
senatus consultum 
(Lat.) 
statutes necessary for the consecrating of property 
sharica (Ar.) Islamic law derived from the Quran, Prophet’s traditions (hadiths), 
consensus by Muslim juri-consultants (ijma’) and analogy (qiyas). 
sharif (Ar.). honorific title of nobility whose holders are allegedly traceable to the 
genealogy of the Prophet Muhammad 
shurut al-waqif (Ar.). specific conditions imposed by the endower on a particular waqf 
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shaykh (Ar. honorific title for a religious leader, head of a tribe or village, Sufi 
order, or generally an old man. 
shaykh al-Islam (Ar.) honorific title given to the leading Muslim scholar in a particular 
locality, here in Chief Kadhi. 
shica (Ar.) theological groups in Islam united by a belief in the imamate of cAli 
bin Abi Talib as the first authentic caliph. They include the Twelvers, 
Zaydis, Khoja Ismacilis, and Bohra Ismacilis. 
sunna (Ar.) normative examples of Prophet Muhammad as recorded in traditions 
about his speech, his actions, his acquiescence to the words and 
actions of others, and his personal characteristics. 
tacabbid (Ar.) see mucabbad. 
tacamul (Ar.) principle where customs and traditions of an Islamized group not 
antithetical to Sharica are accepted to the legal body polity as a source 
of law or legal reference (also tacaruf). 
tabdil (Ar.) see istibdal. 
tacbid (Ar.) hanging the specific conditions imposed by an endower on a given 
waqf. 
tacqib (Ar.) the descent strategy establishing right of beneficence among progeny 
of an endower. 
taqwa (Ar.) piety, righteousness. 
tariqa (Ar.) the way (to follow) or ethical acts linked to spiritual development in 
form of manuals, guides, and literary works. 
tasrif (Ar.) see sarf. 
tawhid (Ar.) Unity of God. 
thalatha taifa (Sw.) three ethnicities – part of the Swahili Muslim confederation of 
Mombasa. 
thenashara taifa (Sw.) twelve ethnicities – Swahili Muslim confederation of Mombasa 
composed of the thalatha taifa and tisa taifa 
thulth (Ar.) one third. 
tisa taifa (Sw.) nine ethnicities – part of the Swahili Muslim confederation of 
Mombasa. 
culama (Ar.) the scholarly class in the Muslim society, i.e. those who know or have 
knowledge, clerics. 
umma (Ar.) community of believers in Islam. 
umuji (Swa.) belonging to a specific town’s locale. (pl. umiji). 
curf (Ar.) see cada. 
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ushenzi (Sw.) social perception associated with being uncivilized among the 
Swahili people 
ustadh (Ar.) see maclim.  
uungwana (Sw.) social perception associated with civilization among the Swahili 
people. 
vakif (Per.) see ahbas (pl. evkaf). 
wabara (Sw.) upcountry folk. Used as an essentialist noun by the coastal 
communities in reference to the non-coastal immigrants in the 
region. 
wakil (Ar.) agent or representative. 
walad (Ar.) biological child. 
wamiji (Sw.) dwellers of a specific town’s locale. 
wapwani (Sw.) coastal folk. Used as an essentialist noun in contrast to wabara. 
waqf (Ar.) see ahbas. 
waqf ahli (Ar.) family or private (also posterity) waqf. 
waqf al-awlad (Ar.) see waqf ahli. 
waqf al-haramayn (Ar.)  consecrations for the benefit of the two holy sites in Islam, Mecca and 
Medina. 
waqf al-khassa (Ar.) see waqf ahli.  
waqf camm (Ar.) public waqf. 
waqf al-turaha’ (Ar.) waqfs for the burial expenses for the indigents in the Egyptian society 
during the reign of the Mumluk. 
waqf dhurri (Ar.) see waqf ahli.  
waqfiyya (Ar.) waqf deed or charter. 
waqf khayri (Ar.) see waqf camm.  
waqf li llah (Ar.) see waqf camm. 
waqf nama (Per.) see waqfiyya. 
waqf nuqud (Ar.) cash waqf. 
waqif (Ar.) endower, or dedicator (female, waqifa). 
waqf mushtarak (Ar.) joint waqf established on indivisible shares of the property or waqf 
designated for both public and private benefits. 
wasiyya (Ar.) bequest setting aside at most a third of one’s wealth as charity. 
xenodochia (Lat.) charitable institutions in Byzantine Christianity. 
zakat (Ar) alms. 
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zakat al-fitr (Ar.) alms given out during celebrations of cid holiday to mark the end of  
Ramadan. 
zawiya (Ar.) Sufi order. 
zedakah (Heb.) charity. 
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